commonwealth essay competition 2022

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AZ529 2024 Essay Writing Contest

Dream. Write. Win.

Your 5th or 6th grader could win $529 towards an AZ529 Education Savings Plan.

CONTEST RULES

CONTEST IS OPEN AUGUST 26 THROUGH OCTOBER 6, 2024.

Tell us how you’d make the world a better place.

For the fifth year, Arizona State Treasurer Kimberly Yee and the AZ529 Education Savings Plan are hosting an essay contest for kids. The 2024 Essay Writing Contest invites Arizona 5th and 6th graders to submit essays explaining their dream job and the steps they’ll take to reach it. Winners will receive $529 toward an AZ529 Education Savings Plan to fund their future educational aspirations!

Contest Details

All current 5th and 6th grade students in Arizona, including students from district, charter, private schools, tribal schools, and homeschools.

Answer the question, “What is your dream job and how do you plan on achieving it in the future?” Responses should be a minimum of three (3) paragraphs with a maximum of 350 words. The more creative, unique, and thought-provoking the better!

Entries will be accepted through October 6, 2024 at 11:59 PM (MST).

Online: Essays can be submitted online at AZ529.gov/EssayContest using the upload button on this page. (Accepted file types: Microsoft Word, PDF, JPG and JPEG. Max. file size: 256 MB).

Or you can mail entries to: 5th and 6th Grade Essay Writing Contest Attention: Jeffrey O. Office of the State Treasurer 1700 West Washington Street, #102 Phoenix, AZ 85007

Because winning $529 towards a new or existing AZ529 Education Savings Plan is an incredible way to launch your 5th or 6th grader’s future!

Twenty (20) prizes, each in the amount of $529, will be awarded towards a new or existing AZ529 Education Savings Plan. Winners will be selected from each of Arizona’s 15 counties and there will also be winners representing all types of schools, including students from district, charter, private schools, tribal schools, and homeschools. We’re excited to help 20 young writers start saving for their educational plans beyond high school!

Official Contest Rules

One (1) original entry per person.

HOW TO ENTER:

Online: Upload entries using the “Upload Here” button on this page. (Accepted file types: Microsoft Word, PDF, JPG and JPEG. Max. file size: 256 MB).

All entries must be received by October 6, 2024 at 11:59 PM (MST).

JUDGING CRITERIA:

• Entries will be judged and scored by a panel of judges, including representatives of the AZ529 Plan Advisory Committee.
• Entries will be anonymously judged based on a scoring rubric of: 40 percent for overall content, 30 percent for originality, and 30 percent for organization. Any ties will be broken based on an additional score for overall readability and grammar.
• Judges will also ensure that a student is selected from each of the five (5) main types of schools in Arizona: district, charter, private schools, tribal schools, or homeschools.

ELIGIBILITY: All participants must be Arizona residents, currently enrolled in 5th or 6th grade as of August 2024 in an Arizona school. The parent or legal guardian submitting an entry on behalf of the minor must also be an Arizona resident. Employees and families of the Arizona State Treasurer’s Office and Davidson Belluso are not eligible to win.

PRIZES: Twenty (20) awards, each in the amount of $529, will be awarded toward an AZ529 Education Savings Plan, across Arizona. All prizes will be conveyed through a direct contribution to a new or existing AZ529 account in the name of the winner or their parent/guardian. No cash prizes will be awarded.

WINNER SELECTION/VERIFICATION: Winners and their parents/guardians will be notified by phone and/or email after the close of the contest and completion of judging. To receive AZ529 funds, parents/guardians must submit verification of an open AZ529 account within 90 days after the award notification. If verification is not completed within 90 days of the notification, the prize will be forfeited.

AGREEMENT TO THE OFFICIAL RULES: By participating in the Contest, each Entrant fully and unconditionally agrees to accept these Official Rules and the decision of the sponsor and judges which are final and binding in all matters related to the Contest. No purchase necessary to enter or win.

AGREEMENT TO USE OF CONTENT: By submitting an entry, each participant (and their parent or legal guardian) agrees to allow The Office of the Arizona State Treasurer , AZ529, Arizona’s Education Savings Plan and its agents to use the content of each essay. Verbiage from selected essays may be shared online or in print for marketing purposes, either in full or in excerpts. The child’s last name will not be shared or posted online or in a social message but may be used in news releases or media coverage. Further, by submitting an entry, a parent or legal guardian agrees to allow AZ529 to use their own or their child’s likeness, photograph(s), video, voice, or name without costs of advertising, publicity, social media, or any other lawful purpose in any medium now known or hereafter, without any review or approval.

DISCLOSURE OF SPONSORS: The AZ529 Education Savings Plan is managed by The Office of the Arizona State Treasurer . Approved AZ529 Plan providers include Fidelity and Goldman Sachs Asset Management. This contest is being managed by Davidson Belluso, marketing partner of the Arizona Education Savings Plan.

TAX LIABILITY: The Sponsors and their agents make no representations as to the tax liability or deductibility of a prize. Each participant (and their parent or legal guardian) shall be solely responsible for filing and paying any taxes arising from the receipt of a prize.

Who will judge?

The 20 winners will be declared by a panel of judges from the AZ529 Advisory Committee. The panel will read and judge each essay based on content, originality, and organization.

What is an AZ529 account?

The AZ529 Education Savings Plan is a designated account to save for qualified higher education expenses at universities, colleges, vocational, and technical schools. Contributions to this account grow on a tax-deferred basis. Funds in an AZ529 account can be used for tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, a computer, internet services and other related educational expenses.

Does my child have to attend an Arizona university to use the AZ529 funds?

If your child wins, you will receive a $529 deposit into an AZ529 Education Savings Plan. AZ529 funds can be used to pay for higher education institutions across the country and some schools abroad. There is no obligation to use the winning funds at a specific vocational school, college, or university.

AZ529 funds can be used for education expenses including tuition and fees, books, supplies, and equipment required for an accredited postsecondary institution or participation in an apprenticeship program registered and certified with the Secretary of Labor under section 1 of the National Apprenticeship Act. AZ529 account funds can also be used for qualified student loan repayments, up to a lifetime maximum of $10,000 per beneficiary. Students who are enrolled at least half-time may use AZ529 account funds for room and board expenses.

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The 2022-2023 Average College Attendance Costs as provided by the College Board were used to estimate current college costs.

National Average College Attendance Costs*

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Room & Board

Books & Supplies

Annual Basic Expenses

Private College / University

Public University (In-state)

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*Source: College Board, 2022 – 2023

The Savings Goal is calculated by multiplying the Shortfall by the savings percentage selected.

If the account owner wanted to make a one-time investment now to save enough to cover the shortfall, the amount needed was calculated by multiplying the Shortfall amount by an investment index multiplier that corresponds to the selected number of years until college as seen in the Necessary Investment Index.

Necessary Investment Index

Years Until College

Contribution LumpSum

If the account owner wanted to make monthly investments to save enough to cover the shortfall, the amount was calculated by multiplying the Shortfall amount by an investment index multiplier that corresponds to the selected number of years until college as seen in the Necessary Investment Index.

Contribution Monthly

The Monthly Savings Goal Amount was calculated by multiplying the Savings Goal amount by an investment index multiplier that corresponds to the selected number of years until college as seen in the Necessary Investment Index.

