cold war tensions essay

The Cold War: The Culmination of US-Soviet Tension

The Cold War was a 45-year period of geopolitical tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). While no direct conflict occurred, hence the war being "cold," the two countries participated in a nuclear arms race, espionage, and proxy wars. This divided the world between the First World (American allies), the Second World (Soviet allies), and the Third World (the non-aligned), meaning that no country was able to entirely escape the impact of these tensions. The Cold War's ramifications are still felt today, with former Soviet satellite states continuing to face economic difficulties. Moreover, escalating threats from Russia demonstrate that nuclear weapons still pose a significant danger. Due to all these considerations, understanding the Cold War in its totality is worthwhile.

The Beginning

During the Second World War , despite the alliance with the West against Nazi Germany , Soviet leader Joseph Stalin feared a possible betrayal. One reason for this fear was that the Americans had developed nuclear weapons in secret. Therefore, to prevent a Western invasion of the USSR, Soviet troops occupied Eastern Europe as they beat back the German army, thereby creating a significant buffer zone. When combined with reports of Soviet spies in Western countries, there were tensions between the Allies before World War II even ended.

On April 12th, 1945, American president Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) died. The new President, Harry Truman , viewed the spread of communism as an existential threat to American geopolitical interests. Thus, almost immediately following World War II, Truman developed a policy of containment, pledging to support countries the Americans thought were being threatened by communism. When combined with Winston Churchill's 1946 declaration that an " Iron Curtain " had descended across Europe, the Cold War officially began.

Berlin Blockade

Following World War II, Germany was divided between the Soviets, Americans, French and British. However, since the capital, Berlin, lay in Soviet-controlled territory, it was also divided between the four.

The first major Cold War crisis was the 1948 to 1949 Berlin Blockade. In an attempt to bring Berlin under Soviet influence, Stalin cut off all road, rail, and canal access. In response, the Western allies organized the Berlin Airlift to ensure that the city received the necessary supplies. Despite the airlift's danger, it managed to supply Berlin for almost a year. Indeed, after over 250,000 flights by American and British air forces, the Soviets lifted the blockade on May 12th, 1949.

While not the only reason for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Berlin Blockade provided another justification for Western countries to form such an alliance. Moreover, NATO then prompted the creation of the Warsaw Pact , a similar defense treaty among Soviet allies. Therefore, apart from being the first major crisis of the Cold War, the Berlin Blockade also contributed to the further polarization of the geopolitical order.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 was arguably the height of the Cold War. While the United States and USSR both had nuclear weapons, the Americans developing them in 1945, and the Soviets in 1949, the US still possessed a strategic advantage. With allies in Western Europe and Asia, America could station its nuclear missiles close to the Soviet Union. The USSR, with allies mostly in Eastern Europe and Asia, had no such ability. However, this changed in 1959 when Cuba , a small island nation about 90 miles from Florida , turned communist. After finding out about Soviet efforts to station nuclear missiles on the island, American President John F. Kennedy (JFK) ordered a blockade. Despite both sides threatening nuclear war, the crisis was ultimately resolved when the Soviets agreed to take their missiles out of Cuba, followed by the Americans removing their missiles from Turkey .

The Vietnam War

While there were other important proxy conflicts, the most consequential one for the United States was the Vietnam War. From 1946-1954, the Vietnamese fought for independence against French colonial rule . The conflict ended with a Soviet-backed northern communist state and a Western-backed southern capitalist state. Fearing the spread of communism into the south, President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) then deployed troops to Vietnam in 1964 after a supposed North Vietnamese attack on an American ship. This marked the beginning of a full-scale war that would last for over a decade, killing over 3 million people, and ending in American defeat in April 1975 . Furthermore, the reputation of the United States suffered greatly, with widespread accusations of war crimes and other atrocities committed by American soldiers.

The 1980s: A New Cold War

Following a period of détente (thawing) in the 1970s, the 1980s saw the reignition of Cold War-based tensions. This happened for several reasons. First, in 1978, a communist revolution occurred in Afghanistan, prompting a counterinsurgency by much of the country's largely conservative and ultra-religious population. Fearing similar uprisings in the USSR's majority Muslim Central Asian Republics, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to quell the unrest. Known as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam War," the subsequent conflict was a decade-long affair that dramatically weakened the USSR. It was also another proxy war, with the Mujahideen (Islamic fighters) receiving aid from the United States .

Another reason for the rise in geopolitical temperatures was a change of leadership in key Western countries. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became British Prime Minister, followed by Ronald Reagan becoming American president two years later. Both shared similar views concerning the Soviet Union, with Thatcher proclaiming that the Soviets were bent on "world domination" and Reagan labeling the country an "evil empire" while increasing the United States' nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Reagan also supported anti-communist movements in the Third World, notably in Central American countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador . This meant that in the 1980s, the Cold War was back in full force.

The End of the Cold War

However, by the mid-1980s, the USSR was ailing. The war in Afghanistan was a disaster and the Soviet economy was stagnant and ineffective. In an attempt to fix the Soviet system, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to tone down the nuclear arms race and redirect that money elsewhere. Therefore, throughout the second half of the 1980s, a series of meetings took place between American and Soviet leaders focused on lessening each country's nuclear arsenal. These were so successful that following the Malta Summit in 1989, Gorbachev and President Bush declared the Cold War over.

Meanwhile, civil unrest was brewing in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Protests due to, among other reasons, the 1986 Chornobyl Disaster , had transformed into full-on-revolutionary movements by 1989. Then, in October of that year, the Berlin Wall fell . Initially constructed to prevent East Berliners from fleeing to the West, it quickly became a symbol of the Iron Curtain. Thus, with its collapse came the erasure of divisions between East and West. Finally, on December 26th, 1991, the Soviet Union itself dissolved , marking the definitive end of US-Soviet tensions.

Aftermath and Conclusion

The impact of the Cold War is still felt today. Eastern Europe and Central Asia , while significantly better economically now than under Soviet rule, continue to face challenges in this regard. Moreover, despite the United States and Russia 's nuclear arsenals being dramatically smaller, the threat of nuclear war persists. Indeed, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the increasing nuclear posturing by Vladimir Putin , this threat is arguably at its highest level since the 1980s. In short, having a solid understanding of the Cold War is important due to its continued relevance.

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The cold war as a historical period: an interpretive essay *.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 October 2011

As a historical period, the Cold War may be seen as a rivalry between two nuclear superpowers that threatened global destruction. The rivalry took place within a common frame of reference, in which a new historical relationship between imperialism and nationalism worked in remarkably parallel ways across the superpower divide. The new imperial–national relationship between superpowers and the client states also accommodated developments such as decolonization, multiculturalism, and new ideologies, thus producing a hegemonic configuration characterizing the period. The models of development, structures of clientage, unprecedented militarization of societies, designs of imperial enlightenment, and even many gender and racial/cultural relationships followed similar tracks within, and often between, the two camps. Finally, counter-hegemonic forces emerged in regions of the non-Western world, namely China and some Islamic societies. Did this portend the beginning of the end of a long period of Western hegemony?

