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Supreme Court says prosecutors improperly charged some Jan. 6 defendants

Nina Totenberg

Pro-Trump protesters gather in front of the U.S. Capitol Building on Jan. 6, 2021 in Washington, D.C. Trump supporters gathered in the nation's capital to protest the ratification of President-elect Joe Biden's Electoral College victory over President Trump in the 2020 election. Brent Stirton/Getty Images hide caption

The U.S. Supreme Court limited which defendants accused of taking part in the Jan. 6 Capitol riot can be charged by federal prosecutors for obstructing Congress. The court’s decision also places at least a cloud of doubt about two of the the four felony counts in the election subversion indictment of President Trump .

In an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court ruled that the government must establish “that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding.”

Prosecutors used a key criminal statute to prosecute more than 350 of the most violent participants in the riot .

The statute had two parts. The first part makes it a crime to corruptly alter or destroy documents and records related to an official proceeding. The second part makes it a crime to otherwise obstruct or impede an official proceeding—in this case, the congressional counting of the electoral college ballots.

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Roberts said the statute was limited to documents and evidence destruction, and that the word otherwise was not meant to broaden the meaning of the law into a catchall provision.

Writing for the court majority, Roberts said the statute was limited to documents and evidence destruction, and that the word otherwise was not meant to broaden the meaning of the law into a catchall provision.

In a concurring opinion, liberal justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote: Despite "the shocking circumstances involved in this case," the "Court's task is to determine what conduct is proscribed by the criminal statute that has been invoked as the basis for the obstruction charge at issue here."

Justices Amy Coney Barrett joined Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan in dissent.

Justice Barrett — a Trump appointee — joined wrote that the provision in question “is a very broad provision, and admittedly, events like January 6th were not its target. (Who could blame Congress for that failure of imagination?) But statutes often go further than the problem that inspired them, and under the rules of statutory interpretation, we stick to the text anyway. The Court, abandoning that approach, does textual backflips to find some way—any way—to narrow” it.

The case was brought by Joseph Fischer, a former police officer in a township near Harrisburg, Pa., who joined the mob on Jan. 6th, even recording a four-minute cell phone video in which he is heard yelling, “charge,” and is seen in a scrum with police officers.

According to prosecutors, Fischer, in text messages, also threatened violence prior to Jan. 6, including sending a text in which he wrote, “take Democratic Congress to the gallows….can’t vote if they can’t breathe lol.” And when the FBI came to arrest him later, he shouted profanities at the agents and at his own police chief, and he sought to conceal the phone he had used to record events at the Capitol.

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The jan. 6 attack: the cases behind the biggest criminal investigation in u.s. history.

The Justice Department maintained that it limited the use of the statute at issue in the case by requiring proof that Fischer and other similarly charged defendants had specifically intended to disrupt the counting of the electoral college ballots and by focusing on elements like a defendant’s preparation for violence, and bringing tactical gear or paramilitary equipment to the Capitol. At oral argument Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar told the justices that prosecutors have brought charges against some 1400 defendants in connection with the riot, but that only 350 of those had been charged under the obstruction statute because of the need to prove intent to disrupt the counting of the ballots.

Defendant Fischer’s lawyer, Jeffrey Green, maintained that the reason the government chose to use the statute at all was that it has a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. Even though nobody has actually gotten such a stiff penalty, he said, for prosecutors it is “a really big cudgel” to use in plea bargaining with defendants.

Friday's decision has already had consequences. Pending the outcome of Friday's case, some judges previously allowed a small number of convicted defendants to be released from prison early. Now a larger number will have to be resentenced, retried, or just released.

But while Friday's decision might intuitively be seen as a devastating blow to prosecutors, a deep dive into the data concludes the effects will be “minimal.” NYU law professor Ryan Goodman is the lead author of the study, published by “Just Security, which relied on NPR’s detailed data base of Jan 6 Capitol riot cases.

Goodman notes that Trump is different from the Capitol rioters because the obstruction charges against him involve efforts to interfere with the electoral college certificates arriving at the desk to be counted on Jan. 6th, and the use of false elector certificates—all of which would seem to fall under the tampering-with-evidence provision of the obstruction statute.

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As for the Jan. 6 rioters, the study found that of the 1417 people charged so far in connection with the Jan. 6 invasion, only 346, or 24 per cent, were charged under the obstruction statute. Of that 346, 128 defendants were convicted by a jury of obstruction and another crime, most often another felony, which would still stand.

A different cohort of 48 people pleaded guilty to the obstruction charge, which now goes away. But hovering over all of these pleas is the fact that the plea agreement uniformly included an important caveat: In the event that the conviction were to be “vacated for any reason,” the government reserved the right to prosecute for other alleged crimes that prosecutors had either agreed not to prosecute or agreed to dismiss at sentencing.

Finally, the study, found that until Friday, 71 people were still awaiting trial on the obstruction charge, but more than half are also charged with another felony. While those felonies may not have penalties as severe as the obstruction charge, if the defendants are found guilty of those other crimes, the sentencing judge is permitted to consider the conduct charged in the obstruction case in determining the length of the sentence.

The study’s authors, in addition to professor Goodman, are Georgetown law professor Mary McCord, a long-time federal prosecutor who held a variety of top Justice Department jobs, including chief of the criminal division and acting assistant attorney general for national security; and NYU law professor Andrew Weissmann, also a long-time Justice Department prosecutor, who served as chief of the fraud section, counsel for the FBI, and lead prosecutor in the Mueller investigation of then President Trump.

Of course, Donald Trump, if re-elected, could pardon all the Jan. 6 defendants. He has not committed to doing that yet, though he often refers to Jan. 6 offenders as “hostages” and “patriots.” In his first term he pardoned friends and political allies who were a lot more prominent, including former campaign chiefs Paul Manafort, convicted on corruption charges, and Stephen Bannon, indicted on fraud charges for a build-the-wall fundraising scheme in which he allegedly pocketed $1million.

In addition Trump pardoned his close friend and advisor Roger Stone, indicted on charges of witness tampering, obstruction, and lying to Congress about what he and then-candidate Trump knew about Russian efforts to discredit Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential campaign; he pardoned former New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, who pleaded guilty to tax fraud and lying to White House officials; He pardoned Charles Kushner, the father of Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner; the elder Kushner pleaded guilty to 18 criminal counts of tax evasion, witness tampering, and making illegal campaign contributions; and Trump also pardoned his former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, who twice pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI and then withdrew his guilty pleas.