The Value of Current Investments When College Starts was calculated by multiplying your current college savings by a growth index multiplier that corresponds to the selected number of years of possible investing (e.g. years until college), assuming a 7% annual rate of return as seen in the Growth Index table.

Growth Index (Assumes 7% Annual Rate of Return)

Years Investing

Multiply By:

Future Annual College Costs are calculated by multiplying the current annual college costs by an 8% inflation rate multiplier that corresponds to the selected number of years until college as seen in the Rising Cost Index.

Rising Cost Index

8% Inflation Rate Multiply By:

Most families set a goal to save for a percent of the total cost of college, not necessarily the whole amount. Some save 25%, some want to cover 30%, others 50% and some families aim for 80%. Use this calculator to find out what amount works best for your current budget.

The Shortfall was calculated by subtracting the Value of Current Investments When College Starts from the Projected Total Cost of College.

Projected Total Cost of College was calculated by multiplying the future annual college costs by the planned number of years of attendance. The projection does not allow for inflation rate adjustments beyond the first year of college.

QCEC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Who can enter.

The competition is open to nationals or residents of all Commonwealth countries and territories, as well as residents of Hong Kong, Ireland, and Zimbabwe. Residents of non-Commonwealth countries where there is an operating RCS branch or affiliated/partner organisation are also eligible; however, entries must be submitted via the local RCS branch or affiliated/partner organisation.

Tips from the Judges

The following guidelines provide some useful insights from previous judges who have had experience recognising what makes a good piece of writing, and may help you get started on your submission:  

Choose to answer one of the topics, and you are encouraged to interpret this in any way you wish. 

Think carefully about the form of writing you use to answer the topic. There are a variety of forms and styles to play with.

Make sure to use your own voice and your own words. Judges are very good at spotting work that is not original.

We understand that English is a diverse language and there are different and innovative ways of using it around the Commonwealth. We encourage diversity and creativity of language in submissions.

Ensure you take into account grammar and punctuation whilst writing your piece. Do not submit an entry without proof-reading.

Presentation is important: think about the visual appearance of the entry as well as the quality of the content.

Guidance Notes

Participants are expected to show originality and flair, linked to sound academic standards and competent use of English as a written language. This includes a good standard of spelling and punctuation, neat presentation and clear hand-writing or word-processing.

Entries must respond to the topic. Each year a number of good entrants must be disregarded because they do not fully answer/reflect on what the topic has asked them to do.

Entrants are encouraged to be creative in their response to a topic. Entries can be submitted in a number of different formats: for example, a poem, letter, article, story, essay or a short play/script.

Illustrations are welcomed, particularly in Junior entries, but they must enhance the written text and add to the overall quality of the entry.

Winning Categories

Junior Awards Categories (Under 14s)

Junior Winner

Junior Runner-up

Gold Awards

Silver Awards

Bronze Awards

Certificate of Participation

Senior Awards Categories (Under 14-18)

Senior Winner

Senior Runner-up

What if I'm too old to participate?

If you're over 18 by the deadline, you'll still be eligible to compete for the Commonwealth Short Story Prize .

Are there prizes for the winners?

One Winner and Runner Up will be chosen from each category. Winners and Runners Up (accompanied by one adult/guardian) will be brought to London for a week of educational and cultural events, culminating in a special Awards Ceremony. A number of Gold Finalist, Gold, Silver and Bronze Awards will be given in both the Senior and Junior categories, rewarding excellence in writing. All successful entries will receive a Certificate of Participation. Local RCS branches often hold local and regional ceremonies or offer prizes so if you were made aware of the competition by your local RCS branch, please contact them after the competition closes on 15 May to inquire about any activities they might have planned.

Is there a word limit?

Yes, different word count rules apply to Junior and Senior categories. Please see our Terms and Conditions for more details.

Can I write on more than one topic?

No, students may only submit one essay each, which means that you have to choose one of the four topics in your relevant category.

Where can I find the topics for the 2024 competition?

Topics for The Queen's Commonwealth Essay Competition 2024 can be read online or downloaded.

How do I know if my entry was successfully submitted?

At the end of the online submission process, you will receive a notice that your entry has been successfully submitted. This notice will contain a unique identification number, which will also be emailed to your nominated email address. If you are encountering difficulties, please email [email protected] for assistance.

How do I download my certificate?

Certificates are no longer able to be downloaded by entrants. Entrants to the QCEC 2024 will have their certificates sent to their nominated email address at the end of the judging process in September 2024.

How do I submit my essay online?

Please click here to submit your entry online. Please note that we do not accept entries sent by email.

The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022

In 2022, on the occasion of her Platinum Jubilee year, Her Majesty The Queen will celebrate 70 years as Head of the Commonwealth. The Queen’s seven decades of service to the Commonwealth are an inspiring example of the steadfast commitment and important contribution we can all make to our societies. The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 will ask entrants to explore the positive impact that can be achieved through dedication and selfless commitment to our Commonwealth.

The top two winners from each category will be awarded with a trip to London for a week of educational and cultural events, culminating in a special Awards Ceremony at a royal palace. While all successful entries will receive a Certificate of Participation and a number of entrants will receive Gold, Silver and Bronze Awards for excellence in writing.

SENIOR CATEGORY

BORN BETWEEN 1 JULY 2003 AND 30 JUNE 2008 (14-18 YEARS OF AGE)

1. Imagine you are a Head of Government delivering a speech to your counterparts at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Rwanda. Write a speech that highlights what you believe should be a priority for collective action within the Commonwealth.

2. Committed to the Commonwealth.

3. Her Majesty The Queen was born in the twentieth century, a period that saw enormous social change driven by visionary and committed leaders. Reflect on an inspirational leader from this period.

4. “Whilst experiences of the last year have been different across the Commonwealth, stirring examples of courage, commitment and selfless dedication to duty have been demonstrated in every Commonwealth nation and territory, notably by those working on the frontline who have been delivering healthcare and other public services in their communities.” – Her Majesty The Queen, Commonwealth Day Message 2021. Imagine you are working on the frontline. Write about your experience, explaining why you serve your community and why your service matters.

JUNIOR CATEGORY

BORN ON OR AFTER 1 JULY 2008 (UNDER 14 YEARS OF AGE)

1. Imagine you are a grandparent in 2022. Tell your grandchildren a bedtime story about an inspirational person. 2. What are the best ways for young people to serve the Commonwealth in your view? 3. Our Commonwealth community. 4. Write a job description for a superhero needed to solve a problem in your community.

HOW TO ENTER The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition is open for entries between 15 March and 30 June 2022. For more information on how to enter the competition please visit, www.royalcwsociety.org

Follow @RoyalCWSociety on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram for writing tips! Email competitions@ royalcwsociety.org with any questions.

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The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition (QCEC) is now open for entries

• Westminster News

In 2022, on the occasion of her Platinum Jubilee year, Her Majesty The Queen will celebrate 70 years as Head of the Commonwealth.

The Queen’s seven decades of service to the Commonwealth are an inspiring example of the steadfast commitment and important contribution we can all make to our societies.

The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022  (QCEC) will ask entrants to explore the positive impact that can be achieved through dedication and selfless commitment to our Commonwealth.

