assignment of ucc

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Chapter 12 – Third-Party Rights

12.2 Assignment of Contract Rights

Contracts create rights and obligations between contracting parties. An assignment is the transfer of rights under a contract from one party (the assignor ) to another party (the assignee ). When a party assigns their rights under a contract, they are essentially transferring their ability to receive benefits or enforce terms of the contract to someone else. Stated another way, an assignment occurs when an obligee (one who has the right to receive a contract benefit) transfers a right to receive a contract benefit owed by the obligor (the one who has a duty to perform) to a third person ( assignee ); the obligee then becomes an assignor (one who makes an assignment). So, the party that makes the assignment is both an obligee and an assignor. The assignee acquires the right to receive the contractual obligations of the promisor, who is referred to as the obligor.

Generally, the assignor may assign any right unless (1) doing so would materially change the obligation of the obligor, materially burden him, increase his risk, or otherwise diminish the value to him of the original contract; (2) statute or public policy forbids the assignment; or (3) the contract itself precludes assignment. The common law of contracts and Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) govern assignments. Assignments are a common occurrence in business, legal, and financial transactions.

Figure 12 .1 Assignment of Rights

Method of Assignment

Manifesting assent.

To effect an assignment , the assignor must make known his intention to transfer the rights to the third person. This intention must take place in the present – it cannot be a future intention. The assignor’s intention must be that the assignment is effective without need of any further action or any further manifestation of intention to make the assignment. Under the UCC, any assignments of rights in excess of $5,000 must be in writing, but otherwise, assignments can be oral and consideration is not required: the assignor could assign the right to the assignee for no exchange of money or any other consideration. For example, Mrs. Franklin has the right to receive $750 a month from the sale of a house she formerly owned; she assigns the right to receive the money to her son Jason, as a gift. The assignment is good, and need not be written.

Acceptance and Revocation

For the assignment to become effective, the assignee must manifest his acceptance under most circumstances. This is done automatically when, as is usually the case, the assignee has given consideration for the assignment (i.e., there is a contract between the assignor and the assignee in which the assignment is the assignor’s consideration), and then the assignment is not revocable without the assignee’s consent. Problems of acceptance normally arise only when the assignor intends the assignment as a gift. Then, for the assignment to be irrevocable, either the assignee must manifest his acceptance or the assignor must notify the assignee in writing of the assignment. Thus, if Mrs. Franklin assigns the $750 a month from the sale of her house to her son Jason as a gift, this assignment is valid, but revocable.

Notice to the obligor is not required, but an obligor who renders performance to the assignor without notice of the assignment (that performance of the contract is to be rendered now to the assignee) is discharged from their obligation within the contract. Obviously, the assignor cannot then keep the consideration he has received; he owes it to the assignee. But if notice is given to the obligor and she performs to the assignor anyway, the assignee can recover from either the obligor or the assignee, so the obligor could have to perform twice. Of course, an obligor who receives notice of the assignment from the assignee will want to be sure the assignment has really occurred. After all, anybody could waltz up to the obligor and say, “I’m the assignee of your contract with the bank. From now on, pay me the $500 a month, not the bank.” The obligor is entitled to verification of the assignment.

Effect of Assignment

An assignment of rights effectively makes the assignee “ stand in the shoes” of the assignor (the “shoe rule”). He gains all the rights against the obligor that the assignor had, but no more. An obligor who could avoid the assignor’s attempt to enforce the rights could avoid a similar attempt by the assignee. Suppose Dealer sells a car to Buyer on a contract where Buyer is to pay $300 per month and the car is warranted for 50,000 miles. If the car goes on the fritz before then and Dealer won’t fix it, Buyer could fix it for, say, $250 and deduct that $250 from the amount owed Dealer on the next installment. Now, if Dealer assigns the contract to Assignee, Assignee stands in Dealer’s shoes, and Buyer could likewise deduct the $250 from payment to Assignee.

The “shoe rule” does not apply to two types of assignments. First, it is inapplicable to the sale of a negotiable instrument to a holder in due course. Second, the rule may be waived: under the UCC and at common law, the obligor may agree in the original contract not to raise defenses against the assignee that could have been raised against the assignor. While a waiver of defenses makes the assignment more marketable from the assignee’s point of view, it is a situation fraught with peril to an obligor, who may sign a contract without understanding the full import of the waiver. Under the waiver rule, for example, a farmer who buys a tractor on credit and discovers later that it does not work would still be required to pay a credit company that purchased the contract; his defense that the merchandise was shoddy would be unavailing (he would, as used to be said, be “having to pay on a dead horse”).