Landmark Supreme Court Cases

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E | Selected Supreme Court Cases

A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States , 295 U.S. 495 (1935). This case represented a challenge to the constitutionality of a law called the National Industrial Recovery Act. This law was a major part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attempt to rebuild the nation’s economy during the Great Depression. Major industries in the United States, however, objected to the way the law empowered the president to regulate aspects of American industry, such as labor conditions and even pay. In the unanimous decision, the court determined that the act was unconstitutional because it shifted the power to regulate commerce from the legislative branch to the executive branch.

Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387 (2012). This case involved federal attempts to prevent an Arizona state immigration law (S.B. 1070) from being enforced. The United States brought suit, arguing that immigration law is exclusively in the federal domain. Agreeing with the federal government, a federal district court enjoined specific provisions in the law. Arizona appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn the decision. In a 5–3 decision, the court found that specific provisions in the law did conflict with federal law, while others were constitutional.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This case represented a challenge to the principle of “separate but equal” established by Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. The case was brought by students who were denied admittance to certain public schools based exclusively on race. The unanimous decision in Brown v. Board determined that the existence of racially segregated public schools violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court decided that schools segregated by race perpetrated harm by giving legal sanction to the idea that African Americans were inherently inferior. The ruling effectively overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and removed the legal supports for segregated schools nationwide.

Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976). This case concerned the power of the then recently created Federal Election Commission to regulate the financing of political campaigns. These restrictions limited the amount of contributions that could be made to candidates and required political contributions to be disclosed, among other things. In 1975, Senator James Buckley filed suit, arguing that these limits amounted to a violation of First Amendment protections on free speech and free association. In a series of decisions in this complex case, the court determined that these restrictions did not violate the First Amendment.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682 (2014). This case involved a challenge to the mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that required that all employment-based group health care plans provide coverage for certain types of contraceptives. The law, however, allowed exemptions for religious employers such as churches that held a religious-based opposition to contraception. The plaintiffs in the case argued that Hobby Lobby, a large family-owned chain of arts and crafts stores, was run based on Christian principles and therefore should be exempt as well because of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The 5–4 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby agreed with the plaintiffs and declared that RFRA permits for-profit companies like Hobby Lobby to deny coverage for contraception in their health plans when that coverage violates a religious belief.

Bush v. Gore , 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Following voting in the November 2000 presidential election, observers recognized that the outcome of the very close national election hinged on the outcome of the election in Florida. Because the Florida election was so close, manual recounts were called for by the state’s supreme court. Then-governor George W. Bush, who was ahead in the initial count, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to halt the manual recount and to declare that the method of manual recount being used violated his rights to equal protection and due process. The court issued a two-part per curiam opinion on the case. (In a per curiam opinion, the court makes it clear that the decision in the case is not intended to set a legal precedent.) In the first part, the court ruled in a 7–2 decision that the manual recount did violate the plaintiff’s right to equal protection. In the second part, decided by a smaller 5–4 margin, the court ruled that there was not sufficient time to adjust the recount procedure and conduct a full recount. The effect of this ruling gave the Florida electoral votes, and thus the presidency, to George W. Bush.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , 558 U.S. 310 (2010). In 2007, the nonprofit corporation Citizens United was prevented by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) from showing a movie about then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. The FEC noted that showing the movie violated the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). BCRA prohibited campaign communications one month before a primary election and two months before a general election, required donors to be disclosed, and prohibited corporations from using their general funds for campaign communications. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions constituted a violation of the First Amendment. The 5–4 decision in Citizens United v. FEC agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that the restrictions imposed by BCRA and enforced by the FEC violated the corporation’s First Amendment right to free expression.

Dred Scott v. Sandford , 60 U.S. 393 (1856). This case concerned the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, which declared that certain states would be entirely free of slavery. Dred Scott, an enslaved person, was brought by his owner into free territories. When the owner brought him back to Missouri, a slave state, Dred Scott sued claiming that his time living in free territory made him free. After failing in his attempts in Missouri, Scott appealed to the Supreme Court. In a 7–2 decision, the court declared that the relevant parts of the Missouri Compromise were unconstitutional, and that Scott remained enslaved as a result.

Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In 1961, Clarence E. Gideon was arrested and accused of breaking into a poolroom and stealing money from a cigarette machine. Not being able to afford a lawyer, and being denied a public defender by the judge, Gideon defended himself and was subsequently found guilty. Gideon appealed to the Supreme Court declaring that the denial by the trial judge constituted a violation of his constitutional right to representation. The unanimous decision by the court in Gideon v. Wainwright agreed that the Sixth Amendment required that those facing felony criminal charges be supplied with legal representation.

King v. Burwell , 576 U.S. 473 (2015). When Congress wrote and passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, lawmakers intended for states to create exchanges through which residents in those states could purchase health care insurance plans. For those residents who could not afford the premiums, the law also allowed for tax credits to help reduce the cost. If states didn’t create an exchange, the federal government created the exchange for the state. While the intention of the lawmakers was for the tax credits to apply to the federally created exchanges as well, the language of the law was somewhat unclear on this point. Residents in Virginia brought suit against the law arguing that the law should be interpreted in a way that withholds tax credits from those participating in the federally created exchange. In the 6–3 decision, the court disagreed, stating that viewing the law in its entirety made it clear that the intent of the law was to provide the tax credits to those participating in either exchange.

Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003). This case concerned two men in Houston who in 1998 were prosecuted and convicted under a Texas law that forbade certain types of intimate sexual relations between two persons of the same sex. The men appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and privacy were violated when they were prosecuted for consensual sexual intimacy in their own home. In the 6–3 decision in Lawrence v. Texas , the court concluded that while so-called anti-sodomy statutes like the law in Texas did not violate one’s right to equal protection, they did violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stated that the government had no right to infringe on the liberty of persons engaging in such private and personal acts.

Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137 (1803). This case involved the nomination of justices of the peace in Washington, DC, by President John Adams at the end of his term. Despite the Senate confirming the nominations, some of the commissions were not delivered before Adams left office. The new president, Thomas Jefferson, decided not to deliver the commissions. William Marbury, one of the offended justices, sued, saying that the Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the court to force Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commissions. In the unanimous decision in Marbury v. Madison , the court declared that while Marbury’s rights were violated when Madison refused to deliver the commission, the court did not have the power to force the secretary to do so despite what the Judiciary Act says. In declaring that the law conflicted with the U.S. Constitution, the case established the principle of judicial review wherein the Supreme Court has the power to declare laws passed by Congress and signed by the president to be unconstitutional.

