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Essay Outline: China Pakistan Energy Corridor (CPEC)

The CPEC is a 3,000-kilometre network of roads, railways and pipelines to transport oil and gas from Gwadar Port to Kashgar city, northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, China Daily reports. China and Pakistan have agreed to build One Belt One Road project more commonly known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is expected to bring about both peace and prosperity in South Asia. This corridor will link between Kashgar in north-western China to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea near the border with Iran via roads, railways and pipelines. There are many internal and external challenges for Pakistan government to implement this multi-dollars project. However, it is a game changer project which will transforn1 the fate of Pakistan and will help Pakistan modernize. It will improve the economy and trade, enhance regional connectivity, overcome energy crises, develop infrastructure and establish people to people contacts in both the countries.

Proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, the CPEC will act as a bridge for the new Maritin1e Silk Route that envisages linking three billion people in Asia, Africa and Europe.

The project links China’s strategy to develop its western region with Pakistan’s focus on boosting its economy, including the infrastructure construction of Gwadar Port, together with some energy cooperatton and investment programmes. It also involves road and railway construction including an upgrade of the 1,300-km Karakoram Highway, the highest paved international road in the world which connects China and Pakistan across the Karakoram mountains.

The CPEC will reduce China’s routes of oil and gas imports from Africa and the Middle East by thousands of kilometres, making Gwadar a potentially vital link in China’s supply chain.

• Introduction
• Development of Gwadar
• Previous project: Silk Road
• Fruits for Pakistan
• The Concept of One Belt and One Road
• Different Routes
• Agreement of Bilateral Trade and Economic Ties
• Geostrategic Location of Gwadar
• Counter Indian Influence
• Economic Gains from This Project
• Removal of Social Problems Due to CPEC
• Balance of Power in South Asia
• Effects of the Projects

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Essay on (CPEC) China Pakistan Economic Corridor for CSS & PMS

• July 25, 2021
• Essay for CSS PMS and Judiciary Exam

This is an essay on (CPEC) China Pakistan Economic Corridor for CSS & PMS. China and Pakistan have agreed to build the One Belt One Road project more commonly known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is expected to bring about both peace and prosperity in South Asia. Find below the complete Essay on CPEC.

Introduction Development of Gwadar Previous project: Silk Road Projects Under CPEC The Concept of One Belt and One Road Different Routes in CPEC Geostrategic location of Gwadar Challenges for Pakistan Internal Challenges External Challenges Counter Indian influence Economic Gains from this Project Removal of Social Problems due to CPEC Effects of the CPEC Projects Conclusion

Essay on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Introduction.

The CPEC is a 3,000-kilometre network of roads, railways, and pipelines to transport oil and gas from Gwadar Port to Kashgar city, northwestern China’s Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, China Daily reports. China and Pakistan have agreed to build the One Belt One Road project more commonly known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is expected to bring about both peace and prosperity in South Asia. This corridor will link Kashgar in north-western China to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea near the border with Iran via roads, railways, and pipelines.

There are many internal and external challenges for the Pakistan government to implement this multi-dollars project. However, it is a game-changer project which will transforn1 the fate of Pakistan and will help Pakistan modernize. It will improve the economy and trade, enhance regional connectivity, overcome energy crises , develop infrastructure and establish people-to-people contacts in both countries.

Proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, the CPEC  will act as a bridge for the new Maritime Silk Route that envisages linking three billion people in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Development of Gwadar

The project links China’s strategy to develop its western region with Pakistan’s focus on boosting its economy, including the infrastructure construction of Gwadar Port, together with some energy cooperation and investment programs. It also involves road and railway construction including an upgrade of the 1300-km Karakoram Highway, the highest paved international road in the world which connects China and Pakistan across the Karakoram mountains.

The CPEC will reduce China’s routes of oil and gas imports from Africa and the Middle East by thousands of kilometers, making Gwadar a potentially vital link in China’s supply chain.

Previous project: Silk Road

With the support of China, Pakistan has gained significant importance not only in the region but the entire world. In recent years, both China and Pakistan have been making concerted efforts to revive the historic Silk Road which is one of the oldest known trade routes in the world and will provide a route for trade from Kashgar (China) to Gwadar (Pakistan). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor plan will help Pakistan to become one of the most strategically important countries in the region.