For that reason, there are various rules that limit both the holder in due course and the waiver rule. Certain defenses, the so-called real defenses (infancy, duress, and fraud in the execution, among others), may always be asserted. Also, the waiver clause in the contract must have been presented in good faith, and if the assignee has actual notice of a defense that the buyer or lessee could raise, then the waiver is ineffective. Moreover, in consumer transactions, the UCC’s rule is subject to state laws that protect consumers (people buying things used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes), and many states, by statute or court decision, have made waivers of defenses ineffective in such consumer transactions . Federal Trade Commission regulations also affect the ability of many sellers to pass on rights to assignees free of defenses that buyers could raise against them. Because of these various limitations on the holder in due course and on waivers, the “shoe rule” will not govern in consumer transactions and, if there are real defenses or the assignee does not act in good faith, in business transactions as well.

Prohibited Assignments

The general rule—as previously noted—is that most contract rights are assignable, and the law favors freely assignable rights. There are five exceptions to this rule however.

Material Change in Duties of the Obligor

When an assignment has the effect of materially changing the duties that the obligor must perform, it is ineffective. Changing the party to whom the obligor must make a payment is not a material change of duty that will defeat an assignment, since that, of course, is the purpose behind most assignments. Nor will a minor change in the duties the obligor must perform defeat the assignment. But, some changes are significant enough to bar assignments.

Several residents in the town of Centerville sign up on an annual basis with the Centerville Times to receive their morning paper. A customer who is moving out of town may assign his right to receive the paper to someone else within the delivery route. As long as the assignee pays for the paper, the assignment is effective; the only relationship the obligor has to the assignee is a routine delivery in exchange for payment. But if the change involves assigning the right to receive the paper to someone that is outside of the delivery route, that change would be material, and the assignment could be invalid.

Assignment of Personal Rights

When it matters to the obligor who receives the benefit of his duty to perform under the contract, then the receipt of the benefit is a personal right that cannot be assigned. For example, a student seeking to earn pocket money during the school year signs up to do research work for a professor she admires and with whom she is friendly. The professor assigns the contract to one of his colleagues with whom the student does not get along. The assignment is ineffective because it matters to the student (the obligor) who the person of the assignee is. It is for this same reason that tenants usually cannot assign (sublet) their tenancies without the landlord’s permission because it matters to the landlord who the person is that is living in the landlord’s property.

Nassau Hotel Co. v. Barnett & Barse Corporation , 147 N.Y.S. 283 (1914)

MCLAUGHLIN, J.

Plaintiff owns a hotel at Long Beach, L. I., and on the 21st of November, 1912, it entered into a written agreement with the individual defendants Barnett and Barse to conduct the same for a period of years.…Shortly after this agreement was signed, Barnett and Barse organized the Barnett & Barse Corporation with a capital stock of $10,000, and then assigned the agreement to it. Immediately following the assignment, the corporation went into possession and assumed to carry out its terms. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action to cancel the agreement and to recover possession of the hotel and furniture therein, on the ground that the agreement was not assignable. [Summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, defendant corporation appeals.]

The only question presented is whether the agreement was assignable. It provided, according to the allegations of the complaint, that the plaintiff leased the property to Barnett and Barse with all its equipment and furniture for a period of three years, with a privilege of five successive renewals of three years each. It expressly provided:

‘That said lessees…become responsible for the operation of the said hotel and for the upkeep and maintenance thereof and of all its furniture and equipment in accordance with the terms of this agreement and the said lessees shall have the exclusive possession, control and management thereof. * * * The said lessees hereby covenant and agree that they will operate the said hotel at all times in a first-class business-like manner, keep the same open for at least six (6) months of each year, * * *’ and ‘in lieu of rental the lessor and lessees hereby covenant and agree that the gross receipts of such operation shall be, as received, divided between the parties hereto as follows: (a) Nineteen per cent. (19%) to the lessor. * * * In the event of the failure of the lessees well and truly to perform the covenants and agreements herein contained,’ they should be liable in the sum of $50,000 as liquidated damages. That ‘in consideration and upon condition that the said lessees shall well and faithfully perform all the covenants and agreements by them to be performed without evasion or delay the said lessor for itself and its successors, covenants and agrees that the said lessees, their legal representatives and assigns may at all times during said term and the renewals thereof peaceably have and enjoy the said demised premises.’ And that ‘this agreement shall inure to the benefit of and bind the respective parties hereto, their personal representatives, successors and assigns.’

The complaint further alleges that the agreement was entered into by plaintiff in reliance upon the financial responsibility of Barnett and Barse, their personal character, and especially the experience of Barnett in conducting hotels; that, though he at first held a controlling interest in the Barnett & Barse Corporation, he has since sold all his stock to the defendant Barse, and has no interest in the corporation and no longer devotes any time or attention to the management or operation of the hotel.