McDonald v. Chicago , 561 U.S. 742 (2010). This case developed as a consequence of the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which dismissed a Washington, DC, handgun ban as a violation of the Second Amendment. In McDonald v. Chicago , the plaintiffs argued that the Fourteenth Amendment had the effect of applying the Second Amendment to the states, not just to the federal government. In a 5–4 decision, the court agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that rights like the right to keep and bear arms are important enough for maintaining liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment rightly applies them to the states.

Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When Ernesto Miranda was arrested, interrogated, and confessed to kidnapping in 1963, the arresting officers neglected to inform him of his Fifth Amendment right not to self-incriminate. After being found guilty at trial, Miranda appealed to the Supreme Court, insisting that the officers violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The 5–4 decision in Miranda v. Arizona found that the right to not incriminate oneself relies heavily on the suspect’s right to be informed of these rights at the time of arrest. The opinion indicated that suspects must be told that they have the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent in order to ensure that any statements they provide are issued voluntarily.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , 567 U.S. 519 (2012). This case represented a challenge to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The suing states argued that the Medicare expansion and the individual mandate that required citizens to purchase health insurance or pay a fine were both unconstitutional. The 5–4 decision found that the Medicare expansion was permissible, but that the federal government could not withhold all Medicare funding for states that refused to accept the expansion. More importantly, it found that Congress had the power to apply the mandate to purchase health insurance under its enumerated power to tax.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case began when the New York Times published a full-page advertisement claiming that the arrest of Martin Luther King, Jr. in Alabama was part of a concerted effort to ruin him. Insulted, an Alabama official filed a libel suit against the newspaper. Under Alabama law, which did not require that persons claiming libel have to show harm, the official won a judgment. The New York Times appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the ruling violated its First Amendment right to free speech. In a unanimous decision, the court declared that the First Amendment protects even false statements by the press, as long as those statements are not made with actual malice.

Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644 (2015). This case concerned groups of same-sex couples who brought suits against a number of states and relevant agencies that refused to recognize same-sex marriages created in states where such marriages were legal. In the 5–4 decision, the court found that not only did the Fourteenth Amendment provision for equal protection under the law require that states recognize same-sex marriages formed in other states, but that no state could deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples if they also issued them to other types of couples.

Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S. 537 (1896). When Homer Plessy, a man of mixed racial heritage, sat in a Whites-only railroad car in an attempt to challenge a Louisiana law that required railroad cars be segregated, he was arrested and convicted. Appealing his conviction to the Supreme Court, he argued that the segregation law was a violation of the principle of equal protection under the law in the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 7–1 decision, the court disagreed, indicating that the law was not a violation of the equal protection principle because the different train cars were separate but equal. Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” remained a guiding principle of segregation until Brown v. Board of Education (1954).

Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This case involved a pregnant woman from Texas who desired to terminate her pregnancy. At the time, Texas only allowed abortions in cases where the woman’s life was in danger. Using the pseudonym “Jane Roe,” the woman appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Constitution provides women the right to terminate an abortion. The 7–2 decision in Roe v. Wade sided with the plaintiff and declared that the right to privacy upheld in the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) included a woman’s right to an abortion. In balancing the rights of the woman with the interests of the states to protect human life, the court created a trimester framework. In the first trimester, a pregnant woman could seek an abortion without restriction. In the second and third trimesters, however, the court asserted that states had an interest in regulating abortions, provided that those regulations were based on health needs. The 2023 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health decision overruled the 1973 decision.

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States . See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States .

Shelby County v. Holder , 570 U.S. 529 (2013). After decades in which African Americans encountered obstacles to voting, particularly in southern states, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Among other things, the law prohibited certain congressional districts from changing election laws without federal authorization. In 2010, Shelby County in Alabama brought a suit against the U.S. attorney general, claiming that both section five of the act, which required districts to seek preapproval, and section four, which determined which districts had to seek preapproval, were unconstitutional. In a 5–4 decision, the court found that both sections violated the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744 (2013). When Thea Clara Spyer died in 2009, she left her estate to her wife, Edith Windsor, with whom she had been legally married in Canada years before. Because of a 1996 U.S. law called the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), this marriage was not recognized by the federal government. As a result, Windsor was compelled to pay an enormous tax on the inheritance, which she would not have had to pay had the federal government recognized the marriage. Appealing to the Supreme Court, Windsor argued that DOMA was unconstitutional because it deprives same-sex couples of their Fifth Amendment right to equal protection. In the 5–4 decision, the court agreed with Windsor, stating that DOMA was intended to treat certain married couples differently in blatant violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.

Selected Supreme Court Cases (by date)

• Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
• Dred Scott v. Sandford , 60 U.S. 393 (1856)
• Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
• A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States , 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
• Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
• Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
• Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
• Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
• Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
• Bush v. Gore , 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
• Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
• Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
• McDonald v. Chicago , 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
• Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
• National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , 567 U.S. 519 (2012)
• Shelby County v. Holder , 570 U.S. 529 (2013)
• United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744 (2013)
• Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682 (2014)
• King v. Burwell , 576 U.S. 473 (2015)
• Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644 (2015)

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Breaking News

Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

Holding : The admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Judgment : Reversed , 6-2, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts on June 29, 2023. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

SCOTUSblog Coverage

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• A guide to the amicus briefs in the affirmative-action cases (Ellena Erskine, Angie Gou, and Elisabeth Snyder, October 29, 2022)
• The court should relegate racial discrimination in higher education to the dustbin of history (Zach West and Bryan Cleveland, October 28, 2022)
• Being race-conscious is a necessary and effective tool to address racism and discrimination — including for Asian Americans (Bethany Li, October 28, 2022)
• On being original: Racial classifications and the fallacy of a certain strain of “progressive originalism” (Devon Westhill, October 28, 2022)
• A business perspective: Diversity in university admissions is a compelling interest (Michael R. Dreeben, Natalie Camastra, and Kelly Kambourelis, October 27, 2022)
• In higher education and beyond, race-based policies stifle individualism and ultimately harm everyone (Wen Fa, October 27, 2022)
• The history of anti-Black discrimination in higher education and the myth of a color-blind Constitution (Danielle R. Holley, October 26, 2022)
• Diversity by diktat: An obscure 1977 OMB memo forms the basis for today’s affirmative-action programs (David Bernstein, October 26, 2022)
• In cases challenging affirmative action, court will confront wide-ranging arguments on history, diversity, and the role of race in America (Amy Howe, October 26, 2022)
• Affirmative action cases up first in November argument calendar (Amy Howe, August 3, 2022)
• Court will hear affirmative-action challenges separately, allowing Jackson to participate in UNC case (Amy Howe, July 22, 2022)
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• Court will hear challenges to affirmative action at Harvard and University of North Carolina (Amy Howe, January 24, 2022)
• Revenge of the rescheduled cases: Congressional proxy voting, the ministerial exception, and more (John Elwood, January 20, 2022)
• Court will take up five new cases, including lawsuit from football coach who wanted to pray on the field (Amy Howe, January 14, 2022)
• Blockbuster watch: Affirmative action, same-sex weddings, and other big relists (John Elwood, January 12, 2022)
• Justices add new cases on bankruptcy, workers’ comp, and relief from final judgments (Amy Howe, January 10, 2022)
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• Affirmative action at Harvard, border searches and pedestrian safety (Andrew Hamm, February 26, 2021)