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1 Paul Ricoeur, Time and narrative , 3 vols, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984–88. See also his ‘Narrative time’, Critical Inquiry 7, 1, 1980, pp. 169–90. For my arguments, see Prasenjit Duara, ‘Transnationalism and the challenge to national histories’, in Bender , Thomas , ed. Rethinking American history in a global age , Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA : University of California Press , 2002 , pp. 25–46 CrossRef Google Scholar . See also Duara , Prasenjit , Rescuing history from the nation: questioning narratives of modern China , Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press , 1995 . CrossRef Google Scholar

2 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in Bouchard , Donald F. , ed. Language, counter-memory, practice , trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 1977 , pp. 139–64 Google Scholar . Latour , Bruno , We have never been modern , trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1993 . Google Scholar

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4 William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘Empire preserv’d: how the Americans put anti-communism before anti-imperialism’, in Duara , Prasenjit , ed. Decolonization: perspectives from now and then , London : Routledge , 2004 , pp. 155–7. Google Scholar

5 Arendt, Origins of totalitarianism , pp. 152–3.

6 As quoted in Marshall , D. Bruce , The French colonial myth and constitution-making in the Fourth Republic , New Haven, CT : Yale University Press , 1973 , p. 44 Google Scholar . See also Prasenjit Duara, ‘The imperialism of “free nations”: Japan, Manchukuo, and the history of the present’, in Stoler , Ann , McGranahan , Carole , and Perdue , Peter , eds. Imperial formations and their discontents , Santa Fe, NM : School of American Research Press , 2007 . Google Scholar

7 The Oxford English Dictionary, http://dictionary.oed.com (consulted 19 July 2011), defines the Roman client as ‘A plebeian under the patronage of a patrician, in this relation called a patron ( patronus ), who was bound, in return for certain services, to protect his client’s life and interests.’ See also Duara , Prasenjit , Sovereignty and authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian modern , Boulder, CO : Rowman and Littlefield , 2003 . Google Scholar

8 Doyle , Michael W. , Empires , Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 1986 , pp. 129–30 Google Scholar ; Johnson , Chalmers , The sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy, and the end of the republic , New York : Henry Holt , 2004 , 29 Google Scholar . For Heinrich Triepel and a summary of the debate, see Münkler , Herfried , The logic of world domination from Ancient Rome to the United States , trans. Patrick Camiller, Cambridge : Polity Press , 2007 , pp. 43–4 Google Scholar .

9 Tsang , Steve , The Cold War’s odd couple: the unintended partnership between the ROC and the UK, 1950–1958 , London : I.B. Tauris , 2006 , pp. 10, 194 Google Scholar .

10 See Paul Marer and Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, ‘Costs of domination, benefits of subordination’, in Triska , Jan F. , ed. Dominant powers and subordinate states: the United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in eastern Europe , Durham, NC : Duke University Press , 1986 , pp. 371–99. Google Scholar

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13 Quoted in Smith, ‘Republican policy’, p. 271.

14 Carl Parrini, ‘The age of ultraimperialism’, Radical History Review , 57, 1993, pp. 7–9.

15 Giovanni Arrighi, Po-keung Hui, Ho-fung Hung, and Mark Selden, ‘Historical capitalism, East and West’, in Arrighi , G. , Hamashita , T. , and Selden , M. , eds. The resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 year perspectives , London : Routledge , 2003 , pp. 259–333 Google Scholar ; quotation on p. 301. See also Münkler, Logic of world domination , pp. 149–50.

16 Hinds , Allister , Britain’s sterling colonial policy and decolonization, 1939–1958 , Westport, CT : Greenwood Press , 2001 , pp. 11, 29–30, 196–7 Google Scholar ; Louis and Robinson, ‘Empire preserv’d’, pp. 152–61.

17 Louis and Robinson, ‘Empire preserv’d’, esp. p. 157 for the nuclear sabre-rattling exchange.

18 Johnson Sorrows of empire , pp. 23–37.

19 Linda Carty, ‘Imperialism: historical periodization or present-day phenomenon?’ Radical History Review , 57, 1993, p. 43; Moon , Katherine H. S. , Sex among allies: military prostitution in U.S.–Korea relations , New York : Columbia University Press , 1997 , pp. 17–18. Google Scholar

20 Hanhimäki , Jussi M. and Westad , Odd Arne , The Cold War: a history in documents and eyewitness accounts , Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2003 , pp. 245–7 Google Scholar ; Ferenc Cseresnyés, ‘The ’56 exodus to Austria’, Hungarian Quarterly 40, 154, 1999, pp. 86–101, http://www.hungarianquarterly.com/no154/086.html (consulted 20 July 2011); Williams , Kieran , The Prague Spring and its aftermath: Czechoslovak politics, 1968–1970 , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1997 , esp. pp. 3–28 CrossRef Google Scholar .

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22 J.V. Stalin, ‘Marxism and the national question’, Prosveshcheniye , 3–5, March–May 1913, transcribed by Carl Kavanagh.

23 Hirsch , Francine , Empire of nations: ethnographic knowledge and the making of the Soviet Union , Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 2005 , pp. 6–8 Google Scholar .

24 Tominaga Tadashi, Manshūkoku no minzoku mondai (The nationality problem of Manchukuo) , Shinkyō, 1943, pp. 43–5.

25 Hirsch, Empire of nations , pp. 316–18.

26 Brubaker , Rogers , Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the new Europe , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1996 , pp. 18–24 CrossRef Google Scholar .

27 Hirsch, Empire of nations , p. 318.

28 Northrop , Douglas , Veiled empire: gender and power in Stalinist Central Asia , Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 2004 . Google Scholar

29 Katherine Verdery, ‘Nationalism and national sentiment in post-socialist Romania’, Slavic Review , 52, 1993, pp. 179–203.

30 See for instance Nkrumah , Kwame , Neo-colonialism: the last stage of imperialism , London : Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. , 1965 . Google Scholar

31 Klein , Christina , Cold War orientalism: Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945–1961 , Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 2003 , pp. 7–16. Google Scholar

32 Yuko Kikuchi, ‘Russel Wright and Japan: bridging Japonisme and good design through craft design’, Journal of Modern Craft , 1, 3, 2008, p. 372.

