The recurrence of terrorism
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- Published: 09 November 2024
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- Shlomo O. Goldman ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4592-6443 1 &
- Michal Neubauer-Shani 2
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Terrorism has been a worldwide threat, and therefore the object of multiple studies which focus on the question of which approach, the conciliatory or the repressive, is most effective in combating terrorism. Supporters of the conciliatory approach maintain that harsh measures lead to a boomerang effect, and therefore tackling the root causes of terrorism, would be more effective. By contrast, supporters of the repressive approach claim that aggressive means are effective in suppressing terrorist organizations. However, the literature fails to address the long-term effect of each of these two approaches. The current study examines the question: Which approach, the conciliatory or the repressive, reduces the probability of terrorist organization resurrection? Conciliatory strategy emerges as slightly more stable and robust in preventing terrorism recurrence in the long-term. However, the repressive strategy showed better effectiveness in preventing terrorism recurrence when the terrorist organizations that were victorious were omitted from the model.
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More variables that EDTG used the GTD as a source for data are: terrorist attacks per million people, attacks diversity, a terrorist group’s share of transnational terrorist attacks in a given year, the total number of deaths caused by a terrorist group in a given year, the total number of injuries caused by a terrorist group in a given year, the total number of terrorist deaths caused by a terrorist group in a given year, the total number of terrorist injuries caused by a terrorist group in a given year.
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See Tables 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 .
To examine whether the probability of a new terrorist organization with the same ideology will emerge in the home base county, logistic regression was conducted. First step univariate regression was performed: for defeat by the military or the police results were not significant (B = -−.48, SE = 0.27, df = 1, N = 242), and for organization ending through politics the results were also not significant (B = 0.107, SE = 0.29, df = 1, N = 242). Therefore, multivariate analyses were not conducted. To examine the relationship between the way the terrorist organization ended and the number of years until a new organization with a similar ideology emerged, linear regressions were conducted: for defeat by the military or the police results were not significant (B −1.86, SE = 1.95, N = 242), and for organization ending through politics the results were also not significant (B = -−.661, SE = 1.995, N = 242). Therefore, multivariate analyses were not conducted.
To examine the relationship between the way the terrorist organization ended and the number of years which passed until the organization perpetrated the first attack after its ending, linear regressions were conducted, controlling the terrorist organization ending year: for defeat by the military or the police results were not significant (B −1.215, SE = 1.232, N = 280), and for organization ending through politics or the terrorist organization achieving its goals the results were also not significant (B1.34, SE = 1.84, N = 242). Therefore, multivariate analyses were not conducted.
To examine the relationship between the numbers of terrorist organizations with a similar ideology which appeared in the home base country after the terrorist organization ended and the way the terrorist organization ended, negative binomial regressions were conducted.
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Goldman, S.O., Neubauer-Shani, M. The recurrence of terrorism. Int Polit (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00631-3
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Accepted : 05 October 2024
Published : 09 November 2024
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00631-3
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