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The National Constitution Center’s Supreme Court Cases Library includes materials on the most influential Supreme Court cases in American history. To ensure nonpartisan rigor and ideological diversity, we enlisted a pair of leading scholars from diverse constitutional perspectives—Caroline Fredrickson and Ilan Wurman—to help choose the landmark cases included in the Supreme Court Cases Library . The Supreme Court Cases Library also includes landmark cases curated by the National Constitution Center team.

Constitutional Topics

Kennedy v. bremerton school district.

597 U.S. __ (2022)

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

597 U.S. ___ (2022)

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo

592 U. S. __ (2020)

Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru

591 U.S. __ (2020)

Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue

Carpenter v. united states.

585 U.S. ___ (2018)

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

584 U.S.__ (2018)

Obergefell v. Hodges

576 U.S. ___ (2015)

Zivotofsky v. Kerry

Town of greece v. galloway.

572 U.S. 565 (2014)

Shelby County v. Holder

570 U.S. 529 (2013)

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

567 U.S. 519 (2012)

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

558 U.S. 310 (2010)

District of Columbia v. Heller

554 U.S. 570 (2008)

Lawrence v. Texas

539 U.S. 558 (2003)

Bush v. Gore

531 U.S. 98 (2000)

Printz v. United States

521 U.S. 898 (1997)

Washington v. Glucksberg

521 U.S. 702 (1997)

United States v. Virginia

518 U.S. 515 (1996)

United States v. Lopez

514 U.S. 549 (1995)

Employment Division v. Smith

494 U.S. 872 (1990)

Texas v. Johnson

491 U.S. 397 (1989)

Morrison v. Olson

487 U.S. 654 (1988)

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

484 U.S. 260 (1988)

South Dakota v. Dole

483 U.S. 203 (1987)

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

467 U.S. 837 (1984)

Lynch v. Donnelly

465 U.S. 668 (1984)

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

457 U.S. 800 (1982)

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

438 U.S. 265 (1978)

United States v. Nixon (The Tapes Case)

418 U.S. 683 (1974)

Frontiero v. Richardson

411 U.S. 677 (1973)

Roe v. Wade

410 U.S. 113 (1973)

Wisconsin v. Yoder

406 U.S. 205 (1972)

New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case)

403 U.S. 713 (1971)

Brandenburg v. Ohio

395 U.S. 444 (1969)

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

393 U.S. 503 (1969)

Terry v. Ohio

392 U.S. 1 (1968)

Katz v. United States

389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Loving v. Virginia

388 U.S. 1 (1967)

Miranda v. Arizona

384 U.S. 436 (1966)

South Carolina v. Katzenbach

383 U.S. 301 (1966)

Griswold v. Connecticut

381 U.S. 479 (1965)

United States v. Seeger

380 U.S. 163 (1965)

Reynolds v. Sims

377 U.S. 533 (1964)

New York Times Company v. Sullivan

376 U.S. 254 (1964)

Sherbert v. Verner

374 U.S. 398 (1963)

Gideon v. Wainwright

372 U.S. 335 (1963)

Engel v. Vitale

370 U.S. 421 (1962)

Mapp v. Ohio

367 U.S. 643 (1961)

Sweezy v. New Hampshire

354 U.S. 234 (1957)

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case)

343 U.S. 579 (1952)

Terminiello v. Chicago

337 U.S. 1 (1949)

Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township

330 U.S. 1 (1947)

Korematsu v. United States

323 U.S. 214 (1944)

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

319 U.S. 624 (1943)

Wickard v. Filburn

317 U.S. 111 (1942)

Thornhill v. Alabama

310 U.S. 88 (1940)

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins

304 U.S. 64 (1938)

United States v. Carolene Products Co.

304 U.S. 144 (1938)

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish

300 U.S. 379 (1937)

Crowell v. Benson

285 U.S. 22 (1932)

Stromberg v. California

283 U.S. 359 (1931)

Olmstead v. United States

277 U.S. 438 (1928)

Whitney v. California

274 U.S. 357 (1927)

Gitlow v. New York

268 U.S. 652 (1925)

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

268 U.S. 510 (1925)

Abrams v. United States

250 U.S. 616 (1919)

Schenck v. United States

249 U.S. 47 (1919)

Lochner v. New York

198 U.S. 45 (1905)

United States v. Wong Kim Ark

169 U.S. 649 (1898)

Plessy v. Ferguson

163 U.S. 537 (1896)

Chinese Exclusion Case—Chae Chan Ping v. United States

130 U.S. 581 (1889)

The Civil Rights Cases

109 U.S. 3 (1883)

Strauder v. West Virginia

100 U.S. 303 (1880)

Reynolds v. United States

98 U.S. 145 (1879)

Minor v. Happersett

88 U.S. 162 (1875)

Bradwell v. The State of Illinois

83 U.S. 130 (1873)

The Slaughter-House Cases

83 U.S. 36 (1873)

Dred Scott v. Sandford

60 U.S. 393 (1857)

McCulloch v. Maryland

17 U.S. 316 (1819)

Marbury v. Madison

5 U.S. 137 (1803)

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Sixth Amendment Activities

Apply landmark Supreme Court cases to contemporary scenarios related to your right to counsel and your right to a fair trial. 