33 Klein, Cold War orientalism , pp. 253–63.

34 Oppenheim , L. , International Law , vol. 1, London : Longmans, Green, and Co. , 1905 Google Scholar , cited in Nele Matz, ‘Civilization and the mandate system under the League of Nations as origin of trusteeship’, in von Bogdandy , A. and Wolfrum , R. , eds. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law , vol. 9, Leiden : Koninklijke Brill NV , 2005 , p. 61. Google Scholar

35 Tilly , Charles , Coercion, capital and European states, ad 990–1992 , Cambridge, MA, and Oxford : Blackwell , 1992 , pp. 209, 221 Google Scholar . For some examples from Southeast Asia, see Reid , Anthony , Imperial alchemy: nationalism and political identity in Southeast Asia , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2009 . CrossRef Google Scholar

36 Stephen Daggett, ‘Costs of major U.S. wars’, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22926, 24 July 2008, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108054.pdf (consulted 21 July 2011), p. CRS-2.

37 Jian , Chen , Mao’s China and the Cold War , Chapel Hill, NC : University of North Carolina Press , 2001 , p. 229. Google Scholar

38 Szonyi , Michael , Cold War island: Quemoy on the front line , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2008 . Google Scholar

39 Rouquié , Alain , The military and the state in Latin America , trans. Paul E. Sigmund, Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 1987 , pp. 2, 131 (Rockefeller Report cited on p. 138) Google Scholar .

40 Greg Grandin, ‘Off the beach: the United States, Latin America, and the Cold War’, in Agnew , Jean-Christophe and Rosenzweig , Roy , eds. A companion to post-1945 America , Oxford : Blackwell Publishing , 2002 , pp. 431–3 Google Scholar . See also Hanhimäki and Westad, The Cold War , pp. 379–80.

41 Rabe , Stephen G. , Eisenhower and Latin America: the foreign policy of anti-communism , Chapel Hill, NC : University of North Carolina Press , 1988 , 45 Google Scholar .

42 Ibid ., p. 58.

43 Grandin, ‘Off the beach’, pp. 434, 441.

44 Hamza Alavi, ‘The origins and significance of the Pakistan–US military alliance’, http://hamzaalavi.com/?p=102 (consulted 21 July 2011).

45 Hanhimäki and Westad, The Cold War , p. 167.

46 Westad , Odd Arne , The global Cold War: Third World interventions and the making of our times , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2007 , chs. 7 and 8 Google Scholar .

47 Nils Gilman, ‘Modernization theory, the highest stage of American intellectual history’, in Engerman , David C. , Gilman , Nils , Haefele , Mark , and Latham , Michael E. , eds. Staging growth: modernization, development, and the global Cold War , Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts Press , 2003 , pp. 48–51, 60 Google Scholar ; Rostow , W. W. , The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1960 . Google Scholar

48 Scott , James C. , Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed , New Haven, CT : Yale University Press , 1998 Google Scholar . See also Szonyi, Cold War island .

49 Richard Madsen, ‘Secularism, religious renaissance, and social conflict in Asia’, Martin Marty Center Web Forum, September 2008, http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/webforum/092008/index.shtml (consulted 21 July 2011).

50 For the development state, see Ziya Oni, ‘The logic of the development state’, Comparative Politics , 24, 1, 1991, pp. 109–26. For its historical legacy, see Duara, ‘Imperialism of “free nations”’.

51 Berger , Mark , The battle for Asia: from decolonization to globalization , London : Routledge , 2004 , pp. 225–9 CrossRef Google Scholar .

52 T. Y. Kwak, ‘The legacies of Korean participation in the Vietnam War: the rise of formal dictatorship’, unpublished paper for annual meeting of the American Studies Association, 24 May 2009, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p113675_index.html (consulted 21 July 2011).

53 Cited in Tilly, Coercion, capital and European states , 213.

54 Curtis Anderson Gayle, ‘Progressive representations of the nation: early post-war Japan and beyond’, Social Science Japan Journal , 4, 1, 2001, p. 9.

55 Victor Koschman, ‘Modernization and democratic values: the “Japanese model” in the 1960s’, in Engerman et al., Staging growth , p. 242.

56 Quoted in Gilman, ‘Modernization theory’, p. 64.

57 Chen Jian, Mao’s China , p. 6; Yang Kuisong, ‘The Sino-Soviet alliance and nationalism: a contradiction’, in Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations , June 2005, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/publications/areastudies/documents/sinosov/Kuisong.pdf (consulted 21 July 2011); Shen Zhihua, ‘Guanyu Zhong-Su tiaoyue tanpan yanjiuzhongde jige zhengyi wenti … (Several controversial questions in the study of the Sino-Soviet treaty negotiations …)’, Shixue yuekan , 8, 2004, pp. 64–6. See also Heinzig , Dieter , The Soviet Union and communist China 1945–1950: the arduous road to the alliance , Armonk, NY : M.E. Sharpe , 2004 . Google Scholar

58 Ross , Robert S. and Changbin , Jiang , eds. Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.–China diplomacy, 1953–1973 , Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 2002 , pp. 300–1 Google Scholar .

59 This was the view in the CIA and State Department in 1969: see Komine , Yukinori , Secrecy in US foreign policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China , Aldershot : Ashgate , 2008 , pp. 118, 130 Google Scholar . See also Ross and Jiang, Re-examining the Cold War , pp. 16, 67–9.

60 Ross and Jiang, Re-examining the Cold War , pp. 70, 67–9.

61 Shirley Kan, U.S.–China military contacts: issues for Congress , CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL32496, updated 10 May 2005, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48835.pdf (consulted 21 July 2011). For the effects of the arms race and SDI on the Soviet Union, see Eric Ringmar, ‘The recognition game: Soviet Russia against the West’, Cooperation and Conflict , 37, 2, 2002, p. 130; also Hanhimäki and Westad, The Cold War , pp. 274–5.

62 Coll , Steve , Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 , New York : Penguin Press , 2004 . Google Scholar

63 Jalal Al-i Ahmad, ‘Diagnosing an illness’, in Duara, Decolonization , pp. 56–63, quotation on p. 62.

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• Volume 6, Issue 3
• Prasenjit Duara (a1)
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022811000416

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Cold War summary

Learn about the cause of the cold war between the u.s. and the soviet union and its impact.

Cold War , Open yet restricted rivalry and hostility that developed after World War II between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The U.S. and Britain, alarmed by the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, feared the expansion of Soviet power and communism in Western Europe and elsewhere. The Soviets were determined to maintain control of Eastern Europe, in part to safeguard against a possible renewed threat from Germany. The Cold War (the term was first used by Bernard Baruch during a congressional debate in 1947) was waged mainly on political, economic, and propaganda fronts and had only limited recourse to weapons. It was at its peak in 1948–53 with the Berlin blockade and airlift, the formation of NATO , the victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war, and the Korean War . Another intense stage occurred in 1958–62 with the Cuban missile crisis, which resulted in a weapons buildup by both sides. A period of détente in the 1970s was followed by renewed hostility. The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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The Cold War Timeline

This post is a comprehensive timeline of the Cold War, from the origins of the Russian-American conflict following World War Two to the final dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the 20th century.