It will also provide an opportunity for China to build a naval base on Gwadar port that will increase the influence of China in the region and also counter US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. CBS News quoted some Western diplomats on the Pakistan-China partnership. According to  them, China’s increasing economic engagement with Pakistan should be seen in the context of Beijing’s “efforts to counter the US efforts to deepen alliances around the Asia-Pacific region.”

Projects Under CPEC

The “One Belt One Road” concept has international strategic importance. The One Belt One Road initiative covers countries and regions with a total population of 4.4 billion and a total economic the volume of US$ 21 trillion, 63 % and 29 %, respectively of the World.

According to the assessment of the Corridor, the plan is involved in laying the foundation for regional cooperation, improving economic growth, offering trade diversifications, investing in transportation, mining, and energy sectors, and creating political flexibility . It is a vision with world-changing implications, an unfolding plan that would weave much of Asia, Europe, Africa,  Oceania, and the Middle East much more closely together through a patchwork of diplomacy, new infi\structure, and free trade zones.

The “One Belt One Road” Project consists of three routes, southern, central, and northern route. The southern corridor begins from Guangzhou, which is the third-largest city of China in South Central China. This route moves towards western parts of China and connects Kashgar with Pakistan at Kunjarab – a point from where China wants to link to Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea. It is the shortest and the most feasible option for China.

The second Chinese option is the Central Corridor that starts from Shanghai and links the country to Tashkent, Tehran, and onwards to Bandar Imam Khomeini Port of Iran on the Persian Gulf. One of its branches goes up towards Europe. This is the longer route but could be an option if Pakistan does not deliver on the timelines of completing its road network to become a beneficiary of the New Silk Road Economic Belt. The third Chinese option is the Northern Corridor that starts from Beijing, passes through Russia, and links it to European cities.

The Concept of One Belt and One Road

Recognizing the fact that regional integration is an inevitable measure to meet the demands of the economically globalized world, the notion of the Silk Road was reformulated and rephrased by China in 2013 under ‘one road, one belt’ initiative, i.e., economic belt along the Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road.

Pakistan is a significant partner for China as it links China to Central Asia, the Southern Asian region, and the Middle East, and its major deep-sea port Gwadar offers direct access to the Indian Ocean and beyond. Both countries have been working on enhancing their coordination and strategic communication to safeguard common interests. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) represents a new model of Pakistan and China cooperation which will serve against the backdrop of complex and changing regional and international situations.

China and Pakistan have developed strong bilateral trade and economic ties and cooperation over the years. China has gradually emerged as Pakistan’s major trading partner both in terms of exports and imports. Bilateral trade and commercial links between the two countries were established in January 1963 when both signed the first bilateral long-term trade agreement. Both countries signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on November 24, 2006, and implemented it from July 1, 2007. Later on, both signed the FTA on Trade in Services on February 21, 2009, which became active from October 10 that year.

CPEC is an under-construction mega-project that will achieve the political and economic objectives through trade and development and will also strengthen the economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. This corridor will also be helpful in creating regional stability in South Asia.

Different Routes in CPEC

After completion of the corridor, it will function as a primary gateway for trade between China and Africa, and the Middle East. It is expected that this corridor will help cut the 12,000-kilometre the route which Middle East oil supplies must now take to reach the Chinese ports. This project will run through most of Pakistan starting from Gwadar in Balochistan and ending in Kashgar in western China while passing through parts of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, and Gilgit-Baltistan in northern Pakistan to reach the Khunjrab Pass and beyond to China.

Pakistan has prepared a plan to construct three corridors after active consultation with the Chinese authorities; these are the eastern alignment, the central alignn1ent, and the western alignment.

Geostrategic location of Gwadar

The eastern alignment of the corridor originates from Gwadar, travels parallel to the Makran Coastal Highway eastwards (towards Karachi), and then after passing through parts of interior Sindh, and southern, central, and northern regions of Punjab, it reaches Islamabad. From Islamabad, it extends to Haripur, Abbottabad, and Mansehra districts of the relatively peaceful Hazara Division in KP this part of the corridor will also run through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir – and reaches Khunjrab after passing through Diamer and Gilgit areas in northern Pakistan.

The corridor will also run through the Pamir Plateau and Karakoram mountains. A link from Taxila through Peshawar and Torkhum will connect the eastern alignment of the corridor to Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Regional connectivity with India through the eastern alignment is designed to be provided through the Hyderabad-Mirpurkhas-Khokhrapar-Zero Point link and the Wagha border, Lahore.