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."  Sixth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

Batson v. Kentucky Jury selection and race

J.E.B. v. Alabama Jury selection and gender

Carey v. Musladin Victims' free expression rights and defendants' rights to an impartial jury

Gideon v. Wainwright Indigent defendants and the right to counsel

In re Gault Juveniles and the right to counsel

DISCLAIMER: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for educational purposes only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on any pending case or legislation.

Supreme Court returns Trump Jan. 6 immunity judgment to lower court

Judge Tanya Chutkan will now apply the Supreme Court's immunity decision.

One month after the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling on presidential immunity, the judge overseeing former President Trump's federal election interference case now has jurisdiction over the case again.

U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan is now likely to set a series of deadlines, including a potential status conference.

The case has been stayed for seven months as Trump's legal team appealed presidential immunity all the way to the Supreme Court.

MORE: Supreme Court gives Trump some immunity in Jan. 6 case, but not for 'unofficial acts'

In a 6-3 ruling authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the court found that a president has absolute immunity for acts within their core constitutional powers and a presumption of immunity for "acts within the outer perimeter of his official responsibility."

Judge Chutkan will now be responsible for applying the Supreme Court's decision to the allegations in Trump's criminal case, including whether Trump's actions were "official acts" or private conduct that can be prosecuted.

Trump last year pleaded not guilty to charges of undertaking a "criminal scheme" to overturn the results of the 2020 election by enlisting a slate of so-called "fake electors," using the Justice Department to conduct "sham election crime investigations," trying to enlist the vice president to "alter the election results," and promoting false claims of a stolen election as the Jan. 6 riot raged -- all in an effort to subvert democracy and remain in power.

The former president has denied all wrongdoing.

Trump originally faced a March 4 trial date before his appeal effectively paused the proceedings for more than half a year.

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Criminal Trials & Prosecutions Supreme Court Cases

A defendant in a criminal prosecution faces the potential loss of their liberty. In addition to basic due process protections, defendants have certain rights under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, including:

• Speedy and public trial
• Trial by an impartial jury
• Assistance of counsel
• Confrontation of opposing witnesses

The right to confront opposing witnesses includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses. Under Crawford v. Washington , the modern standard for determining whether confrontation is required hinges on whether a statement is testimonial. Decisions following Crawford have sought to define testimonial statements. Confrontation Clause questions also may involve the meaning of “confrontation,” such as whether a confrontation must be face to face.

Beyond the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has shaped constitutional rights related to lawyers and juries in criminal cases. For example, a defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel regardless of whether they can afford a lawyer. This right even attaches before the start of a trial. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require “effective” assistance of counsel. Meanwhile, a jury must be selected from a representative cross-section of the community. Jury pools and juries must be formed in a non-discriminatory way.

Below is a selection of Supreme Court cases involving criminal trials and prosecutions, arranged from newest to oldest.

Author: Elena Kagan

When an expert in a criminal trial conveys an absent analyst's statements in support of their opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, the statements come into evidence for their truth. If those statements are also testimonial, the Confrontation Clause will bar their admission.

Author: Clarence Thomas

The Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession when the confession has been modified to avoid directly identifying the non-confessing co-defendant, and the court offers a limiting instruction that jurors may consider the confession only with respect to the confessing co-defendant.

Author: Neil Gorsuch

The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense.

Author: Ruth Bader Ginsburg

The Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.

Author: Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

The Confrontation Clause does not necessarily bar the introduction of all out-of-court statements that support the prosecution's case. Instead, a court asks whether a statement was given with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.

Out-of-court statements that are related by an expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.

If an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable, and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.

Author: Sonia Sotomayor

An identification and description of a shooter and the location of a shooting were not testimonial statements for Confrontation Clause purposes because they had a primary purpose to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.

Author: Antonin Scalia

Affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis are testimonial, rendering the affiants “witnesses” subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.

Author: David Souter

A criminal defendant's initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where they learn the charge against them and their liberty is subject to restriction, marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Author: Stephen Breyer

The Constitution does not forbid states from insisting on representation by counsel for people competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point that they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.

A trial court's erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel entitles them to reversal of their conviction.

Statements are testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

When testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is confrontation.

Author: Sandra Day O’Connor

The right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied without a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only when the denial of such a confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy, and only when the testimony's reliability is otherwise assured.

A screen placed between the defendant and the complaining witnesses, which blocked the defendant from their sight, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination but not successful cross-examination. It is satisfied when the defendant has a full and fair opportunity to bring out the witness' bad memory and other facts tending to discredit their testimony.

The Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name but also any reference to their existence.

Author: Lewis Powell

When the state obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached, a defendant does not make out a violation of the right to counsel simply by showing that an informant reported their incriminating statements to the police. Instead, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.

While a defendant has no right to a jury composed in whole or in part of persons of their own race, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the state will not exclude members of their race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of their race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors. In addition, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.

Author: William Rehnquist

A criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that they were prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness. However, the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is subject to harmless error analysis. Whether an error is harmless depends on factors such as the importance of the witness' testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case.

The Sixth Amendment becomes applicable only when the government's role shifts from investigation to accusation through the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. Also, Miranda should not be extended to require the reversal of a conviction if the police are less than forthright in their dealings with an attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of an attorney's unilateral efforts to contact them.

Author: Warren Burger

The Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance of counsel is not violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at their trial.

Author: William Brennan

The right to assistance of counsel attaches at critical stages in the criminal justice process, at which the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a formality.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce the accused to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the government violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the resulting statements should not have been admitted at trial.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has provided them with the right to assistance of appointed counsel in their defense. However, these Amendments do not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant who is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment on conviction is authorized but not imposed.

Author: Potter Stewart

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel means at least that a person is entitled to a lawyer's help at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against them. To show a waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel, the state must prove an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant in a criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of self-representation. They may defend themselves without counsel when they voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so.

Author: Byron White

The requirement that a jury be selected from a representative cross-section of the community is fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of women from jury panels.

The right of confrontation is paramount to a state policy of protecting juvenile offenders, and any temporary embarrassment to a witness by the disclosure of their juvenile court record and probation status is outweighed by the defendant's right effectively to cross-examine a witness.

Author: Harry Blackmun

The Sixth Amendment does not grant an accused the right to have counsel present when the government conducts a post-indictment photographic display, containing a picture of the accused, for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.

A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any inflexible rule. It must be determined on an ad hoc balancing basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. The court should assess factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of their right, and prejudice to the defendant.

Author: William O. Douglas

The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assistance of counsel is not governed by the classification of the offense or by whether a jury trial is required.