Scroll down to learn more. Alternatively, watch this nine-minute explainer video for an overview of the Cold War.

This article is part of our larger collection of resources on the Cold War. For a comprehensive outline of the origins, key events, and conclusion of the Cold War, click here. 

This article is also part of our larger selection of posts about the Vietnam War. To learn more, click here for our comprehensive guide to the Vietnam War .

This article is part of our larger selection of posts about the Cold War. To learn more,  click here for our comprehensive guide to the Cold War .

Additional Resources About Cold War

What was the iron curtain and how did it collapse, the origins of the cold war timeline, cold war detente — us/soviet enmity cools, when did china become communist, cite this article.

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The Cold War

Cold war historiography.

As an event spanning almost 50 years and touching all corners of the globe, the Cold War has been closely studied by hundreds of historians. Histories of the period have reached different conclusions and formed different interpretations about the Cold War, why it occurred and how it developed and evolved. This page provides a brief survey of Cold War historiography and its three main schools of thought.

The role of historians

Our understanding of the Cold War has been shaped by the work of historians. Since the outbreak of global tensions in 1945, the events, ideas and complexities of the Cold War have been researched, studied and interpreted by thousands of historians.

These historians have explored and hypothesised about the causes and effects of the Cold War. They have examined the ideas, motives and actions of significant Cold War leaders. They have weighed the numerous political, social, economic and cultural factors of the period. They have evaluated the outcomes and effects of the Cold War, both globally and in particular countries and regions.

Like most historians studying a long and complex period, they formed different interpretations and reached different conclusions. As a consequence, the historiography of the Cold War, like the Cold War itself, contains a range of views, perspectives and arguments.

Why differing perspectives?

Why have Cold War historians formed different and often competing arguments? Fundamentally, there are two main reasons for this.

The first pertains to historians and their unique perspectives. Historians come from different backgrounds, learn history from different people and embrace different values and methodologies. Their views and priorities are shaped by their places of origin, the times in which they live and the company they keep.

Secondly, the recency of the Cold War and its political divisiveness are complicating factors. The Cold War ended a little over 30 years ago and its political tensions and competing viewpoints still reverberate through modern societies. Unlike historians who focus on the Middle Ages or the French Revolution , for example, most Cold War historians actually lived through the event they are studying.

There are three main movements or schools of thought in Cold War historiography. These are broadly known as the Orthodox, Revisionist and Post-Revisionist schools. Historians in these schools do not think alike on every or any issue, nor do they always advance similar arguments – but their general approach to or position on the Cold War tends to be similar.

The Orthodox school

Orthodox views of the Cold War emerged among historians in the United States and other Western nations in the early 1950s. Though less used today, this perspective has also been known as the ‘Traditional view’.

Broadly speaking, Orthodox historians attribute the outbreak of the Cold War to Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union. They argue that the Soviet regime initiated the Cold War by seeking to expand and exert control over Europe and Asia. They attribute this to Russia’s inherent expansionism, the doctrine of Marxist-Leninism which preached international revolution and world communism, as well as Stalin’s anti-Western paranoia.

Orthodox historians argue that Stalin broke agreements forged at Yalta and Potsdam in order to expand Soviet communism into eastern Europe and throughout the world. The Soviet leader’s duplicitous actions led to the collapse of the Grand Alliance and the beginnings of the Cold War.

“According to the influential Orthodox account, the conflict was unavoidable owing to the nature of Soviet objectives and Stalin’s character. It was an illusion to believe that the ‘Uncle Joe’ of pro-Soviet wartime propaganda corresponded to reality. Stalin was no horse-trading statesman or American-style political boss, but a ruthless dictator determined to extend his totalitarian system far beyond the strict requirements of Soviet security. Nothing the United States or Britain might have done would have persuaded him to moderate his designs.” John Lamberton Harper, historian

American passivity

In the Orthodox mind, the United States had only a passive or reactive role in these events. American leaders entered the negotiations in 1945 with benign objectives: they sought no territory and were guided by principles rather than self-interest. Roosevelt and Truman both sought conciliation with Stalin and a post-war working relationship with the Soviet Union.

When Stalin violated the agreements of 1945, however, American leaders, particularly Truman, acted in defence of self-determination and democracy. Many Orthodox histories also offer scathing criticisms of economic policy and political repression within the Soviet system, while ignoring the shortcomings of American capitalism.

The Orthodox view became the accepted historical position of the United States during the 1950s – not surprisingly, since it aligned with American interests and justified US policies like the Truman Doctrine and the Domino Theory . It remained the prevailing explanation of the Cold War until the emergence of Revisionist historians in the 1960s.

Notable advocates of the Orthodox school included Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr , Herbert Feis , Thomas A. Bailey and Louis J. Halle. It may come as no surprise that many of these historians held official positions with the US State Department or other government bodies.

Revisionist historians

Revisionist historians attribute greater responsibility for the Cold War to the United States. According to Revisionists, US policy after World War II was neither passive nor benign. It was driven more by economic considerations and national self-interest than the principles of democracy and self-determination.

American policymakers pushed to contain Soviet communism in Europe for selfish reasons: they wanted a European continent populated with capitalist nations open to trade and American exports. Policies such as lend-lease, post-war loans and the Marshall Plan all worked toward this objective.

Some Revisionist historians also point to America’s “atomic diplomacy” in 1945. Gar Alperovitz , for example, argues that Truman used nuclear weapons against Japan, not for military reasons but to flex America’s diplomatic muscle when negotiating with Stalin. Justifiably or not, the Soviet Union felt threatened by America’s policies and diplomatic approaches of the mid to late 1940s, which contributed to the collapse of their alliance and a lost opportunity for post-war conciliation.

“The Revisionists disagree among themselves on a wide range of specific issues [but] tend to divide into two recognisable groups. The ‘soft’ Revisionists place far more emphasis upon individuals than they do on the nature of institutions or systems. They see a sharp break between the foreign policies of Roosevelt and Truman and the men around him. Truman, according to this view, broke apart a functioning coalition soon after he took office… The ‘hard’ Revisionists raise more fundamental issues [about] the American system as it developed over the years.” Robert James Maddox, historian

The spread of Revisionism

The first significant Revisionist work was William Appleman Williams ‘ The Tragedy of American Diplomacy , published in 1959. In this thorough but controversial book, Williams concluded that since the 1890s, the overriding function of US foreign policy has been to secure foreign markets for American-made goods and services. He calls this the ‘open door policy’ because it seeks to open up other nations for American capitalists by removing tariffs and other trade barriers.