…[C]learly…the agreement in question was personal to Barnett and Barse and could not be assigned by them without the plaintiff’s consent. By its terms the plaintiff not only entrusted them with the care and management of the hotel and its furnishings—valued, according to the allegations of the complaint, at more than $1,000,000—but agreed to accept as rental or compensation a percentage of the gross receipts. Obviously, the receipts depended to a large extent upon the management, and the care of the property upon the personal character and responsibility of the persons in possession. When the whole agreement is read, it is apparent that the plaintiff relied, in making it, upon the personal covenants of Barnett and Barse. They were financially responsible. As already said, Barnett had had a long and successful experience in managing hotels, which was undoubtedly an inducing cause for plaintiff’s making the agreement in question and for personally obligating them to carry out its terms.

It is suggested that because there is a clause in the agreement to the effect that it should ‘inure to the benefit of and bind the respective parties hereto, their personal representatives and assigns,’ that Barnett and Barse had a right to assign it to the corporation. But the intention of the parties is to be gathered, not from one clause, but from the entire instrument [Citation] and when it is thus read it clearly appears that Barnett and Barse were to personally carry out the terms of the agreement and did not have a right to assign it. This follows from the language used, which shows that a personal trust or confidence was reposed by the plaintiff in Barnett and Barse when the agreement was made.

In [Citation] it was said: “Rights arising out of contract cannot be transferred if they…involve a relation of personal confidence such that the party whose agreement conferred those rights must have intended them to be exercised only by him in whom he actually confided.”

This rule was applied in [Citation] the court holding that the plaintiff—the assignee—was not only technically, but substantially, a different entity from its predecessor, and that the defendant was not obliged to entrust its money collected on the sale of the presses to the responsibility of an entirely different corporation from that with which it had contracted, and that the contract could not be assigned to the plaintiff without the assent of the other party to it.

The reason which underlies the basis of the rule is that a party has the right to the benefit contemplated from the character, credit, and substance of him with whom he contracts, and in such case he is not bound to recognize…an assignment of the contract.

The order appealed from, therefore, is affirmed.

Case questions

The corporation created to operate the hotel was apparently owned and operated by the same two men the plaintiff leased the hotel to in the first place. What objection would the plaintiff have to the corporate entity—actually, of course, a legal fiction—owning and operating the hotel?
The defendants pointed to the clause about the contract inuring to the benefit of the parties “and assigns.” So the defendants assigned the contract. How could that not be allowed by the contract’s own terms?
What is the controlling rule of law upon which the outcome here depends?

Assignment Forbidden by Statute or Public Policy

Various federal and state laws prohibit or regulate some contract assignments. For example, the assignment of future wages is regulated by state and federal law, such an attempt to try to effect such an assignment would not be valid. And even in the absence of statute, public policy might prohibit some assignments.

Contracts That Prohibit Assignment

A written contract may contain general language that prohibits assignment of rights or assignment of “the contract.” Both the Restatement and UCC Section 2-210(3) declare that in the absence of any contrary circumstances, a provision in the agreement that prohibits assigning “the contract” bars “only the delegation to the assignee of the assignor’s performance.” In other words, unless the contract specifically prohibits assignment of any of its terms, a party is free to assign anything except his or her own duties. Even if a contractual provision explicitly prohibits it, a right to damages for breach of the whole contract is assignable under UCC Section 2-210(2) in contracts for goods. Likewise, UCC Section 9-318(4) invalidates any contract provision that prohibits assigning sums already due or to become due. Indeed, in some states, at common law, a clause specifically prohibiting assignment will fail. For example, the buyer and the seller agree to the sale of land and to a provision barring assignment of the rights under the contract. The buyer pays the full price, but the seller refuses to convey. The buyer then assigns to her friend the right to obtain title to the land from the seller. The latter’s objection that the contract precludes such an assignment will fall on deaf ears in some states; the assignment is effective, and the friend may sue for the title. Bottom line, even though a contract may expressly state it cannot be assigned, that may not always be the case.

As we saw with integration clauses, if you are a Verizon Wireless ™ customer, you have agreed to their terms regarding assignment:

You cannot assign this Agreement or any of your rights or duties under it without our permission. However, we may assign this Agreement or any debt you owe us without notifying you.

Such assignment clauses can be found in many common contracts.

Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co. 194 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1973)

HUSKINS, J.