A showup after arrest, but before the initiation of any adversary criminal proceeding, is not a criminal prosecution at which the accused as a matter of absolute right is entitled to counsel.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements as long as they are testifying as a witness at trial and are subject to full cross-examination.

The conviction of a defendant at a joint trial should be set aside on Confrontation Clause grounds when a co-defendant's confession inculpating the defendant was introduced as evidence against the co-defendant during the trial, even though the jury was instructed that the confession should be disregarded in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence.

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in all criminal cases that would come within the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury if they were tried in a federal court. Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings at which the results might well determine their fate, and at which the absence of counsel might derogate from their right to a fair trial. A post-indictment lineup is a critical prosecutive stage at which an accused is entitled to the aid of counsel.

Author: Hugo Black

The right granted to a defendant by the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against them, which includes the right of cross-examination, is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Author: Arthur Goldberg

When a police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect in police custody who has been refused an opportunity to consult with their counsel and has not been warned of their constitutional right to keep silent, the accused has been denied the assistance of counsel, and no statement extracted by the police during the interrogation may be used against them at trial.

Incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents from a defendant in the absence of their attorney deprived them of their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and could not be used as evidence against them at their trial.

Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused who has requested it violates due process when the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.

The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial.

Author: Felix Frankfurter

Involuntary verbal confessions are inadmissible in a criminal trial under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.

Author: Owen Josephus Roberts

Under the circumstances, the refusal of a state court to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant at a trial in which he was convicted of robbery did not deny him due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (This decision was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright below.)

Author: Frank Murphy

The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental to be made to depend upon nice calculations by courts of the degree of prejudice arising from its denial.

The right to assistance of counsel may be waived, but the waiver must be intelligent. Whether there was a waiver must depend on the particular facts and circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.

Author: George Sutherland

The right of the accused, at least in a capital case, to have the aid of counsel for their defense is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This includes the right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare a defense.

Author: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

A trial for murder in a state court in which the accused are hurried to conviction under mob domination without regard for their rights is without due process and void.

Author: William Howard Taft

The provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions do not apply to a territory belonging to the U.S. that has not been incorporated into the Union, such as Puerto Rico.

Author: William Strong

When a state law secures to every white man the right of trial by a jury selected from and without discrimination against his race, and at the same time permits or requires such discrimination against the colored man because of his race, the latter is not equally protected by law with the former.

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Trump election subversion case returned to trial judge following Supreme Court opinion

Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump speaks at the National Association of Black Journalists, NABJ, convention, Wednesday, July 31, 2024, in Chicago. (AP Photo/Charles Rex Arbogast)

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WASHINGTON (AP) — The criminal case charging former President Donald Trump with plotting to overturn the 2020 presidential election was returned Friday to the trial judge in Washington after a Supreme Court opinion last month that narrowed the scope of the prosecution.

The case was formally sent back to U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan for further proceedings aimed at sorting out which acts in the landmark indictment constitute official acts and which do not.

The procedural move is expected to restart the case with a flurry of motions and potential hearings, but the sheer amount of work ahead for the judge and lawyers ensures that there’s no way a trial can take place before the November presidential election in which Trump is the Republican nominee. If Trump is elected president, he can appoint an attorney general who would presumably order the case dismissed.

The four-count indictment, one of four criminal cases brought against Trump last year, accuses him of illegally conspiring to cling to the presidency by working with aides to try to undo the results of the election he lost to Democrat Joe Biden.

But the Supreme Court on July 1 dealt prosecutors a major blow, ruling in a 6-3 opinion that presidents enjoy absolute immunity for core constitutional duties and are presumptively immune from prosecution for all other official acts.

The justices left it to Chutkan, who is presiding over the case, to decide how to apply their opinion to the remainder of the case.

That means she’ll be deciding in the weeks ahead whether key allegations in the case — including that Trump badgered his vice president, Mike Pence, to reject the official counting of electoral votes showing that he had lost the election — can remain part of the prosecution or must be discarded.

The case brought by special counsel Jack Smith had been effectively frozen since last December amid Trump’s appeal, which was argued in April before the Supreme Court, that he was immune from prosecution for the acts charged in the indictment.

A separate case brought by Smith, accusing Trump of illegally hoarding classified documents at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, was dismissed by a different judge last month who held that Smith’s appointment was illegal. The Justice Department is appealing.

The high court’s immunity opinion has been cited by defense lawyers in another of Trump’s prosecutions, with attorneys arguing that his hush money conviction in New York should be set aside in light of the ruling. The judge in the case postponed sentencing and has said he’ll rule on the matter next month.

Trump faces a separate prosecution in Fulton County, Georgia, related to efforts to overturn the 2020 election. That case has been significantly delayed, preventing a trial from taking place this year.

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United States Government​

Because the Constitution is vague and ambiguous in many places, it is often possible for critics to fault the Supreme Court for misinterpreting it. Among the most important doctrinal sources used by the Supreme Court have been the commerce, due-process, and equal-protection clauses of the Constitution. It also has often ruled on controversies involving civil liberties, including freedom of speech and the right of privacy. Much of its work consists of clarifying, refining, and testing the Constitution’s philosophic ideals and translating them into working principles. On divisive issues such as abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, and flag burning, the Court’s decisions have aroused considerable opposition and controversy, with opponents sometimes seeking constitutional amendments to overturn the Court’s decisions.

Marbury v. Madison (1803)​

Constitutional judicial review is usually considered to have begun with the assertion by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803) that the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts had the power to invalidate legislation enacted by Congress, as well as executive and administrative actions, that it deemed inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. The case arose after the administration of Pres. Thomas Jefferson withheld from William Marbury a judgeship commission that had been formalized in the last days of the preceding John Adams administration.  Read more.

Related Articles

Judiciary act of 1801, federalist party, democratic-republican party, dred scott v. john f.a. sandford (1857).

On March 6, 1857, the Supreme Court ruled in Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sandford , that having lived in a free state and territory did not entitle a slave, Dred Scott, to his freedom. In essence, the decision argued that as a slave Scott was not a citizen and could not sue in a federal court. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney also stated that Congress had no power to exclude slavery from the territories (thus invalidating the Missouri Compromise [1820]) and that African Americans could never become U.S. citizens.  Read more.

Related articles

Missouri compromise, roger b. taney, how the dred scott decision affected the u.s. election of 1860, plessy v. ferguson (1896).