Williams’ analysis shattered two popular illusions: first, that the United States was an isolationist, anti-imperialist neutral power, and second, that US foreign policy during the Cold War was reactive, peace-seeking and not agenda-driven.

Revisionist perspectives gained traction and popularity in the United States during the 1960s, a period when the failures of Vietnam led many to question America’s foreign policy. Aside from Williams and Alperovitz, other notable historians of the Revisionist school include Denna Fleming , Christopher Lasch , Walter LaFeber and Lloyd Gardner. During the 1960s and 1970s these historians were often referred to as the ‘New Left’, though this label oversimplified their perspectives.

The Post-Revisionists

Orthodox and Revisionist accounts of the Cold War had many advocates – but some historians were dissatisfied with the extremities of both perspectives. A new approach, pioneered by John Lewis Gaddis and dubbed Post-Revisionism, began to emerge during the 1970s.

Post-Revisionist historians looked for a middle ground between Orthodox and Revisionist histories of the Cold War. These academics synthesised ideas and conclusions from both schools of thought – but they also had the advantages of time, hindsight, the cooling passions of Détente and, later, access to newly-declassified documents from both sides of the struggle.

The Post-Revisionist movement was sometimes referred to as ‘Eclecticism’ because it borrowed heavily from existing research. Revisionists called it ‘New Orthodoxy’ because they believed it pushed responsibility for the Cold War back onto the Soviet Union.

The work of Gaddis

The first significant Post-Revisionist account was Gaddis’ 1972 book The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 . In this text, Gaddis considered existing explanations for the Cold War but also widened his focus, examining “external and internal influences, as perceived by officials responsible for [policy] formulation” in Washington.

Gaddis also acknowledged the limitations faced by previous Cold War historians of not having access to official Soviet archives, meaning they had to assess Soviet policy “from without”.

Gaddis identified several factors that contributed to the emergence of a US-Soviet cold war. There was entrenched political attitudes and rivalry before 1941, including a lack of communication and formal recognition. The Allies’ delay in opening up a second front in Europe left the Soviets three years to battle the Nazis unaided. Washington’s refusal to recognise a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe was another source of tension, as was Truman’s ‘atomic diplomacy’ and refusal to share nuclear technology with the Soviets.

Other Post-Revisionists

Gaddis’ account gave birth to numerous Post-Revisionist histories of the Cold War. Among the historians to embrace this new approach were Ernest May , Melvyn Leffler and Marc Trachtenberg.

Like the Revisionist school, the Post-Revisionist movement contains a diversity of perspectives and arguments, though there are identifiable trends. Most Post-Revisionists suggest that Stalin was an opportunist and a pragmatist, rather than an international revolutionary hell-bent on exporting communism around the world. They also accept that American foreign policy often involved overreach and was driven, at least in part, by economic imperatives.

Post-Revisionists also tend to focus on internal systems and factors that may shape or determine Cold War policies. They may include domestic political conditions, economic pressures and cultural influences.

“Starting in the 1970s, the study of the Cold War began to move beyond the simple application of blame and responsibility. While still focusing mainly on the diplomatic and military aspects of the Cold War, scholars started to view the conflict as a result of a complex interaction between all the parties involved… As befits a general international atmosphere of détente, most Post-Revisionists deemphasised the role of ideas and ideologies and instead explained the Cold War increasingly in a realist manner: decision-makers on all sides became, in effect, rational geopolitical calculators, advancing their respective national interests in the unique context of the post-war world.” Jussi M. Hanhimäki, historian

Post-Cold War perspectives

The end of the Cold War has also caused a shift in perspectives. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed the opening of Soviet archives once denied to historians. This access has led to new research and shifting perspectives.

As a consequence, some Revisionist and Post-Revisionist historians have modified their positions, particularly with regard to Joseph Stalin and Soviet policy. Gaddis, for example, published a new text in 1997 after “slogging dutifully through archives in Moscow, Prague, Berlin, Budapest, Beijing, Hanoi and Havana”. He took a much firmer line on Stalin, who “partly driven by ideological and geostrategic ambitions, partly responding to the opportunities that lay before him, built a post-war European empire”.

Other historians have also returned to claiming the Cold War as an ideological struggle, rather than a conflict driven by geopolitical rivalry and economic factors.

Huntington and Fukuyama

Some writers and academics have pondered what the Cold War means for the future. Two of the best-known theories were developed by political scientists Samuel P. Huntington and Francis Fukuyama .

Writing in 1992, Fukuyama claimed that the end of the Cold War was the final victory for democracy and capitalism. Liberal democracy had emerged as mankind’s highest-evolved and best form of government, surpassing all other systems. According to Fukuyama, this marked the “end of history” – not the end of historical events or change but of the great historical struggle between ideologies.

Huntington’s view of the future was more pessimistic. A former advisor to the US government during the Vietnam War , Huntington suggested that the collapse of the Soviet Union would produce significant changes in the world order. Future tensions and conflicts, he argued, would be driven not by ideology or competing economic interests but by fundamental differences in social structure, culture and religious values. Huntington’s thesis became known as the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory.

1. Historians have reached different conclusions and formed different arguments about the Cold War, including how it began, who was responsible and what conditions and factors perpetuated it.

2. Orthodox historians attribute the origins of the Cold War to Joseph Stalin and Soviet aggression. Stalin’s violation of post-war agreements led to a defensive policy response from the US and the West.

3. In contrast, Revisionist historians argue that US foreign policy was unnecessarily belligerent, seeking to contain Soviet communism to create a Europe that was more amenable to American trade and exports.

4. Post-Revisionists draw on the Orthodox and Revisionist schools and seek a middle ground. They suggest that neither superpower was wholly or mostly responsible but that complex factors were at play.

5. Post-Cold War historians, some of them with access to previously unavailable Soviet archives, have returned to describing the Cold War as an ideological conflict. Some, like Huntington and Fukuyama, have attempted to understand the implications for the future.

Citation information Title: ‘Cold War historiography’ Authors: Jennifer Llewellyn , Steve Thompson Publisher: Alpha History URL: https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/historiography/ Date published: October 14, 2019 Date updated: November 18, 2023 Date accessed: June 21, 2024 Copyright: The content on this page is © Alpha History. It may not be republished without our express permission. For more information on usage, please refer to our Terms of Use .

“Tear Down This Wall”: Ronald Reagan and the End of the Cold War

Written by: bill of rights institute, by the end of this section, you will:.

• Explain the causes and effects of the end of the Cold War and its legacy

Suggested Sequencing:

Use this decision point after students have read the introductory essay to introduce foreign policy milestones during Reagan’s presidency. This decision point can be used with  The Iran-Contra Affair  Narrative; the  Ronald Reagan, “Tear Down this Wall” Speech, June 12, 1987  Primary Source; and the  Cold War DBQ (1947–1989)  Lesson.

