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Animal Rights: The Simple Idea That Sparked a Movement

Animal rights is a revolutionary idea and social movement that requires humans to reexamine their relationship with animals, especially animals used for food.

Explainer • Policy • Reflections

Words by Hemi Kim

There are many awkward conversations you might have at family or work meetings as the singular vegan . It’s possible to find yourself carefully describing your food choices, aware that you are on the edge of disassembling a joyous bulgogi dish into the painful experiences that were required to produce it. Talking about issues related to animal rights can be emotionally difficult especially when eating with and cooking for others is a love language; rejecting family and friends’ cooking can be hurtful.

Yet animal advocates have managed to tap into common, shared values, successfully encouraging more and more people to reexamine what living their values really looks like, especially values of respect, empathy, imagination, cooperation, adaptability, and compassion for all living beings.

Do Animals Have Rights?

In the United States, many animals are defined as property and do not have rights in the same sense that humans have rights. At least 13 nations have symbolically acknowledged the dignity and personhood of nonhuman animals or the need to show compassion towards them as something other than objects in their constitutions . (These are Brazil, Germany, India, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Egypt, the Iroquois Nations, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the People’s Republic of China, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.) Yet such acknowledgments remain largely lip service—the animals in these thirteen nations are still treated similarly, both culturally and legally, to the animals in any other country.

Nevertheless, animal studies researchers such as Maneesha Deckha often see potential in the “shift in legal standing of nonhumans that constitutional recognition can precipitate.”

One advocacy approach seeks to translate the moral rights of animals into practical change by expanding how the law views animals: from property to personhood . Legal status as a person is something that U.S. courts have given to corporations, ships, and “entities of nature,” according to the Animal Legal Defense Fund , and it has been conferred on individual great apes outside the United States. Read more about the nuances of how advocates are trying to improve the status and legal protections of animals here .

What Are Animal Rights?

Animal rights form part of a way of thinking about nonhuman animals as off-limits for human exploitation. People that espouse this way of thinking try to direct their own and others’ behaviors away from eating, dressing, conducting scientific experiments, and being entertained in ways that involve harm to nonhuman animals.

Animal rights is also a broad term describing animal advocacy , and the social movement focused on improving the lives of nonhuman animals. Yet the term “animal rights activist” can be alienating , which may be why groups prefer to use the terms “animal protection” or “animal advocates.”

When Did the Animal Rights Movement Begin in the U.S.?

The modern animal rights movement in the United States saw a major milestone in the 1970s with the publication of Peter Singer’s “Animal Liberation,” in which he argued that it was ethically important that nonhuman animals feel pain, and that this fact demanded far more equal treatment of nonhuman animals and humans. He also popularized the term “ speciesism ” to describe what happens when nonhuman animals are not given the same consideration as humans. Other thinkers, writers, and activist groups have also notably furthered and developed the fabric of the animal rights movement, both before and since Singer’s book, including Tom Regan and PETA.

Singer’s text itself reportedly sits on the shoulders of at least one British author who lived about a century prior. And for many centuries European travelers to India have learned about, and been attracted to, the concept of ahimsa and care for animals. Ahimsa , documented as early as the eighth century B.C. in Indian religious texts—Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist—affirms nonviolence and the alleviation of the suffering of all beings.

From the perspectives of scholars such as Cree writer Billy Ray Belcourt, and vegan theorists such as Aph and Syl Ko, the modern divide between animals and humans works in tandem with the imposition of white supremacy: on Indigenous people whose land was stolen by settler-colonists and who were targets of genocide, and on Black and Brown people who were and often continue to be treated as less than human.

Thus the animal protection movement in the United States is limited by the legacies and habits of thought of settler colonialism and other oppressions, and the history of the movement is whitewashed—something that people are now trying to undo. Belcourt, for example, argued in a 2020 article that people concerned with living ethically must challenge the white supremacy underpinning many efforts to expand the rights of nonhuman animals, and instead look to Indigenous traditions that see “animals as kin who co-produce a way of life that engenders care rather than and contra to suffering.”

What’s the Difference Between Animal Welfare and Animal Rights?

The terms “animal welfare” and “animal rights” are similar, but animal rights is a broader idea than animal welfare. Animal welfare refers to the responsibility of humans to treat nonhuman animals well and directly care for their health, but without challenging the overall circumstances that animals find themselves in or the ways they are used in society.

For example, an animal welfare advocate may be vigilant about how animals such as bears and apes are treated in the movie industry when they are working on a set. An animal rights proponent may instead call for an end to the use of animals in films altogether.

Another example of animal welfare is when people campaign for better treatment of young chickens before they are slaughtered. Though groups that campaign for animal welfare may also support goals that are compatible with animal rights, for example when promoting the consumption of plant-based foods.

What Are Some Examples of Animal Rights?

Animal rights supporters tend to be concerned that people use animals as a means to an end, typically without the animals’ assent to participate in an activity. In addition to the examples below, common areas of concern for animal rights include clothing, makeup, scientific experimentation, sports, and wildlife.

Animal Agriculture

Hogs are not just the source material for a good slow roast, crispy bacon, and pork belly. The pork industry also disassembles pigs for their parts to be used as ingredients in manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and other scientific endeavors. People who support animal rights tend to oppose all farming of livestock and fish. The fictional film “Okja” is often cited as an animal rights story dealing with these issues—one that is sympathetic to animals sent to slaughter.

Entertainment

Circuses, zoos, and aquariums have been the subject of animal rights campaigns and popular documentaries, such as “Blackfish” , that have resulted in changes to how the entertainment industry markets animal-based entertainment.

Companionship and Working Animals

People concerned with animal rights might be more concerned with the potential for conscripting an animal into an unhealthy situation that exploits their labor than they would be about the benefits to humans of emotional support animals or land-mine-sniffing rats.

Animal Rights Arguments: Pros and Cons

The arguments of critics and supporters of animal protection can seem as diverse as the number of people who express an opinion. Below are some common reasons why people may feel pulled toward or away from animal rights causes.

Arguments in Favor of Animal Rights

In “Aphro-ism” , Syl and Aph Ko promote a view of animal rights within Black Veganism that sees animal rights as essential to ending racism. They write sensitively about the topic in a way that acknowledges how white supremacy has animalized Black people. They also draw a line from the oppression of nonhuman animals to white supremacy and convincingly argue that being antiracist is essential to animal liberation.

People allied with animal rights might also include Coast Salish activists in the Block Corporate Salmon campaign, who identify themselves as Salmon People and oppose the introduction of genetically modified fish to the local wildlife environment.

Arguments Against Animal Rights

People who oppose animal rights might see animals as property, and inferior to humans. They might argue that eating meat is a natural feature of the food chain, or that nonhuman animals exist for the benefit of humans .

Sometimes, deciding to disregard animal rights is a matter of practicality. For example, using life-saving products that were created with scientific research that relied on experimentation on nonhuman animals, as is the case with vaccines and pharmaceutical medicines.

As animal advocate, Christopher Soul Eubanks wrote in March 2021, “To Black people and non-vegans of all races, the animal rights movement can appear as an affluent far-left group who ignore the systemic oppression they have benefited from while using that affluence to advocate for nonhumans.” Indeed, roughly 9 out of 10 people working for farmed animal protection organizations are white. In a more racially equitable world, that number would be closer to 6 in the United States.

Colonialist harms brought about by animal rights and vegan activism can be investigated: it’s something people of the global majority and others have begun.

Why Are Animal Rights Important?

“Being labeled less-than-human” is a condition that most people experience, one that Black and other oppressed peoples live daily, according to Aph Ko in a chapter of “Aphro-Ism.” Ko also writes in a later chapter that “‘[a]nimal’ is a category that we shove certain bodies into when we want to justify violence against them, which is why animal liberation should concern all who are minoritized, because at any moment you can become an ‘animal’ and be considered disposable.”

For Ko, being a critical thinker is more important than believing popular, yet false, narratives about oneself and nonhuman animals. This desire to re-evaluate what one thinks is a launching point for Afrofuturist possibilities, or Black-centered creativity , a philosophical wellspring for Black veganism. You can read more about Black veganism here , here , and here .

Animal rights, then, is an opportunity to constantly ask tough questions. And asking questions creates spaces within which vulnerable communities can flourish. For antiracist humane educator Dana McPhall , the following questions guide her work:

“So what would it look like to imagine a world where I’m not defined by the racial and gender constructs imposed upon me? Where people racialized as white are no longer invested in whiteness? Where the lives of nonhuman animals are no longer circumscribed within the social construct “animal?” Where huge swaths of our planet are not considered disposable, along with the people and wildlife who inhabit them?”

What Are the Consequences of Animal Rights?

Results of animal rights activism include the increasing popularity of vegan food products, a ban on selling fur in California, and state bans on using most animals in circuses. Keeping up with Sentient Media is one way to see these types of stories as they proliferate.

Ending Suffering Wherever It Persists

Nonhuman animals’ rights are not so much a question of legality or illegality, especially as laws tend to treat them as property. They are rather a way of thinking about what is morally right in a given cultural context. Avoiding the suffering of animals and respecting their right to exist are basic tenets of animal protection. As a way of thinking and being in community with others, animal rights can be an invitation for learning and imagining. Animal advocates of all races can dismantle white supremacy and undo “isms” by re-centering the experiences of Black, Brown, Indigenous, Asian, and other previously “less-than-human” people.

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Hemi is a writer and educator.

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What Are Animal Rights & Why Should Animals Have Rights?

Estimated reading time: 9½ minutes

Around the world, the fight for human rights continues – for equality, justice and freedom. Alongside this important movement, compassionate people are working to ensure that non-human animals are not left behind. For centuries, animals have been exploited, abused, deliberately harmed and killed by people because they have been seen as different and inferior. So, while the rights that humans need and deserve are different from those that animals need and deserve, there is much in common between the two movements. Both seek justice and fairness for beings who have traditionally been treated – and are still being treated – appallingly.

What Are Animal Rights?

If human animals have rights, then why not non-human animals? After all, we are all just creatures living on this same planet, and sharing many biological, psychological and emotional traits. We’re not the same as a dog or a bird, and they are not the same as each other, but if we are worthy of dignity, autonomy and respect, then what reason could there be for denying the same to non-human animals?

Some people argue from a position of ignorance, or perhaps deliberate misunderstanding, and say but cows don’t need to vote! as if this is what is meant when we talk about the rights of animals. What we are saying is that animals deserve not just better treatment, but to be given dignity, have their interests recognised and respected, and – crucially – not to be exploited for human gain.

Why Are Animals’ Rights Important?

We may as well ask why human rights are important! Because animals are sentient beings here on this planet with us, not for us. Because who would we be if we abused those weaker than ourselves just because we could, or treated others with kindness only if we thought them attractive or intelligent?

For animals, having rights is everything. With rights, they would not be trapped, beaten, caged, artificially inseminated, mutilated, drugged, traded, transported, harmed and killed just because someone else profits by it. By granting animals rights, the sum of suffering in the world would reduce dramatically.

How Are Animal Rights Violated?

In thousands of ways. When we breed animals so we can take their babies and eat them; when we deliberately impregnate them so we can take their babies’ milk; when we force them into a circus ring or into a cage at a zoo; when we breed and sell them as ‘pets’ for profit; when we force them to race; when we beat them to make them do what we want; when we rub chemicals into their eyes in laboratories; when we shoot or hunt them for fun; when we trap them for fur; when we pluck out their feathers to fill duvets or jackets; when we put them in a tank or cage in our living rooms so we can watch them instead of the television for a few minutes.

Our relationship with animals is based entirely on their subjugation and our dominance. And this unequal relationship stems from the historical ideology that might is right, that it is acceptable for the stronger to bully and abuse the weaker simply because they can.

The Difference Between Animal Welfare And Animal Rights?

Often, the difference between these two has been described as the difference between giving animals bigger cages and abolishing cages altogether. Animal welfare asks that we reduce suffering while still exploiting, harming, governing every aspect of their lives, and ultimately killing them.

If you believe it is not OK for one being to exploit and subjugate another, then you believe in animal rights.

Do Animals Need Rights?

They do, just as human animals do. Without rights that are enshrined in law, there is nothing to stop up being harmed and exploited.

Animals can suffer, like us, they have personalities and preferences like us, and they do not wish to be harmed, like us. Their rights should not be based on a human perception of their intelligence or worth. Our own prejudices should not matter when it comes to the rights of animals, just as they should not matter when it comes to ensuring that the rights of marginalized people are conferred and upheld.

Arguments In Favor Of Animal Rights

Simply, it is the right thing to do. Animals are not ours to harm and abuse just because we can. They are not our playthings, but sentient beings in their own right.

But there is a wider impact of conferring rights on animals, one that benefits people, too. Human rights would be enhanced because the same forces that give rise to racism, sexism, and hatred of – or prejudice toward – marginalized groups also give rise to the systematic exploitation of animals. This prejudiced worldview stems from the notion of a biological hierarchy with European straight white males at the top, and below them, women, people of colour, those from the LGBTQ+ community, people with a disability, and animals. Conferring rights on animals helps demolish this hierarchy, dismantles this old, destructive way of categorizing and ranking individuals, and helps achieve justice for all.

Arguments Against Animal Rights

Those who profit from harming or exploiting animals are unsurprisingly the most resistant to a change in the status quo. Instead of being honest about their own vested interests, they put forward other arguments.

They might say: Animals are not intelligent, which of course is not true, but even if we were to confer rights based on intelligence, would we accept that babies should not have rights? They might say: You can’t have rights without responsibilities. Again, this makes no sense unless we accept that children and those with serious mental impairments do not have rights; and what about our own responsibilities to other sentient beings? Or they might say: God put animals here for our use. This belief stems from a certain reading of the Bible, one that many compassionate Christians do not support.