…Plaintiff [Rose], after leasing his quarry to J. E. Dooley and Son, Inc., promised not to engage in the rock-crushing business within an eight-mile radius of [the city of] Elkin for a period of ten years. In return for this promise, J. E. Dooley and Son, Inc., promised, among other things, to furnish plaintiff stone f.o.b. the quarry site at Cycle, North Carolina, at stipulated prices for ten years.…

By a contract effective 23 April 1960, Vulcan Materials Company, a corporation…, purchased the stone quarry operations and the assets and obligations of J. E. Dooley and Son, Inc.…[Vulcan sent Rose a letter, part of which read:]

Mr. Dooley brought to us this morning the contracts between you and his companies, copies of which are attached. This is to advise that Vulcan Materials Company assumes all phases of these contracts and intends to carry out the conditions of these contracts as they are stated.

In early 1961 Vulcan notified plaintiff that it would no longer sell stone to him at the prices set out in [the agreement between Rose and Dooley] and would thereafter charge plaintiff the same prices charged all of its other customers for stone. Commencing 11 May 1961, Vulcan raised stone prices to the plaintiff to a level in excess of the prices specified in [the Rose-Dooley agreement].

At the time Vulcan increased the prices of stone to amounts in excess of those specified in [the Rose-Dooley contract], plaintiff was engaged in his ready-mix cement business, using large quantities of stone, and had no other practical source of supply. Advising Vulcan that he intended to sue for breach of contract, he continued to purchase stone from Vulcan under protest.…

The total of these amounts over and above the prices specified in [the Rose-Dooley contract] is $25,231.57, [about $260,000 in 2024 dollars] and plaintiff seeks to recover said amount in this action.

The [Rose-Dooley] agreement was an executory bilateral contract under which plaintiff’s promise not to compete for ten years gained him a ten-year option to buy stone at specified prices. In most states, the assignee of an executory bilateral contract is not liable to anyone for the nonperformance of the assignor’s duties thereunder unless he expressly promises his assignor or the other contracting party to perform, or ‘assume,’ such duties.…These states refuse to imply a promise to perform the duties, but if the assignee expressly promises his assignor to perform, he is liable to the other contracting party on a third-party beneficiary theory. And, if the assignee makes such a promise directly to the other contracting party upon a consideration, of course he is liable to him thereon. [Citation]

A minority of states holds that the assignee of an executory bilateral contract under a general assignment becomes not only assignee of the rights of the assignor but also delegatee of his duties; and that, absent a showing of contrary intent, the assignee impliedly promises the assignor that he will perform the duties so delegated. This rule is expressed in Restatement, Contracts, s 164 (1932) as follows:

(1) Where a party under a bilateral contract which is at the time wholly or partially executory on both sides purports to assign the whole contract, his action is interpreted, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, as an assignment of the assignor’s rights under the contract and a delegation of the performance of the assignor’s duties.

(2) Acceptance by the assignee of such an assignment is interpreted, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, as both an assent to become an assignee of the assignor’s rights and as a promise to the assignor to assume the performance of the assignor’s duties.’ (emphasis added)

We…adopt the Restatement rule and expressly hold that the assignee under a general assignment of an executory bilateral contract, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, becomes the delegatee of his assignor’s duties and impliedly promises his assignor that he will perform such duties.

The rule we adopt and reaffirm here is regarded as the more reasonable view by legal scholars and textwriters. Professor Grismore says:

It is submitted that the acceptance of an assignment in this form does presumptively import a tacit promise on the part of the assignee to assume the burdens of the contract, and that this presumption should prevail in the absence of the clear showing of a contrary intention. The presumption seems reasonable in view of the evident expectation of the parties. The assignment on its face indicates an intent to do more than simply to transfer the benefits assured by the contract. It purports to transfer the contract as a whole, and since the contract is made up of both benefits and burdens both must be intended to be included.…Grismore, Is the Assignee of a Contract Liable for the Nonperformance of Delegated Duties? 18 Mich.L.Rev. 284 (1920).

In addition, with respect to transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, an assignment of a contract in general terms is a delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor, and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a promise by him to perform those duties. Our holding in this case maintains a desirable uniformity in the field of contract liability.

We further hold that the other party to the original contract may sue the assignee as a third-party beneficiary of his promise of performance which he impliedly makes to his assignor, under the rule above laid down, by accepting the general assignment. Younce v. Lumber Co. , [Citation] (1908), holds that where the assignee makes an express promise of performance to his assignor, the other contracting party may sue him for breach thereof. We see no reason why the same result should not obtain where the assignee breaches his promise of performance implied under the rule of Restatement s 164. ‘That the assignee is liable at the suit of the third party where he expressly assumes and promises to perform delegated duties has already been decided in a few cases (citing Younce). If an express promise will support such an action it is difficult to see why a tacit promise should not have the same effect.’ Grismore, supra. Parenthetically, we note that such is the rule under the Uniform Commercial Code, [2-210].