• Click here for more details and to enter the competition

The QCEC, delivered by the Royal Commonwealth Society, is the world’s oldest international writing competition for schools. It offers thousands of young people, whatever their background, the opportunity to make their voices heard on a global platform.  In this Platinum Jubilee year of our Sovereign, Her Majesty The Queen, young Commonwealth writers are asked to reflect on inspirational leadership and to explore the positive impact that can be achieved through commitment to their communities within the theme ‘Our Commonwealth’.

Open to all UK residents, aged 18 and under, the competition has two age categories for those aged 14 – 18 years, and those under 14 years. Winners from each category will win a trip to London for a week of educational and cultural activities, culminating in an awards ceremony, usually held at Buckingham Palace and hosted by the Society’s Vice-Patron, Her Royal Highness The Duchess of Cornwall. All successful entries are recognised for their participation.

The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition will close for submissions on the 30 June 2022. For more information please visit, www.royalcwsociety.org .

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Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 (Win a fully-funded trip to London)

Deadline: June 30, 2022

Submit entries for the Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022. The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition is the world’s oldest international writing competition for schools, established in 1883. With thousands of young people taking part every year, it is an important way to recognise achievement, elevate youth voices and develop key skills through creative writing.

In 2022, on the occasion of her Platinum Jubilee year, Her Majesty The Queen will celebrate 70 years as Head of the Commonwealth. The Queen’s seven decades of service to the Commonwealth are an inspiring example of the steadfast commitment and important contribution we can all make to our societies. The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 will ask entrants to explore the positive impact that can be achieved through dedication and selfless commitment to our Commonwealth.

Senior Category

• Imagine you are a Head of Government delivering a speech to your counterparts at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Rwanda. Write a speech that highlights what you believe should be a priority for collective action within the Commonwealth.
• Committed to the Commonwealth.
• Her Majesty The Queen was born in the twentieth century, a period that saw enormous social change driven by visionary and committed leaders. Reflect on an inspirational leader from this period.
• “Whilst experiences of the last year have been different across the Commonwealth, stirring examples of courage, commitment and selfless dedication to duty have been demonstrated in every Commonwealth nation and territory, notably by those working on the frontline who have been delivering healthcare and other public services in their communities.” – Her Majesty The Queen, Commonwealth Day Message 2021.  Imagine you are working on the frontline. Write about your experience, explaining why you serve your community and why your service matters.

Junior Category

• Imagine you are a grandparent in 2022. Tell your grandchildren a bedtime story about an inspirational person.
• What are the best ways for young people to serve the Commonwealth in your view?
• Our Commonwealth community.
• Write a job description for a superhero needed to solve a problem in your community.
• The top two winners from each category will be awarded with a trip to London for a week of educational and cultural events, culminating in a special Awards Ceremony at a royal palace.
• All successful entries will receive a Certificate of Participation and a number of entrants will receive Gold, Silver and Bronze Awards for excellence in writing.

Eligibility

• Applicants to the Senior Category should be born between July 1, 2003 and June 30, 2008 (14-18 years of age);
• The maximum word count for the Senior Category is 1,500 words.
• Applicants to the Junior Category should be born on or after July 1, 2008 (under 14 years of age).
• The word count for the Junior Category is 750 words.

Application

Click here to submit entry

For more information, visit QCEC .

Jude Ogar is an educator and youth development practitioner with years of experience working in the education and youth development space. He is passionate about the development of youth in Africa.

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Queen’s commonwealth essay competition award silver 2022.

Ayushi Paul Roy of Grade XI has been awarded the Silver award in the Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 – the world’s oldest international schools writing competition. There were 26,300 entries this year in which young Commonwealth citizens shared their thoughts, ideas and experiences on key global issues. We are extremely proud of Ayushi’s achievement. Thank you.

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Home » Opportunities & Events » Essay Competitions » The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 [QCEC 2022; Award: Trip to London & More]: Submit by June 30

The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 [QCEC 2022; Award: Trip to London & More]: Submit by June 30

• Akanksha Bharadwaj
• Jun 29, 2022
• No Comments

The Royal Commonwealth Society is conducting The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 (QCEC 2022). Register for the competition by June 30.

About the Organizers

The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition is the world’s oldest international writing competition for schools, established in 1883. With thousands of young people taking part each year, it is an important way to recognize achievement, elevate youth voices and develop key skills through creative writing.

Aspiring young writers submit their pieces in response to a theme. The theme is rooted in Commonwealth values, providing an interesting introduction to the network and allowing young people to explore their own connection to the Commonwealth, whilst fostering an empathetic and open-minded worldview.

About the QCEC 2022

In 2022, on the occasion of her Platinum Jubilee year, Her Majesty The Queen will celebrate 70 years as Head of the Commonwealth.

The Queen’s seven decades of service to the Commonwealth are an inspiring example of the steadfast commitment and important contribution we can all make to our societies.

The Queen’s Commonwealth Essay Competition 2022 will ask entrants to explore the positive impact that can be achieved through dedication and selfless commitment to our Commonwealth.

Entries will be accepted from March 15, 2022 until June 30, 2022.

Senior category (Born between 1 July 2003 and 30 June 2008 (14-18 years of age), maximum word count: 1500 words

• Imagine you are a Head of Government delivering a speech to your counterparts at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Rwanda. Write a speech that highlights what you believe should be a priority for collective action within the Commonwealth.
• Committed to the Commonwealth.
• Her Majesty The Queen was born in the twentieth century, a period that saw enormous social change driven by visionary and committed leaders. Reflect on an inspirational leader from this period.
• “Whilst experiences of the last year have been different across the Commonwealth, stirring examples of courage, commitment and selfless dedication to duty have been demonstrated in every Commonwealth nation and territory, notably by those working on the frontline who have been delivering healthcare and other public services in their communities.” – Her Majesty The Queen, Commonwealth Day Message 2021. Imagine you are working on the frontline. Write about your experience, explaining why you serve your community and why your service matters.

Junior category (Born on or after 1 July 2008 (under 14 years of age), maximum word count: 750 words

• Imagine you are a grandparent in 2022. Tell your grandchildren a bedtime story about an inspirational person.
• What are the best ways for young people to serve the Commonwealth in your view?
• Our Commonwealth community.
• Write a job description for a superhero needed to solve a problem in your community.

Eligibility

• Nationals and residents of all Commonwealth countries and territories aged 18 and under are eligible to enter the competition, including entrants from Zimbabwe.
• All entries must be written in English
• Entries are accepted from residents of non-Commonwealth countries who submit through their local RCS branch.
• Entrants can be presented in any form/method of creative writing. Pictures/Illustrations are particularly encouraged in the Junior Category.

Click here to know the terms and conditions for the competition.

• Top 2 winners from each category: A trip to London for a week of educational and cultural events, culminating in a special Awards Ceremony at a royal palace
• All successful entries will receive a Certificate of Participation.
• A number of entrants will receive Gold, Silver and Bronze Awards for excellence in writing.

How to Enter the Competition?

Submit by entering the competition through the link given at the end of this post.

Submission Deadline

June 30, 2022

Click here to enter the QCEC 2022 essay competition.

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The return of the enemy: Putin’s war on Ukraine and a cognitive blockage in Western security policy

Subscribe to the center on the united states and europe update, constanze stelzenmüller constanze stelzenmüller director - center on the united states and europe , senior fellow - foreign policy , center on the united states and europe , fritz stern chair on germany and trans-atlantic relations.