There are also people who argue that giving rights to animals would diminish human rights and undermine our ‘special’ role in the world. Our view is – as above – that it would only enhance it.

The Consequences Of Animal Rights

For so long, we have treated animals like property, not like beings, and much of our way of life is predicated on us doing whatever we want to them. While we are incrementally moving towards a few rights for some animals, it’s wonderful to imagine what the world would be like if animals were afforded full legal rights.

If that was the case, we wouldn’t eat them, breed them for milk or confine them for eggs. Factory farming would end, slaughterhouses would close and we would all be vegan. Without consuming animal fats and protein, some or our biggest killers – heart disease, diabetes and hypertension – would be dramatically reduced. With reduced sickness, there would be a boost to the economy .

Because we wouldn’t be wasting precious antibiotics trying to keep sick animals alive inside factory farms, we would limit the dangers of antibiotic resistance. And since three quarters of emerging infectious diseases come from animals, we would drastically reduce the risk of pandemics, too.

Without factory farming, our impact on the Earth would be much gentler. We’d reduce deforestation, pollution and climate change. With everyone vegan, we could feed many more people using less land, and that means people would not go hungry and nature would benefit, too. With 68 percent of animal populations having been wiped out in the past 50 years, a massive reduction in land use would redress that shocking annihilation.

No profit could be made from the lives and bodies of animals, so we would not wear their skins or keep them as ‘pets’. This is not to say we would have to throw away our old leather jacket or turn out our dogs to fend for themselves. Nothing can protect the cows whose skin that coat once was, and we have a duty of care to the animals already here, but we would not skin more cows or breed more dogs.

Circuses would showcase the very best human talent, as many already do, but there would be no tigers forced through hoops or other animals made to dance. Zoos would initially close to the public because animals are not put here for our entertainment. That industry would no longer breed, sell on and kill animals at their own convenience, and eventually, they would close altogether. Any claims they have as conservation bodies would be rendered obsolete because there would be a lot more land available for wildlife, and wild populations could flourish again.

We would not spend our time at horse or dog races. We would not attend rodeos or bullfights. We would not see animals in films or adverts, dressed up and exploited, their ‘cuteness’ or ‘strength’ being used to sell products and make rich people richer.

And instead of causing horrific suffering to animals in laboratories – testing chemicals, cosmetics, and drugs on them, as well as infecting them with human diseases – we would use cutting-edge, modern, scientifically excellent techniques that are quicker, more efficient and more effective.

Our whole attitude and way of life would change and it would benefit us in so many ways. Nature would thrive. People would thrive. The world would be kinder, more compassionate and safer.

Do Animals Have Legal Rights?

There are welfare laws that protect some animals in some circumstances against certain treatment but these are not universal, and are often not enforced. But do animals have meaningful legal rights? Not yet, but thanks to groups like The Non Human Rights Project, that is changing. They are securing court hearings in support of the legal personhood and right to bodily liberty of chimpanzees and elephants, the organization’s first clients.

In 2020, Bronx Supreme Court Justice Alison Y. Tuitt issued a decision in the case of Happy, an elephant held in isolation in a one-acre exhibit at the Bronx Zoo. She wrote that the Court “agrees [with the NhRP] that Happy is more than just a legal thing, or property. She is an intelligent, autonomous being who should be treated with respect and dignity, and who may be entitled to liberty … the arguments advanced by the NhRP are extremely persuasive for transferring Happy from her solitary, lonely one-acre exhibit at the Bronx Zoo to an elephant sanctuary.”

There is much work to do, but it is a fight that, when successful, will liberate us all.

stop factory farms : animal rights demonstration

Most people understand that our lives are as important to us as animals’ lives are to them. And yet we exist in a society that treats them as things, not beings, as something not someone. To achieve justice for all, we must unpick the hierarchy that keeps different groups of people and animals ‘in their place’. Conferring rights on animals is vital to them and long overdue, but the benefits for people would be momentous, too.

For those wishing to know more about the history of animal rights and the campaigns to confer meaningful rights on animals, we recommend reading:

Animal Liberation , Peter Singer
The Case for Animal Rights , Tom Regan
The Sexual Politics of Meat , Carol J Adams
Animals Matter , Marc Bekoff
Animals as Persons , Gary L Francione
Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism from Two Sisters , Aph Ko and Syl Ko

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Animal Rights Movement: Understanding When and Why It Started

August 28, 2023 by Selena Darlim - 7 minute read

Introduction

The animal rights movement has progressed with time, reflecting our growing knowledge of animals’ needs and changing attitudes toward their treatment. What can animal advocates learn from looking back at how the animal rights movement came to be? In this article, we’ll explore the concept of animal rights and the history of the animal rights movement, delving into its early days, goals, challenges, and evolution in the modern era.

Do Animals Have Rights?

The belief that nonhuman animals have intrinsic value and the right to be treated with respect and compassion has existed in some form for millennia. For example, the Indian principle of ahiṃsā , which preaches nonviolence toward all living beings, dates back to the 9th century BCE and is observed in religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism to this day. Throughout history, however, humans have generally regarded animals as commodities with no inherent rights. One of the first prominent figures to discuss animals’ moral value, 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes, promoted a particularly callous view of animals. He argued that animals lacked a mind and could not feel pain, justifying cruel acts such as live vivisection. This sentiment fortunately lost favor as humans’ understanding of animal cognition, emotions, and sentience deepened.

Why Are Animal Rights Important?

Animals are sentient beings capable of experiencing pain, suffering, and joy. Respecting their rights to not be harmed, captured, taken away from their habitat, abused, confined, or killed for human purposes is in line with moral principles such as empathy, compassion, and ethical conduct. By securing animal rights, we can greatly minimize the amount of pain and suffering in the world. Acknowledging animal rights also benefits humans. For example, improving the living conditions of animals on farms decreases the likelihood of disease transmission to humans. Similarly, reducing meat consumption can help curb the impact of climate change and preserve ecosystems.

When Did the Animal Rights Movement Start?

The modern-day animal rights movement traces back to the Industrial Revolution, when rapid industrialization and urbanization spurred massive changes across Europe and North America. Along with other industries, traditional farming practices were replaced by large-scale, profit-driven factory farms and slaughterhouses. The dangerous, unsanitary, and traumatic working conditions in these meat industry facilities were famously depicted in Upton Sinclair’s 1906 book The Jungle . People began to question the treatment of workers and animals in this new industrial era, leading to the first organized animal advocacy efforts.

Who Started the First Animal Rights Movement?

Several people played a role in the development of the animal rights movement, although a few individuals are often credited with starting it. One of these individuals is Richard Martin, an Irish politician who passed one of the first farmed animal welfare laws (the Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act) in 1822 and founded the first animal welfare charity (the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) in 1824. Another prominent figure of the early animal rights movement is Henry Stephens Salt, an English writer and social reformer who argued in favor of animal rights in his 1892 book Animals’ Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress.

What Are the Goals of the Animal Rights Movement?

The goals of the animal rights movement have evolved over time, with early efforts more focused on soliciting compassion for animals and modern efforts more focused on reducing animal consumption or securing legal protection. Today, the end goal of the animal rights movement is to abolish all human activities that cause animal suffering, including factory farming, animal experimentation, and habitat destruction. Animal rights advocates focus on various causes and use different approaches to achieve this goal. Our Menu of Interventions presents a range of these strategies and their potential positive outcomes for animals.

What Laws Protect Animal Rights?

Animal rights laws vary significantly among countries, states, and jurisdictions. Although most countries still do not recognize animal rights or sentience, several have implemented laws to protect certain species against cruelty and neglect. Laws range from basic anti-cruelty protections to more nuanced regulations designed to address animal treatment in specific contexts. Companion animals tend to receive greater protection than farmed and wild animals, as industries routinely challenge new and existing legislation.

Was the Animal Rights Movement Successful?

Although there have been considerable advancements in animal welfare, the animal rights movement still faces challenges. Legal and societal shifts have resulted in better protections against animal cruelty and exploitation, but enforcement remains weak, welfare considerations for farmed animals are lacking, and few countries officially recognize animal sentience in law. Nevertheless, the movement has made significant progress by banning certain cruel practices, improving living conditions for animals, and shifting public opinion.

What Did the Animal Rights Movement Accomplish?

The animal rights movement has accomplished several significant changes and advancements over the years, although the extent of these accomplishments varies by species and region. Some notable accomplishments of the animal rights movement include:

Raising public awareness about the treatment of animals in various industries, such as factory farming, entertainment, and research
Influencing the creation and enforcement of laws and regulations aimed at protecting animals, covering areas such as animal cruelty, animal testing, and wildlife conservation
Improving conditions for farmed animals in some regions, with some companies and farms adopting more humane practices, larger enclosures, and better living conditions for animals
Addressing issues like poaching, illegal wildlife trade, and the use of animals in entertainment
Pressuring companies to adopt more ethical and sustainable sources in their supply chains

The growth of the animal rights movement has also resulted in increased collaboration with other causes, such as environmental protection, social justice, labor rights, and human health. This approach addresses the broader context in which animal suffering occurs and builds alliances for more effective advocacy.

When Did Effective Animal Advocacy Emerge?

Effective animal advocacy (EAA) emerged during the early days of Effective Altruism (EA), a movement that uses evidence and reason to identify the most effecient and impactful ways to do good. EA gained prominence in the 21st century and quickly spread to philanthropic spaces, including the animal rights movement. The first group solely dedicated to effective animal advocacy, Effective Animal Activism, was founded in 2012 as an intern project of 80,000 Hours —a U.K.-based organization that guides individuals toward high-impact careers. Effective Animal Activism sought to improve animal welfare as much as possible, despite the lack of evidence-based guidance on the most effective ways to do so.

Growth of Effective Animal Advocacy

Effective Animal Activism’s earliest efforts consisted of evaluating animal charities, expanding the effective animal advocacy community, and providing career advice to aspiring animal advocates. In 2013, the group merged with a 501(c)(3) nonprofit and revised its mission to finding and promoting highly effective opportunities to help animals, soon rebranding as Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE). Charity evaluations became ACE’s core, and we remained the most prominent organization in EAA for years. Through introspection and the growth of EAA, we realized the limitations of our approach in directing funds to smaller groups in underrepresented regions. To address this gap, we introduced the Movement Grants Program.

How Did Effective Animal Advocacy Impact the Animal Rights Movement?

Effective animal advocacy has influenced the animal rights movement by popularizing data-driven approaches with measurable impact, leading to more strategic and cost-effective advocacy efforts. Despite its positive impacts, EAA has also been criticized for its quantitative focus, lack of diversity, prioritization methods, and association with the EA movement. As a prominent figure in the EAA space, ACE carefully considers these critiques and continually reassesses our approach to ensure we support the entire animal rights movement as best we can.

From ancient principles of nonviolence to modern legal debates, the animal rights movement is larger and more relevant than ever before. While many challenges lie ahead, the movement’s forward progress is undeniable. Will you help us advance it even further?

ACE is dedicated to maximizing the impact of every donation we receive. By becoming an ACE monthly donor, you can make the most of your desire to help animals and provide us with a stable foundation to plan and execute long-term projects that drive meaningful change for animals. Together, we can work toward a world where animal rights are valued and respected.

HELP ANIMALS ALL YEAR LONG

Selena joined ACE in September 2021. She is a longtime animal advocate with several years’ experience writing for nonprofits and media organizations. She holds a self-designed bachelor’s degree in Wildlife Conservation and Animal Advocacy, and she strives to continually expand her knowledge of human and nonhuman advocacy movements.

Reader interactions.

September 28, 2023 at 8:22 am

At the risk of appearing to lack humility, the concept of Effective Animal Advocacy started earlier, with the launch of Faunalytics (then called the Humane Research Council) in 2000. We may have not used the same terminology, but we had a similar sense of cause prioritization and a clear focus on evaluation and effectiveness for both individual groups and the movement. This is a part of our movement’s history that I think is often overlooked by EAAs.

October 23, 2023 at 11:37 am

Hi Che. Thank you for reading this article and providing additional background around the movement. We update our pages periodically, and we’ll make sure to take this into account in our next revision.

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animal rights summary

Learn about the principles and ethics of animal rights and their influence on the modern animal-rights movement.

animal rights , rights, primarily against being killed and being treated cruelly, that are thought to be possessed by higher nonhuman animals (e.g., chimpanzees) and many lower ones by virtue of their sentience. Respect for the welfare of animals is a precept of some ancient Eastern religions, including Jainism , which enjoins ahimsa (“noninjury”) toward all living things, and Buddhism , which forbids the needless killing of animals, especially (in India) of cows. In the West, traditional Judaism and Christianity taught that animals were created by God for human use, including as food, and many Christian thinkers argued that humans had no moral duties of any kind to animals, even the duty not to treat them cruelly, because they lacked rationality or because they were not, like Man, made in the image of God. This view prevailed until the late 18th century, when ethical philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham applied the principles of utilitarianism to infer a moral duty not to inflict needless suffering on animals. In the latter half of the 20th century, the ethical philosopher Peter Singer and others attempted to show that a duty not to harm animals follows straightforwardly from simple and widely accepted moral principles, such as “It is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering.” They also argued that there is no “morally relevant difference” between humans and animals that would justify raising animals, but not humans, for food on “factory farms” or using them in scientific experiments or for product testing (e.g., of cosmetics). An opposing view held that humans have no moral duties to animals because animals are incapable of entering into a hypothetical “moral contract” to respect the interests of other rational beings. The modern animal-rights movement was inspired in part by Singer’s work. At the end of the 20th century, it had spawned a large number of groups dedicated to a variety of related causes, including protecting endangered species, protesting against painful or brutal methods of trapping and killing animals (e.g., for furs), preventing the use of animals in laboratory research, and promoting what adherents considered the health benefits and moral virtues of vegetarianism .