We now apply the foregoing principles to the case at hand. The contract of 23 April 1960, between defendant and J. E. Dooley and Son, Inc., under which, as stipulated by the parties, ‘the defendant purchased the assets and obligations of J. E. Dooley and Son, Inc.,’ was a general assignment of all the assets and obligations of J. E. Dooley and Son, Inc., including those under [the Rose-Dooley contract]. When defendant accepted such assignment it thereby became delegatee of its assignor’s duties under it and impliedly promised to perform such duties.

When defendant later failed to perform such duties by refusing to continue sales of stone to plaintiff at the prices specified in [the Rose-Dooley contract], it breached its implied promise of performance and plaintiff was entitled to bring suit thereon as a third-party beneficiary.

The decision…is reversed with directions that the case be certified to the Superior Court of Forsyth County for reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court in accordance with this opinion.

Why did Rose need the crushed rock from the quarry he originally leased to Dooley?
What argument did Vulcan make as to why it should not be liable to sell crushed rock to Rose at the price set out in the Rose-Dooley contract?
What rule did the court here announce in deciding that Vulcan was required to sell rock at the price set out in the Rose-Dooley contract? That is, what is the controlling rule of law in this case?

Future Contracts

The law distinguishes between assigning future rights under an existing contract and assigning rights that will arise from a future contract. Rights contingent on a future event can be assigned in exactly the same manner as existing rights, as long as the contingent rights are already incorporated in a contract. Ben has a long-standing deal with his neighbor, Mrs. Robinson, to keep the latter’s walk clear of snow at twenty dollars a snowfall. Ben is saving his money for a new printer, but when he is eighty dollars shy of the purchase price, he becomes impatient and cajoles a friend into loaning him the balance. In return, Ben assigns his friend the earnings from the next four snowfalls. The assignment is effective. However, a right that will arise from a future contract cannot be the subject of a present assignment.

Partial Assignments

An assignor may assign part of a contractual right, but only if the obligor can perform that part of his contractual obligation separately from the remainder of his obligation. Assignment of part of a payment due is always enforceable. However, if the obligor objects, neither the assignor nor the assignee may sue him unless both are party to the suit. Mrs. Robinson owes Ben one hundred dollars. Ben assigns fifty dollars of that sum to his friend. Mrs. Robinson is perplexed by this assignment and refuses to pay until the situation is explained to her satisfaction. The friend brings suit against Mrs. Robinson. The court cannot hear the case unless Ben is also a party to the suit. This ensures all parties to the dispute are present at once and avoids multiple lawsuits.

Successive Assignments

It may happen that an assignor assigns the same interest twice. With certain exceptions, the first assignee takes precedence over any subsequent assignee. One obvious exception is when the first assignment is ineffective or revocable. A subsequent assignment has the effect of revoking a prior assignment that is ineffective or revocable. Another exception: if in good faith the subsequent assignee gives consideration for the assignment and has no knowledge of the prior assignment, he takes precedence whenever he obtains payment from, performance from, or a judgment against the obligor, or whenever he receives some tangible evidence from the assignor that the right has been assigned (e.g., a bank deposit book or an insurance policy).

Some states follow the different English rule: the first assignee to give notice to the obligor has priority, regardless of the order in which the assignments were made. Furthermore, if the assignment falls within the filing requirements of UCC Article 9 the first assignee to file will prevail.

Figure 1 2 .2 Successive Assignments

Assignor’s Warranties

An assignor has legal responsibilities in making assignments. Unless the contract explicitly states to the contrary, a person who assigns a right for value makes certain assignor’s warranties to the assignee: that he will not upset the assignment, that he has the right to make it, and that there are no defenses that will defeat it. However, the assignor does not guarantee payment; assignment does not by itself amount to a warranty that the obligor is solvent or will perform as agreed in the original contract. Mrs. Robinson owes Ben fifty dollars. Ben assigns this sum to his friend. Before the friend collects, Ben releases Mrs. Robinson from her obligation. The friend may sue Ben for the fifty dollars. Or again, if Ben represents to his friend that Mrs. Robinson owes him (Ben) fifty dollars and assigns his friend that amount, but in fact Mrs. Robinson does not owe Ben that much, then Ben has breached his assignor’s warranty. The assignor’s warranties may be express or implied.

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Check your Understanding

the transfer of rights under a contract from one party to another party

the party who transfers their rights to another

a person to whom a property right is transferred

one to whom an obligation is made

one who makes and has an obligation

a legal relationship, created by law or contract, in which a person or business owes something to another

relevant and significant

U.C.C. - ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2010)

Primary tabs.