August 2023

• 39 min read

This is a translated, expanded, and updated version of an essay that appeared in the German magazine Kursbuch in June 2023. This piece is part of a series of policy analyses entitled “ The Talbott Papers on Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine ,” named in honor of American statesman and former Brookings Institution President Strobe Talbott. Brookings is grateful to Trustee Phil Knight for his generous support of the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Eighteen months after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked full-scale invasion of his country’s sovereign neighbor on February 24, 2022, the question of how this war ends appears as open as ever. Ukraine has put up a heroic resistance to the invaders. The West, under U.S. leadership, and with huge financial and material outlays on both sides of the Atlantic, has helped. Kyiv’s counteroffensive is producing modest successes. But it is equally clear that it is taking a terrible toll — on Ukraine’s armed forces, on its citizens, and on its supporters worldwide. Russia, too, is taking heavy losses, has failed to reach key goals, and is arguably running out of options; the brief mutiny of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin has revealed startling vulnerabilities in the top echelons of the Kremlin, including of Putin himself. 1 Still, Moscow continues its barbaric, indiscriminate attacks against Ukraine’s troops, its people, its cultural heritage sites, and the infrastructure of its economy.

Is it time — as critics continue to argue — to seek a compromise solution instead of further arms deliveries in order to prevent further bloodshed or a disintegration of the Western coalition? 2 Might it even be imperative for Ukraine to renounce regaining its entire territory in order to avoid defeat, the expansion of the war to neighboring states, a nuclear escalation by the Kremlin, or starvation in the world’s poorest countries? Certainly, Vladimir Putin appears to be calculating that time is on his side. “Far from seeking an off-ramp,” Alexander Gabuev writes, “Vladimir Putin is preparing for an even bigger war.” 3

Such a compromise peace would demand a near-superhuman degree of pragmatism and self-denial from the Ukrainians, who are victims of a war of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and who live under almost continuous Russian bombardment. The critics’ fears are nonetheless worthy of careful consideration because they are realistic. They are heightened by the visible fact of Western governments struggling with numerous other disruptive challenges, as well as the prospect of a string of elections in key states, from Poland in October 2023 to the United States in November 2024; all of which appear to be empowering the extreme right, or at least driving up the price of voter consent. Notably, opposition against U.S. support for Ukraine is rising in the ranks of Republican presidential candidates and among their voters as the election campaign takes off. 4 Responsible policymakers must acknowledge these constraints and weigh the costs and risks of all options.

Putin’s Russia: Take it literally and seriously

And yet the calls for negotiation elide a central question: What if Putin’s system and the Russian president himself are unwilling — even unable — to reach such a compromise? The distinguished German historian of Eastern Europe Karl Schlögel has described Putinism succinctly: “a violence-based order following on the demise of a continental empire and a system of state socialism” rooted in a “Soviet-Stalinist DNA … It includes the targeted killing of political opponents, commonplace violence in prisons and camps, impunity for crimes, arbitrariness, conspiracy myths, the notion of ‘enemies of the people.’” 5

In his now notorious historical essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” from the summer of 2021, Putin flatly — and not for the first time — denied Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent country; it was, he wrote, a component (together with Belarus) of a “single large nation, a triune nation.” 6 The Kremlin has repeatedly made it clear that only Ukraine’s complete surrender, including the relinquishment of its sovereignty, is acceptable as the basis for a peace agreement.

This maximalist intransigence is by no means limited to Ukraine. On December 17, 2021, the Kremlin sent two similar “draft treaties” to the White House and to NATO headquarters in Brussels which articulated the Kremlin’s goals for Europe with remarkable clarity. 7 The demands in the proposals — which were immediately dismissed by their recipients — included not just a veto on Ukrainian membership in the alliance but a revision of the Euro-Atlantic security acquis of the post-Cold War period on enlargement, basing, deployments, exercises, and cooperation with partners. They would have severely limited U.S. freedom of movement in Europe (with no concomitant limitations on Russia), reversed 25 years of Central and Eastern European integration into NATO and the European Union, ended the right of non-members to choose their own alliances, and re-established a Russian sphere of influence on the continent. 8 The coup de grâce was the final stipulation (Art. 7) of the draft U.S.-Russia treaty, that all nuclear weapons should be returned to their national territories: it would have meant the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe and thus quite possibly of the alliance itself.

As my Brookings colleagues Fiona Hill and Angela Stent have warned: “This war is about more than Ukraine. … Ukrainians and their supporters understand that in the event of a Russian victory, Putin’s expansionism would not end at the Ukrainian border. The Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and many other states that were once part of the Russian empire would be at risk of attack or overthrow from within.” 9

Konrad Schuller, the Eastern Europe correspondent of the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, adds that the proponents of negotiations misjudge the categorical nature of this hostility: “In the case of total enmity, compromise never serves anything but a tactical pause.” This approach, he writes, has “deep roots in the Soviet Union,” and has been demonstrated time and again by Putin, as in the systematic violation of the Minsk agreements from the outset. 10

It appears Putin must be taken — like Donald Trump — literally and seriously .

It appears Putin must be taken — like Donald Trump — literally and seriously . That, in turn, requires confronting something else: the return of the category of the enemy to security policy.

1989: The end of enmity

The key theorist of this concept in the 20th century was Carl Schmitt, a fierce critic of liberal modernity, parliamentary democracy, and political pluralism; also an ardent antisemite. Despite his refusal to distance himself from his role as “crown jurist of the Third Reich,” his thought has unleashed what Jan-Werner Müller described as a “great and lasting intellectual fallout” for debates about political geostrategy to this day — not only in the West, but also in Russia and China. 11 For Schmitt, the concept of the enemy is the essence of the political: “The political enemy is … the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” 12 Enmity is not meant here in a metaphorical sense: “The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.” 13 Schmitt distinguishes here between “real” and “absolute” enemies: the former are capable of a territorial reconciliation of interests; the latter are incapable of this because of the ideological nature of their antagonism. 14

During the Cold War, much of the world was divided into camps of friend and foe, some of which were separated by genuine fortified borders such as the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. The West’s adversary was the Soviet Union, a rival superpower with a totalitarian ideology and a “settled and implacable hostility,” together with the Warsaw Pact. 15 In the words of John Lewis Gaddis, Western leaders envisaged a postwar European security order “that assumed the possibility of compatible interests, even among incompatible systems” — whereas Josef Stalin’s goal was “the eventual Soviet domination of Europe,” and it “assumed no such thing.” 16 The states of the West, on the other hand, as former French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian noted in 2016, no longer defined their national identity after 1945 in opposition to a “demonized Other.” 17

It seemed that the phenomenon of the enemy in international relations had ended up on the garbage heap of history.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States was left as the only superpower, with no rival far and wide. Its hegemonic status was also reflected in political theory: the so-called theory of convergence, according to which the rest of the world would gradually align itself with the Western model of free-market democracy. (Ironically, the notion of convergence originated in a famous essay by the Russian physicist and human rights defender Andrei Sakharov, whose 1968 essay “Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom” posited that the political systems of the West and the Soviet bloc would converge as their relations thawed. 18 ) Thomas Wright has pointed out that “the notion of convergence pervaded the three post-Cold War U.S. administrations. It was an explicit goal of their strategy and defined the parameters of it.” 19

The convergence thesis found its classic expression in a 1990 address to Congress by then-President George H.W. Bush:

“Out of these troubled times … a new world order … can emerge: a new era — freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.” 20

History, as we know, has taken a somewhat different course since then. Nonetheless, there was remarkable progress in the decade that followed, which initially seemed to confirm the hope for convergence. The bipolar order of the Cold War reconstituted itself as an “aspiring global commonwealth that enlarged NATO and transformed the United Nations, the [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the EU.” 21 Not only that, the democratic transformation of almost the entire Warsaw Pact found imitators around the world; civil society movements overthrew authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It seemed that the phenomenon of the enemy in international relations had ended up on the garbage heap of history.