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The Moral Rights of Animals

Mylan Engel Jr. and Gary Lynn Comstock (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals , Lexington, 2016, 296pp., $100.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781498531900.

Reviewed by Dan Hooley, University of Toronto

The attitudes of philosophers on our obligations to other animals and the view that other animals possess certain moral rights have shifted considerably in the last 40 years and a great deal of credit for this shift is owed to Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights and subsequent work. This excellent anthology grew out of a 2011 workshop held in Regan's honor and is dedicated to him. It features fourteen essays all of which intersect with Regan's views in some way. The authors largely defend the view that other animals have moral rights and those who don't hold that we have significant obligations to other animals. The essays succeed at exploring, critiquing, and expanding upon Regan's work in a way that is both rigorous and detailed, while accessible to those new to Regan or the animal rights literature.

The book has three parts. Part 1 focuses on the theoretical basis of animal rights, and responses to objections to animal rights. Part 2 looks at questions relating to the comparative value of human and nonhuman lives, with a focus on the comparative harm of death for humans and animals and the question of whether or not humans and animals have an equal right to life. Part 3 turns to the practical import of animal rights.

Part 1 begins with an essay by Regan, which succinctly summarizes the argument he made in The Case for Animal Rights that all individuals who are "subjects of a life" -- conscious, sentient individuals with an experiential welfare who have beliefs and desires and some awareness of the past and future -- have certain basic moral rights. This essay, combined with the relevant summaries in subsequent chapters, provide a sufficient overview of Regan's views, so those who have not read Regan before will not be lost.

In Chapter 2, Jeremy Garrett argues that deontological libertarians should accept animal rights. Garrett argues that libertarian views harmonize quite nicely with Regan's defense of animal rights and defends this view against objections from Nozick. In Chapter 3, Mylan Engel Jr. makes a straightforward and compelling case that if all humans have moral rights, then many other animals do as well since these animals have the properties that confer rights on humans. Engel also argues that most of the harmful uses of animals are wrong even if animals do not possess rights. In Chapter 4, Nathan Nobis considers some of the limitations of Regan's response to Carl Cohen's well-known "kind" argument, which holds that since animals are not of the kind of beings who are moral agents, they do not possess rights, and develops stronger objections to Cohen's position. In Chapter 5, Anne Baril argues that the equal inherent value of all animals does not demand intervention to prevent predation among wild animals. She argues that respect for wild animals, as the kinds of beings they are, does not require intervention to prevent predation.

Central or important to many of the essays in Part 1 is the much discussed (and poorly named) "Argument from Marginal Cases." [1] Versions and variations on this argument are put forward here by Regan, Garrett, Engel, and Nobis. Engel and Nobis, in particular, do a superb job challenging many of the common attempts to defend the view that all humans possess certain basic rights but all nonhumans do not. These essays present important challenges to those who think some form of human exceptionalism is defensible.

One important point made by Engel is that defenders of human exceptionalism must provide a plausible rationale for why any specific capacity, claimed to be both necessary and sufficient for the possession of a given right, is connected to that specific right in question. Many attempts to do this fail the test of having a plausible rationale. Moral autonomy is relevant to whether or not beings can be held morally accountable for their behavior, but it is far from clear why being morally autonomous is a necessary condition for possessing a right not to be harmed. This is because being morally autonomous is not necessary to have a morally relevant interest in not being harmed. As Engel notes, it is a much more plausible rationale to think that sentience is the morally relevant rights-conferring property for the right not to be harmed. This capacity has a much more plausible connection to the specific right in question.

A similar point is made by Nobis in response to Cohen's "kind" argument. Cohen claims all humans (regardless of cognitive capacities) have moral rights because they are members of a kind of being that possess moral agency. But this lacks a plausible rationale when it comes to the specific rights of non-rational humans (such as babies or individuals with severe cognitive disabilities). Cohen claims these individuals have rights related to autonomy because they are members of a kind that is morally autonomous. But even if we concede this, it would be wrong to let them make all the decisions about their lives that we allow paradigmatic adults to make (75). They seem to lack these rights because they do not possess the relevant interests. Once we recognize this, however, it is not clear why membership in a kind is morally relevant: we can be classified in different groups, but we don't always have the rights typical members of those groups possess.

Part 2 focuses primarily on the comparative harm of death for humans and animals and the question of whether or not humans and other animals have an equal right to life. In Chapter 6, Aaron Simmons argues that while life has less value for animals than for humans, they nevertheless possess an equal right to life, such that the negative rights they possess are just as stringent as those possessed by humans. In Chapter 7, Molly Gardner argues that Regan's rights view does not, as he claims, actually prohibit animal research in all cases. She develops an alternative position, what she calls the "attenuated rights view," that balances rights with a somewhat complex but interesting weighing principle. This view generates a strong presumption against animal research, but would not justify a categorical opposition to all harmful research involving animals. In Chapter 8, Evelyn Pluhar draws on ethological research to argue that all vertebrates and some cephalopod invertebrates should be seen as subjects of a life. She defends the view that all subjects of a life, who have satisfying lives and opportunities for future satisfaction, are harmed equally by death. In Chapter 9, Alastair Norcross argues that Singer's account of moral considerability -- where all sentient creatures deserve equal consideration -- can be combined with Regan's account of subjects of a life. Norcross argues that all sentient creatures deserve equal consideration, but that subjects of a life have a lot more to lose by dying than "merely" sentient beings. And in Chapter 10, Gary Comstock gives empirical evidence that suggests much of the time human behavior is controlled by non-conscious mechanisms. Comstock uses this to argue against the view that the ability of humans to control their behavior is a morally relevant difference separating humans from other animals: if animals act "on instinct" much of the time, so do we.

The question of whether or not humans are harmed more by death than animals and the related question of whether or not humans and animals have an equal right to life are some of the most difficult and perplexing questions in animal ethics. One notable feature of the essays in Part 2 is the diversity of views presented on these issues, despite the (mostly) shared belief that nonhuman animals possess basic moral rights.

Both Simmons and Gardner, for example, defend the common position that life has more value for (most) humans compared to most other animals because of our more sophisticated cognitive abilities. Simmons defends this by arguing that our more sophisticated cognitive capacities allow us to experience more creative and intellectual pleasures that are quantitatively and qualitatively superior to other pleasures (110).

One important objection not considered by either author concerns the ways in which the more sophisticated capacities of humans might allow for qualitatively and quantitatively worse forms of displeasure or negative experiences. If human life has more value because of the quantity and types of pleasures and valuable experiences we can enjoy, why are the distinct types of suffering, anxiety, and agony we can experience not relevant? If the claim is that humans have more valuable lives because of the net quantity and quality of pleasure and valuable experiences we can enjoy, then it isn't obviously true that humans have more valuable lives compared to animals, once we take the distinct types of displeasure we can experience into account. Further, even if it is true that some human lives contain more net value than other animals, this is likely not true for all of us.

More interesting, I think, is Simmons' suggestion that even if most humans are harmed more by death than most animals, this does not undermine an equal right to life. The assumption needed to ground this claim holds that two beings have an equal right to life only if the value of life for them is equal (112). But Simmons thinks we ought to reject this assumption because it entails that all humans do not have an equal right to life. Not only would this be the case for humans with severe cognitive disabilities but, Simmons rightly notes, there are reasons to think that among paradigmatic adult humans some are harmed more by death, as "some normal, adult humans seem to have greater capacities for reflective, creative, and intellectual activity than others" (112). This is an important point often ignored in this debate. Instead, Simmons suggests that to have an equal right to life only requires that the value of life for a being meets a certain threshold of value. And this threshold, he argues, should be set to include all individuals who are subjects of a life.

Norcross takes a different approach to these questions. He draws attention to an important element related to the harm of death not addressed in the other essays: the psychological relationship between an individual and her self in the future. Norcross argues that death is worse for animals who are subjects of a life (and who have some degree of self-consciousness) because of our psychological connection to our future selves: a fact we see when you must decide between a procedure that would extend your life for two years, or one that would extend "your" life by twenty years but sever all psychological connections between your present self and the future individual. Since it is rational to prefer the first procedure, Norcross argues that what is significant about death to individuals with a personal identity over time is the effect on their well-being (as opposed to the well-being of the organism) (171).

Subjects of a life, as beings with some degree of self-consciousness, have lives that matter to them . In this respect, their death is quite different from beings who are merely sentient and lack any psychological connection to their future selves. Their death may affect the net amount of well-being in the world, but it lacks personal significance to that being, in the same way that opting for the second procedure in the example above lacks any personal significance for me. This fact, Norcross argues, can ground a preference for subjects of a life over the merely sentient when it comes to issues of life and death (174).

Part 3 turns to more practical implications of animal rights and contains a variety of interesting and unique essays. In Chapter 11, Ramona Ilea argues that the capabilities approach to animals, articulated by Nussbaum, provides a useful and rigorous way to practically apply Regan's account of animal rights to questions of public policy and the law. In Chapter 13, Robert Bass develops an argument for veganism centered on moral caution. Bass argues that if there is a reasonable chance that an action is seriously wrong and no chance that it is morally required, then we ought to avoid that action. Bass thinks meat eating meets these criteria, and presents an array of arguments that attempt to show that the more modest conclusion is that there is a substantial chance meat-eating is wrong. In Chapter 14, Jason Hanna responds to arguments that animal rights views are consistent with "therapeutic hunting" aimed at reducing the suffering and future death of overabundant species. Hanna contends that hunters and wildlife managers are not in a situation where they must override an individual's rights, and that this blunts attempts to defend therapeutic hunting.

In Chapter 12, Scott Wilson argues that many who have made moral arguments for vegetarianism have failed to appreciate the significant interest meat-eaters have in consuming meat. He makes a strong case that the interest in consuming meat cannot be reduced to an interest simply in taste or nutrition, but instead reflects and involve a much wider variety of interests, including our self-conceptions of who we are, relationships with family and friends, convenience, and a variety of symbolic meanings. Wilson contends that this ultimately undermines utilitarian arguments for vegetarianism, and shows that rights-based approaches to animals are superior.

While I think Wilson is right to highlight some of the ways in which the consumption of meat reflects more than a simple interest in taste or pleasure, it is not clear his argument actually undermines a utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Two points can be made in response to his argument. The first concerns the plasticity of our desires. We might think, against Wilson, that many meat-eaters overestimate the effect that switching to a vegetarian lifestyle will have on their welfare. If this is the case, it is not clear that any loss they might experience is as significant as they might initially be inclined to think (many vegetarians and vegans, for example, report enjoying food just as much or nearly as much as during their omnivorous days). Second, and related to this, there is a considerable body of evidence that suggests eating a plant-based diet makes it much more likely an individual will be healthier, avoid chronic diseases, and live longer. If this is the case, individuals who adopt a vegetarian diet may experience welfare gains (even if they miss eating meat), and even if they don't appreciate this fact.

This book offers an interesting and expansive exploration of current thought on animal rights. One downside it has, however, is that none of the essays engage with more recent work on the political status of non-human animals and their place in our legal and political institutions (Ilea's essay is in this ballpark, but it doesn't address any of the recent work on the topic). This omission is understandable: the anthology grew out of a 2011 conference, and much of the emerging literature on the political status of nonhuman animals was sparked by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's (2011) Zoopolis . However, one of the volume's stated goals is to "reflect the current state of philosophical thought on the moral rights of animals" (x). The political turn that is happening in animal ethics (and among animal rights theorists) can be understood as a potential implication of the moral rights of animals (and would thus fit in Part 3). This omission leaves out a rather exciting current development in the field that is particularly relevant to advocates of the moral rights of animals.

Some of this new work, moreover, would connect the topics in Parts 2 and 3 in an interesting way. One question we might have concerns whether much hangs on questions about the comparative harm of death or claims to an equal right to life. If other animals are significantly harmed by death and have a right to life, then we might think this is all we need to see that harmful animal-use industries, like animal agriculture, must be stopped, even if humans are harmed more by death or possess a more stringent right to life.

However, if we frame our relationship to other animals in political terms, the question of the comparative harm of death may take on a new importance. If, to give just one example, we begin to look at other domesticated animals as fellow members of our political communities, then there might be additional reasons why it matters how much death harms these beings. Domesticated animals could have positive rights to things like health care, emergency services, research and development into present diseases, and the policing and investigation of crimes. How we think about these claims and their comparative strength may depend, in part, on how we think about the comparative harm of death, and whether or not humans and animals have an equal right to life. I highlight this not to fault the book for this omission, but to note how some of the more recent developments in animal ethics connect with some of the topics explored in the essays, and potentially make these questions more urgent and intriguing.

Overall, this anthology makes an excellent companion to the work of Regan, and contains a great collection of readings on current debates in the area of animal rights. It would work quite well in a class on animal ethics, and the material is suitable and accessible for undergraduates of all levels.

[1] One problem with this name is that it is misleading. The cognitive diversity that is characteristic of humans is not something that just affects those with cognitive disabilities or dementia, but all of us across our lives (when we are young, during periods of severe illness, and for many of us, as we age).

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The Moral Status of Animals

Is there something distinctive about humanity that justifies the idea that humans have moral status while non-humans do not? Providing an answer to this question has become increasingly important among philosophers as well as those outside of philosophy who are interested in our treatment of non-human animals. For some, answering this question will enable us to better understand the nature of human beings and the proper scope of our moral obligations. Some argue that there is an answer that can distinguish humans from the rest of the natural world. Many of those who accept this answer are interested in justifying certain human practices towards non-humans—practices that cause pain, discomfort, suffering and death. This latter group expects that in answering the question in a particular way, humans will be justified in granting moral consideration to other humans that is neither required nor justified when considering non-human animals. In contrast to this view, an increasing number of philosophers have argued that while humans are different in a variety of ways from each other and other animals, these differences do not provide a philosophical defense for denying non-human animals moral consideration. What the basis of moral consideration is and what it amounts to has been the source of much disagreement.