Western alignment was the original alignment which the government says has been deferred until the eastern alignment of the corridor is completed. According to the western alignment plan, the economic corridor (highway and railway) starts from Gwadar and runs through some southern and eastern districts of Balochistan (Khuzdar and Dera Bugti, respectively), and some districts in south Punjab to reach D. I. Khan in KP.

From D. I. Khan, it further extends to Islamabad and Abbottabad, and from there onwards, the route is the same as in the eastern alignment. The western alignment will have an additional regional connectivity link to Afghanistan through Chaman and will connect with Iran through the Quetta-Kho-e-Taftan link.

Following are the challenges for Pakistan in fulfillment of CPEC.

Challenges for Pakistan

Pakistan faces several challenges in the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. These challenges can be identified as external and internal. The Vice Director General of Policy Research Office at the International Department of the Central Committee Communist Party of China, Dr. Luan Jianzhang is of the view that political unrest, the security situation, and administrative issues are some of the greatest challenges in the way of successful completion of the corridor.

The construction of the corridor has been defined by many as a strategic moment such that Pakistan has assumed the position of economic pivot for the whole region. This paradigm shift in circumstances is a cause of great worry for the enemies of Pakistan both within and outside. India, Israel, and the US are unhappy. For India, CPEC is a thorn in its paw. They have put their heads together to work out new strategies to block the project forward march. RAW has opened a special office in Delhi and has been allotted $300 million to disrupt CPEC. Already one can notice a sudden upsurge in the acts of terror in the three restive regions and activation of certain NGOs and think tanks all trying to air misgivings and create a fear psychosis.

Internal Challenges for Pakistan

In Pakistan, some political parties like ANP, Baloch nationalists, PkMAP raised serious objections to the CPEC project. Even PT! and JUI (F) showed inclinations to climb the bandwagon of anti-CPEC forces. Objections were being raised despite assurances by the government that this project will provide equal opportunities to all the provinces.

Security concerns have been the most critical challenge to the CPEC and both Pakistan and China have been trying to meet these. An arc of militancy stretches from Xinjiang to Gwadar consisting of groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Daesh (ISIS), Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the militant wings of some political parties. Most of these groups may not have an enn1ity with China itself but rather intend to attack the Chinese interests like the  CPEC as a means to deal with the Pakistani state.

Gwadar is the tail of the Silk belt, which will connect at Kashgar through different communication networks. The security of the whole corridor and Gwadar is a real concern for China. After the military operation in different parts of Pakistan, the terrorist infrastructure still exists inside and outside of the borders which will continue to pose a threat.

The support of the American CIA, Israeli Mossad, and Indian RAW has continuously been assisting the militant groups and sub-nationalists in all the provinces to conduct subversive acts – and using terrorist elements in the whole country to threaten the Pak-Chinese plans of developing the CPEC. In the past few years, they kidnapped and killed many Chinese nationals in Pakistan despite Pakistan’s efforts to provide the best possible security.

The army has announced the creation of a 10,000 men special force for protecting the development projects. The new force, named the Special Security Division, will comprise nine army battalions and six wings of paramilitary forces, the Rangers and the Frontier Corps.

External Challenges for Pakistan

As an economic enterprise, for the CPEC, the greatest challenge comes from competitors. The most significant is the Iranian port of Chabahar. India intends to invest significantly ($85 million) in the development of Chabahar, which lies a few miles away from Gwadar and is part of its efforts for access to land-locked Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing rival Pakistan. Chabahar will effectively be a way station for energy imports coming from the Gulf region and destined for Afghanistan and Central Asia.

It will also be a gateway to the Middle East, and possibly Europe, for exports originating from Afghanistan and Central Asia. While the Chabahar project has not yet been started due to the ongoing talks on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Gwadar port has already become functional. However, there is no need for contention between these two ports. Iran has a stake in the CPEC through the proposal to link the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline with China, which has been described as a “common interest” between the three countries.

Counter Indian Influence

Indian involvement in Chabahar is linked to Pakistan’s refusal to allow India access to transit to and from Afghanistan, so India sees Iran as the next-best option. If Pakistan extends transit facilities to India, and then India may not be interested in building up Chabahar.