The key proponents of this thesis were the liberal political theorists. Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay “The End of History” — arguably the most influential articulation of the theory of liberal entropy — postulated outright that the category of the enemy state, or more precisely, the enemy state with an anti-Western ideology, was doomed to become an anachronism. “The passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance … And the death of this ideology means … the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.” Fukuyama hastened to add that terrorism and wars of national liberation would continue, but “large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.” 22

As late as 2011, the most persistent proponent of the liberal convergence thesis, G. John Ikenberry, inveighed against the “panicked narrative” of the rise of illiberal, authoritarian powers: “China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today’s power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance.” 23

The country that most enthusiastically embraced the narrative of the end of history, the victory of the West through diplomacy and democratic transformation, and the irresistible global spread of a rules-based world order, was reunified Germany. In 2019, the diplomat Thomas Bagger, then head of the planning staff at the German Foreign Office, described Berlin’s interpretation of the Zeitenwende of 1989 with gentle but unmistakable irony:

“Toward the end of a century marked by having been on the wrong side of history twice, Germany finally found itself on the right side. What had looked impossible, even unthinkable, for decades suddenly seemed to be not just real, but indeed inevitable. The rapid transformation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into parliamentary democracies and market economies was taken as empirical proof of Fukuyama’s bold headline. … Best of all, while Germany would still have to transform its new regions in the East, the former GDR, the country in a broader sense had already arrived at its historical destination: it was a stable parliamentary democracy, with its own well-tested and respected social market economy. While many other countries around the globe would have to transform, Germany could remain as is, waiting for the others to gradually adhere to its model. It was just a matter of time.” 24

Thirty years after reunification, the Germans’ remarkably complacent interpretation of the events of 1989 would become a stubborn cognitive blockage against perceiving and adapting to another, much darker period of climate change in international relations and the global security order.

In the United States, however, the representatives of the realist school of international relations viewed this liberal narrative of a linear arc of history with the same skepticism they harbored for international institutions, international law, and the notion of a liberal world order in general. Realist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt argued that competition was the main driver of the international system. But because realists consider interests to be far more important than ideologies, they are also disinclined to consider a rival state or even an adversary an “enemy” in the Schmittian sense. The competitor’s interests are simply different; this also makes it easier to negotiate with them, to come to a compromise, or even to accept their demand for a sphere of influence. 25 This rather relaxed — and quite condescending — view of the phenomenon of interstate competition was doubtless rooted in the fact that until recently the United States had no plausible peer rival. China’s rise has noticeably changed the realists’ tone.

A third school — the constructivists — took exception to the realists’ refusal to acknowledge identity and ideas as key factors in the behavior of states. And it was the constructivist Alexander Wendt who, a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, addressed the problem of the enemy head-on. He distinguished between Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian orders — based respectively on enmity, rivalry, and friendship. 26 Explicitly citing Schmitt, Wendt defined the difference between enemy and rival: “An enemy does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as a free subject at all … A rival, in contrast, is thought to recognize the Self’s right to life and liberty.” He adds: “Violence between enemies has no internal limits. … Violence between rivals, in contrast, is self-limiting, constrained by recognition of each other’s right to exist.” 27 Wendt cites post-Cold War conflicts occurring between “Palestinian and Israeli fundamentalists” and in Northern Ireland, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda as examples of hostility. All of these examples, however, are of internal or highly localized conflicts.

At the end of the first Bush presidency (1989-93) and then under his successor Bill Clinton (1993-2001), the United Nations sent peacekeepers to Cambodia and Rwanda, and NATO intervened in the Balkans with combat troops for the first time since its founding. Justifications for sending troops included the need to prevent regional destabilization, to end a humanitarian disaster, or the violation of basic principles of international law such as the prohibition of genocide. Leading Western states had patronage relationships with some of the conflict actors (France-Rwanda; France/U.K.-Serbia; Germany-Croatia), but they never went so far as to consider their clients’ enemies as their own. Meanwhile, relations among the great powers were for the most part stable and constructive. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Clinton clashed over NATO’s air war against Serbia. Otherwise, however, they largely cooperated with each other; Clinton paved the way for China to join the World Trade Organization.

2001: Terrorists, the West’s new enemy

It was the rise of radical Islamist terrorism, al-Qaida’s attacks on America on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent “Global War on Terror” with which the category of the enemy as the enemy of the West returned to trans-Atlantic strategic discourse. The neoconservative strategists of President George W. Bush (2001-2009) were convinced that the terrorists and their state sponsors had to be utterly defeated; they put this conviction into practice by driving the Taliban out of Afghanistan and invading Iraq. Their highly controversial formulas, such as the “axis of evil” or “Islamofascism,” were reminiscent of the “absolute enemy” in Schmitt’s “Theory of the Partisan . ” 28 What distinguished the neoconservatives from the Schmittians, however, was the fact that they were moral universalists and, in the majority, convinced advocates of a democratic transformation of the Middle East. On this issue, they were in broad agreement with the liberal internationalists.

The Islamist enemy, it was hoped, would also be transformed by the pull of freedom and democracy. As my colleague Robert Kagan wrote in 2008: “The best [option] may be to hasten the process of modernization in the Islamic world. More modernization, more globalization, faster.” 29 The great powers of Russia and China would — or so it was assumed — share the task of combating terrorism with the West. For the rest, the great powers would — as the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy put it — “compete in peace.” 30 In 2005, Bush’s Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said that once China became a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led world order, all differences could be settled in light of shared interests. 31

A decade later, Le Drian identified the Islamic State group (IS) as France’s “current enemy.” 32 But he simultaneously introduced a distinction that was as precise as it was careful: for France, he explained, IS was an ennemi conjoncturel , an enemy whose status was contingent, depending on the current threat it posed. France, on the other hand, is an ennemi structurel for IS, based on an “apocalyptic, totalitarian, and eliminatory vision of this combat … Our deeds are of little importance from this point of view. We are targeted above all for what we are, and for what we represent.” 33 We will have to come back to this distinction.

2008-present: The pulverization of peaceful convergence

The presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2016) was the last in the post-Cold War era to spell out its national security strategy within the paradigm of peaceful convergence. Obama, however, viewed the interventionism of his predecessors with skepticism. He understood that competition was rising globally, but he was determined not to let that fact define his administration. 34

When Obama took office in 2009, Dmitry Medvedev was his counterpart in the Kremlin. But the power center was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who had served once before as prime minister (1999-2000) and as president (2000-2008). Putin had triggered a sharp revisionist turn in Russian foreign policy in 1999 with the bloody Chechen war. In February 2007, he challenged the West in a speech at the Munich Security Conference. 35 In August 2008, the Kremlin provoked Georgia into a week-long shooting war as punishment for its aspirations to become a NATO member. Obama nevertheless offered Russia a “reset”; it produced the New START Treaty on strategic arms reduction and greater Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran.