1.1 Speciesism

1.2 human exceptionalism, 1.3.1 rational persons, 1.3.2 legal persons, 1.4 sentience, 2. the moral significance of animals’ moral claims, 3. alternative perspectives on human relations to other animals, references cited, further reading, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the moral considerability of animals.

To say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there is a moral claim that this being can make on those who can recognize such claims. A morally considerable being is a being who can be wronged. It is often thought that because only humans can recognize moral claims, it is only humans who are morally considerable. However, when we ask why we think humans are the only types of beings that can be morally wronged, we begin to see that the class of beings able to recognize moral claims and the class of beings who can suffer moral wrongs are not co-extensive.

The view that only humans are morally considered is sometimes referred to as “speciesism”. In the 1970s, Richard Ryder coined this term while campaigning in Oxford to denote a ubiquitous type of human centered prejudice, which he thought was similar to racism. He objected to favoring one’s own species, while exploiting or harming members of other species. Peter Singer popularized the term and focused on the way speciesism, without moral justification, favors the interests of humans:

the racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. (Singer 1974: 108)

Discrimination based on race, like discrimination based on species is thought to be prejudicial, because these are not characteristics that matter when it comes to making moral claims.

Speciesist actions and attitudes are prejudicial because there is no prima facie reason for preferring the interests of beings belonging to the species group to which one also belongs over the interests of those who don’t. That humans are members of the species Homo sapiens is certainly a distinguishing feature of humans—humans share a genetic make-up and a distinctive physiology, we all emerge from a human pregnancy, but this is unimportant from the moral point of view. Species membership is a morally irrelevant characteristic, a bit of luck that is no more morally interesting than being born in Malaysia or Canada. As a morally irrelevant characteristic it cannot serve as the basis for a view that holds that our species deserves moral consideration that is not owed to members of other species.

One might respond that it is not membership in a biological category that matters morally, but rather the social meaning of those categories, meanings that structure not only the institutions we operate within, but how we conceptualize ourselves and our world. Humans have developed moral systems as well as a wide range of other valuable practices, and by creating these systems, we separate the human from the rest of the animal kingdom. But the category “human” itself is morally contested. Some argue, for example, that racism is not simply, or even primarily about discrimination and prejudice, but rather a mechanism of dehumanizing blackness so as to provide the conditions that makes humans white (see Fanon 1967; Kim 2015; Ko& Ko 2017). According to this line of thought, speciesism isn’t focused on discrimination or prejudice but is a central tool for creating human (and white) supremacy or exceptionalism.

Like speciesism, human exceptionalism can be understood in different ways. The most common way of understanding it is to suggest that there are distinctly human capacities and it is on the basis of these capacities that humans have moral status and other animals do not. But which capacities mark out all and only humans as the kinds of beings that can be wronged? A number of candidate capacities have been proposed—developing family ties, solving social problems, expressing emotions, starting wars, having sex for pleasure, using language, or thinking abstractly, are just a few. As it turns out, none of these activities is uncontroversially unique to human. Both scholarly and popular work on animal behavior suggests that many of the activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occurs in non-humans. For example, many species of non-humans develop long lasting kinship ties—orangutan mothers stay with their young for eight to ten years and while they eventually part company, they continue to maintain their relationships. Less solitary animals, such as chimpanzees, baboons, wolves, and elephants maintain extended family units built upon complex individual relationships, for long periods of time. Meerkats in the Kalahari desert are known to sacrifice their own safety by staying with sick or injured family members so that the fatally ill will not die alone. All animals living in socially complex groups must solve various problems that inevitably arise in such groups. Canids and primates are particularly adept at it, yet even chickens and horses are known to recognize large numbers of individuals in their social hierarchies and to maneuver within them. One of the ways that non-human animals negotiate their social environments is by being particularly attentive to the emotional states of others around them. When a conspecific is angry, it is a good idea to get out of his way. Animals that develop life-long bonds are known to suffer from the death of their partners. Some are even said to die of sorrow. Darwin reported this in The Descent of Man : “So intense is the grief of female monkeys for the loss of their young, that it invariably caused the death of certain kinds” (1871: 40). Jane Goodall’s report of the death of the healthy 8 year old chimpanzee Flint just three weeks after the death of his mother Flo also suggests that sorrow can have a devastating effect on non-human animals (see Goodall 2000: 140–141 in Bekoff 2000). Coyotes, elephants and killer whales are also among the species for which profound effects of grief have been reported (Bekoff 2000) and many dog owners can provide similar accounts. While the lives of many, perhaps most, non-humans in the wild are consumed with struggle for survival, aggression and battle, there are some non-humans whose lives are characterized by expressions of joy, playfulness, and a great deal of sex (Woods 2010). Recent studies in cognitive ethology have suggested that some non-humans engage in manipulative and deceptive activity, can construct “cognitive maps” for navigation, and some non-humans appear to understand symbolic representation and are able to use language. [ 1 ]

It appears that most of the capacities that are thought to distinguish humans as morally considerable beings, have been observed, often in less elaborate form, in the non-human world. Because human behavior and cognition share deep roots with the behavior and cognition of other animals, approaches that try to find sharp behavioral or cognitive boundaries between humans and other animals remain controversial. For this reason, attempts to establish human uniqueness by identifying certain capacities, are not the most promising when it comes to thinking hard about the moral status of animals.

1.3 Personhood

Nonetheless, there is something important that is thought to distinguish humans from non-humans that is not reducible to the observation of behavior best explained by possessing a certain capacity and that is our “personhood”. The notion of personhood identifies a category of morally considerable beings that is thought to be coextensive with humanity. Historically, Kant is the most noted defender of personhood as the quality that makes a being valuable and thus morally considerable (for a contemporary utilitarian discussion of personhood, see Varner 2012). Kant writes:

…every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will…Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. (Kant [1785] 1998: [Ak 4: 428])

The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person….that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion. (Kant [1798] 2010: 239 [Ak 7: 127])

More recent work in a Kantian vein develops this idea. Christine Korsgaard, for example, argues that humans “uniquely” face a problem, the problem of normativity. This problem emerges because of the reflective structure of human consciousness. We can, and often do, think about our desires and ask ourselves “Are these desires reasons for action? Do these impulses represent the kind of things I want to act according to?” Our reflective capacities allow us and require us to step back from our mere impulses in order to determine when and whether to act on them. In stepping back we gain a certain distance from which we can answer these questions and solve the problem of normativity. We decide whether to treat our desires as reasons for action based on our conceptions of ourselves, on our “practical identities”. When we determine whether we should take a particular desire as a reason to act we are engaging in a further level of reflection, a level that requires an endorseable description of ourselves. This endorseable description of ourselves, this practical identity, is a necessary moral identity because without it we cannot view our lives as worth living or our actions as worth doing. Korsgaard suggests that humans face the problem of normativity in a way that non-humans apparently do not:

A lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of them. That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves, on to our own mental activities, and we are conscious of them. That is why we can think about them…And this sets us a problem that no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative…. The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. (Korsgaard 1996: 93)

Here, Korsgaard understands “reason” as “a kind of reflective success” and given that non-humans are thought to be unable to reflect in a way that would allow them this sort of success, it appears that they do not act on reasons, at least reasons of this kind. Since non-humans do not act on reasons they do not have a practical identity from which they reflect and for which they act. So humans can be distinguished from non-humans because humans, we might say, are sources of normativity and non-humans are not.

But arguably, Kant’s view of personhood does not distinguish all and only humans as morally considerable. Personhood is not, in fact, coextensive with humanity when understood as a general description of the group to which human beings belong. And the serious part of this problem is not that there may be some extra-terrestrials or deities who have rational capacities. The serious problem is that many humans are not persons. Some humans—i.e., infants, children, people in comas—do not have the rational, self-reflective capacities associated with personhood. This problem, unfortunately known in the literature as the problem of “marginal cases”, poses serious difficulties for “personhood” as the criterion of moral considerability. Many beings whose positive moral value we have deeply held intuitions about, and who we treat as morally considerable, will be excluded from consideration by this account.

There are three ways to respond to this counter-intuitive conclusion. One, which can be derived from one interpretation of Kant, is to suggest that non-persons are morally considerable indirectly. Though Kant believed that animals were mere things it appears he did not genuinely believe we could dispose of them any way we wanted. In the Lectures on Ethics he makes it clear that we have indirect duties to animals, duties that are not toward them, but in regard to them insofar as our treatment of them can affect our duties to persons.

If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. ([1784–5] 1997: 212 [Ak 27: 459])

And one could argue the same would be true of those human beings who are not persons. We disrespect our humanity when we act in inhumane ways towards non-persons, whatever their species.

But this indirect view is unsatisfying—it fails to capture the independent wrong that is being done to the non-person. When someone rapes a woman in a coma, or whips a severely brain damaged child, or sets a cat on fire, they are not simply disrespecting humanity or themselves as representatives of it, they are wronging these non-persons. So, a second way to avoid the counter-intuitive conclusion is to argue that such non-persons stand in the proper relations to “rational nature” such that they should be thought of as morally considerable. Allen Wood (1998) argues in this way and suggests that all beings that potentially have a rational nature, or who virtually have it, or who have had it, or who have part of it, or who have the necessary conditions of it, what he calls “the infrastructure of rational nature”, should be directly morally considerable. Insofar as a being stands in this relation to rational nature, they are the kinds of beings that can be wronged.

This response is not unlike that of noted animal rights proponent, Tom Regan, who argues that what is important for moral consideration are not the differences between humans and non-humans but the similarities. Regan argues that because persons share with certain non-persons (which includes those humans and non-humans who have a certain level of organized cognitive function) the ability to be experiencing subject of a life and to have an individual welfare that matters to them regardless of what others might think, both deserve moral consideration. Regan argues that subjects of a life:

want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death—all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As the same is true of … animals … they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own. (Regan 1985: 24)

A third way of addressing this problem has been taken up by Korsgaard who maintains that there is a big difference between those with normative, rational capacities and those without, but unlike Kant, believes both humans and non-humans are the proper objects of our moral concern. She argues that those without normative, rational capacities share certain “natural” capacities with persons, and these natural capacities are often the content of the moral demands that persons make on each other. She writes,

what we demand, when we demand … recognition, is that our natural concerns—the objects of our natural desires and interests and affections—be accorded the status of values, values that must be respected as far as possible by others. And many of those natural concerns—the desire to avoid pain is an obvious example—spring from our animal nature, not from our rational nature. (Korsgaard 2007: 7)

What moral agents construct as valuable and normatively binding is not only our rational or autonomous capacities, but the needs and desires we have as living, embodied beings. Insofar as these needs and desires are valuable for agents, the ability to experience similar needs and desires in patients should also be valued.

In the courts, all humans and some corporations are considered persons in the legal sense. But all animals, infants and adults, are not legal persons, but rather, under the law they are considered property. There have been a few attempts to change the legal status of some nonhuman animals from property to persons. The Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) founded by Steven Wise, has filed a series of cases in the New York courts seeking to establish legal personhood for particular chimpanzees being held in the state, with the goal of protecting their rights to bodily integrity and liberty, and allow them to seek remedy, through their proxies, when those rights are violated. Chimpanzees are a good test case for establishing nonhuman legal personhood as they are, according to the documents filed by NhRP, autonomous beings with sophisticated cognitive abilities including

episodic memory, self-consciousness, self-knowing, self agency, referential and intentional communication, mental time-travel, numerosity, sequential learning, meditational learning, mental state modeling, visual perspective taking, understanding the experiences of others, intentional action, planning, imagination, empathy, metacognition, working memory, decision-making, imitation, deferred imitation, emulation, innovation, material, social, and symbolic culture, cross-modal perception, tool-use, tool-making, cause-and-effect. (petition of NhRP v. Samuel Stanley, p. 12, see Other Internet Resources )

The legal arguments to extend personhood beyond the human parallel more general ethical arguments that extend ethical consideration outward from those who occupy the moral center. Turning to empirical work designed to show that other animals are really similar to those considered legal persons, primatologists submitted affidavits attesting to what they have learned working with chimpanzees. Mary Lee Jensvold suggests

there are numerous parallels in the way chimpanzee and human communication skills develop over time, suggesting a similar unfolding cognitive process across the two species and an underlying neurobiological continuity. (Jensvold affidavit, p. 4, in Other Internet Resources )

James King notes

chimpanzees and humans resemble each other in terms of their ability to experience happiness and the way in which it relates to individual personality. (King affidavit, p. 8, in Other Internet Resources )

And Mathias Osvath makes remarkable claims about chimpanzee personhood:

Autonoetic consciousness gives an individual of any species an autobiographical sense of it self with a future and a past. Chimps and other great apes clearly possess an autobiographical self, as they are able to prepare themselves for future actions… they likely can, just as humans, be in pain over an anticipated future event that has yet to occur. For instance, confining someone in a prison or cage for a set time, or for life, would lose much of its power as punishment if that individual had no self-concept. Every moment would be a new moment with no conscious relation to the next. But, chimpanzees. and other great apes have a concept of their personal past and future and therefore suffer the pain of not being able to fulfill one’s goals or move around as one wants; like humans they experience the pain of anticipating a never-ending situation. (Osvath affidavit, pp. 4–7, in Other Internet Resources )

These claims, as well as those of others experts, identify the relevantly similar capacities that chimpanzees and other great apes share with humans and it is in virtue of these capacities that legal personhood is sought.