In the wake of World War II, a Cold War erupted between the world’s two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. During the postwar era, the contest between their respective capitalist and communist systems manifested itself in a nuclear arms race, a space race, and several proxy wars. In the 1960s and 1970s, as the United States fought the Vietnam War and struggled internally with its aftermath and a faltering economy, the Russians seemed ascendant. Increasing oil prices globally led to a revenue windfall for oil-rich Russia, which paid for a massive arms buildup and supported communist insurrections that Russia backed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Eventually, the policy of détente decreased tensions between the two countries and led to their signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972. SALT I, the first of two SALT agreements, limited the number of nuclear missiles either country could possess and banned the building of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems used to defend against nuclear strikes. The use of ABMs would have upset the stalemate represented by the possibility of mutual assured destruction (MAD)—the obliteration of both parties in a nuclear war—because it would allow one side to strike first and then defend itself against retaliation.

The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to prop up a puppet communist regime led President Jimmy Carter to seek increased military budgets and to withdraw from Senate consideration the recently signed SALT II treaty, which would have reduced both countries’ nuclear missiles, bombers, and other delivery vehicles. When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, he rejected détente and instituted a tough stance with Soviets designed to reverse their advances, topple communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and win the Cold War. His administration supported freedom in Eastern Europe and the Polish resistance movement known as Solidarity; armed fighters resisting communism around the world, including the  mujahideen  in Afghanistan; and increased military spending to support peace through strength and to bankrupt the Soviet economy if it tried to match the increases. Reagan also launched an ideological crusade against the Soviet regime for violating inalienable rights and liberties.

For decades before coming into office, Reagan had criticized the spread of Soviet communism and the danger it posed. He compared communism to Nazism and totalitarianism, characterized by a powerful state that limited individual freedoms. In a 1964 televised speech, Reagan told the American people he believed there could be no accommodation with the Soviets.

We cannot buy our security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an immorality so great as saying to a billion human beings now in slavery behind the Iron Curtain, “Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skins, we are willing to make a deal with your slave-masters.”

Shortly before he became president, Reagan told an aide: “My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic. It is this: We win and they lose.”

Reagan also specifically targeted the Berlin Wall, erected by communist East Germany in 1961 to separate East and West Berlin. In a 1967 televised town hall debate with Robert Kennedy, Reagan argued, “I think it would be very admirable if the Berlin Wall should . . . disappear.” He continued, “We just think that a wall that is put up to confine people, and keep them within their own country . . . has to be somehow wrong.” In 1978, he visited the wall and was disgusted to learn the story of Peter Fechter, one of the first among hundreds who were gunned down by East German police while trying to escape to freedom.

Americans knew Ronald Reagan was an uncompromising Cold War warrior when they elected him president in 1980. Over the heads of many in the State Department and the National Security Council, he instituted controversial policies that reversed détente because he thought it had strengthened and emboldened the Soviets during the 1970s. He joked that détente was “what a farmer has with his turkey—until Thanksgiving Day.”

Reagan also pressed an unrelenting ideological attack on communism in stark moral terms that pitted it against a free society. In 1981, he asserted at the University of Notre Dame that “The West won’t contain communism, it will transcend communism . . . it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.” In a 1982 speech to the British Parliament, he said communism ran “against the tides of history by denying human freedom and human dignity” and predicted that the Soviet regime would end up “on the ash heap of history.” The Berlin Wall was “the signature of the regime that built it.” During that trip, Reagan visited the wall and said, “It’s as ugly as the idea behind it.” In a 1983 speech that made the supporters of a softer line toward the Soviets cringe, he called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.”

In June 1987, Reagan was in West Berlin to speak during a ceremony commemorating the 750th anniversary of the city and faced an important choice. The Berlin Wall was one of the most important symbols of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a symbol of communist oppression. He could confront the Soviets about the injustice of the wall, or he could deliver bland remarks that would satisfy the members of the American foreign policy establishment who wanted to avoid conflict. He decided to deliver a provocative speech demanding an end to the oppression of the wall and of communism.

Many officials in Reagan’s administration and in the allied West German government were strongly opposed to his delivering any provocative words or actions during the speech. The West Germans did not want the speech to be given anywhere near the wall and sought to avoid what might be perceived as an aggressive signal. The German Foreign Ministry appealed to the White House, but to no avail. Some members of the administration were even more concerned. At the time, the United States was in the midst of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations with the U.S.S.R., and officials did not want to jeopardize the progress they had made by undermining the Soviet leader so close to home. As a result, Secretary of State George Shultz, Chief of Staff Howard Baker, and the U.S. Embassy in Bonn (the West German capital) read the drafts of Reagan’s speech and repeatedly implored the president and his speechwriters to tone down the language. Deputy National Security Advisor Colin Powell and other members of the National Security Council were particularly adamant and offered several revisions of the speech. Reagan listened to all the objections and unalterably decided, “I think we’ll leave it in.” He would not be deterred from challenging the Soviets and communism.

The stark moral difference between the systems on either side of the Berlin Wall was evident on June 12. Reagan and his team arrived in West Berlin and encountered some protesters who freely voiced their dissent at his appearance. He also spoke to reporters and nervous German officials who feared the fallout over an antagonistic speech. As he told them, “This is the only wall that has ever been built to keep people in, not keep people out.” In East Berlin, in contrast, the German secret police and Russian KGB agents cordoned off an area a thousand yards wide on the other side of the wall from where Reagan was to speak. They wanted to ensure that no one could hear his message of freedom.

Reagan stepped up to the podium to speak, with the Brandenburg Gate and the imposing wall in the background. He told the audience, “As long as this gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind.” In the middle of the speech, Reagan directly challenged Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who wanted to reform communism in an attempt to save it. He delivered the line that had caused so much consternation among American and German officials: “If you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Reagan finished the speech by predicting the wall would not endure. “This wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom.” Reagan took responsibility for causing a diplomatic furor because he believed in universal ideals of freedom and self-government. And he understood the power of using a dramatic moment to promote American ideals.

A year later, Reagan addressed the students at Moscow State University. “The key is freedom,” he told them. It was an ideal that had been at the core of his political philosophy and public statements for 50 years, since the dawn of the Cold War. In a statement that reflected his own sense of responsibility for defeating communism and defending freedom, he told them: “It is the right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts, and watch it catch fire among the people. It is the right to dream—to follow your dream or stick to your conscience, even if you’re the only one in a sea of doubters.”

In applying military, economic, moral, and ideological pressure against the system to facilitate its collapse, Reagan was joined by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Pope John Paul II, Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, and others who fought for democracy and freedom. No one imagined the Berlin Wall would fall only two years later on November 9, 1989, as communism collapsed across Eastern Europe, or that the Soviet Union would formerly dissolve by the end of 1991.