In 2012, Putin again assumed the Russian presidency. Yet even as Russia illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and sent proxy troops into eastern Ukraine, Obama — supported by German Chancellor Angela Merkel — resisted pressure from Congress and his own administration to send lethal weapons to Kyiv. When Putin intervened in Syria in 2015 in favor of Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad (triggering Germany’s refugee crisis), the United States also remained reluctant to intervene. Obama believed that the Europeans should take more responsibility for their own security; for him, the most important American security interests lay elsewhere, in Asia.

But China had also become much more power-conscious, both in its own neighborhood and in international institutions. The Obama administration initially took a wait-and-see approach; then it tried to change course with the “pivot to Asia” — with limited success. Derek Chollet, who had served as a senior Pentagon official in the administration, described U.S.-China relations as “increasingly cooperative on select issues, [but] rooted in competition and distrust.” 36 Few people, however, would have been less inclined to view a challenging great power like Russia or a rising rival like China as an enemy than the cerebral Obama; indeed, he notoriously dismissed Russia as a “regional power.”

Donald Trump’s term in office did not end the era of friendly convergence — that had already been ‘pulverized’ by the global financial crisis, the failure of the Arab Spring, Russia and China’s increasing challenge to the Western-led liberal world order, and the global rise of populism.

Donald Trump’s term in office (2017-2021) did not end the era of friendly convergence — that had already been “pulverized” by the global financial crisis, the failure of the Arab Spring, Russia and China’s increasing challenge to the Western-led liberal world order, and the global rise of populism. 37 But it became the scene of a bizarre power struggle in U.S. security policy between Republican traditionalists and the president. The former sought to articulate a new paradigm of global great power competition with the 2017 National Security Strategy. The document referred to Russia and China as “revisionist powers”; however, it simultaneously emphasized the importance of democracy, values, and allies. 38 This restrained intonation of systemic rivalry enjoyed bipartisan consensus. It found an increasing echo in Europe as well — such as in the European Union’s 2019 China Strategy, with its description of the emerging great power as a “partner, competitor, and strategic rival.” 39

The commander-in-chief’s political instincts, as it happened, were diametrically opposed to those of his advisers. The president had nothing but contempt for institutions, rules, allies, and especially NATO and the EU; he admired authoritarian leaders like Putin all the more submissively. In all this, Trump was (and is) neither a strategist nor an ideologue, but a transactional “America First” nationalist in a zero-sum world — a theory of American power that an anonymous senior official described as a “no friends, no enemies” policy. 40 Trump’s attacks on the rules-based world order were ultimately unsuccessful, as were his attempts to prevent his successor from winning the election. Nor did he manage to stop the U.S. government from providing Ukraine with lethal assistance, increasing sanctions on Russia, and strengthening the American military presence in Europe. 41

The lasting damage done by Trump’s tenure, however, was and is the normalization of ethno-nationalism, open contempt for democracy, and violence in the U.S. conservative camp. The enemy of the right-wing of the GOP (as is the case with other radical populists) is none other than liberal modernity itself. The Economist reported from a meeting of the hard-right Conservative Political Action Conference: “the movement’s goal is the utter destruction of the enemy.” 42

Joe Biden assumed the presidency of a politically and socially deeply divided country in January 2021, in the midst of a historic pandemic that by today’s count has claimed the lives of nearly seven million people worldwide and has shed an unsparing light on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the international order and Western democracies. 43 An administration strategy paper from March of that year described Russia as a disruptor (“determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage”) and China as a potential peer opponent (“the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system”). 44

2022: The return of the great power enemy

Only eleven months later, Putin invaded Ukraine; shortly before, Moscow and Beijing had sworn a “friendship” with “no limits.” 45 In October 2022, the administration’s National Security Strategy stated succinctly: “The world is now at an inflection point. This decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our competition with the [People’s Republic of China], managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in our efforts to deal with shared challenges, particularly climate change, pandemics, and economic turbulence.” 46 But in the summer of 2023, fears of a U.S.-China war continue to haunt Western capitals; Russia shows no signs that it might be willing to relent.

The free democracies must now understand that they are dealing with a phenomenon they had believed to be historically obsolete: state rivals who see them as ideological enemies. Specifically, “absolute” enemies as defined by Schmitt, or ennemis structurels, as Le Drian put it. Or — to use a more old-fashioned term — mortal enemies. Whether the leadership in Beijing perceives the nations of the West in this sense can be left open here — but in the case of Putin and his regime, the case is clear. Putin’s frequent characterization of the Kyiv leadership as “Nazis,” the tirades with which Putin rails against a “corrupt” Ukraine and a “decadent” West and threatens to “cleanse” “filth and traitors” in his own population, the threats of nuclear Armageddon — these linguistic tropes are familiar from the history of 20th-century genocides. 47

Conceivably, in the case of Putin himself, there is a personal psychopathology at play. Equally possibly, it is — as Fiona Hill argues — simply a cynical terror strategy designed to paralyze the resistance of Ukraine and the West. 48 Perhaps Putin is convinced that he can win this way; perhaps he feels compelled to articulate his invasion as a life-or-death struggle because his power and his life depend on not losing? In any case, the facts are that this unhinged language is amplified daily in the most garish colors by members of the Kremlin leadership as well as Russia’s state-controlled media, that it is taken at face value by much of the Russian population, and that it is implemented in brutal and sadistic ways by Putin’s armed forces. In this respect, Putin’s publicly staged hostility has long since developed a political life of its own. “If anything,” writes Tatiana Stanovaya in a compelling analysis of the hardening mood of Russia’s next-generation security elites, “the country is becoming more committed to the fight … No one is seriously considering or discussing a diplomatic end to the war: a notion that looks to many high-profile Russians like a personal threat, given all the war crimes that their country has committed and the responsibility that the entire elite now bears for the carnage in Ukraine.” 49

Help Ukraine win, strengthen Europe’s defenses, and avoid the mirroring trap

So how should the West grapple with this dilemma? Peace for Ukraine must at some point involve negotiations with Russia. But given the Kremlin’s implacable attitude, the burden of proof for the credibility of its negotiating offers would be extremely high. An armistice based on a freezing of the status quo in the form of continued Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbas would reward Putin’s aggression and merely pause hostilities. The fact that the aggressor’s identity and the extent of his war crimes are beyond legal doubt will weigh heavily on any negotiations; an end to the fighting without some form of accountability, atonement, and reparations is hard to imagine. Diplomacy, in other words, would have to be very largely on Kyiv’s terms. That does not necessarily presuppose a Russian military defeat or a Ukrainian military victory. Conceivably, Russia could be forced to conclude that the price of pursuing Ukraine’s subjugation is unsustainably high by, for example, losing the support of a key non-Western power like China, or if the so-called Global South turned away from it. But as long as neither of those scenarios is within reach, helping Ukraine means helping it win on the battlefield. 50

Given the risk that an end to the war becomes an interregnum between wars, only the strongest guarantees can satisfy Ukraine’s security interests, and indeed those of the Western alliance.