Using rational nature or cognitive capacities as the touchstone of moral considerability misses an important fact about animals, human and nonhuman. Our lives can go better or worse for us. Utilitarians have traditionally argued that the truly morally important feature of beings is unappreciated when we focus on personhood or the rational, self-reflective nature of humans, or the relation a being stands in to such nature, or being the subject of a life, or being legal persons. What is really important, utilitarians maintain, is the promotion of happiness, or pleasure, or the satisfaction of interests, and the avoidance of pain, or suffering, or frustration of interests. Bentham, one of the more forceful defenders of this sentientist view of moral considerability, famously wrote:

Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things . [original emphasis] … The day has been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated … upon the same footing as … animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the ossacrum , are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?…the question is not, Can they reason ? nor, Can they talk ? but, Can they suffer ? (Bentham 1780/1789: chapter xvii, paragraph 6)

Contemporary utilitarians, such as Peter Singer (1990, 1979 [1993]), suggest that there is no morally justifiable way to exclude from moral consideration non-humans or non-persons who can clearly suffer. Any being that has an interest in not suffering deserves to have that interest taken into account. And a non-human who acts to avoid pain can be thought to have just such an interest. Even contemporary Kantians have acknowledged the moral force of the experience of pain. Korsgaard, for example, writes “it is a pain to be in pain. And that is not a trivial fact” (1996: 154).

When you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a reason. An animal’s cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason, a reason to change its conditions. And you can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can the words of a person. Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can. …So of course we have obligations to animals. (Korsgaard 1996: 153)

When we encounter an animal in pain we recognize their claim on us, and thus beings who can suffer are morally considerable.

That non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen—how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions. Of course, how one argues for the moral considerability of non-human animals will inform how we are to understand the force of an animal’s claims.

According to the view that an animal’s moral claim is equivalent to a moral right, any action that fails to treat the animal as a being with inherent worth would violate that animal’s right and is thus morally objectionable. According to the animal rights position, to treat an animal as a means to some human end, as many humans do when they eat animals or experiment on them, is to violate that animal’s right. As Tom Regan has written,

…animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their value were reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated. (Regan 1985: 24).

The animal rights position is an absolutist position. Any being that is a subject of a life has inherent worth and the rights that protect such worth, and all subjects of a life have these rights equally. Thus any practice that fails to respect the rights of those animals who have them, e.g., eating animals, hunting animals, experimenting on animals, using animals for entertainment, is wrong, irrespective of human need, context, or culture.

The utilitarian position on animals, most commonly associated with Peter Singer and popularly, though erroneously, referred to as an animal rights position, is actually quite distinct. Here the moral significance of the claims of animals depends on what other morally significant competing claims might be in play in any given situation. While the equal interests of all morally considerable beings are considered equally, the practices in question may end up violating or frustrating some interests but would not be considered morally wrong if, when all equal interests are considered, more of these interests are satisfied than frustrated. For utilitarians like Singer, what matters are the strength and nature of interests, not whose interests these are. So, if the only options available in order to save the life of one morally considerable being is to cause harm, but not death, to another morally considerable being, then according to a utilitarian position, causing this harm may be morally justifiable. Similarly, if there are two courses of action, one which causes extreme amounts of suffering and ultimate death, and one which causes much less suffering and painless death, then the latter would be morally preferable to the former.

Consider factory farming, the most common method used to convert animal bodies into relatively inexpensive food in industrialized societies today. An estimated 8 billion animals in the United States are born, confined, biologically manipulated, transported and ultimately slaughtered each year so that humans can consume them. The conditions in which these animals are raised and the method of slaughter causes vast amounts of suffering (see, for example, Mason & Singer 1980 [1990]). Given that animals suffer under such conditions and assuming that suffering is not in their interests, then the practice of factory farming would only be morally justifiable if its abolition were to cause greater suffering or a greater amount of interest frustration. Certainly humans who take pleasure in eating animals will find it harder to satisfy these interests in the absence of factory farms; it may cost more and require more effort to obtain animal products. The factory farmers, and the industries that support factory farming, will also have certain interests frustrated if factory farming were to be abolished. How much interest frustration and interest satisfaction would be associated with the end to factory farming is largely an empirical question. But utilitarians are not making unreasonable predictions when they argue that on balance the suffering and interest frustration that animals experience in modern day meat production is greater than the suffering that humans would endure if they had to alter their current practices.

Importantly, the utilitarian argument for the moral significance of animal suffering in meat production is not an argument for vegetarianism. If an animal lived a happy life and was painlessly killed and then eaten by people who would otherwise suffer hunger or malnutrition by not eating the animal, then painlessly killing and eating the animal would be the morally justified thing to do. In many parts of the world where economic, cultural, or climate conditions make it virtually impossible for people to sustain themselves on plant based diets, killing and eating animals that previously led relatively unconstrained lives and are painlessly killed, would not be morally objectionable. The utilitarian position can thus avoid certain charges of cultural chauvinism and moralism, charges that the animal rights position apparently cannot avoid.

It might be objected that to suggest that it is morally acceptable to hunt and eat animals for those people living in arctic regions, or for nomadic cultures, or for poor rural peoples, for example, is to potentially condone painlessly killing other morally considerable beings, like humans, for food consumption in similar situations. If violating the rights of an animal can be morally tolerated, especially a right to life, then similar rights violations can be morally tolerated. In failing to recognize the inviolability of the moral claims of all morally considerable beings, utilitarianism cannot accommodate one of our most basic prima facie principles, namely that killing a morally considerable being is wrong.

There are at least two replies to this sort of objection. The first appeals to the negative side effects that killing may promote. If, to draw on an overused and sadly sophomoric counter-example, one person can be kidnapped and painlessly killed in order to provide body parts for four individuals who will die without them, there will inevitably be negative side-effects that all things considered would make the kidnapping wrong. Healthy people, knowing they could be used for spare parts, might make themselves unhealthy to avoid such a fate or they may have so much stress and fear that the overall state of affairs would be worse than that in which four people died. Appealing to side-effects when it comes to the wrong of killing is certainly plausible, but it fails to capture what is directly wrong with killing.

A more satisfying reply would have us adopt what might be called a multi-factor perspective, one that takes into account the kinds of interest that are possible for certain kinds of morally considerable beings, the content of interests of the beings in question, their relative weight, and the context of those who have them. Consider a seal who has spent his life freely roaming the oceans and ice flats and who is suddenly and painlessly killed to provide food for a human family struggling to survive a bitter winter in far northern climes. While it is probably true that the seal had an immediate interest in avoiding suffering, it is less clear that the seal has a future directed interest in continued existence. If the seal lacks this future directed interest, then painlessly killing him does not violate this interest. The same cannot be said for the human explorer who finds himself face to face with a hungry Inuit family. Persons generally have interests in continued existence, interests that, arguably, non-persons do not have. So one factor that can be appealed to is that non-persons may not have the range of interests that persons do.

An additional factor is the type of interest in question. We can think of interests as scalar; crucial interests are weightier than important interests, important interests are weightier than replaceable interests, and all are weightier than trivial interests or mere whims. When there is a conflict of interests, crucial interests will always override important interests, important interests will always override replaceable interests, etc. So if an animal has an interest in not suffering, which is arguably a crucial interest, or at least an important one, and a person has an interest in eating that animal when there are other things to eat, meaning that interest is replaceable, then the animal has the stronger interest and it would be wrong to violate that interest by killing the animal for food if there is another source of food available.

Often, however, conflicts of interests are within the same category. The Inuit’s interest in food is crucial and the explorer’s interest in life is crucial. If we assume that the explorer cannot otherwise provide food for the hunter, then it looks as if there is a conflict within the same category. If you take the interests of an indigenous hunter’s whole family into account, then their combined interest in their own survival appears to outweigh the hapless explorer’s interest in continued existence. Indeed, if painlessly killing and eating the explorer were the only way for the family to survive, then perhaps this action would be morally condoned. But this is a rather extreme sort of example, one in which even our deepest held convictions are strained. So it is quite hard to know what to make of the clash between what a utilitarian would condone and what our intuitions tell us we should believe here. Our most basic prima facie principles arise and are accepted under ordinary circumstances. Extraordinary circumstances are precisely those in which such principles or precepts give way. [ 2 ]

The multi-factor utilitarian perspective is particularly helpful when considering the use of animals in medical research. According to the animal rights position, the use of animals in experimental procedures is a clear violation of their rights—they are being used as a mere means to some possible end—and thus animal rights proponents are in favor of the abolition of all laboratory research. The utilitarian position, particularly one that incorporates some kind of multi-factor perspective, might allow some research on animals under very specific conditions. Before exploring what a utilitarian might condone in the way of animal experimentation, let us first quickly consider what would be morally prohibited. All research that involves invasive procedures, constant confinement, and ultimate death can be said to violate the animal’s crucial interests. Thus any experiments that are designed to enhance the important, replaceable, or trivial interests of humans or other animals would be prohibited. That would mean that experiments for cosmetics or household products are prohibited, as there are non-animal tested alternatives and many options already available for consumers. Certain psychological experiments, such as those in which infant primates are separated from their mothers and exposed to frightening stimuli in an effort to understand problems teenagers have when they enter high school, would also come into question. There are many examples of experiments that violate an animal’s crucial interests in the hopes of satisfying the lesser interests of some other morally considerable being, all of which would be objectionable from this perspective.

There are some laboratory experiments, however, that from a multi-factor utilitarian perspective may be permitted. These are experiments in which the probability of satisfying crucial or important interests for many who suffer from some debilitating or fatal disease is high, and the numbers of non-human animals whose crucial interests are violated is low. The psychological complexity of the non-humans may also be significant in determining whether the experiment is morally justified. In the case of experimenting in these limited number of cases, presumably a parallel argument could be made about experimenting on humans. If the chances are very high that experimenting on one human, who is a far superior experimental animal when it comes to human disease, can prevent great suffering or death in many humans, then the utilitarian may, if side effects are minimal, condone such an experiment. Of course, it is easier to imagine this sort of extreme case in the abstract, what a utilitarian would think actually morally justified, again depends on the specific empirical data.

In sum, the animal rights position takes the significance of morally considerable claims to be absolute. Thus, any use of animals that involves a disregard for their moral claims is problematic. The significance of an animal’s morally considerable interests according to a utilitarian is variable. Whether an action is morally justified or permissible will depend on a number of factors. The utilitarian position on animals would condemn a large number of practices that involve the suffering and death of billions of animals, but there are cases in which some use of non-human animals, and perhaps even human animals, may be morally justified (Gruen 2011: ch. 4; Gilbert, Kaebnick, & Murray 2012).

Given the long-standing view that non-humans are mere things, there are still many who reject the arguments presented here for the moral considerability of non-humans and the significance of their interests. Nonetheless, most now realize that the task of arguing that humans have a unique and exclusive moral status is rather difficult. Yet even amongst those who do view animals as within the sphere of moral concern, there is disagreement about the nature and usefulness of the arguments presented on behalf of the moral status of animals.

Increasingly, philosophers are arguing that while our behavior towards animals is indeed subject to moral scrutiny, the kinds of ethical arguments that are usually presented frame the issues in the wrong way. Some philosophers suggest that rational argumentation fails to capture those features of moral experience that allow us to really see why treating animals badly is wrong. The point, according to commentators such as Stephen R.L. Clark and Cora Diamond, for example, is that members of our communities, however we conceive of them, pull on us and it is in virtue of this pull that we recognize what is wrong with cruelty. Animals are individuals with whom we share a common life and this recognition allows us to see them as they are. Eating animals is wrong not because it is a violation of the animal’s rights or because on balance such an act creates more suffering than other acts, but rather because in eating animals or using them in other harmful, violent ways, we do not display the traits of character that kind, sensitive, compassionate, mature, and thoughtful members of a moral community should display.

According to some in the virtue ethics tradition, carefully worked out arguments in which the moral considerability and moral significance of animals are laid out will have little if any grip on our thoughts and actions. Rather, by perceiving the attitudes that underlie the use and abuse of non-human animals as shallow or cruel, one interested in living a virtuous life will change their attitudes and come to reject treating animals as food or tools for research. As Rosalind Hursthouse recognized after having been exposed to alternative ways of seeing animals:

I began to see [my attitudes] that related to my conception of flesh-foods as unnecessary, greedy, self-indulgent, childish, my attitude to shopping and cooking in order to produce lavish dinner parties as parochial, gross, even dissolute. I saw my interest and delight in nature programmes about the lives of animals on television and my enjoyment of meat as side by side at odds with one another…Without thinking animals had rights, I began to see both the wild ones and the ones we usually eat as having lives of their own, which they should be left to enjoy. And so I changed. My perception of the moral landscape and where I and the other animals were situated in it shifted. (Hursthouse 2000: 165–166; see also Diamond 2001 [especially chs. 11 and 13], and Clarke 1977)

Alice Crary argues that shifting perceptions of our moral landscapes occur because these landscapes, and more precisely the rich worlds of those who inhabit them, are not morally neutral. The characteristics that philosophers tend to look for in other animals to determine whether or not they are morally considerable, according to Crary, are already infused with moral importance, “human beings and other animals have empirically discoverable moral characteristics” (my emphasis, 2016: 85) that are, as she puts it “inside ethics”. These values often sneak in under a supposedly neutral gloss. By explicitly locating these characteristics inside ethics, the texture, quality, and purposes of our ethical reflection on moral considerability changes. Arriving at an adequate empirical understanding requires non-neutral methods, identifying historical and cultural perspectives as shaping how we consider other animals morally. What ethical questions we think are important and how we frame and answer them, will be different if we see our lives and the lives of other animals as already imbued with moral values.