Review Questions

1. The Cold War manifested itself through all the following except

• a nuclear arms race
• the space race
• direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union

2. The massive Soviet arms buildup during the 1960s and 1970s was financed by

• increased oil prices globally
• mineral wealth gained from Afghanistan
• increased Soviet industrial productivity
• surplus tariffs from the trade war with the United States

3. Tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. increased in the 1970s with the

• signing of the SALT Treaty in 1972
• banning of the antiballistic missile system
• Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
• policy of détente

4. The president most often credited with advocating policies leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union was

• Richard Nixon
• Jimmy Carter
• Ronald Reagan
• George H. W. Bush

5. The Reagan administration challenged Soviet influence by

• supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland
• refusing to get involved in the Afghanistan conflict
• embracing unilateral nuclear disarmament
• continuing the policy of détente

6. For President Ronald Reagan, the “evil empire” confronting the world was

• Afghanistan
• Communist China
• the Soviet Union

7. Events marking the end of the Cold War included all the following except

• Eastern European uprisings against communism
• the tearing down of the Berlin War
• the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.
• the end of communist rule in China

Free Response Questions

• Explain how détente led to a lessening of nuclear tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s.
• Compare President Reagan’s attitudes and policies toward the Soviet Union with those of his predecessors.

AP Practice Questions

“But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind —too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor. And now—now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. . . . There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev—Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, June 12, 1987

Refer to the excerpt provided.

1. The sentiments expressed in the excerpt contributed to which of the following?

• An end to the war on terrorism
• Conflicts in the Middle East
• The fall of the Soviet Union
• The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001

2. The Soviet conditions referred to in this excerpt most directly resulted from

• the end of World War II
• collective security agreements
• the creation of the United Nations

3. This excerpt was written in response to

• Cold War competition extending into Latin America
• postwar decolonization
• efforts to seek allies among nonaligned nations
• political changes and economic problems in Eastern Europe

Primary Sources

Reagan, Ronald. “Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin.” June 12, 1987.  https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-at-brandenburg-gate/

Reagan, Ronald. “Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin.” June 12, 1987. Reagan Foundation Video.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5MDFX-dNtsM

Suggested Resources

Brands, H. W.  Reagan: The Life . New York: Doubleday, 2015.

Busch, Andrew E.  Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Freedom . Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.

Gaddis, John Lewis.  The Cold War: A New History . New York: Penguin, 2005.

Hayward, Steven F.  The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980–1989 . New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009.

Lettow, Paul.  Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons . New York: Random House, 2005.

Ratnesar, Romesh.  Tear Down This Wall: A City, A President, and the Speech that Ended the Cold War . New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009.

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum website.  https://www.reaganfoundation.org/library-museum/

Schweizer, Peter.  Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism . New York: Doubleday, 2002.

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World History Project AP®

Course: world history project ap®   >   unit 8.

• ACTIVITY Sourcing — Who Started the Cold War?
• ACTIVITY: Simulation – Cold War Crisis

READ: Cold War - An Overview

• ACTIVITY: Causation – Cold War
• READ: The Cold War Around the World
• ACTIVITY: Quick Sourcing – Cold War
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• WATCH: Chinese Communist Revolution
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• WATCH: Decolonization and the Cold War - Through a Caribbean Lens
• BEFORE YOU WATCH: Decolonization and the Cold War - Through an Asian Lens
• WATCH: Decolonization and the Cold War through an Asian Lens
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• ACTIVITY: SAQ Practice – Unit 8

Cold War: An Overview

• According to the author, what was the basic difference at the heart of the Cold War conflict?
• What does this author identify as the three main features of the Cold War?
• Why did Stalin want to expand Soviet influence in Eastern Europe?
• What was the policy of containment and what does the author use as an example of this policy?
• To what extent does this article explain the causes and effects of the ideological struggle of the Cold War?
• The Cold War was a conflict that divided nations across the world. Which of the AP themes do you think best describes why the Cold War happened?

What was the Cold War?

A divided europe, the cold war heats up around the world, the end of the cold war, want to join the conversation.

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By: History.com Editors

Updated: March 16, 2023 | Original: October 14, 2009

An arms race occurs when two or more countries increase the size and quality of military resources to gain military and political superiority over one another. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is perhaps the largest and most expensive arms race in history; however, others have occurred, often with dire consequences. Whether an arms race increases or decreases the risk of war remains debatable: some analysts agree with Sir Edward Grey , Britain's foreign secretary at the start of World War I , who stated "The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war."

Dreadnought Arms Race

With the Industrial Revolution came new weaponry, including vastly improved warships. In the late nineteenth century, France and Russia built powerful armies and challenged the spread of British colonialism. In response, Great Britain shored up its Royal Navy to control the seas.

Britain managed to work out its arms race with France and Russia with two separate treaties. But Germany had also drastically increased its military budget and might, building a large navy to contest Britain’s naval dominance in hopes of becoming a world power.

In turn, Britain further expanded the Royal Navy and built more advanced and powerful battlecruisers, including the 1906 HMS Dreadnought , a technically advanced type of warship that set the standard for naval architecture.

Not to be outdone, Germany produced its own fleet of dreadnought-class warships, and the standoff continued with both sides fearing a naval attack from the other and building bigger and better ships.

Germany couldn’t keep up, however, and Britain won the so-called Anglo-German Arms Race . The conflict didn’t cause World War I, but it did help to increase distrust and tensions between Germany, Britain and other European powers.

Arms Control Efforts Fail

After World War I, many countries showed an interest in arms control. President Woodrow Wilson led the way by making it a key point in his famous 1918 Fourteen Points speech, wherein he laid out his vision for postwar peace.

At the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922), the United States, Britain and Japan signed a treaty to restrict arms, but in the mid-1930s Japan chose not to renew the agreement. Moreover, Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles and began to rearm.

This started a new arms race in Europe between Germany, France and Britain—and in the Pacific between Japan and the United States—which continued into World War II .

Nuclear Arms Race

Though the United States and the Soviet Union were tentative allies during World War II, their alliance soured after Nazi Germany surrendered in May 1945.

The United States cast a wary eye over the Soviet Union’s quest for world dominance as they expanded their power and influence over Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union resented the United States’ geopolitical interference and America’s own arms buildup.

Further fueling the flame of distrust, the United States didn’t tell the Soviet Union they planned to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, although the United States informed them they had created such a bomb.

To help discourage Soviet communist expansion, the United States built more atomic weaponry. But in 1949, the Soviets tested their own atomic bomb, and the Cold War nuclear arms race was on.

The United States responded in 1952 by testing the highly destructive hydrogen “superbomb,” and the Soviet Union followed suit in 1953. Four years later, both countries tested their first intercontinental ballistic missiles and the arms race rose to a terrifying new level.