In its Plessy v. Ferguson ruling in 1896, the Supreme Court put forward the controversial “separate but equal” doctrine, according to which laws mandating racial segregation in public accommodations were constitutional provided that the separate facilities for each race were equal. The ruling essentially established the constitutionality of racial segregation and the Jim Crow laws that enforced segregation in the South between the end of Reconstruction and the 1950s.  Read more.

Homer Plessy

Jim crow law, racial segregation, featured videos, world history.

History provides a chronological, statistical, and cultural record of the events, people, and movements that have made an impact on humankind and the world at large throughout the ages.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)

On May 17, 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , the Supreme Court ruled unanimously (9–0) that racial segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the states from denying equal protection of the laws to any person within their jurisdictions. The decision declared that separate educational facilities for white and African American students were inherently unequal. It thus rejected the “separate but equal” doctrine, advanced by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). The ruling helped inspire the American civil rights movement of the late 1950s and 1960s.  Read more .

American civil rights movement

Equal protection, thurgood marshall, roe v. wade (1973).

In its Roe v. Wade decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on January 22, 1973, that unduly restrictive state regulation of abortion is unconstitutional. In his majority opinion Justice Harry A. Blackmun held that a set of Texas statutes criminalizing abortion in most instances violated a woman’s constitutional right of privacy, which it found to be implicit in the liberty guarantee of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Read more.

Due process

Norma mccorvey, harry a. blackmun, citizens united v. federal election commission (2010).

On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court ruled (5–4) in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that laws that prevented corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds for independent “electioneering communications” (political advertising) violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.  Read more.

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

Federal election campaign act, political action committee, featured explainer series, wwii explained in 5 questions.

Topic: Supreme Court Cases

Washington v. texas (1967).

See Incorporation (Nationalization) of the Bill of Rights

Southern Railway Company v. Reid (1912)

Southern Railway Company v. Reid (1912) is an early preemption case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a North Carolina statute requiring common carriers…

Shapiro v. Thompson (1969)

In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Shapiro v. Thompson that states could not impose durational residency requirements for the receipt of public…

Schilb v. Kuebel (1971)

Robinson v. california (1962), pointer v. texas (1965), parker v. gladden (1966).

See Nationalization of the Bill of Rights

New State Ice Company v. Liebmann (1932)

In this case the Supreme Court manifested its historic dedication to the protection of economic liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth…

Near v. Minnesota (1931)

Mccray v. united states (1904).

This Supreme Court case addresses the scope of Congress’s taxing and spending powers. More specifically, it examines the ability of Congress to use its taxing authority for regulatory…

Luther v. Borden (1849)

In 1849, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply Article IV, Section 4, of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees states a “republican form of government,” to a…

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)

This 1987 U.S. Supreme Court case dealt with the controversy over the legally permissible scope of state and local government regulatory land-use power under…

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992)

This 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case addresses the question of what constitutes the proper exercise of state and local government regulation over land use…

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What is the purpose of the center for the study of federalism (csf).

The Center for the Study of Federalism (CSF) is a nonpartisan, interdisciplinary research and education institution dedicated to supporting and advancing scholarship and public understanding of federal theories, principles, institutions, and processes as practical means of organizing power in free societies.

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Supreme Court Rejects Long-Shot Challenge to Trump Hush Money Case

Missouri sought to sue New York under the court’s “original jurisdiction,” which sometimes allows suits between states to be brought directly to the justices.

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By Adam Liptak

Reporting from Washington

The Supreme Court on Monday rejected an audacious lawsuit by Missouri that asked the justices to intervene in the hush money case in New York in which former President Donald J. Trump was convicted of falsifying business records.

Andrew Bailey, Missouri’s attorney general, asked the court to defer Mr. Trump’s sentencing, scheduled for Sept. 18, until after the election and to lift a gag order limiting what he can say.

The Supreme Court’s brief order did not lay out the court’s reasoning. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr. said they would have let the state file the suit, but they did not express a view about whether it had merit.

Mr. Bailey told the justices that his “modest request imposes no harm on the state of New York, but it ensures that voters in Missouri and across America are able to make their voices heard this November without one state interfering with the ability of everybody else to hear a major-party candidate campaign.”

Much of Missouri’s proposed suit was devoted to what it said were legal shortcomings in and political motivations behind the case against Mr. Trump.

In response , Letitia James, New York’s attorney general, wrote that the suit was flawed in at least three ways. Missouri has not suffered the sort of injury that gave the state standing to sue, she wrote. New York was not a proper defendant, she added, as the case against Mr. Trump was brought by an elected district attorney, Alvin L. Bragg, who had exercised independent discretion. And there were, she wrote, other forums in which the questions raised by Missouri can be adjudicated.

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Home > Cases > Citizenship Amendment Act

Citizenship Amendment Act

Indian Union Muslim League v Union of India

The Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.

D.Y. Chandrachud CJI

J.B. Pardiwala J

Manoj Misra J

Petitioner: Indian Union Muslim League; Mahua Moitra; Jairam Ramesh; Asaduddin Owaisi; Deb Mukharji IFS (Retd); T.N. Prathapan; Harsh Mander; Sayyed Farooq; Tehseen Poonawalla; Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay; Asom Gana Parishad; All Assam Students Union; All Assam Lawyers Association; Assam Pradesh Congress Committee Assam; Assam Association of the Deaf; Assam State Jamiat Ulema; Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chatra Parishad; All Assam Matak Sanmilan; Asom Sankhyalaghu Sangram Parishad; Asam Sahitya Sabha;; Rihai Manch; United Against Hate; Edara E Sharia; Peace Party; Social Democratic Party of India; Muslim Advocates Association; Jamiat Ulama E Hind; Tamil Nadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam Trust; National People’s Party; North East Students Organisation; Democratic Youth Federation of India; Digboi IOCL Contract Association; Kerala Muslim Jamaath; Loktantrik Yuva Janata Dal; Jamiat Ulama I Hind; Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam; Jorhat Bar Association; Communist Party of India; ANIS Educational and Welfare Trust; ACPR; Rihai Manch; Nishtha Ganesh; Makkal Needhi Maiam; Debabrata Saikia; Ajanta Neog; Ehtesham Hashmi; Pradyot Deb Burman; Ramesh Chennithala; Rangon Choudhury; Suhas Chakma; Intekhab Alam; Abu Soehl; Padi Richo; Prasenjit Bose; Peter Aiborlang Dohkrut; Maitur Rahman; Umar M; Anjum Parvez; Hiren Gohain; Prof. Manoj Kumar Jha; Jitendra Chaudhury; Mohd. Faziluddin; Thol. Thirumaavalavan; Prashant Padmanabhan; Mohd. Azam Hashmati; Mohd. Ghouse; Rakesh Chakravorty; Jorhat Bar; Syed Mohammad Haider; Lachit Bordoloi; Puneet Kaur Dhanda; Mukesh Kumar Sharma; Ummea Salma

Respondent: Union of India

Lawyers: Attorney General R. Venkataramani; Solicitor General Tushar Mehta

Case Details

Case Number: WP (C) 1470/2019

Next Hearing: March 19, 2024

Last Updated: March 19, 2024

TAGS: CAA , Citizenship , Dignity , Religion , Right to Equality , Right to Life

Whether the CAA violates Article 14 of the Constitution by failing the reasonable classification test?