Part 1. General Provisions

[Subpart 1. Short Title, Definitions, and General Concepts]

§ 9-101 . SHORT TITLE.
§ 9-102 . DEFINITIONS AND INDEX OF DEFINITIONS.
§ 9-103 . PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTEREST; APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS; BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING.
§ 9-104 . CONTROL OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.
§ 9-105 . CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC CHATTEL PAPER.
§ 9-106 . CONTROL OF INVESTMENT PROPERTY.
§ 9-107 . CONTROL OF LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHT.
§ 9-108 . SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION.

[Subpart 2. Applicability of Article]

§ 9-109 . SCOPE.
§ 9-110 . SECURITY INTERESTS ARISING UNDER ARTICLE 2 OR 2A.
Part 2. Effectiveness of Security Agreement; Attachment of Security Interest; Rights of Parties to Security Agreement

[Subpart 1. Effectiveness and Attachment]

§ 9-201 . GENERAL EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY AGREEMENT.
§ 9-202 . TITLE TO COLLATERAL IMMATERIAL.
§ 9-203 . ATTACHMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SECURITY INTEREST; PROCEEDS; SUPPORTING OBLIGATIONS; FORMAL REQUISITES.
§ 9-204 . AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY; FUTURE ADVANCES.
§ 9-205 . USE OR DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL PERMISSIBLE.
§ 9-206 . SECURITY INTEREST ARISING IN PURCHASE OR DELIVERY OF FINANCIAL ASSET.

[Subpart 2. Rights and Duties]

§ 9-207 . RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SECURED PARTY HAVING POSSESSION OR CONTROL OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-208 . ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF SECURED PARTY HAVING CONTROL OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-209 . DUTIES OF SECURED PARTY IF ACCOUNT DEBTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF ASSIGNMENT.
§ 9-210 . REQUEST FOR ACCOUNTING; REQUEST REGARDING LIST OF COLLATERAL OR STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT.
Part 3. Perfection and Priority

[Subpart 1. Law Governing Perfection and Priority]

§ 9-301 . LAW GOVERNING PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS.
§ 9-302 . LAW GOVERNING PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF AGRICULTURAL LIENS.
§ 9-303 . LAW GOVERNING PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN GOODS COVERED BY A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.
§ 9-304 . LAW GOVERNING PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS.
§ 9-305 . LAW GOVERNING PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT PROPERTY.
§ 9-306 . LAW GOVERNING PERFECTION AND PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS.
§ 9-307 . LOCATION OF DEBTOR.
§ 9-308 . WHEN SECURITY INTEREST OR AGRICULTURAL LIEN IS PERFECTED; CONTINUITY OF PERFECTION.
§ 9-309 . SECURITY INTEREST PERFECTED UPON ATTACHMENT.
§ 9-310 . WHEN FILING REQUIRED TO PERFECT SECURITY INTEREST OR AGRICULTURAL LIEN; SECURITY INTERESTS AND AGRICULTURAL LIENS TO WHICH FILING PROVISIONS DO NOT APPLY.
§ 9-311 . PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN PROPERTY SUBJECT TO CERTAIN STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND TREATIES.
§ 9-312 . PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHATTEL PAPER, DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS, DOCUMENTS, GOODS COVERED BY DOCUMENTS, INSTRUMENTS, INVESTMENT PROPERTY, LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS, AND MONEY; PERFECTION BY PERMISSIVE FILING; TEMPORARY PERFECTION WITHOUT FILING OR TRANSFER OF POSSESSION.
§ 9-313 . WHEN POSSESSION BY OR DELIVERY TO SECURED PARTY PERFECTS SECURITY INTEREST WITHOUT FILING.
§ 9-314 . PERFECTION BY CONTROL.
§ 9-315 . SECURED PARTY'S RIGHTS ON DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL AND IN PROCEEDS.
§ 9-316 . CONTINUED PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTEREST FOLLOWING CHANGE IN GOVERNING LAW.

[Subpart 3. Priority]