Cold War Arms Race Heads to Space

The Soviet’s launch of the first Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957, stunned and concerned the United States and the rest of the world, as it took the Cold War arms race soon became the Space Race .

President Dwight D. Eisenhower tried to tone down the rhetoric over the success of the launch, while he streamed federal funds into the U.S. space program to prevent being left behind.

After a series of mishaps and failures, the United States successfully launched its first satellite into space on January 31, 1958, and the Space Race continued as both countries researched new technology to create more powerful weapons and surveillance technologies.

Missile Gap

Throughout the 1950s, the United States became convinced that the Soviet Union had better missile capability that, if launched, could not be defended against. This theory, known as the Missile Gap, was eventually disproved by the CIA but not before causing grave concern to U.S. officials.

Many politicians used the Missile Gap as a talking point in the 1960 presidential election. Yet, in fact, U.S. missile power was superior to that of the Soviet Union at the time. Over the next three decades, however, both countries grew their arsenals to well over 10,000 warheads.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cold War arms race came to a tipping point in 1962 after the John F. Kennedy administration’s failed attempt to overthrow Cuba’s premier Fidel Castro , and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev implemented a secret agreement to place Soviet warheads in Cuba to deter future coup attempts.

After U.S. intelligence observed missile bases under construction in Cuba, they enforced a blockade on the country and demanded the Soviet Union demolish the bases and remove any nuclear weapons. The tense Cuban Missile Crisis standoff ensued and came to a head as Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged letters and made demands.

The crisis ended peacefully; however, both sides and the American public had fearfully braced for nuclear war and began to question the need for weapons that guaranteed “mutually assured destruction.”

HISTORY Vault: Military Documentaries

Watch documentaries on the military.

Arms Races Continue

The Cold War ended in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall . But years earlier, in 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union had signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) to limit the scope and reach of all types of missiles.

Other treaties such as the START 1 treaty in 1991 and the New START treaty in 2011 aimed to further reduce both nations’ ballistic weapons capabilities.

The United States withdrew from the INF treaty in 2019, however, believing that Russia was non-compliant. Though the Cold War between the United States and Russia is over, many argue the arms race is not.

Other countries have beefed up their military might and are in a modern-day arms race or poised to enter one, including India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea , and Iran and China .

Herman, Steve. US Leaves INF Treaty, Says Russia ‘Solely Responsible.’ VOA. Hundley, Tom. Pakistan and India: The Real Nuclear Challenge. Pulitzer Center. Sputnik, 1957. U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian. The Reader’s Companion to American History. Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, Editors. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.

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Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy’s Vision for America

This essay about John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address explores its significance as a defining moment in American history. Delivered in 1961, Kennedy’s speech resonated with a call for national unity and collective responsibility amidst Cold War tensions. It emphasized themes of civic duty, global cooperation for peace, and progress on civil rights. The address not only outlined Kennedy’s vision for America but also set the tone for his presidency, characterized by optimism, leadership, and a commitment to societal advancement. Kennedy’s words continue to inspire generations, reflecting enduring lessons in effective rhetoric, political leadership, and the ideals of democracy.

How it works

John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, delivered on January 20, 1961, stands as a pivotal moment in American history. It marked not only the commencement of his presidency but also encapsulated his vision for the nation amidst a backdrop of Cold War tensions and societal change. Kennedy’s speech resonated with a call to unity and a shared responsibility for the future, setting a tone that would define his administration.

One of the defining characteristics of Kennedy’s inaugural address was its rhetorical eloquence and its memorable phrases that have echoed through time.

His famous words, “Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country,” encapsulated his appeal to civic duty and collective action. This resonated deeply with Americans, invoking a sense of national pride and commitment to service that transcended partisan divides.

Beyond its rhetorical power, Kennedy’s speech outlined his administration’s key priorities and policy directions. He emphasized the need for global cooperation to achieve peace, highlighting the challenges posed by the Cold War and the imperative for diplomacy over conflict. His vision for America was one of leadership not just in military might, but in moral and intellectual realms, advocating for freedom and justice around the world.

Moreover, Kennedy addressed pressing domestic issues, including civil rights and economic prosperity. He spoke of the importance of equality of opportunity for all Americans, regardless of race or background, signaling his commitment to advancing civil rights—a theme that would become increasingly prominent during his presidency.

Kennedy’s inaugural address was also notable for its optimism and forward-looking perspective. He acknowledged the daunting challenges facing the nation but expressed confidence in America’s ability to overcome them through innovation, perseverance, and unity. This hopeful outlook galvanized the nation and inspired a new generation of Americans to engage actively in the political process and strive for a better future.

Furthermore, the symbolic significance of Kennedy’s inauguration as the youngest president elected to office at that time and the first Catholic president cannot be overstated. His ascension to the presidency represented a generational shift and marked a departure from the political norms of the past. His youthful energy and progressive ideals infused a sense of dynamism into American politics, resonating deeply with younger voters and heralding a new era of leadership.

In conclusion, John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address remains a seminal moment in American political rhetoric, celebrated for its eloquence, optimism, and visionary outlook. It set the stage for his presidency, articulating his priorities both at home and abroad and challenging Americans to embrace their responsibilities as citizens of a democratic nation. Kennedy’s enduring legacy continues to inspire leaders and citizens alike to strive for a more just, peaceful, and prosperous future.

In reflecting on Kennedy’s words and the context in which they were delivered, it becomes evident that his inaugural address transcends its time and place, offering enduring lessons in leadership, rhetoric, and the responsibilities of citizenship. As we continue to navigate the complexities of our own era, Kennedy’s call to service, unity, and global cooperation remains as relevant and compelling as ever.

Cite this page

Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy's Vision for America. (2024, Jun 17). Retrieved from https://papersowl.com/examples/inaugural-insights-john-f-kennedys-vision-for-america/

"Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy's Vision for America." PapersOwl.com , 17 Jun 2024, https://papersowl.com/examples/inaugural-insights-john-f-kennedys-vision-for-america/

PapersOwl.com. (2024). Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy's Vision for America . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/inaugural-insights-john-f-kennedys-vision-for-america/ [Accessed: 21 Jun. 2024]

"Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy's Vision for America." PapersOwl.com, Jun 17, 2024. Accessed June 21, 2024. https://papersowl.com/examples/inaugural-insights-john-f-kennedys-vision-for-america/

"Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy's Vision for America," PapersOwl.com , 17-Jun-2024. [Online]. Available: https://papersowl.com/examples/inaugural-insights-john-f-kennedys-vision-for-america/. [Accessed: 21-Jun-2024]

PapersOwl.com. (2024). Inaugural Insights: John F. Kennedy's Vision for America . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/inaugural-insights-john-f-kennedys-vision-for-america/ [Accessed: 21-Jun-2024]

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