Whether the CAA discriminates on the basis of religion?

Whether the CAA violates the right to live with dignity guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution?

Whether G.S.R. 685(E), 686(E), 702(E) and 703(E) are unconstitutional (on the same grounds as the CAA is)?

Case Description

The  Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019  (hereafter ‘CAA’) amends the  Citizenship Act, 1955  so as to grant a certain class of illegal migrants a path to Indian citizenship. The CAA makes illegal migrants eligible for citizenship if they (a) belong to the Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community and (b) are from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan. It only applies to migrants who entered India on or before 31 December, 2014. Certain areas in the North-East are exempted from the provision.

Viewed in combination with the  proposed all-India National Register of Citizens (NCR) , the CAA has the potential to deprive many Muslims residing in India of full citizenship. The proposed NRC will likely deprive many persons, both Muslim and non-Muslim, residing in India of citizenship. While excluded non-Muslims will have the opportunity to regain citizenship via the CAA, this will not be the case for Muslims. Hence, the NRC in combination with the CAA may disproportionately exclude Muslim residents of India.

On 11 December, Parliament passed the  Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2019  (at which point it became the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019). The CAA was officially notified on 10 January 2020.

Immediately after the Bill was passed, the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) filed  a petition  under  Article 32 of the Constitution  challenging the constitutionality of the CAA. Soon various other litigants followed and there are currently around 200 petitions tagged to the IUML petition. These petitions primarily challenge the CAA for discriminating on the basis of religion. They also contend that it violates the fundamental rights to equality and dignity of illegal migrants under  Articles 14  and  21  of the Constitution.

A majority of the petitions base their primary challenge to the CAA on Article 14. Article 14 guarantees all ‘persons’ (not only citizens) equality before the law and equal protection of law. In  R.K. Garg  (1981), the Supreme Court established that Article 14 prohibits Parliament from enacting laws that arbitrarily or irrationally differentiate between groups of persons. The Court has developed the two-part reasonable classification test for assessing whether a law unconstitutionally differentiates between persons: (1) any differentiation between groups of persons must be founded on ‘intelligible differentia’; (2) ‘that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act’. The petitioners claim that the CAA fails the reasonable classification test and thus violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

The stated aim (‘object sought to be achieved’) of the CAA is to accommodate persons facing religious persecution. The petitioners claim that this aim has no rational relation with a differentiation based on religion and country of origin. For example, there are illegal migrants who have fled to India after facing religious persecution in Sri Lanka, but the CAA arbitrarily excludes them. The petitioners conclude that there is no rational nexus between the differentia and the aim sought.

The petitions pray for the Supreme Court to strike down the CAA for violating the Constitution. A majority of the petitions single out Section 2(1)(b) of the CAA, which specifically provides for a path to citizenship to Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan.

Further, many of the petitions pray for the Court to strike down four notifications issued by the Union government in 2015 and 2016 on the same grounds. The notifications (G.S.R.  685(E), 686(E) ,  702(E), 703(E) ) exempt illegal migrants from the above six religions and three countries of origin from deportation and detention under the  Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920  and  Foreigners Act, 1946 .

On 28 May, the Government of India issued an order under Section 16 the Citizenship Act, 1955. The order gives district collectors in 13 districts with a high migrant population the power to accept citizenship applications from people from the same 3 countries belonging to the same 6 religions.

On 1 June, the IUML has filed an application requesting an interim stay on this order.

Documents (23)

The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) Rules, 2024

March 11, 2024

Counter Affidavit On Behalf of Union Government

October 31, 2022

CAA: Intervention Application Against Government Order by IUML

January 1, 2021

CAA: Counter Affidavit filed by Union of India

March 17, 2020

CAA: UNHRC Intervention Application

March 3, 2020

CAA: Supreme Court Order on Filing Delays

February 18, 2020

CAA: Writ Petition by Muslim Students Federation (Assam)

CAA: Writ Petition by Deborshi Chakraborty

February 10, 2020

CAA: Writ Petition by Sachin Vrashabhanath Mone

January 30, 2020

CAA: Supreme Court Order Granting Union4 Week Extension

January 22, 2020

CAA: Stay Application by IUML

January 16, 2020

CAA: Writ Petition by Mahboob Alam Khan

CAA: Writ Petition by Advocates Association for Indigenous Rights of Assamese

January 14, 2020

CAA: Supreme Court Order Issuing Notice

December 18, 2019

CAA: Writ Petition by Prasenjit Bose

December 17, 2019

CAA: Writ Petition by National People's Party (Assam)

December 13, 2019

Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019

December 12, 2019

CAA: Writ Petition by Pallavi Pratap on Behalf of Indian Union Muslim League

GRS 702-3 (E) Union Government Notification

July 18, 2016

GRS 685-6 (E) Union Government Notification

September 7, 2015

Citizenship Act, 1955

December 30, 1955

Counter affidavit in All Assam Student's Union

October 27, 2022

Counter Affidavit IUML

Reports (9)

Citizenship Amendment Act | Supreme Court refuses to stay the CAA rules; directs Union to file responses to interim stay applications

March 19, 2024

CAA #3: SC Will Hear Challenges from December 6th

CAA challenge #3: Supreme Court Directs Compartmentalisation of Issues

September 12, 2022

CAA: Writ Petition Summary (Indian Union Muslim League)

June 7, 2021

CAA: Writ Petition Summary (All Assam Students’ Union)

CAA: Stay Application Declined

May 20, 2020

CAA: Plain English Summary of Union’s Reply

Day 2 Arguments

Day 1 Arguments