§ 9-317 . INTERESTS THAT TAKE PRIORITY OVER OR TAKE FREE OF UNPERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST OR AGRICULTURAL LIEN.
§ 9-318 . NO INTEREST RETAINED IN RIGHT TO PAYMENT THAT IS SOLD; RIGHTS AND TITLE OF SELLER OF ACCOUNT OR CHATTEL PAPER WITH RESPECT TO CREDITORS AND PURCHASERS.
§ 9-319 . RIGHTS AND TITLE OF CONSIGNEE WITH RESPECT TO CREDITORS AND PURCHASERS.
§ 9-320 . BUYER OF GOODS.
§ 9-321 . LICENSEE OF GENERAL INTANGIBLE AND LESSEE OF GOODS IN ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS.
§ 9-322 . PRIORITIES AMONG CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS IN AND AGRICULTURAL LIENS ON SAME COLLATERAL.
§ 9-323 . FUTURE ADVANCES.
§ 9-324 . PRIORITY OF PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS.
§ 9-325 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN TRANSFERRED COLLATERAL.
§ 9-326 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS CREATED BY NEW DEBTOR.
§ 9-327 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.
§ 9-328 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT PROPERTY.
§ 9-329 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHT.
§ 9-330 . PRIORITY OF PURCHASER OF CHATTEL PAPER OR INSTRUMENT.
§ 9-331 . PRIORITY OF RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS OF INSTRUMENTS, DOCUMENTS, AND SECURITIES UNDER OTHER ARTICLES; PRIORITY OF INTERESTS IN FINANCIAL ASSETS AND SECURITY ENTITLEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 8.
§ 9-332 . TRANSFER OF MONEY; TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.
§ 9-333 . PRIORITY OF CERTAIN LIENS ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW.
§ 9-334 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN FIXTURES AND CROPS.
§ 9-335 . ACCESSIONS.
§ 9-336 . COMMINGLED GOODS.
§ 9-337 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN GOODS COVERED BY CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.
§ 9-338 . PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTEREST OR AGRICULTURAL LIEN PERFECTED BY FILED FINANCING STATEMENT PROVIDING CERTAIN INCORRECT INFORMATION.
§ 9-339 . PRIORITY SUBJECT TO SUBORDINATION.

[Subpart 4. Rights of Bank]

§ 9-340 . EFFECTIVENESS OF RIGHT OF RECOUPMENT OR SET-OFF AGAINST DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.
§ 9-341 . BANK'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITH RESPECT TO DEPOSIT ACCOUNT.
§ 9-342 . BANK'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ENTER INTO OR DISCLOSE EXISTENCE OF CONTROL AGREEMENT.
Part 4. Rights of Third Parties
§ 9-401 . ALIENABILITY OF DEBTOR'S RIGHTS.
§ 9-402 . SECURED PARTY NOT OBLIGATED ON CONTRACT OF DEBTOR OR IN TORT.
§ 9-403 . AGREEMENT NOT TO ASSERT DEFENSES AGAINST ASSIGNEE.
§ 9-404 . RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY ASSIGNEE; CLAIMS AND DEFENSES AGAINST ASSIGNEE.
§ 9-405 . MODIFICATION OF ASSIGNED CONTRACT.
§ 9-406 . DISCHARGE OF ACCOUNT DEBTOR; NOTIFICATION OF ASSIGNMENT; IDENTIFICATION AND PROOF OF ASSIGNMENT; RESTRICTIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS, CHATTEL PAPER, PAYMENT INTANGIBLES, AND PROMISSORY NOTES INEFFECTIVE.
§ 9-407 . RESTRICTIONS ON CREATION OR ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST IN LEASEHOLD INTEREST OR IN LESSOR'S RESIDUAL INTEREST.
§ 9-408 . RESTRICTIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTES, HEALTH-CARE-INSURANCE RECEIVABLES, AND CERTAIN GENERAL INTANGIBLES INEFFECTIVE.
§ 9-409 . RESTRICTIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS INEFFECTIVE.
Part 5. Filing

[Subpart 1. Filing Office; Contents and Effectiveness of Financing Statement]

§ 9-501 . FILING OFFICE.
§ 9-502 . CONTENTS OF FINANCING STATEMENT; RECORD OF MORTGAGE AS FINANCING STATEMENT; TIME OF FILING FINANCING STATEMENT.
§ 9-503 . NAME OF DEBTOR AND SECURED PARTY.
§ 9-504 . INDICATION OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-505 . FILING AND COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER STATUTES AND TREATIES FOR CONSIGNMENTS, LEASES, OTHER BAILMENTS, AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS.
§ 9-506 . EFFECT OF ERRORS OR OMISSIONS.
§ 9-507 . EFFECT OF CERTAIN EVENTS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCING STATEMENT.
§ 9-508 . EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCING STATEMENT IF NEW DEBTOR BECOMES BOUND BY SECURITY AGREEMENT.
§ 9-509 . PERSONS ENTITLED TO FILE A RECORD.
§ 9-510 . EFFECTIVENESS OF FILED RECORD.
§ 9-511 . SECURED PARTY OF RECORD.
§ 9-512 . AMENDMENT OF FINANCING STATEMENT.
§ 9-513 . TERMINATION STATEMENT.
§ 9-514 . ASSIGNMENT OF POWERS OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD.
§ 9-515 . DURATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCING STATEMENT; EFFECT OF LAPSED FINANCING STATEMENT.
§ 9-516 . WHAT CONSTITUTES FILING; EFFECTIVENESS OF FILING.
§ 9-517 . EFFECT OF INDEXING ERRORS.
§ 9-518 . CLAIM CONCERNING INACCURATE OR WRONGFULLY FILED RECORD.