India is also not happy with the handing over of Gwadar Port development and its operations to China. There have long been reports that Delhi is fuelling insurgency in Balochistan, which is rich in oil and gas resources, but poor law and order conditions have halted work on exploration activities there. Experts believe the India-UAE nexus will try to fail the Gwadar Port development project and create hurdles in the way of exploration activities in Balochistan.

In recent years, India has been particularly active in engaging Central Asian states for the sake of pursuing energy deals. India can be easily accommodated via the CPEC itself through the eastern interface in Punjab and Sindh and transformed into a stakeholder in the success of both Gwadar and the CPEC.

The dice of connectivity loaded by China has left India confused and bewildered. India is also concerned about China’s huge investment in Pakistan, particularly its recent decision to fund for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China is also helping Pakistan in producing plutonium at the Chinese-built Kyushu reactor and will also sell eight submarines worth $5 billion, which will give a quantum jump to Pak Navy’s sea capability.

Economic Gains from this Project

After the completion of CPEC, Pakistan may become a trade hub in the region after Gwadar Port starts functioning fully and duty-free economic zones are set up. Many Central Asian states have also expressed interest in becoming part of the corridor. This strategic partnership between Pakistan and China has upset India that openly voiced its opposition and even premier Narendra Modi pressed the president of China during his visit to Beijing to drop the plan of developing the corridor. However, China did not cave into the pressure and vowed to push ahead with work on the project.

With Chinese clout growing and Russia flexing muscles to regain control over Central Asia, India is struggling to make some headway and spread its sphere of influence in the region. Delhi has bet on Iran and Afghanistan to reach the Central Asian states via land route as Pakistan and China have control over many land links that provide access to the resource-rich region.

India hopes it will be able to reach Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chabahar and build a north-south corridor that will run to Afghanistan and eventually stretch to Central Asia.

Pakistan has been playing a significant role in South Asia. After the completion of the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor economic, commercial as well as geostrategic environment will improve in Pakistan. It will help Pakistan in dealing with the problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequities of undeveloped provinces.

During his meeting with President Xi Jinping, President Mamnoon  Hussain said, “the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would prove to be a game-changer in the whole region by generating massive trade and economic activity and opening new vistas of progress and prosperity for the people of the two countries and about three billion people of the region” .

CPEC from all counts will prove a game-changer and will make China a real stakeholder in Pakistan’s stability and security. It is a win-win situation for both. It will greatly expand the scope for the sustainable and stable development of China’s economic development. Investments by China will boost Pakistan’s $274 billion GDP by over 15 %.

Corresponding progress and prosperity in Pakistan and China’s patronage will help Pakistan in getting rid of the decade-old labels of ‘epicenter of terrorism’, ‘most dangerous country, and a ‘failing state’.

Pakistan enjoys a more favorable financial situation compared to India by reducing its budget deficit to 4.7% of GDP in 2014 (as against India’s 7%) and Pakistan is both competitive and cheaper as an emerging market. China’s economic and military assistance will help Pakistan a great deal in narrowing its ever-widening gap in economic military-nuclear fields with India and in bettering its defense potential.

Ambassador of China to Pakistan Sun Weidong while talking about the corridor said that the setting up of energy, transport, infrastructure, and industrial projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would benefit all the provinces of Pakistan. He said that the CPEC was not limited to just a road but it will connect the country with a number of motorways and infrastructure projects.

He explained that infrastructure projects included Gwadar port, the second phase of the upgrading project of Karakoram Highway, motorway project between Karachi and Lahore, Thakot-Havelian motorway, Gwadar port expressway, Gwadar international airport, and Karachi-Sukkur motorway, adding further that the project will increase collaboration in areas of energy, finance,  commerce, banking, industry, and education.

Removal of Social Problem due to CPEC

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will help build a robust and stable economy in Pakistan and will create a significant opportunity for Pakistan to revive its industry and advance its economic interests. It will also help in overcoming the psychological barriers to flows of foreign investment from other sources. Despite its restrictive economic regime, over 150 private equity funds, foreign and domestic, are active in India.

Only three or four such funds are dedicated to investing government, with the participation of the private sector, to encourage foreign direct investment in Pakistan is indispensable. Finance Minister Ishaq Dar said war phobia can also be defeated through economic development. Peace and prosperity can be achieved with economic advancement.

This project will go beyond regional ambits to bring about enormous changes not only to the national economies of the benefiting states but also to the economics of the people at the grassroots level.