Other feminist philosophers have taken issue with the supposedly morally neutral methods of argumentation used to establish the moral status of animals. For many feminists the traditional methods of rational argumentation fail to take into account the feelings of sympathy or empathy that humans have towards non-humans, feelings they believe are central to a full account of what we owe non-humans and why (see Adams & Donovan 1995; Donovan & Adams 2007; Adams & Gruen 2014).

Feminist philosophers have also challenged the individualism that is central in the arguments for the moral status of animals. Rather than identifying intrinsic or innate properties that non-humans share with humans, some feminists have argued instead that we ought to understand moral status in relational terms given that moral recognition is invariably a social practice. As Elizabeth Anderson has written:

Moral considerability is not an intrinsic property of any creature, nor is it supervenient on only its intrinsic properties, such as its capacities. It depends, deeply, on the kind of relations they can have with us. (Anderson 2004: 289).

And these relationships needn’t be direct. The reach of human activity has expanded across the entire globe and humans are entangled with each other and other animals in myriad ways. We participate in activities and institutions that directly or indirectly harm others by creating negative experiences, depriving them of their well-being, or denying them opportunities to be who they are and pursue what they care about. Philosophers Elisa Aaltola and Lori Gruen have argued for refining our empathetic imagination in order to improve our relationships with each other and other animals.

Even though it is challenging to understand what it is like to be another, and even though we are limited by our inevitable anthropocentric perspectives, being in respectful ethical relation involves attempting to understand and respond to another’s needs, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and perspectives. What Gruen calls, “entangled empathy” is a process that involves both affect and cognition (Gruen 2015). Individuals who are empathizing with others respond to the other’s condition and reflectively imagine themselves in the distinct position of the other while staying attentive to both similarities and differences between herself and her situation and that of the fellow creature with whom she is empathizing. Entangled empathy involves paying critical attention to the broader conditions that may negatively affect the experiences and flourishing of those with whom one is empathizing, and this requires those of us empathizing to attend to things we might not have otherwise. It therefore also enhances our own experiences, develops our moral imagination, and helps us to become more sensitive perceivers.

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Midgley, Mary, 1983, Animals and Why They Matter , Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
Pachirat, Timothy, 2011, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight , New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Rachels, James, 1990, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rowlands, Mark, 2012, Can Animals Be Moral? New York: Oxford University Press.
Ryder, Richard D., 1989, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Toward Speciesism , Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Sapontzis, Steve F. (ed.), 2004, Food for Thought: The Debate Over Eating Meat , NY: Prometheus Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

The Moral Status of Animals , webpage at Ethics Updates (Larry Hinman, University of San Diego), now only available at the Internet Archive.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation , at the Library of Economics and Liberty.
AnimalLaw.com: International Institute for Animal Law (National Anti-Vivisection Society)
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Nicholas Kristof

Turning the Tide on Animal Suffering

A photograph of a group of protesters holding signs. One sign shows pigs crawling atop each other, and another shows an animal behind a cage.

By Nicholas Kristof

Opinion Columnist

In 1971, a half-dozen graduate students at Oxford University held what was perhaps the first protest of the modern animal rights movement. They insisted that respecting animals was a moral imperative.

And the world changed.

No, not right away. But one of those students, a young Australian philosopher named Peter Singer, turned his ideas into a transformative 1975 book, “Animal Liberation,” that was initially mocked for overreach. “The animal movement was still widely seen as crackpot,” Singer recalls.

Yet to anyone who thinks that ideas are irrelevant in a practical age, think again. His arguments stirred a slow-motion revolution that has changed the way we treat other animals.

Singer has just issued a new edition of the book, updated and titled “Animal Liberation Now.” It’s a monument to the remarkable spread of the ideas he articulated in 1975. At least nine states and the European Union now ban veal crates, hen cages or tight stalls for sows. The top supermarket chains in America have agreed to sell only cage-free eggs by 2026, and McDonald’s has done the same.

A court in Argentina accepted that habeas corpus rights apply to a chimpanzee. Israel and California have banned the sale of fur coats. Pope Francis has suggested that animals go to Heaven and that the Virgin Mary “grieves for the sufferings” of mistreated livestock.

How times have changed. When Mary Wollstonecraft advocated for the rights of women in 1792, that seemed to some so ridiculous that a satirist mocked her by calling for the rights of animals as well. Now it’s unquestioned (at least in the abstract) that rights extend to people of all races and religions, including women, and in some cases to animals as well. When voters face referendums on animal rights, they often approve them by large margins.

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Essay on Animal Rights

Introduction

Every day, millions of animals suffer in silence, their voices drowned out by the machinery of industrialization. Yet, hidden behind the walls of factory farms and laboratories, their plight remains largely invisible to the human eye. Consider this: in the United States alone, over 9 billion land animals are raised and slaughtered for food every year, enduring lives of confinement, pain, and fear. As Mahatma Gandhi famously said, ‘The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by how its animals are treated. ‘ In a world where such staggering numbers reflect the disregard for animal welfare, the call to uphold animal rights becomes an ethical choice and a moral imperative.

Understanding Animal Rights

Animal rights, a concept rooted in moral philosophy, advocates for the ethical treatment and consideration of non-human animals. It extends beyond the notion of animal welfare, which primarily concerns the well-being of animals, to assert that animals possess inherent rights that should be respected and protected by society.

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Definition of Animal Rights

Animal rights entail recognizing that animals have interests and desires and deserve to live free from unnecessary suffering and exploitation. This perspective views animals as individuals with intrinsic value rather than mere commodities or resources for human use.

Historical Background and Evolution of the Animal Rights Movement

Enlightenment Era: Philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant laid the groundwork for animal rights discourse by questioning the moral treatment of animals and advocating for their ethical consideration.
19th Century: Early advocates like Henry Salt raised awareness about animal welfare and criticized practices such as animal cruelty and vivisection.
20th Century: The animal rights movement gained traction with the publication of “Animal Liberation” by Peter Singer in 1975, which presented a philosophical argument for extending moral consideration to animals.
Emergence of Activism: Throughout the 20th century, various animal rights organizations and activists, such as the Humane Society of the United States and ASPCA (American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) , campaigned for legislative reforms and raised public awareness about animal rights issues.
Global Impact: The animal rights movement expanded beyond national borders, with international organizations like PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) advocating for animal rights globally and exposing abuses in various industries worldwide.

Philosophical Perspectives on Animal Rights

Utilitarianism: Utilitarian philosophers argue that actions should determine their moral worth based on their consequences, which include maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering. From this perspective, we should consider the suffering of animals equal to that of humans, and actions that cause unnecessary harm to animals are morally wrong.
Deontology: Deontological ethics, championed by philosophers like Immanuel Kant, emphasizes the importance of moral duties and principles. While Kant himself did not advocate for animal rights, contemporary deontologists argue that we should include animals within the scope of moral consideration due to their capacity to suffer.
Animal Liberation Theory: Developed by Peter Singer in his seminal work “Animal Liberation,” this theory posits that animals deserve equal consideration of interests and should not be discriminated against solely based on their species. Singer argues for the abolition of practices that exploit animals, such as factory farming, animal testing , and animal entertainment.

Basic Rights for Animals

Basic animal rights encompass fundamental protections to ensure their well-being and prevent unnecessary suffering. While the concept of animal rights can vary depending on different ethical, philosophical, and legal perspectives, some commonly advocated basic rights for animals include:

Right to Life: Animals should have the right to live without arbitrary deprivation of life, meaning we should not kill them for reasons other than essential survival needs or inhumane circumstances.
Right to Freedom from Cruelty: We should protect animals from unnecessary suffering, abuse, neglect, and cruelty. This includes provisions against physical harm, psychological distress, and the infliction of pain.
Right to Freedom from Exploitation: Humans should not exploit animals in ways that cause them harm or diminish their quality of life for human benefit. This includes prohibitions against factory farming, animal testing, and using animals for entertainment like circuses or rodeos.
Right to Basic Welfare: Animals should have their basic needs met, including access to food, water , shelter, and appropriate medical care. They should also be able to express natural behaviors and live in environments conducive to their well-being.
Right to Respect for Natural Behaviors: Animals should be allowed to engage in natural behaviors important to their species, such as socializing, foraging, and exercising.
Right to Consideration of Interests: Animals should be considered individuals with interests and preferences rather than objects or property for human use. Decisions affecting animals should consider their well-being and autonomy.
Right to Legal Recognition and Protection: Animals should be recognized as sentient beings with inherent value and legally protected against exploitation, abuse, and cruelty. This includes enacting and enforcing laws that uphold animal welfare standards and punish those who violate them.

Moral and Ethical Justifications for Animal Rights

The moral and ethical justifications for animal rights are grounded in various philosophical perspectives and ethical principles that recognize animals’ intrinsic value and sentience. Here are some key moral and ethical justifications for animal rights:

Sentience and the Capacity for Suffering in Animals

Recognition of Sentience: Animals, like humans, are capable of experiencing pain, pleasure, emotions, and consciousness.
Moral Relevance of Sentience: The ability to suffer is morally significant and warrants consideration in ethical decision-making, regardless of species.
Principle of Equal Consideration: Philosopher Peter Singer argues for the principle of equal consideration of interests, asserting that we should weigh the interests of all sentient beings equally, regardless of species membership.

Moral Consideration for Non-Human Animals

Expanding the Moral Community: Advocates for animal rights advocate for expanding the moral community beyond humans to include animals, recognizing their moral status and rights.
Respect for Individual Lives: Animals possess inherent value and interests in their own lives, and we should respect their rights based on their intrinsic worth, not solely on their utility to humans.
Principle of Non-Harm: Ethical frameworks, such as utilitarianism and deontology, support minimizing harm and promoting the well-being of all sentient beings, including animals.

The Interconnectedness of Human and Animal Well-being

Ecological Interdependence: Recognizing the interconnectedness of ecosystems and biodiversity and protecting animal rights contributes to environmental sustainability and ecosystem health.
Human Health and Welfare: Cruelty towards animals can negatively affect human health and societal well-being, such as the spread of zoonotic diseases and environmental degradation .
Moral Progress and Compassion: Upholding animal rights reflects moral progress and compassion in society, promoting empathy, kindness , and respect for all living beings.

Violations of Animal Rights

Despite growing awareness and advocacy efforts, animals continue to face numerous violations of their rights, ranging from systemic exploitation to individual acts of cruelty. These violations often occur across various industries and contexts, resulting in immense suffering and harm to animals. Here are key points outlining common violations of animal rights:

Factory Farming : The industrialized agriculture sector subjects billions of animals to cramped, unsanitary conditions and routine practices such as confinement, mutilation (e.g., debeaking, tail docking), and overcrowding. Animals are treated as commodities, deprived of natural behaviors, and subjected to immense physical and psychological suffering.
Animal Testing : Millions of animals, including mice, rats, rabbits, and primates, are used in scientific experiments each year. These experiments often involve invasive procedures, exposure to toxins, and infliction of pain and suffering for research purposes, cosmetics testing, and pharmaceutical development.
Animal Entertainment : The entertainment industry exploits animals for profit, subjecting them to confinement, physical abuse, and unnatural living conditions in circuses, marine parks, zoos, and rodeos. Practices such as elephant rides, dolphin shows, and bullfighting prioritize human entertainment over animal welfare.
Fur Farming and the Wildlife Trade involve raising or trapping animals in cruel conditions for their fur, skins, or body parts, leading to suffering and the depletion of wild populations. Fur farming subjects animals like minks, foxes, and chinchillas to confinement, stress, and painful killing methods.
Live Animal Transport : Animals endure long-distance transportation under stressful and often inhumane conditions, including overcrowding, extreme temperatures, and lack of food and water. This transportation occurs in various industries, including livestock, poultry, and exotic animal trade, resulting in injuries, exhaustion, and death.
Blood Sports : Activities such as dogfighting, cockfighting, and trophy hunting involve deliberate cruelty towards animals for entertainment or sport. People breed, train, and force animals to fight or hunt them for trophies, resulting in physical harm, psychological trauma , and often death for the animals.
Environmental Destruction and Habitat Loss : Human activities such as deforestation , urbanization, and industrial development contribute to habitat destruction and fragmentation, threatening the survival of countless species. Loss of habitat disrupts ecosystems, displaces wildlife, and leads to population declines and extinction.
Neglect and Abandonment : Domesticated animals, including pets and farm animals, are often subjected to neglect, abandonment, and cruelty by their caregivers. Lack of proper care, inadequate shelter, and abandonment result in suffering, health issues, and premature death for many animals.

Arguments in Favor and Against Animal Rights

Here’s a table outlining arguments in favor of and against animal rights:


	Animals have inherent worth and interests that should be respected, regardless of species.	Some argue that humans have a special moral status due to higher cognitive abilities.
	Recognizing animal rights promotes a culture of kindness, empathy, and respect for life.	Critics contend that human interests often take precedence over animal welfare.
	Protecting animal rights contributes to ecosystem stability and mitigates biodiversity loss.	Opponents argue that focusing solely on animal rights may neglect broader environmental concerns.
	Enacting animal rights laws provides legal safeguards against cruelty and exploitation.	Some express concerns that excessive regulation could burden industries and hinder economic growth.
	Improving animal welfare standards in food production enhances food safety and quality.	Critics question the practicality and economic feasibility of implementing higher welfare standards.
	Animal rights advocacy aligns with principles of social justice, promoting equality for all beings.	Some argue that prioritizing animal rights may divert attention from pressing human rights issues.
	Ethical treatment of animals in research ensures valid and reliable scientific outcomes.	Opponents suggest that strict animal rights regulations may impede scientific advancements and innovation.
	Treating animals with dignity and care fosters positive attitudes and emotional well-being.	Critics argue that anthropocentric values prioritize human interests over those of animals.
	Advocating for animal rights cultivates empathy and compassion, fostering a more humane society.	Some contend that empathy towards animals should not come at the expense of human welfare.