[Subpart 2. Duties and Operation of Filing Office]

§ 9-519 . NUMBERING, MAINTAINING, AND INDEXING RECORDS; COMMUNICATING INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RECORDS.
§ 9-520 . ACCEPTANCE AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RECORD.
§ 9-521 . UNIFORM FORM OF WRITTEN FINANCING STATEMENT AND AMENDMENT.
§ 9-522 . MAINTENANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS.
§ 9-523 . INFORMATION FROM FILING OFFICE; SALE OR LICENSE OF RECORDS.
§ 9-524 . DELAY BY FILING OFFICE.
§ 9-525 . FEES.
§ 9-526 . FILING-OFFICE RULES.
§ 9-527 . DUTY TO REPORT.
Part 6. Default

[Subpart 1. Default and Enforcement of Security Interest]

§ 9-601 . RIGHTS AFTER DEFAULT; JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT; CONSIGNOR OR BUYER OF ACCOUNTS, CHATTEL PAPER, PAYMENT INTANGIBLES, OR PROMISSORY NOTES.
§ 9-602 . WAIVER AND VARIANCE OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES.
§ 9-603 . AGREEMENT ON STANDARDS CONCERNING RIGHTS AND DUTIES.
§ 9-604 . PROCEDURE IF SECURITY AGREEMENT COVERS REAL PROPERTY OR FIXTURES.
§ 9-605 . UNKNOWN DEBTOR OR SECONDARY OBLIGOR.
§ 9-606 . TIME OF DEFAULT FOR AGRICULTURAL LIEN.
§ 9-607 . COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BY SECURED PARTY.
§ 9-608 . APPLICATION OF PROCEEDS OF COLLECTION OR ENFORCEMENT; LIABILITY FOR DEFICIENCY AND RIGHT TO SURPLUS.
§ 9-609 . SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO TAKE POSSESSION AFTER DEFAULT.
§ 9-610 . DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL AFTER DEFAULT.
§ 9-611 . NOTIFICATION BEFORE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-612 . TIMELINESS OF NOTIFICATION BEFORE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-613 . CONTENTS AND FORM OF NOTIFICATION BEFORE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL: GENERAL.
§ 9-614 . CONTENTS AND FORM OF NOTIFICATION BEFORE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL: CONSUMER-GOODS TRANSACTION.
§ 9-615 . APPLICATION OF PROCEEDS OF DISPOSITION; LIABILITY FOR DEFICIENCY AND RIGHT TO SURPLUS.
§ 9-616 . EXPLANATION OF CALCULATION OF SURPLUS OR DEFICIENCY.
§ 9-617 . RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREE OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-618 . RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CERTAIN SECONDARY OBLIGORS.
§ 9-619 . TRANSFER OF RECORD OR LEGAL TITLE.
§ 9-620 . ACCEPTANCE OF COLLATERAL IN FULL OR PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF OBLIGATION; COMPULSORY DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-621 . NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT COLLATERAL.
§ 9-622 . EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF COLLATERAL.
§ 9-623 . RIGHT TO REDEEM COLLATERAL.
§ 9-624 . WAIVER.

[Subpart 2. Noncompliance with Article]

§ 9-625 . REMEDIES FOR SECURED PARTY'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ARTICLE.
§ 9-626 . ACTION IN WHICH DEFICIENCY OR SURPLUS IS IN ISSUE.
§ 9-627 . DETERMINATION OF WHETHER CONDUCT WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE.
§ 9-628 . NONLIABILITY AND LIMITATION ON LIABILITY OF SECURED PARTY; LIABILITY OF SECONDARY OBLIGOR.
Part 7. Transition
§ 9-701 . EFFECTIVE DATE.
§ 9-702 . SAVINGS CLAUSE.
§ 9-703 . SECURITY INTEREST PERFECTED BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE.
§ 9-704 . SECURITY INTEREST UNPERFECTED BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE.
§ 9-705 . EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTION TAKEN BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE.
§ 9-706 . WHEN INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT SUFFICES TO CONTINUE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCING STATEMENT.
§ 9-707 . AMENDMENT OF PRE-EFFECTIVE-DATE FINANCING STATEMENT.
§ 9-708 . PERSONS ENTITLED TO FILE INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT OR CONTINUATION STATEMENT.
§ 9-709 . PRIORITY.
Part 8. TRANSITION PROVISIONS FOR 2010 AMENDMENTS