Would that lead Russia to stop seeing it, and the West, as enemies? Certainly, Germany only embarked on the road to atonement after utter defeat, capitulation, and occupation — a scenario that seems unimaginable for Russia in this conflict. Given the risk that an end to the war becomes an interregnum between wars, only the strongest guarantees — a clear, constructive, and hopefully short path to NATO and EU membership — can satisfy Ukraine’s security interests, and indeed those of the Western alliance. The EU has accelerated membership talks, and the European Council is expected to kick off accession negotiations with Ukraine in December, a process that my Brookings colleague Carlo Bastasin notes comes with “huge political, financial, and institutional implications.” 51 Managing it carefully is all the more crucial because NATO member states were unable to agree on accelerating Kyiv’s NATO accession at the Vilnius summit in July; the question will unquestionably return with full force at the alliance’s 75th-anniversary summit in Washington, DC in July 2024.

Meanwhile, NATO, as well as the European Union, will have to continue to radically rethink their security provisions and address their huge deficits in deterrence and defense. Given the evolving U.S. presidential election campaign, Europeans especially will have to do more (much more) to defend themselves. As long as Russia is internally totalitarian and externally neo-imperial, Europe’s security can only be defined against Moscow.

Finally, as Le Drian put it succinctly in his 2016 essay: we must not fall into the intellectual trap of mirroring. This risk is not trivial, as was demonstrated by the attempts of Justice Department officials under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks to justify “enhanced interrogation techniques” such as waterboarding by invoking a quasi-unlimited executive prerogative. 52 The current debate on how to deal with China’s increasingly assertive global stance also has hysterical overtones, even if the concern itself is justified. And, yes, there is a very real danger of subjecting those who leave authoritarian regimes to blanket suspicion, racism, and dehumanization.

The 19th-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once said: “He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. When you gaze long into the abyss for a long time, the abyss also gazes into you.” 53 In an age of what a recent U.K. strategy paper calls accelerated, constant, and dynamic systemic competition and faced with authoritarian great powers who think of us as the absolute enemy, that warning is especially pertinent. 54

Related Content

Michael E. O’Hanlon, Constanze Stelzenmüller, David Wessel

July 10, 2023

Constanze Stelzenmüller

June 8, 2023

• Lawrence Freedman, “Putin is running out of options in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs , July 25, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putin-running-out-options-ukraine .
• Jürgen Habermas, “A Plea for Negotiations,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 14, 2023, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/kultur/juergen-habermas-ukraine-sz-negotiations-e480179/?reduced=true ; Alice Schwarzer and Sarah Wagenknecht, “Manifest für Frieden” [Manifesto for Peace], petition, Change.org, February 10, 2023, https://www.change.org/p/manifest-f%C3%BCr-frieden ; Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan, “The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs , April 13, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations .
• Alexander Gabuev, “Putin is looking for a bigger war, not an off-ramp, in Ukraine,” Financial Times , July 30, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/861a8955-924e-4d3e-8c59-73a13403e191 .
• William A. Galston, “Republicans are turning against aid to Ukraine,” The Brookings Institution, August 8, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/republicans-are-turning-against-aid-to-ukraine/ .
• Claudia von Salzen, “Historiker Schlögel zum Ukrainekrieg: ‘Der Ruf nach Verhandlungen zeugt von völliger Unkenntnis der Lage’” [Historian Schlögel on the war in Ukraine: ‘The Call for Negotiations Testifies to Complete Ignorance of the Situation’], Tagesspiegel , January 11, 2023, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/internationales/karl-schlogel-zum-ukrainekrieg-der-ruf-nach-verhandlungen-hat-etwas-mit-volliger-unkenntnis-der-lage-zu-tun-9149778.html .
• Vladimir Putin, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the historical unity of Ukrainians and Russians,’” Office of the President of Russia, July 12, 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 .
• “Press release on Russian draft documents on legal security guarantees from the United States and NATO,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 17, 2021, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1790809/ .
• William Alberque, “Russia’s new draft treaties: like 2009, but worse,” (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), January 25, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/01/russias-new-draft-treaties-like-2009-but-worse ; Steven Pifer, “Russia’s draft agreements with NATO and the United States: intended for rejection?”, The Brookings Institution, December 21, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-draft-agreements-with-nato-and-the-united-states-intended-for-rejection/ .
• Fiona Hill and Angela Stent, “The Kremlin’s Grand Delusions,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/kremlins-grand-delusions .
• Konrad Schuller, “Frieden mit dem Todfeind” [Peace with the mortal enemy], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 7, 2022, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/schwarzer-und-habermas-zum-ukraine-krieg-frieden-mit-dem-todfeind-18010760.html . 
• Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 1.
• Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 27. 
• Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, trans. G.L. Ulmen (New York:  Telos Press Publishing, 2007), 85-95.
• Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 119.
• John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Allen Lane, 2005), 27.
• Jean-Yves Le Drian, Qui est l’ennemi? [Who is the enemy?] (Paris: Le Cerf, 2016), 19.
• Andrei Sakharov, “Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,” The New York Times, July 22, 1968, https://www.sakharov.space//lib/thoughts-on-peace-progress-and-intellectual-freedom .
• Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and The Future of American Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 8.
• George H.W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,” (speech, Washington, DC, September 11, 1990), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-persian-gulf-crisis-and-the-federal-budget . 
• Robert D. Blackwill and Thomas Wright, “The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy,” (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2020), 6, https://www.cfr.org/report/end-world-order-and-american-foreign-policy . 
• Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest , no. 16 (Summer 1989), 18.
• G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011), 57, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/future-liberal-world-order . 
• Thomas Bagger, “The World According to Germany: Reassessing 1989,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 4 (2018), 54, https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/the-world-according-to-germany-reassessing-1989/ . 
• See, for example: John Mearsheimer, “Playing With Fire in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs , August 17, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/playing-fire-ukraine ; Stephen M. Walt, “The Conversation About Ukraine Is Cracking Apart,” Foreign Policy, February 28, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/28/the-conversation-about-ukraine-is-cracking-apart/ . 
• Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 260.
• Ibid., 261.
• Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, 91.
• Robert Kagan, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Oxford University Press, 2008), 36-59, 54.
• “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America , ” (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf .
• Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”, (speech, New York, September 21, 2005), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm . 
• Jean-Yves Le Drian, Qui est l’ennemi? , 13.
• Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War , 173.
• Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” (speech, Munich, February 10, 2007), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 . 
• Derek Chollet, The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America’s Role in the World (New York: Perseus Books, 2016), 58.
• Thomas Wright, “The G20 Is Obsolete,” The Atlantic, July 11, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/g20-obsolete-trump-putin-russia-germany-france/533238/ . 
• “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” (Washington, DC: The White House, December 18, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf . 
• “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: EU-China – A strategic outlook , ” (Strasbourg: European Commission, March 12, 2019), 1, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf .
• Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Senior White House Official Defines the Trump Doctrine: ‘We’re America, Bitch,’” The Atlantic , June 11, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/a-senior-white-house-official-defines-the-trump-doctrine-were-america-bitch/562511/ . 
• Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt, “U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated June 15, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040 ; Cory Welt et al., “U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 17, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45415/9 ; Paul Belikin and Hibbah Kaileh, “The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budget Overview,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated June 16, 2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1106137.pdf . 
• “Donald Trump’s Hold on the Republican Party is Unquestionable,” The Economist , August 18, 2022, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/08/18/donald-trumps-hold-on-the-republican-party-is-unquestionable .
• “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard,” World Health Organization, https://covid19.who.int/ (accessed 5/1/2023).
• “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf . 
• “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” (joint statement, Beijing, February 4, 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 .
• “National Security Strategy,” (Washington, DC: The White House, October 12, 2022), 12-13; https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf .
• See, for example, Vladimir Putin, “Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting,” (speech, Moscow, October 27, 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695 . 
• Fiona Hill, “Freedom From Fear: A BBC Reith Lecture,” (speech, Washington, DC, December 21, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/freedom-from-fear/ . 
• Tatiana Stanovaya, “Putin’s Age of Chaos,” Foreign Affairs , August 8, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/vladimir-putin-age-chaos .
• For a useful summary of the arguments, see Timothy Ash et al., “How to end Russia’s war on Ukraine: Safeguarding Europe’s future, and the dangers of a false peace,” (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, June 2023), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/2023-06-27-how-end-russias-war-ukraine-ash-et-al_0.pdf . See also the exchange organized by Samuel Charap, “Should Ukraine negotiate with Russia?,” Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/responses/should-america-push-ukraine-negotiate-russia-end-war . 
• Carlo Bastasin, “Want Ukraine in the EU? You’ll have to reform the EU, too,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, July 2023), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/want-ukraine-in-the-eu-youll-have-to-reform-the-eu-too/ .
• Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Deception, cruelty and the compromise of law (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 270.
• Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse [Beyond Good and Evil] (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1886) Aphorism no. 146.
• “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world,” (London: United Kingdom Government, March 2023), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1145586/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf .

U.S. Foreign Policy

Russia Ukraine

Foreign Policy

Europe & Eurasia Russia Ukraine

Center on the United States and Europe

Andrew Yeo, Isaac B. Kardon

August 20, 2024

Amy J. Nelson, Andrew Yeo

July 22, 2024

July 12, 2024

How Moscow has long used the historic Kyivan Rus state to justify expansionism

Professor of Modern European History, University of Warwick

The Kyivan Rus

The Principality of Kyiv was founded on the location of contemporary Kyiv in the ninth century by Viking warrior-traders from Scandinavia (also called Varangians or Rus) who mixed with the local east Slavic population. In 988, Grand Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv adopted Christianity from Byzantium, not Rome, and the Rus – now a term also applied to the land – became part of the Orthodox Christian world .

Putin refers to this event as a “ civilisational choice ” which shaped the future of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. It created what he calls a “common spiritual space”, an Orthodox Russian space distinct from the Latin, Roman Catholic world. By contrast, the neighbouring peoples – the Poles and the Lithuanians – took their Christianity from Rome.

With the arrival of Mongol troops in the mid-13th century, the land of the Kyivan Rus was broken up. The western and south-western parts, which constitute most of the territory of today’s Ukraine and Belarus, was divided between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. Meanwhile the northern and north-eastern parts was cut off from developments in Europe for 200 years.

Gatherers of the land

The first historical mention of Moscow is in a chronicle from 1147. Later, Prince Ivan I of Moscow (ca. 1288-1340), known as Kalita (the moneybag), was the tax collector for Sultan Ozbeg, the khan of the Golden Horde. Ozbeg awarded Ivan the title of grand prince, as rulers of Kyiv were traditionally known. And Ivan and his successors subsequently used this title to claim all the lands of the Rus including those under Lithuanian and Polish rule as their patrimony.

Ivan III (1440-1505), his son Vasily III (1478-1533) and his grandson Ivan IV , known as Ivan the Terrible (1530-1584) were the most successful gatherers of the land of the Rus in its initial phase, annexing the lands of rival Rus princes in the north and north east.

After the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman army in 1453, Moscow’s religious leaders argued that a transfer of the Byzantine empire had taken place: Moscow was now the third Rome and the capital of Christendom. From that point, Ivan III not only called himself grand prince but also tsar, deriving from “Caesar”, the title used by the Roman and later Byzantine emperors.

The Moscow tsars styled themselves as the protectors of the Orthodox faith. They justified interventions in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries by the pretext that they were protecting Orthodox believers. Similarly, the Russian government today justifies invading Ukraine by claiming the need to protect the millions of Russian speakers living there.

The grand duke of Lithuania was the tsar’s main rival and he also claimed to be the ruler of the entire Rus. From the 14th century, Poland and Lithuania began to unite ; the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was eventually established in 1569.

A formidable opponent , by the mid-17th century, Poland-Lithuania was at war with most of its neighbours. And internally, the commonwealth fought off rebellion too. The Ukrainian Cossacks, led by Hetman (military leader and ruler) Bohdan Khmelnitsky attempted to secede, in part because of the discrimination they faced as Orthodox Christians under a Catholic ruler.

After some setbacks, Khmelnitsky asked for the support of the Orthodox Moscow tsar, Alexis. In 1654 the Cossacks and emissaries of Alexis signed the treaty of Pereyaslav , thereby submitting Ukraine to Russian rule within the context of their fight against the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth.

Historians differ on what purpose this pact ultimately served. From the perspective of the then Cossack leaders, as well as Ukrainian historians today, this was a temporary alliance, directed against Poland-Lithuania. For the tsar, meanwhile, and for generations of Russian historians that have followed, it was the acknowledgement of Moscow’s suzerainty for all eternity.

Russia and Poland were then at war until 1667, when the two parties signed the truce of Andrusovo . This agreement saw Moscow receive Ukraine west of the River Dnipro/Dnieper as well as the eastern part of today’s Belarus. In the 18th century, Poland-Lithuania was forced into the Russian sphere of influence and in 1772, was partitioned between Prussia, Austria and Russia.

The historic imperative to gather the land of the Rus was not the primary goal of this expansionism on the part of Moscow. Rather, it was the ideological justification given by its rulers for first consolidating and expanding the Moscow state in the Russian north and then for imperial advances into Ukraine and Belarus.

During Soviet times, the incorporation of most of Ukraine into the Soviet Union under Lenin was not driven by the idea of gathering the land of the Rus but by the desire to make Ukraine a socialist state. The concept is however implicitly contained in Stalin’s justification for invading eastern Poland in 1939. Soviet propaganda claimed that this was not only a social, but also a “national liberation” of Belarusian and Ukrainian “brothers and sisters”.

Putin also speaks of Ukrainian “brothers and sisters”. But he is waging war against them now that they have made it abundantly clear they have no wish to be “gathered” again.

• Orthodox Church
• Ukraine invasion 2022

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Thomson Reuters

As Moscow bureau chief, Guy runs coverage of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Before Moscow, Guy ran Brexit coverage as London bureau chief (2012-2022). On the night of Brexit, his team delivered one of Reuters historic wins - reporting news of Brexit first to the world and the financial markets. Guy graduated from the London School of Economics and started his career as an intern at Bloomberg. He has spent over 14 years covering the former Soviet Union. He speaks fluent Russian.

Latah County Human Rights Task Force

Strengthening the bonds of community to embrace diversity and reject bigotry..

Art and Essay Contest

Each year a topic concerning human rights is chosen with grade-specific contest parameters.  The information below is provided for the 2023-24 contest.

LATAH COUNTY HUMAN RIGHTS TASK FORCE 2023-24 MARTIN LUTHER KING ART AND ESSAY CONTEST THEME: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OUR LIBRARIES