Challenges and Controversies

Upholding animal rights faces numerous challenges and controversies from diverse ethical, cultural, legal, and practical considerations. These complexities present hurdles to achieving meaningful progress in safeguarding the welfare and dignity of animals. Here are several key challenges and controversies:

Balancing Human and Animal Interests: One of the central challenges is striking a balance between human interests, such as economic growth, cultural practices, and dietary preferences, and the rights and welfare of animals. Conflicts often arise when addressing practices like factory farming, animal testing, and hunting, where economic interests clash with ethical considerations for animal well-being.
Ethical Relativism: Cultural and moral differences worldwide contribute to ethical relativism, complicating efforts to establish universal standards for animal rights. Practices deemed acceptable in one culture may be morally reprehensible in another, leading to challenges in fostering global consensus and cooperation on animal welfare issues.
Legal Limitations and Enforcement: Despite advancements in animal welfare legislation, enforcement remains a significant challenge. Inadequate resources, lax enforcement mechanisms, and loopholes in existing laws undermine efforts to hold perpetrators of animal cruelty and exploitation accountable, leaving animals vulnerable to abuse and neglect.
Anthropocentrism: Anthropocentric attitudes, which prioritize human interests and values over those of animals, hinder the recognition and upholding of animal rights. Deeply ingrained beliefs about human superiority and dominion over nature perpetuate systemic injustices and hinder efforts to extend moral consideration to non-human beings.
Economic Interests and Industry Influence: Powerful industries, such as agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, and entertainment, wield significant influence over policymaking and public discourse on animal rights. Economic interests often precede ethical considerations, perpetuating practices that exploit and harm animals for profit.
Technological and Scientific Challenges: The development of alternative methods for animal testing and sustainable agricultural practices presents opportunities and challenges. While technological advancements offer promising alternatives to traditional animal-based industries, transitioning away from established practices requires investment, innovation, and regulatory support.
Public Awareness and Education: Limited public awareness and understanding of animal rights issues challenge advocacy and grassroots mobilization efforts. Overcoming apathy, misinformation, and cultural biases requires targeted education campaigns, outreach initiatives, and advocacy strategies that engage and empower individuals to advocate for animal welfare.
Interdisciplinary Collaboration: Addressing complex animal rights challenges requires interdisciplinary collaboration among stakeholders, including policymakers, scientists, activists, and industry representatives. Building consensus and finding common ground on contentious issues necessitates dialogue, cooperation, and collective action to effect meaningful change.

Promoting Animal Rights: Strategies and Solutions

Advancing animal rights requires a multifaceted approach that combines legislative reforms, advocacy efforts, education initiatives, and practical solutions to address systemic issues of animal exploitation and cruelty. Here are several key strategies and solutions for promoting animal rights:

Legislative Initiatives: Encourage legislation that gives animals legal personhood and outlaws inhumane treatment in sectors like animal testing and factory farming. Strengthening existing legislation and enacting new laws are crucial for enhancing animal rights protections.
Advocacy Campaigns: Mobilize public support through grassroots organizing, media outreach, and digital activism. Target specific industries or practices, such as fur farming or puppy mills, to generate momentum for policy reform and corporate accountability while promoting ethical consumer choices.
Education Initiatives: Integrate animal rights education into school curricula, develop educational resources, and organize workshops. These initiatives aim to raise awareness about animal welfare issues and foster empathy , a key driver of change. They empower individuals like you to become advocates for change through outreach to diverse audiences.
Corporate Engagement: Encourage companies to adopt animal-friendly policies and practices, such as phasing out animal testing and sourcing cruelty-free products. Promote transparency and ethical sourcing through corporate social responsibility initiatives, leveraging consumer pressure and shareholder activism.
Collaboration Building: Form coalitions and partnerships with other advocacy organizations, nonprofits, and government agencies. By leveraging collective expertise and resources, advocates can amplify their voices, facilitate strategic planning, and drive industry-wide change on animal rights issues.
Legal Advocacy: Animal rights lawyers pursue litigation and legal challenges to enforce existing laws and advance animal rights. They can file lawsuits, set legal precedents, and advocate for legal reforms to protect animals from exploitation and harm through the judicial system.
Grassroots Mobilization: Empower local activists, organize protests, rallies, and petitions, and build alliances with community groups. By mobilizing grassroots support and raising visibility, advocates can effect change at the local level and build solidarity within the animal rights movement.

Case Studies and Success Stories

Below, case studies and success stories demonstrate the impact of advocacy efforts, legislative initiatives, public awareness campaigns, and corporate reforms in advancing animal rights and welfare across different contexts and industries.

Ban on Cosmetics Testing on Animals (EU): In 2013, the European Union outlawed animal testing for cosmetics and forbade the sale of cosmetics and their ingredients inside the EU. This landmark legislation resulted from years of advocacy efforts by animal rights organizations and coalitions, demonstrating the effectiveness of collaborative campaigning and legislative initiatives in achieving tangible policy changes.
California Proposition 12 (USA): Proposition 12 was a ballot measure California voters approved in 2018. It set minimum space restrictions for farm animals bred for food within the state, such as veal calves, breeding pigs, and egg-laying hens. The measure also prohibited the sale of products from animals kept in conditions that did not meet these standards. Proposition 12 represented a significant victory for animal welfare advocates and demonstrated public support for legislative measures to improve the lives of farm animals.
Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus (USA) have ended: In 2017, Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus, one of the largest and most iconic circuses in the United States, announced its closure after decades of criticism and declining attendance. Years of pressure from animal rights organizations, public demonstrations, and legal challenges against the circus’s use of wild animals in shows preceded the decision. The closure marked a significant victory for animal rights advocates and highlighted changing societal attitudes towards animal entertainment.
Ban on Fur Farming (United Kingdom): In 2000, the United Kingdom became the first country to ban fur farming on ethical grounds, effectively ending the practice of raising animals, such as minks and foxes, for their fur. The ban culminated years of advocacy by animal rights organizations, public campaigns, and parliamentary debates, showcasing the power of grassroots activism and legislative initiatives in achieving progressive animal welfare reforms.
SeaWorld Phases Out Orca Breeding Program (USA): In 2016, after years of criticism and public controversy regarding how it treated captive orcas, SeaWorld declared that it would discontinue its breeding program for orcas and phase out its theatrical orca presentations at its parks. The decision came after sustained pressure from animal rights activists, documentary films, and declining attendance at SeaWorld parks. While challenges remain in transitioning captive animals to sanctuary environments, SeaWorld’s policy change reflected shifting societal attitudes towards marine mammal captivity. It signaled a significant step towards ending the exploitation of cetaceans for entertainment purposes.

Animal rights represent a moral imperative and a call to action for compassionate stewardship of the natural world. Recognizing animals’ intrinsic worth and sentient nature, the movement seeks to secure legal protections, abolish exploitative practices, and foster a culture of empathy and respect towards all living beings. From legislative reforms to grassroots activism, the quest for animal rights embodies the ideals of justice, compassion, and ethical responsibility. Upholding animal rights is not just a moral duty but also a necessary first step in building a world where all beings can live in dignity and freedom as we work to create a more humane and equitable society.

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Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction

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Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction explores the implications for how we should treat animals in connection with our diet, zoos, and research. Most people are opposed to cruelty and sense that animals have moral significance. At the same time, traditional views that sanction animal use with few constraints have heavily influenced beliefs and everyday practices. How should we understand the moral status of animals vis-à-vis human beings? Do animals have moral rights? If so, what does this mean? What kinds of beings are animals, what sorts of mental lives do they have, and how should we understand welfare?

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External resources

In the OUP print catalogue
Moral Status Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (2000) on Oxford Scholarship Online
The Animal Question (2002) on Oxford Scholarship Online
"The Ethics of Confining Animals" in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (2011) on Oxford Handbooks Online
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Should Trees Have Publicity Rights? Capturing Value from the Use of Endangered Species in Advertising

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The Dormant Commerce Clause and Moral Complicity in a National Marketplace

National pork producers council v. ross, nonhuman rights project, inc., ex rel. happy v. breheny.

New York Court of Appeals Rejects Extending Writ of Habeas Corpus to Elephant.

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En Banc Third Circuit Strikes Down Federal Statute Prohibiting the Interstate Sale of Depictions of Animal Cruelty.

Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems Essay

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Since the research works held every year in the field of biology and biodiversity show that the decline in the number of rare species is constantly growing, and that animals rights are being violated by a number of physical persons and legal entities, the obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that there must be something done about the situation. In spite of the fact that animals right have been talked much about, there is still very little done to protect the wildlife from the people and their inventions that pose a terrible threat to the state of the wildlife.

Humanists have come up with the idea of animal rights rather recently, and the progress that the idea has brought, rapidly growing popular with the people all over the world, is truly indescribable.

People have grown concerned with the issues that they have never thought of, and the humanism that the theory of animals having their own right is shot through is a clear evidence of the fact that the mankind has achieved another level of development. The notion of mankind and humanity are bound to be intertwined someday, and this is quite cheerful news.

In spite of the fact that the progress cannot but bring joy and relief, there are certain questions rising as the new ideas start developing.

However, not all people think that animals are supposed to have any rights at all. For example, Cohen (2008) assumes that according to their natural state, animals cannot have any rights, in contrast to people. He explains it by the fact that animals are no human beings, while rights are the attribute of people only, according to the law and logics.

Human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous. Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that word) lack this capacity for free moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals therefore have no rights, and they can have none. (p. 709)

This is the core of the argument about the alleged rights of animals. Indeed, the existing laws do not presume that animals should have the same rights as people do. From this point of view, it must be ridiculous to think that animals can understand the notion of rights, and accept that they have certain rights.

Since humans are the only beings that can be taken as sane and articulate, only humans can have rights and freedoms. Meanwhile, the wildlife does not have the privilege of rights. It is not that animals are thought to be of less importance than the progressive mankind or the other elements of the Earth, but the whole idea is that wildlife cannot fit the idea of rights. It is high above the moral concepts – the latter are not applicable to the nature as it is at all.

Cohen (2008) explains that his idea is not that, because of people’s superiority, a man can do to animals whatever he or she wants to – on the other hand, he tends to think that people should take care of animals, since the latter are more vulnerable. Yet Cohen insists that animals cannot possess rights owing to their belonging to the sphere where no morals or laws can exist.

Rights entail obligations, but many of the things one ought to do are in no way tied to another’s entitlement. Rights and obligations are not reciprocals of one another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose that they are. (p. 708)

In other words, nature is the environment different from the human civilization, and animals cannot possess rights in the meaning that people are used to out to this concept. Freedoms, as well as obligations, are the substance that does not fit into the frame of the wild life.

With all the regard to the abovementioned point of view, it is necessary to mark that it embraces the concept of rights only from the legal point of view. This is only the constitution and the Declaration of Rights and Freedoms that such judgment is based on. In other words, since the nature itself id the notion that stands out of the structure of the human world, the rights of animals are supposed to touch the sphere that does not have the direct correspondence to the acting laws and justice.

As Regan puts it, the treatment of animals in the modern society is not to be improved, it is to be changed completely, for its ideas are interconnected – once something has been changed, the whole system is brought down.

Regan (2008) shows a complete revision of the concept of animals rights as the possible way out of the conflict situation: “What’s wrong — fundamentally wrong — with the way animals are treated isn’t the details that vary from case to case. It’s the whole system.” (p. 696)

This wrongness is the fact that drives people to the abuse of animal rights.

However much one might know about the right treatment of animals, it will be impossible to solve the misconception of the animals rights with help of the standards that we are used to apply to people.

There must be something deeply wrong about the way people perceive the idea of respecting animals and their rights. The basic question is whether it is possible to respect the rights of chicken having it for a dinner. This is what vegetarians are conducting debates about.

The perfect explanation that Regan (2008) provides for the drawbacks of the existing system of animal rights is the following:

As for animals, since they cannot understand contracts, they obviously cannot sign; and since they cannot sign, they have no rights. Like children, however, some animals are the objects of the sentimental interest of others. (p. 699)

This is as far as the law system goes with providing animals with their right to live and to enjoy their life, the right not to be treated brutally and killed. The law makes their rights equal to naught, since they can be posed neither like physical persons, nor like a legal entity, of course. Like lawyers say, “dura lex sed lex suus” – “the law is hard, but it is the law.”

Still it is obvious that animals must not be mistreated. However different they might be from people, it is the principle of humanity that must guide people in their relation towards the living creatures.

It goes without saying that people can make use of the plenty that the Earth provides us with. Since people cannot handle without eating meat, the question of vegetarianism remains open, and the “meat-eaters” can stay with their consciousness unstained. But as far as it goes about mistreating the living beings, making them suffer just because a man is a superior creature to those who are in pain because of people, such things have to stop.

The cruelties that people can do make one’s hair rise in terror. As Regan (2008) said, animals suffer greatly because of people and their actions, which are wilder than the nature itself, completely deprived of logic of the wild world where killing is for food, not for pleasure.

But what is wrong isn’t the pain, isn’t the suffering, isn’t the deprivation. These compound what’s wrong. Sometimes – often – they make it much, much worse. (p. 697)

As a matter of fact, they do. These compounds shape into such terrible results that one cannot help thinking of whether a man is any difference from a beast. In fact, even animals do not treat each other with the cruelty of a man.

Regarding the situation, one must say that it has to be dealt with. People have to acknowledge that animals are living beings just like people are, and their rights are not a vague notion but the basis for the humanity of people all over the world. Animals have to get the rights that they have been deprived of for so long, and the aim of giving them those rights must be the prior goal of humanists and animal protection organizations.