Effects of CPEC Projects

CPEC is the crown jewel in the new Pakistan economic paradigm because Pakistan has the opportunity to act independently of the western influence especially the US influence as it has proved of late, an irritant factor. CPEC project will also bring an opportunity to Pakistan for normalization of ties with India, Iran, and Afghanistan which will keep balance, strengthen prospects of peace and improve the socio-economic status of the people of the region.

CPEC is a game-changer project which will lift millions of Pakistanis out of poverty and misery. The project embraces the construction of the textile garments, industrial park projects, construction of dams, the installation of nuclear reactors, and creating networks of road, railway lines that will generate employment, and people will also take ownership of these projects. Fully equipped hospitals, technical and vocational training institutes, water supply, and distribution in undeveloped areas will also improve the quality of life of people.

CPEC is not only the name of road, port, and railway system but a multi-dollars mega project which will bring peace and prosperity in all the provinces of Pakistan. The chairman of the Gwadar port, Dostain Khan Jamaldini said that the CPEC would not only benefit Balochistan but also prove beneficial for the country’s three other provinces.

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China’s big gamble in Pakistan: A 10-year scorecard for CPEC

The monster project for the Belt and Road Initiative has a deeply troubled beginning.

• China – Belt and Road Initiative

A flagship for China’s much-vaunted Belt and Road Initiative , the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor  (CPEC) has been underway for a decade. Signed by Pakistan’s then prime minister Nawaz Sharif following a July 2013 meeting in Beijing with China’s President Xi Jinping, the two leaders pledged the now all-too-familiar homilies about the opportunities involved – to steadily move forward and promote integrated interests to achieve common development.

CPEC is indeed ambitious. Realistic? Perhaps the experience over the decade since might be better characterised as one of resistance than progress.

The project is a broad branding for dozens of interconnected efforts, with the construction of highways, railways and energy pipelines from Khunjerab in western China to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The aim is to open an energy corridor between Central Asia and the Gulf. The hype about CPEC was given a boost by Xi’s visit to Pakistan  in 2015, while Sharif billed it as a game-changer .

No doubt the promise was massive. Investment-starved Pakistan has so far reportedly attracted direct investments worth US$25.4 billion from China. Electric power projects under CPEC also fed an estimated 6000 megawatts into the grid for the energy-deficient nation, expanding the transmission network by nearly 1000 kilometres. And witnessed the construction of some 500 kilometres of highways, a huge expansion for the populous but underdeveloped South Asian nation.

But does that match the hype? 

Pakistan continues to be mired in chronic economic distress . Even after CPEC investments, there are no signs of an economic turnaround but rather fears of a default on foreign debt obligations. Pakistan’s external debt has increased to $100 billion, with one-third owed to China. Although Pakistan has so far averted the risk of default on its foreign debt obligations by signing a $3 billion deal with the International Monetary Fund when its program was due to expire on 30 June, this only came after a tense eight months of negotiations. Pakistan continues to face an acute balance of payment crisis and depleting foreign exchange reserves.

Locals in Pakistan feel the brunt of this economic turmoil . Inflation increased to 29.4 per cent in June, with food prices up by 40 per cent and transport costs by 20 per cent over the previous year. The poverty rate in the country is forecast to reach an alarming 37.2 per cent. And for all the extra energy the CPEC projects have produced, many Pakistanis are struggling to afford the high electricity prices , just as high fuel prices keep people from travelling on the CPEC-built highways.

This is all because a debt-ridden country with a fragile economy is unable to pay long-term development dividends to the masses. When Imran Khan came to power in 2018, the brakes went on CPEC. The Khan government wasn’t convinced the deal was in Pakistan’s national interest and even alleged the then Chief Minister of Punjab province was taking kickbacks from Chinese companies working on CPEC projects.

Then came  terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals and projects, which further stalled CPEC progress. Strategically located, Gwadar Port in Balochistan province is a crucial link yet a security challenge for Chinese nationals. A long-standing local insurgency has morphed to target China’s interests with a string of attacks. In 2018, Baloch rebels claimed an assault on the Chinese consulate in Karachi, a year later an attack on Chinese tourists at the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar, and in April last year a suicide bomber targeted the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University. Last year, a Baloch insurgent group in a video message on social media warned China : “The Baloch Liberation Army guarantees you that CPEC will fail miserably on Baloch land … you still have time to quit Balochistan, or you will witness a retaliation from Baloch sons and daughters that you will never forget.”

It’s not exactly the “ win-win ” China or Pakistan might have hoped for – or rivals feared .

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CPEC and Pakistan: Its Economic Benefits, Energy Security and Regional Trade and Economic Integration

• Original Article
• Published: 01 January 2021
• Volume 6 , pages 207–227, ( 2021 )

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• Hafez Muhammad Javed   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1611-2181 1 &
• Muhammad Ismail 1  

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Pakistan’s geo-strategic location provides Beijing alternate routes for oil and gas supplies from the access to the energy-rich Persian Gulf region. In April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan and announced a US $ 46 billion commitment to build a multifaceted network called the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (the value of CPEC projects is worth the US $ 87 billion as of 2020). CPEC project is the flagship of the One Belt, One Road initiative since it is a trunk passageway connecting the Silk Road Economic Belt in the north with the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road in the south. CPEC is expected to further strengthen trade and economic cooperation in regional states. When the corridor is constructed, it will serve as a primary gateway for trade between China and the Middle East and Africa. This study revealed that CPEC has important impacts on the regional state’s trade and energy security. It will create economic security for Pakistan more as compared to the energy and other issues.

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Javed, H.M., Ismail, M. CPEC and Pakistan: Its Economic Benefits, Energy Security and Regional Trade and Economic Integration. Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev. 6 , 207–227 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00172-z

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00172-z

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The Benefits and Risks of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is solidifying relations between the two nations but the project faces multiple security and political challenges.

Traditionally, China and Pakistan have cooperated closely at the strategic and political levels. Now the two nations are making efforts to expand their bilateral collaboration economically as well. The construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a milestone that signifies this shift.

At its core, the CPEC is a large-scale initiative to build energy, highway, and port infrastructure to deepen economic connections between China and Pakistan. This initiative has been well-received in both countries, although it is not without its problems. 1 Nevertheless, China and Pakistan regard the CPEC as a new source of potential synergy between their respective national development strategies, which may help the two countries translate their close political cooperation into multifaceted economic cooperation, attain mutual benefits, and achieve win-win outcomes. For the economic corridor to reach its potential, however, there are security and political challenges in Pakistan that must be addressed.

China first proposed the corridor project in May 2013. Chinese President Xi Jinping then visited Pakistan in April 2015, and both sides agreed to elevate their relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership.” 2 During Xi’s visit, the two countries signed fifty-one agreements at an estimated value of $46 billion. 3

The CPEC is now moving into the implementation phase. On May 6, 2016, there was an opening ceremony held in the city of Sukkur in Pakistan’s Sindh Province, as construction began on a section of highway between Sukkur and the city of Multan—it will be part of a network of highways that will connect the cities of Peshawar and Karachi. 4 This network is a major component of the CPEC’s plans for infrastructure expansion, which highlights the progress the two nations have achieved thus far in the area of transportation. In addition, on November 13, 2016, the first large shipment of Chinese goods went through the port of Gwadar , a flagship CPEC project in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan. 5

China considers these development initiatives a potential source of stability and prosperity for both countries. From a Chinese perspective, cooperation in the areas of security and economics are closely intertwined, and improvements on one side can improve the other. It is almost as though security and economics are two separate wheels on the same vehicle, and both need to be spinning to move things forward. China believes economic development can strengthen Pakistan’s internal stability, thus reinvigorating the latter’s economy through investment in infrastructure projects as well as the construction of oil and gas pipelines. China hopes this will create a certain level of stability within Pakistan and in turn stabilize China’s western periphery, particularly the province of Xinjiang.

More broadly, the CPEC has to be understood in the context of China’s strategic interests in East Asia and the way the United States has challenged them. Faced with such difficulties, China hopes it can expand its strategic space by heading west. Pakistan serves as a crucial bridge between China and Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Security and stability in Pakistan will make it possible for China to exercise greater influence in these regions and to ensure security at home. This is why China is willing to pour vast amounts of resources into the economic corridor—based on the logic of improving security through economic development. 

Likewise, Pakistan has realized that no other country places such high strategic importance in its economic relationship with Pakistan as China does. Pakistan also greatly values the economic corridor and views it as mutually beneficial in terms of politics and economic development. According to Pakistan 2025 —a blueprint for economic development published in 2014 by Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform—Pakistan aims to advance from being a lower-middle-income nation to an upper-middle-income nation by 2025. 6 To achieve this goal, Pakistan hopes to attract increasing amounts of foreign investment. The country is working to improve its overall economy by constructing energy projects and other forms of infrastructure, to create employment opportunities for its populace, and to improve its governance.

The logic behind this strategy is that fundamentally improving Pakistan’s economy will help alleviate the challenges posed by political extremists, radicals, and jihadists. China and Pakistan share the belief that economic development can help stabilize Pakistan and improve its domestic security situation. However, China also recognizes that the security, political, and cultural risks and uncertainties facing the economic corridor cannot be overlooked. 

The first of these risks is terrorism, which has long affected Pakistan’s internal security and stability. Although Pakistan has worked hard to strike at religious extremism and terrorist activities, its problems with terrorism have not substantially improved in recent years. Because the CPEC is so important to the Pakistani government, these projects’ construction sites and engineering personnel may become targets for religious as well as nationalist extremists. Indeed, there already have been numerous occasions when Chinese engineers working in Pakistan have been attacked or even lost their lives. In May 2016, for instance, engineers in Karachi were attacked by Sindh separatists . 7 Fortunately, no Chinese personnel were wounded or killed. Then in September, Baloch rebels killed at least two Chinese engineers and injured many others. 8 Moreover, several large-scale terrorist attacks in Balochistan have killed dozens of people, which shows that the security situation in this province where China has key projects is far from ideal. 9

The security threat posed by terrorism remains ongoing, despite the economic benefits that the CPEC can offer Pakistan. The corridor aims to enhance the well-being of people throughout the country and bring long-term prosperity and stability. The Pakistani authorities, meanwhile, have promised China they will do everything possible to ensure the safety of Chinese workers . 10 This is a feasible commitment in the short term. However, over time, it will become more difficult for Pakistan to guarantee the security of the CPEC’s growing transportation networks, which will require increasing investments of security personnel and material support. It will likely become uncertain in the future whether Pakistan can maintain a strong enough military presence to ensure the security of all these transportation routes.

Second, Pakistan’s domestic politics is also important to the CPEC’s success. The country’s political system has never been particularly stable. Political power oscillates between military and civilian leaders. General Pervez Musharraf’s resignation as president in 2008 ended the latest period of military rule, and from that point onward, the military has been pushed from center stage. In the 2013 election, the Pakistan People’s Party lost power after the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz defeated it. The successful completion of this election, as well as the smooth transition of power that ensued, was the first time in Pakistan’s history that a civilian government was able to serve out its entire term. This was a sign of improvement for Pakistan’s democracy.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s traditional political culture, which is almost feudal in nature, also continues to play an important role. Powerful families based in different provinces, such as the Bhuttos and the Sharifs, have typically held political power. Behind the party politics are local interests groups associated with these families.

Various parties within Pakistan have disagreed a lot about how CPEC transportation routes should be mapped out. The competing parties are primarily interested in how the cake should be divided, so to speak. To strengthen its respective standing among the electorate, each of Pakistan’s political parties hopes the CPEC will pass through the region it represents, allowing its local community to enjoy the corridor’s benefits. In fact, since the initiative was first presented in 2013, the debate over which route the CPEC would follow has caused substantial delays. The construction of the corridor has just begun. It is expected that competition among Pakistan’s domestic political groups will continue to affect its future implementation.

Yet the CPEC will not only serve as a roadway that simply connects point A to point B—the initiative is designed to do more. The corridor also aims to facilitate multisectoral economic cooperation in finance, trade, energy, and industry.

Amid a market slowdown and high unemployment rates, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came back into office in 2013 with the intent of reinvigorating the economy , and he undertook a series of measures to improve Pakistan’s economic prospects. 11 One was lowering barriers to foreign investment . 12 As for addressing energy shortages, Pakistan has been making efforts to restructure its energy industry and increase its electricity production. At the same time, the government has worked hard to strengthen investment in infrastructure, has moved forward with tax reforms, and has focused on increasing revenue and reducing expenditures. In addition, the government has adopted other measures to develop its market economy. It has overseen reforms for state-run enterprises and encouraged market privatization.

These measures are already starting to take effect. The country’s GDP is growing at a stronger rate, and the economy is improving. 13 For the time being, however, it will still remain unclear whether these economic advances can actually alleviate Pakistan’s serious security and stability problems.

Cultural considerations and public relations should be also taken into account when evaluating the CPEC’s prospects for economic success. Ordinary citizens in China and Pakistan are not very familiar with each other. The countries’ leaders have built an all-weather friendship and close political relationship over the years, but this is not yet true of the two societies at large.

As China and Pakistan gradually expand cooperation, there will be an increasing number of Chinese corporations investing in Pakistan. Different cultural practices and ways of thinking could cause misunderstandings, and this could negatively affect CPEC projects. For these corporations to be successful, they will need to understand local cultures, norms, and rules. Having information about and services for doing business in Pakistan is also crucial for Chinese corporations. 

China should abandon its traditional way of dealing only with the Pakistani government and instead get in contact with local communities to better accommodate local interests so that more Pakistani people can benefit from the CPEC. China and Pakistan need to strengthen their cultural ties and increase people-to-people interactions. This has already begun, due to the increasing economic activity between the two countries, forcing China to become more informed about the complexities of Pakistani society. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Council was founded in 2015 to jointly address the challenges arising in the CPEC projects. 14 The council has opened offices in Beijing and Islamabad respectively, and its purpose is to assist with the implementation of CPEC projects . 15

China and Pakistan have taken positive measures to help set up the CPEC for success. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s domestic situation is still decisive. Until the country’s political and security conditions turn a corner, it will be difficult to judge the corridor's future prospects. For China, this means neutrality, strategic patience, and caution are needed as the construction of this grand initiative continues.

Lu Yang is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, working on South Asian politics and China’s diplomatic relations with South Asian countries.

1 S. Akbar Zaidi, “The New Game Changer in Pakistan,” the Hindu , last updated September 20, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/chinapakistan-economic-corridor-the-new-game-changer-in-pakistan/article8656498.ece .   

2 An Lu, “China, Pakistan Lift Ties to All-Weather Strategic Partnership of Cooperation,” Xinhua News Agency , April 20, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/20/c_134167316.htm .

3 “China’s Xi Jinping agrees $46 bn superhighway to Pakistan,” BBC , April 20, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32377088 .

4 “PM Performs Groundbreaking of Sukkur-Multan Motorway,” the Express Tribune , May 6, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1098275/pm-performs-groundbreaking-of-sukkur-multan-motorway/ .

5 Kay Johnson, “Pakistani PM Welcomes First Large Chinese Shipment to Gwadar Port,” Reuters, November 13, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-china-port-idUSKBN1380LU .

6 Government of Pakistan; Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform; Planning Commission, Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision , http://pc.gov.pk/vision2025/Pakistan%20Vision-2025.pdf .

7 Imtiaz Ali, “Chinese Citizen Targeted in Karachi Blast,” Dawn , May 30, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1261600 .

8 Mayank Pratap Singh, “Baloch Rebels Attack Dudher Project Site, 2 Chinese Engineers Killed, Many Hurt,” India Today , September 28, 2016, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/baloch-rebels-attack-kills-two-engineers/1/775273.html .

9 “Pakistan Hospital Bomb Attack Kills Dozens in Quetta,” BBC, August 8, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37007661 ; “Pakistan Shah Noorani Shrine Bomb Kills 52,” BBC, November 12, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/37962741 ; “Quetta Terror Attack: At Least 44 Killed in Pakistan Police Academy Attack,” Times of India , October 25, 2016, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Quetta-terror-atatck-At-least-20-killed-in-Pakistan-police-academy-attack/articleshow/55041063.cms .

10 Shannon Tiezzi, Pakistan Will Provide ‘Special Force’ to Defend Chinese Investments,” the Diplomat , February 5, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/pakistan-will-provide-special-force-to-defend-chinese-investments/ .

11 Farhan Bokhari and Victor Mallet, “Nawaz Sharif Takes Steps to Revive Pakistan’s Economy,” Financial Times , May 13, 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/374bc1a6-bbe8-11e2-a4b4-00144feab7de .

12 Government of Pakistan, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Board of Investment, Investment Policy 2013 , http://boi.gov.pk/UploadedDocs/Downloads/InvestmentGuide.pdf .

13 World Bank, “GDP Growth [Pakistan],” World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=PK .

14 “Pak-China Economic Corridor Council Launched in Islamabad,” China Daily , April 09, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/09/content_20038726.htm .

15 “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Council: Council Profile,” China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Council, http://c-pecc.com/en/about/about-47.html .

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