Cohen, C. (2008). The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research.

The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Nonfiction. 12 th Ed . New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

Regan, T. (2008). The Case for Animal Rights. The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Nonfiction, 12 th Ed . New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company

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IvyPanda. (2018, December 27). Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems. https://ivypanda.com/essays/animal-rights/

"Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems." IvyPanda , 27 Dec. 2018, ivypanda.com/essays/animal-rights/.

IvyPanda . (2018) 'Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems'. 27 December.

IvyPanda . 2018. "Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems." December 27, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/animal-rights/.

1. IvyPanda . "Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems." December 27, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/animal-rights/.

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IvyPanda . "Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems." December 27, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/animal-rights/.

Essay on Animal Rights

Students are often asked to write an essay on Animal Rights in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Animal Rights

Understanding animal rights.

Animal rights mean animals should be free from human harm, abuse, or use for personal gains. It’s the belief that animals deserve to live their lives free from suffering and exploitation. This concept is based on the idea that animals have feelings and interests just like humans.

Importance of Animal Rights

Threats to animal rights.

Animals face many threats. These include hunting, habitat loss, and cruel treatment in farms or circuses. Many animals are also used for scientific experiments. These practices cause pain and suffering to animals. They are clear violations of animal rights.

Steps to Protect Animal Rights

We can protect animal rights in many ways. We can adopt pets instead of buying them. We can avoid products tested on animals. We can also support organizations that work for animal rights. Teaching others about animal rights is another effective way to help.

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250 Words Essay on Animal Rights

What are animal rights.

Animal rights mean that animals deserve to live free from suffering, pain, and exploitation. This idea is based on the belief that animals have feelings too. They can feel joy, sadness, and pain just like us humans. So, they should be treated with kindness and respect.

Why are Animal Rights Important?

Animal rights are important for many reasons. Firstly, animals are living beings, not objects. They should not be used for our selfish needs like food, clothing, or entertainment. Secondly, respecting animal rights helps us become better humans. It teaches us values like compassion, empathy, and respect for all life. Lastly, animals play a crucial role in our ecosystem. If we harm them, it can disturb the balance of nature.

How can we Protect Animal Rights?

Protecting animal rights is not hard. We can start by being kind to animals. We should not hurt them or make them suffer. We can also stop using products that are tested on animals. Many companies test their products on animals, causing them pain and suffering. By refusing to buy such products, we can stand up for animal rights.

Role of Laws in Protecting Animal Rights

In conclusion, animals have a right to live free from pain and suffering. It’s our duty to respect these rights and protect animals. After all, a world where all living beings are treated with kindness and respect is a better world for everyone.

500 Words Essay on Animal Rights

Animal rights mean that animals deserve certain kinds of consideration—what’s best for them. Regardless of how useful they are to humans, or how cute they are, they should be treated with respect. They should not be hurt or treated badly. Some people think animals should have the same rights as humans, while others believe they should have different rights.

Animal rights are important because animals are living beings. They can feel pain, they can suffer, and they have a will to live. Just like humans, they have feelings and emotions. They deserve to be treated with kindness and respect. Animal rights also help people. When we treat animals well, we also learn to treat people well.

Types of Animal Rights

The second type is ‘animal liberation’. This means that animals should be free and not used by humans at all. People who believe in animal liberation think that animals should not be kept in zoos or farms, used for testing, or used for entertainment.

Animal Rights and Laws

Animal rights movements, what can we do.

There are many ways we can help animals and support animal rights. We can adopt pets instead of buying them. We can choose not to go to places that use animals for entertainment, like circuses and zoos. We can eat less meat or no meat at all. And, we can tell others about why animal rights are important.

In conclusion, animal rights are about respecting and caring for animals. They are about understanding that animals have feelings and deserve to be treated well. By supporting animal rights, we are not just helping animals, we are also making the world a better place for all living beings.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

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Persuasive Animal Rights and The Importance of Treating Animals with Respect

Categories: Animal Cruelty Animal Ethics

About this sample

Words: 1394 |

Published: Jan 28, 2021

Words: 1394 | Pages: 3 | 7 min read

Introduction, works cited.

American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). (n.d.). Animal cruelty laws in Canada. Retrieved from https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/canada
Animal Equality. (n.d.). Animal testing. Retrieved from https://www.animalequality.org/issues/animal-testing
Animal Welfare Act. (1966). 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq.
Bekoff, M. (2013). The emotional lives of animals: A leading scientist explores animal joy, sorrow, and empathy — and why they matter. New World Library.
Cartmill, M. (1996). A view to a death in the morning: Hunting and nature through history. Harvard University Press.
Dawkins, M. S. (2006). Through our eyes only? The search for animal consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Francione, G. L. (1995). Animals, property, and the law. Temple University Press.
Herzing, D. L. (2010). Dolphin communication: A window into the complexity of human language. In S. M. Reader & K. Laland (Eds.), Animal social complexity: Intelligence, culture, and individualized societies (pp. 293-311). Harvard University Press.
Regan, T. (1983). The case for animal rights. University of California Press.
Singer, P. (2009). Animal liberation. Harper Perennial.

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Pollan, Michael. "An Animal's Place." The New York Times. 10 November 2002. Salzman, J. "Animal Law." Foundation Press, 2011. Singer, P. "Animal Liberation." Harper Perennial, 2009.

The existence of zoos serves a broader purpose beyond mere entertainment. The benefits that zoos provide in terms of conservation, education, research, and public engagement are undeniable. Through dedicated efforts, zoos [...]

De La Cruz, R. A. 'Ecological and Interspecies Ethics'.Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press.

The documentary film Blackfish, directed by Gabriela Cowperthwaite, has sparked widespread controversy and debate about the treatment of orcas in captivity. The film, which features interviews and footage from former [...]

The Bahamas are a ground of about 700 islands and 2,400 uninhabited islets and cays lying 50 mi off the east coast of Florida. Only about 30 of the islands are inhabited; the most important is New Providence (80 sq. mi; 207 sq. [...]

Statement of the problem: Animal testing has been around for centuries, starting with ancient Greek physicians who used animals for testing of medicines and anatomy of animals. It was only during the 12th century when physicians [...]

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Animal rights
Steven M. Wise. Animal rights, moral or legal entitlements attributed to nonhuman animals, usually because of the complexity of their cognitive, emotional, and social lives or their capacity to experience physical or emotional pain or pleasure. Historically, different views of the scope of animal rights have.
Animal Rights: Definition, Issues, and Examples
Animal Rights: Definition, Issues, and Examples. THL. Jul 08, 2022 (Originally Published: Dec 17, 2020) Animal rights advocates believe that non-human animals should be free to live as they wish, without being used, exploited, or otherwise interfered with by humans. T he idea of giving rights to animals has long been contentious, but a deeper ...
Animal Rights: Why Is It Important and What Are Some Examples?
Animal rights supporters tend to be concerned that people use animals as a means to an end, typically without the animals' assent to participate in an activity. In addition to the examples below, common areas of concern for animal rights include clothing, makeup, scientific experimentation, sports, and wildlife.
What Are Animal Rights & Why Should Animals Have Rights?
They do, just as human animals do. Without rights that are enshrined in law, there is nothing to stop up being harmed and exploited. Animals can suffer, like us, they have personalities and preferences like us, and they do not wish to be harmed, like us. Their rights should not be based on a human perception of their intelligence or worth.
Animal Rights Movement: Understanding When and Why It Started
Effective animal advocacy (EAA) emerged during the early days of Effective Altruism (EA), a movement that uses evidence and reason to identify the most effecient and impactful ways to do good. EA gained prominence in the 21st century and quickly spread to philanthropic spaces, including the animal rights movement.
The Importance of Animal Rights
Get a custom Essay on The Importance of Animal Rights. First of all, animals significantly impact human lives since many species contribute to the world economy by producing fur, food, and other essential products. Blattner argues that animals are people's co-workers, which is a common opinion among researchers and farmers (33).
Principles and ethics of animal rights and the modern animal-rights
animal rights, rights, primarily against being killed and being treated cruelly, that are thought to be possessed by higher nonhuman animals (e.g., chimpanzees) and many lower ones by virtue of their sentience.Respect for the welfare of animals is a precept of some ancient Eastern religions, including Jainism, which enjoins ahimsa ("noninjury") toward all living things, and Buddhism, which ...
Animal rights
The plaque in this statue of Valluvar at an animal sanctuary in South India describes the Kural's teachings on ahimsa and non-killing, summing them up with the definition of veganism. Animal rights is the philosophy according to which many or all sentient animals have moral worth independent of their utility to humans, and that their most basic ...
Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?
It shows the range of possible positions concerning the animal rights issue and explores what issues, of theory or fact, separate reasonable people. The chapter claims that in at least some sense, almost everyone believes in animal rights, and that the real question is about what the phrase 'animal rights' actually means.
BBC
Animals aren't 'moral' Some of the arguments against animal rights centre on whether animals behave morally. Rights are unique to human beings. rights only have meaning within a moral community ...
A modern argument for the rights of animals
Aug 2014. Depressed dogs, cats with OCD — what animal madness means for us humans. Laurel Braitman. Why do we prioritize human rights over those of other species? Philosopher Peter Singer dives into what he calls "speciesism," the root of the widely ignored mistreatment of animals around the world, from factory farms to product-testing ...
The Moral Rights of Animals
The essays succeed at exploring, critiquing, and expanding upon Regan's work in a way that is both rigorous and detailed, while accessible to those new to Regan or the animal rights literature. The book has three parts. Part 1 focuses on the theoretical basis of animal rights, and responses to objections to animal rights.
The Moral Status of Animals
1. The Moral Considerability of Animals. To say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there is a moral claim that this being can make on those who can recognize such claims. A morally considerable being is a being who can be wronged.
Towards a Theory of Legal Animal Rights: Simple and Fundamental Rights
1. Introduction: The Need for Legal Animal Rights Theory. Legal animal rights are on the horizon, and there is a need for a legal theory of animal rights—that is, a theory of animal rights as legal rights. While there is a diverse body of moral and political theories of animal rights, 1 the nature and conceptual foundations of legal animal rights remain remarkably underexplored.
Rights of Nature, Rights of Animals
A. Animals as Part of Nature. At the most fundamental level, if nature has rights, and if nature includes animals, then rights-based claims could be made on behalf of animals using existing rights of nature doctrine and strategy. A 2008 case from the Superior Court of Justice in Brazil, known as the Wild Parrot case, illustrates this ...
Animal Rights and the Making of a Revolution
647. By Nicholas Kristof. Opinion Columnist. In 1971, a half-dozen graduate students at Oxford University held what was perhaps the first protest of the modern animal rights movement. They ...
Essay on Animal Rights- 'The Right to Live a Healthy Life'
Right to Life: Animals should have the right to live without arbitrary deprivation of life, meaning we should not kill them for reasons other than essential survival needs or inhumane circumstances. Right to Freedom from Cruelty: We should protect animals from unnecessary suffering, abuse, neglect, and cruelty.
Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction
Abstract. Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction explores the implications for how we should treat animals in connection with our diet, zoos, and research. Most people are opposed to cruelty and sense that animals have moral significance. At the same time, traditional views that sanction animal use with few constraints have heavily influenced beliefs and everyday practices.
Animal Law
Social Change Essay. ... two animal rights activists — one of whom, Wayne Hsiung, is an author of this Essay — faced a felony trial and up to ... Ninth Circuit Holds that Americans with Disabilities Act Prohibits Imposing Certification Requirement on Animal Who Meets Functional Definition of "Service Dog" Vol. 135 No. 8 June 2022. Animal ...
Definition of Animal Rights and Its Problems Essay
For example, Cohen (2008) assumes that according to their natural state, animals cannot have any rights, in contrast to people. He explains it by the fact that animals are no human beings, while rights are the attribute of people only, according to the law and logics. Human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous.
Essay on Animal Rights
Animal rights are important for many reasons. Firstly, animals are living beings, not objects. They should not be used for our selfish needs like food, clothing, or entertainment. Secondly, respecting animal rights helps us become better humans. It teaches us values like compassion, empathy, and respect for all life.
Persuasive Animal Rights and The Importance of Treating Animals with
They killed many of them and some of them extinct many people often argue in that humans need help and are ignored in our country to even pay attention to animal rights and welfare which is viewed as a secondary and lower issue and some even mock the idea of animal rights humans have a voice to speak their minds and that humans cause the ...
The Animal Rights Struggle: An Essay in Historical Sociology
The animal rights struggle. An essay in historical sociology (1820-1980) Christophe Traïni The ongoing struggle to protect the rights of animals, though often reduced in the public mind ... definition of what constitutes legitimate violence; the establishment of norms designed to change what constitutes morally acceptable practices; rivalry ...

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Animal Rights Movement: Understanding When and Why It Started

Introduction

Do Animals Have Rights?

Why Are Animal Rights Important?

When Did the Animal Rights Movement Start?

Who Started the First Animal Rights Movement?

What Are the Goals of the Animal Rights Movement?

What Laws Protect Animal Rights?

Was the Animal Rights Movement Successful?

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Growth of Effective Animal Advocacy

How Did Effective Animal Advocacy Impact the Animal Rights Movement?

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animal rights summary

A modern argument for the rights of animals

The Moral Rights of Animals

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The Moral Status of Animals

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Turning the Tide on Animal Suffering

Essay on Animal Rights

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Understanding Animal Rights

Definition of Animal Rights

Historical Background and Evolution of the Animal Rights Movement

Philosophical Perspectives on Animal Rights

Basic Rights for Animals

Moral and Ethical Justifications for Animal Rights

Violations of Animal Rights

Arguments in Favor and Against Animal Rights

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Promoting Animal Rights: Strategies and Solutions

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Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction