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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2024

Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

June 20, 2024, 8:30pm ET  

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia’s illegal war of conquest in Ukraine.  Ukraine’s partners undertook several important steps in mid-June to cohere a common strategy and define the desired strategic outcome of the war. Over 80 Western and international officials recently established a principled position on supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundation of lasting peace in Ukraine in a communique adopted during the Ukraine-led Global Peace Summit on June 16.[1] Ukraine also signed security agreements with the United States and Japan for 10 years on June 13, and numerous partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and the Ramstein formats.[2] US President Joe Biden stated that the United States will continue supporting Ukraine so that Ukraine “has victory and that Russia does not prevail” when discussing the US-Ukraine security agreement.[3] Putin’s strategy for winning the war relies on the Kremlin’s ability to mislead the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine’s international allies into ceasing support for Ukraine and abandoning key principles of international law – respect for state sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial integrity.[4] Allied strategic clarity and commitment to enabling Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine greatly undermines Putin’s center of gravity – and his ability to shape the will and decisions of allied decision makers.

Putin implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if the West enables Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia in order to undermine the international community's cohering strategic vision of support for Ukraine.  Putin stated in a press conference on June 20 following his trip to North Korea and Vietnam that Russia is considering making changes to its nuclear doctrine, claiming that Russia is aware that an unnamed “potential adversary” is working on new elements “related to lowering the threshold nuclear weapon use."[5] Putin’s statement was likely partly in response to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s June 17 remarks that NATO members are discussing increased nuclear readiness in the face of growing threats from Russia and China, even though Stoltenberg did not discuss lowering the threshold for nuclear weapon use.[6] The Russian nuclear doctrine calls for Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of “exceptional cases” of threats to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Putin notably defined Russia’s possible strategic defeat in Ukraine as the “end of [Russia’s] statehood” following his mention of lowering thresholds for nuclear weapon usage.[7] Putin added that a defeat on the battlefield would signify the end of the “thousand-year history” of the Russian state and that Russia is better off fighting until the end. Putin’s rhetoric deliberately aims to present Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as an existential war for Russia’s sovereignty, and Putin likely invoked the possibility of lowering the threshold for nuclear weapon use to imply that he reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if his forces are decisively defeated on the frontlines in order to deter Ukraine’s allies from reaching a common strategic objective of decisively defeating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — an outcome which is in the West’s interests.[8]

Putin’s nuclear threat is part of an ongoing Kremlin nuclear blackmail campaign aimed at dissuading Ukraine’s allies from decisively committing to defeating Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and is therefore highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation.  A Russian strategic defeat in Ukraine does not threaten Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (but it can threaten the stability of Putin's regime). The Kremlin did not engage in nuclear escalation following Russia’s devastating defeats around Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Kherson oblasts in 2022, and these defeats certainly did not threaten Russian sovereignty or territorial integrity. Putin’s own nuclear threats have been riddled with contradictions since 2022. Putin claimed that Ukraine was not aggressive towards Russia but was threatening the occupied “Donbas republics” before Putin illegally annexed them.[9] Putin also noted in his discussion of the potential changes to the Russian nuclear doctrine that Russia does not need the ability to launch a preventative nuclear strike. Both of these statements are incompatible with the notion that Russia is fighting an existential war. Putin indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian “red line” that would result in Russian nuclear escalation after Ukrainian forces struck Belgorod Oblast with HIMARS armed with GMLRS.[10] ISW has also routinely assessed that the threat of a nuclear escalation will continue to be the core asset of Russia’s ability to manipulate the perceptions of foreign decision makers via its reflexive control campaign.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West — and will likely lose — if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin.[12]

South Korea responded to the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 20 and stated that it would reconsider its previous ban on sending lethal military assistance to Ukraine.  South Korea's  Yonhap News Agency  reported that South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin stated that South Korea will reconsider its stance on sending aid to Ukraine following the Russian-North Korean agreement and that South Korea is "grave[ly] concerned" and condemns the agreement.[13] South Korea has notably had a long-standing policy that prevents it from directly transferring arms into active conflict zones—a policy that has forced South Korea to send artillery shells to Ukraine via indirect transfers using third party intermediary states.[14] Chang also noted that any Russian military-technical cooperation with North Korea violates a series of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and will result in unspecified corresponding retaliatory measures from South Korea. Chang stated that South Korea will also sanction four ships, five organizations, and eight individuals involved in the transfer of weapons and oil between Russia and North Korea in response to the agreement.   North Korean state outlet  Korean Central News Agency  published the full text of the agreement on June 20, which includes provisions for "immediate military and other assistance... in the event of an armed attack by any state of several states" and "joint activities to strengthen [each country's] defense capabilities... to prevent war."[15] Several Russian and South Korean sources noted that the agreement is almost identical to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that the Soviet Union and North Korea signed in 1961.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin simultaneously attempted to downplay aspects of the Russia-North Korea agreement potentially in response to South Korea's concerns during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam.  Putin reiterated several times during the press conference that the Russian-North Korean agreement mirrors the language of a previous security agreement that both countries signed in 1961 and that the agreement is only a "reproduction" of the terms of the 1961 agreement.[17] Putin stated that South Korea has "nothing to worry about" regarding the new agreement as long as South Korea does not perpetrate acts of aggression against North Korea. Putin threatened, however, that it would be a "very big mistake" for South Korea to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine and that Russia would take unspecified actions in response to such a policy. Putin claimed that the new agreement's clause on providing mutual security assistance does not apply to the war in Ukraine because Ukraine committed acts of aggression towards the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR/LNR) before Russia illegally annexed the territories and that Russia hopes that this agreement will be a "restraining factor" that prevents the situation on the Korean peninsula from intensifying. Putin also claimed that Russia has not asked anyone to "use [their] capabilities" in Ukraine and no one has offered to help Russia in this way, insinuating that there is no threat of third parties getting militarily involved in Ukraine. Putin may have tempered his rhetoric about Russia's June 19 agreement with North Korea in order to quell South Korean concern about the agreement and lull South Korea into reassurance and away from reconsidering its policy on aiding Ukraine. ISW has previously observed that Russia at times seems to be trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of a growing relationship with North Korea, and Putin may have followed up his visit to North Korea with such statements in an effort to appease Seoul.[18]

Putin also used the press conference to reiterate a series of known information operations feigning Russia's interest in good faith negotiations with Ukraine, including by characterizing Russia's offensive operation into Kharkiv Oblast as solely defensive. Putin claimed that he expected the West to reject his June 14 demands for Ukraine's capitulation as a prerequisite for his envisioned peace negotiations and suggested that Russia has previously unsuccessfully presented these demands during "behind-the-scenes negotiations."[19] Putin claimed that "sensible politicians" will realize that Putin's demands for Ukraine to "completely withdraw" its forces from the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and officially abandon its intention to join NATO are "realistic" and acceptable conditions for peace. Putin’s terms for Ukraine’s capitulation violate the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and other cornerstones of international law. Putin stated that any peace negotiations predicated on Russia withdrawing its forces from occupied Ukraine will "never happen." Russian officials made similar claims about how Kherson City would “forever” remain in Russian occupation before Russian forces abandoned Kherson City in November 2022.[20] Putin reiterated his claims that Russia remains open to peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, placing the onus on Ukraine and the West for the lack of progress toward peace negotiations despite the fact that Russian officials, including Putin, continue to publicly signal that they are unwilling to participate in good faith peace negotiations with Ukraine.[21] Putin also reiterated claims that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction to defend Belgorod Oblast from Ukrainian shelling and that Russian forces have "no goals of approaching Kharkiv [City]."

Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Ph ạ m Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Community Party Nguy ễ n Phú Tr ọ ng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries .[22] ISW noted on June 19 that Putin appears to be pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union that could form the basis of an alternative to the West and the current world order.[23]

Russian forces used the new FAB-3000 M-54 bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time, representing a new Russian capability with a high potential for destruction if Russian forces continue to be able to use such weapons uninhibited.  Russian sources widely amplified footage of the first-ever FAB-3000 M-54 strike against a reported Ukrainian deployment point in Lyptsi, Kharkiv Oblast, on June 20, noting that the bomb caused substantial destruction even though it landed 10 meters away from its intended target.[24] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu first announced the serial production of FAB-3000 M-54s, dumb-bomb variants weighing over 3,000 kilograms that can be converted into guided glide bombs with the addition of the UMPC modification, during a visit to Nizhny Novgorod Oblast in March 2024.[25] Russian sources previously praised the production of FAB-3000s but noted that their weight and general dimensions would make them very difficult for most Russian tactical aircraft to deliver.[26] The fact that Russian forces have figured out how to launch FAB-3000s is a significant development and will increase the destructive potential of Russia's ongoing glide bomb attacks against Ukrainian forces and infrastructure. Russian forces have already increased guided and unguided glide bomb use against Ukraine, particularly in Kharkiv Oblast, to devastating effect, and should Russian forces be able to launch massive barrages of FAB-3000s (or even heavier guided glide bombs) they will be able to cause even more widespread damage to Ukrainian frontline positions and critical infrastructure.[27] Russian milbloggers noted that the June 20 strike was not particularly accurate, but the destruction radius of the FAB-3000 will compensate for its lack of accuracy, especially if Russian forces are able to use them at scale uncontested as the Russian Air Forces has with 500-kilogram glide bombs.[28]

The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine.  US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 20 that the US is going to "reprioritize" the export of Patriot missiles so that the missiles "rolling off the production line" will go straight to Ukraine.[29] Kirby characterized the decision as "difficult but necessary" to ensure that hundreds of Patriot and NASAM munitions produced for the next 16 months would go to Ukraine, regardless of which country ordered them. Kirby stated that Ukraine will receive the first shipments of Patriot missiles by the end of Summer 2024 and that other countries that ordered Patriot missiles will receive them on a "delayed timeline." Kirby stated that other countries impacted by the delay were ”broadly supportive” of the decision to prioritize Ukraine’s air defense needs.[30] The Romanian Supreme National Defense Council announced on June 20 that Romania will donate one Patriot system to Ukraine due to Russia's large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy and civil infrastructure.[31] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba have recently emphasized Ukraine's need for more Patriot systems.[32] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.[33]

US policy still prohibits Ukrainian forces from striking military targets with US-provided weapons in the operational and deep rear of Russian territory.  Politico  reported on June 20 that anonymous US government officials reiterated that the United States permits Ukrainian forces to strike Russian forces where Russian forces attack into Ukraine across the international border, likely meaning the international border near Ukraine’s Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[34] This report does not signify a change in US policy. The report makes clearer the contours of current US policy:  Ukrainian forces may use HIMARS armed with GMLRS to strike Russian forces preparing to or actively attacking Ukraine, but likely may not strike all legitimate Russian military targets in range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts.  The  Politico  report acknowledged that Ukrainian and European officials have urged the Biden Administration to further loosen its restrictions and allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia.[35] US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy still forbids Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.[36] The Biden Administration’s partial removal of Russian sanctuary is a step in the right direction but is by itself inadequate and unable to disrupt Russian operations at scale. ISW assesses that the West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.[37]

The Russian military's increased over-reliance on infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics has greatly degraded the distinctions between various Russian combat services on the battlefield in Ukraine, minimizing the operational efficacy of frontline troops.  Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 20 that he gained access to a 2024 training manual for Russian airborne (VDV) troops, entitled "Combat use of an assault company (group) in an offensive."[38] Mashovets stated that the training manual is meant to integrate battlefield experiences from the war in Ukraine into VDV training doctrine and noted that the tactical solution to contemporary frontline challenges that the manual offers is the creation of dedicated VDV assault detachments, usually at the company level, pulled from units at the brigade-, regiment-, and battalion-level.[39] According to the manual, the assault groups should seize Ukrainian strong pints and individual firing points, as well as fortified terrain features, and ideally operate within a larger “assault detachment” or “assault battalion.”[40] Mashovets emphasized that Russian high command expects for these company-sized assault groups have a standard service life of two days maximum, as this is the timeframe in which the Russian high command has calculated that the assault group will completely expend its combat capabilities during attritional combat operations.

The concept of dedicated assault companies pulled from existing regiments, brigades, and battalions is not a novelty for Russian forces in Ukraine, and indeed has become the prevalent tactic of attack along most of the frontline for over a year, apart from occasional (mostly unsuccessful) mechanized assaults. ISW first began reporting on the creation of such specialized assault detachments within non-VDV Russian forces in February 2023 and observed the use of such assault-focused detachments in infantry-heavy frontal assaults leading to high levels of attrition throughout the course of 2023.[41] The fact that VDV forces are now relying on the same frontal assault tactic as ordinary Russian infantry and mechanized forces is notable, and further suggests that the VDV and other formations that were previously considered "elite" within the Russian military prior to 2022 have lost those distinctions due to the way that the Russian command writ large is prosecuting the war.[42] The codification of the assault group into VDV training doctrine further supports ISW's long-standing assessment that the way that Russia is fighting in Ukraine has blurred previously relevant distinctions among various services, largely reducing all frontline troops to understrength and low-quality motorized rifle units.[43] A prominent Russian commentator, who previously served as an instructor for a "Storm-Z" assault unit (which notably used similar tactics to those outlined in the VDV training manual), criticized Russia's reliance on attritional infantry-led frontal assaults on June 20, noting that this practice maintains constant pressure on Ukrainian defenders but does not achieve operationally significant results.[44] The current style of Russian assaults in Ukraine, however, corresponds with Russian President Vladimir Putin's recently articulated theory of Russian victory in Ukraine, which suggests that all Russian forces need to do is gradually achieve creeping advances while keeping tension on Ukraine and its partners in order to win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[45]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a working visit to the Eastern Military District in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai to create the appearance of a strict but engaged defense minister.  Belousov visited the military camp of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, residential buildings for military personnel, the Okeansky military sanatorium, and a branch of the Nakhimov Naval School in Vladivostok on June 20.[46] Belousov issued instructions concerning multiple construction projects at these facilities and stated that the rehabilitation of Russian servicemembers and the allotment of housing to Russian servicemembers' families are priorities of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Belousov repeatedly emphasized the need to complete these construction projects before the set deadlines and even threatened the director of a construction company that was touring the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade's military camp with Belousov with criminal liability should the construction company not complete the project on time.[47] Belousov also notably spoke about Russian servicemembers' possible return home from the war in Ukraine for the first time, stating twice on his tour that unspecified Russian soldiers will start to return home and that Russian authorities need to make sure that everything is "worthy" and "ready" for the soldiers.[48] The Russian decree on partial mobilization does not allow for the termination of mobilized Russian servicemembers' contracts before the end of Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine, however, and it is unclear if Belousov was speaking about the return of soldiers in near or longer term, or purely theoretically.[49] The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly congratulated and awarded the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade over the course of the war in Ukraine, despite the fact that the unit has suffered significant losses and has had to reconstitute multiple times.[50] The Russian MoD may be paying special attention to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade's military and social facilities in Vladivostok in order to appease the soldiers and their families who may be angered by the unit's heavy losses. Belousov's strict orders about the timely fulfillment of military construction projects may also be part of efforts to create the appearance that Belousov is spearheading an anti-corruption campaign in the Russian MoD.[51]

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against at least two oil facilities in Russia on the night of June 19 to 20.  Ukrainian outlet  RBK-Ukraine  reported on June 20 that sources stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted drone strikes against the Tambovnefteprodukt fuel and lubricants warehouse in Tambov Oblast and the Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt "Enemska" oil depot in the Adygea Republic.[52] Geolocated footage shows fires at the oil depot in Platonovka, Tambov Oblast and the oil refinery in Enem, Adygea Republic.[53] Tambov Oblast Head Maskim Egorov acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone caused an oil tank at the Platonovka oil depot to catch fire.[54] Adygea Republic Head Murat Kumpilov stated that a Ukrainian drone strike started a fire at the Enem oil depot.[55] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that a drone fell on a house in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have been targeting the Slavyansk Eko oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[56] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky oil refinery near Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai.[57] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that information about a fire at the Afipsky refinery is not reliable.[58] ISW cannot independently verify that the Ukrainian strike on the Afipsky refinery, and the Afipsky and Enem oil refineries are notably fewer than 10 kilometers apart from each other. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed six drones over the Adygea Republic and three drones over Krasnodar Krai but did not mention activity over Tambov Oblast.[59]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia’s illegal war of conquest in Ukraine.
• Putin implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if the West enables Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia in order to undermine the international community's cohering strategic vision of support for Ukraine.
• Putin’s nuclear threat is part of an ongoing Kremlin nuclear blackmail campaign aimed at dissuading Ukraine’s allies from decisively committing to defeating Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and is therefore highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation.
• South Korea responded to the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 20 and stated that it will reconsider its previous ban on sending lethal military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin simultaneously attempted to downplay aspects of the Russia-North Korea agreement potentially in response to South Korea's concerns during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam.
• Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Ph ạ m Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Community Party Nguy ễ n Phú Tr ọ ng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries.
• Russian forces used the new FAB-3000 M-54 bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time, representing a new Russian capability with a high potential for destruction if Russian forces continue to be able to use such weapons uninhibited.
• The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine.
• US policy still prohibits Ukrainian forces from striking military targets with US-provided weapons in the operational and deep rear of Russian territory.
• The Russian military's increased over-reliance on infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics has greatly degraded the distinctions between various Russian combat services on the battlefield in Ukraine, minimizing the operational efficacy of frontline troops.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a working visit to the Eastern Military District in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai to create the appearance of a strict but engaged defense minister.
• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against at least two oil facilities in Russia on the night of June 19 to 20.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
• Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is failing to properly incentivize Russian servicemen to fight and explain the purpose of the Russian full-scale invasion to its troops.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast   ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued Russian and Ukrainian attacks north and northeast of the city on June 20. Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook several positions northeast of Vovchansk and advanced along Soborna Street within northern Vovchansk.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted strikes against Ukrainian positions along Hohol and Olesya Dosvitna streets in central Vovchansk and ISW has not observed recent evidence of enduring Russian positions within this area of central Vovchansk, suggesting that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area despite previous Russian claims.[61] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized two buildings on the grounds of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[62] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions roughly 300 meters from the Vovcha River in an unspecified area of Vovchansk.[63] A different Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.55 kilometers towards Tykhe (immediately east of Vovchansk) and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Tykhe, supporting previous Russian reports that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the settlement.[64] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reported that Russian attacks have been less intense near Vovchansk since the morning of June 20.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City), including near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[66]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 19 and 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and Kruhlyakivka; southwest of Svatove near Serhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske, Hrekivka, and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on the evening of June 19 and throughout the day on June 20.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.13 kilometers deep along a 2-kilometer-wide front west of Ploshchanka (north of Kreminna) and up to 300 meters deep within a forested area near Torske, but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of these claims.[68] Elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Borova direction (west of Svatove).[69]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized attack in the Siversk direction and reportedly made marginal advances elsewhere in the area as of June 20. Ukraine's State Border Guard Service published geolocated footage on June 20 of Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized attack comprised of one tank and two BMP amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles southeast of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[70] A Russian milblogger similarly reported that Russian forces attacked near Vyimka, and one milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to one kilometer southwest of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk and southwest of Vyimka).[71] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing further northward in Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[72] ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian advances in these areas, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and near Rozdolivka on June 19 and 20.[73]

Russian forces recently advanced up to the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal north of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal in central Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) in the area where the canal runs underground.[74] If Russian forces are able to properly exploit this advance, they may be able to attack into Chasiv Yar from the north and threaten Ukrainian positions in central Chasiv Yar without having to conduct an opposed crossing of the canalized terrain in order to enter the settlement. Russian forces have not yet been able to cross the canal where it runs above ground in the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar). Russian milbloggers similarly reported Russian gains near the canal in Kalynivka.[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on June 20 that Russian forces have resumed infantry-heavy frontal assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction after having recently suffered high losses during unsuccessful mechanized assaults.[76] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in the Kanal and Novyi microraions (easternmost Chasiv Yar); northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 19 and 20.[77] Elements of the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly fighting near Chasiv Yar.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and west of Horlivka) on June 19 and 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers deep on the eastern outskirts of Pivnichne (east of Toretsk), and some milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have advanced to the outskirts of Niu-York (south of Toretsk).[79] The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces continued offensive operations on this part of the front east of Pivnichne and near Niu-York and Shumy (southeast of Toretsk) on June 19 and 20.[80]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows that Russian forces made marginal gains on the southern bank of the Samoyilova Gully northeast of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka), which is generally consistent with Russian claims of Russian advances near this gully area north of Sokil.[81] Additional geolocated footage published on June 19 shows that Russian forces advanced on the northern bank of the Karlivske Reservoir (southwest of Avdiivka), and milbloggers similarly reported Russian gains in the reservoir area on June 20.[82] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced on the outskirts of Karlivka and west of Netaylove (both south of the Karlivske Reservoir and southwest of Avdiivka) as well as near Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[83] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are using fewer armored vehicles in attacks west of Avdiivka than they previously did and are now relying on small light infantry groups using ATVs or motorcycles to simplify their movement along forest belt and windbreak areas.[84] Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Oleksandropil, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Sokil, Vozdvyzhenka, and Novoselivka Persha; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 19 and 20.[85]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently marginally advanced west of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces on motorcycles advanced in the area.[86] Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City within Krasnohorivka and near Heorhiivka and Maksymilyanivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on June 19 and 20.[87] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[88]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Urozhaine and Vremivka (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 20.[89]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis  (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Mala Tokmachka (northwest of Robotyne) on June 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[90]

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on June 19 and 20.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian servicemember operating in the Kherson direction stated that Russian forces are having issues due to effective Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).[92] Elements of the Russian 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Oleshky.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign  (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against mainly Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of June 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft over the Caspian Sea; three Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-59 cruise missiles from the airspace above the Sea of Azov; and 27 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all four Kh-101/555 missiles, one Kh-59 missile, and all 27 Shahed drones and noted that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that the overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian energy facilities that are critical to the operation of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).[95] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian drones damaged equipment at energy facilities in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts and that Ukrenergo is increasing restrictions on energy consumption as a result.[96] Ukraine's largest private energy operator DTEK reported that the Russian strikes seriously damaged equipment at an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant and that this is the seventh massive Russian strike on DTEK's thermal power plants in the last three months.[97] DTEK reported that Russian strikes damaged high-voltage power grids in Brovarskyi Raion, Kyiv Oblast.[98] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak stated that Russian forces struck the Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol raions.[99] Vinnytsia Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Borzov stated that debris from a downed Shahed drone damaged critical infrastructure in Vinnystia Oblast.[100]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is failing to properly incentivize Russian servicemen to fight and explain the purpose of the Russian full-scale invasion to its troops.[101] One milblogger claimed that he had recently returned from a trip to Belgorod Oblast and occupied Avdiivka and observed that the Russian military command does not offer real incentives for its subordinates to fight and selectively enforces punishments.[102] Another milblogger responded to the post and claimed that interviews with Russian servicemen often reveal their lack of understanding of Russia’s objectives.[103] The milblogger claimed that Russian servicemen often offer differing interpretations of Russia's war goals, which include “denazification,” victory over NATO, and ”liberation” of Donbas. The milblogger noted that some Russian servicemen are fighting without a reason outside of just responding to Ukrainian forces on the battlefield and noted that the Russian MoD needs to raise a new generation of frontline commanders. The first milblogger later added that many Russian frontline servicemen do not get promoted because they do not know how to advocate for themselves and that the Russian military encourages meekness and obedience as opposed to efficacy.[104]

Russian Sevmash shipbuilding enterprise General Director Andrei Puchkov announced on June 20 that the Project 11442M heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser  Admiral Nakhimov  will undergo testing at sea in November 2024 after undergoing modernization procedures at Sevmash.[105] Puchkov added that Sevmash is replacing unspecified outdated military systems and complexes with modern weapons and military equipment which will correspond with the characteristics of the fourth-generation ship. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseev additionally stated on June 19 that Russia is preparing to construct fifth-generation submarines, including strategic and multi-purpose nuclear submarines.

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Fleet-2024 International Naval Show in St. Petersburg reportedly featured the "Orkan," "Vizier," and "BEK-1000" unmanned naval drones for the first time.[106] The "Orkan" is reportedly the most compact drone, the "Vizier" reportedly has a maximum speed of 45 knots and range of up to 270 miles, and the "BEK-1000" can reportedly carry a payload up to one ton.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts  (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

The Russian government is continuing to deflect responsibility for well-documented Russian violations of international law regarding Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian children via Russian diplomatic platforms. Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova stated at a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press conference on June 20 that the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against her is preventing the processes of reunifying children with their families because the warrant is scaring parents from seeking help.[107] Lvova-Belova added that Western and Ukrainian “fake information” is directly interfering with the process of ”reuniting children with families in Ukraine and Russia.” Lvova-Belova was directly implicated in the forced deportations of Ukrainian children to Russia by the ICC in March 2023.[108]

The Russian and Belarusian ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) published a report on June 20 accusing the West of imposing the Western-led “rules-based order” to commit human rights violations, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin information operation to undermine and misrepresent international law and undermine Western-led human rights and humanitarian norms.[109] The report claimed that the Western “rules-based order” is in opposition to international law and accused the West of using the premise of human rights violations to ”escalate confrontation and put pressure on sovereign states.” The Russian government’s recently announced intent to suspend Russia’s participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), however, is a sufficient indicator that the Kremlin is not interested in actual discussions about safeguarding human rights and is using this narrative to discredit international law and deflect from its own human rights violations.[110]

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) resurrected the narrative about a claimed political power strife between former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as part of ongoing efforts to erode confidence in the Ukrainian government and portray Ukrainian leadership as illegitimate.[111] The SVR claimed on June 20 that the United States considers Zaluzhnyi to be the “most suitable” candidate to replace Zelensky and that the West is preparing to “write off” Zelensky. The SVR absurdly claimed that the West benefits from Zelensky’s "illegitimacy” because it forces Zelensky to be completely dependent on the West.[112] The SVR’s statements are a continuation of the Russian “Maidan-3” information campaign aimed at portraying the Zelensky government as illegitimate because Ukraine lawfully suspended the May 20 presidential elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and martial law.

The Russian government is continuing to charge Ukrainian military commanders with crimes in absentia as part of its ongoing efforts to enforce Russian federal law outside of Russia's jurisdiction and insinuate that Ukraine should not exist as an independent state. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) placed former Ukrainian Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodskyi on Russia's wanted list for an unspecified criminal infraction on June 20.[113] The Kremlin's prosecution of Ukrainian military personnel continues to highlight Russia's enduring belief that the Ukrainian state does not and should not exist as a political entity separate from Russia.[114]

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on June 20 that Belarusian MoD Department of International Military Cooperation Head and Deputy Defense Minister for International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko met with Saudi Arabian defense officials in Belarus to discuss bilateral military cooperation.[115]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2024/06/16/joint-communique-on-a-peace-framework-summit-on-peace-in-ukraine/

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2024

[3] https://it.usembassy.gov/president-biden-and-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-in-joint-press-conference/

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success

[5] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2024/06/20/1045213-putin-zayavil

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-talks-put-nuclear-weapons-standby-boss-tells-uks-telegraph-2024-06-17/; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74357

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74234; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6775946

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-1-%E2%80%94-military-strategic-financial-implications-russian; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond

[9] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74357

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024#:~:text=will%20do%20so.-,Putin%20indirectly%20indicated%20that%20Ukrainian%20strikes%20on%20Russian%20territory%20with,at%20SPIEF%20on%20June%207.

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success

[13] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20240620012200315

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624; https://www.barrons.com/news/s-korea-says-it-will-reconsider-ban-on-weapons-sales-to-ukraine-da823575

[15] http://kcna dot kp/ru/article/q/848b072d48dcc965d89ce5f716e78e71.kcmsf ; https://t.me/tass_agency/255646

[16] https://www.yna dot co.kr/view/AKR20240620055554504?section=north-korea/all ; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/06/20/putin-and-kim-jong-un-s-mutual-defense-pact-uses-language-nearly-identical-to-the-ussr-s-1961-treaty-with-north-korea ; https://t.me/rybar/61116

[17] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74357

[18] s://isw.pub/UkrWar011924

[19] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74357 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024

[20] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5346368; https://ria dot ru/20221027/kherson-1827083322.html

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524

[22] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/74345 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/255674 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/255676 ; https://vietnamnews dot vn/Politics%20-%20Laws/1657881/vietnamese-russian-presidents-hold-talks-in-ha-noi.html ; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74349 ; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74350 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/255733

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024

[24] https://t.me/rybar/61119; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/17113; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18143; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70777; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27091 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127448; https://t.me/dva_majors/45619; https://t.me/sashakots/47425; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16256; https://t.me/tass_agency/255800

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024; https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/how_possible_is_to_turn_3_ton_fab_3000_dumb_superbomb_into_a_smart_glide_munition_and_which_aircraft_can_lift_it-9931.html

[26] https://en.topwar dot ru/239398-samolety-takticheskoj-aviacii-potencialnye-nositeli-fab-3000-s-umpk.html

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824; https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/news/2024/04/26/7184731/ ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2024/04/26/7453164/

[28] https://t.me/fighter_bomber/17113; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18143; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70777; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27091 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127448

[29] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-air-defense-interceptor-patriot-missile/ ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-air-defense-interceptor-patriot-missile/

[30] https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1803851264867922313

[31] https://www.presidency dot ro/ro/media/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1718883520

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias

[34] National security adviser Jake Sullivan told PBS on June 17 that the agreement with Ukraine about firing American weapons into Russia extends to “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory.” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/sullivan-hamas-cease-fire-response-has-both-understandable-and-out-of-step-proposals ; https://politico.com/news/2024/06/20/us-says-ukraine-can-hit-inside-russia-anywhere-00164261

[35] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/06/20/us-says-ukraine-can-hit-inside-russia-anywhere-00164261

[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/30/biden-ukraine-weapons-strike-russia-00160731 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/30/nato-europe-us-weapons-ukraine-russia/ ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-allows-ukraine-to-use-american-weapons-strikes-inside-russia/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-allows-ukraine-to-strike-inside-russia-with-american-weapons-72a3f8a1

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024

[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1965; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1967

[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1967

[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1965

[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2023

[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war

[44] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1042; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1041

[45] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/39990; https://t.me/mod_russia/39998 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/40002; https://t.me/mod_russia/40005; https://t.me/mod_russia/40019

[47] https://t.me/agentstvonews/6372; https://t.me/mod_russia/39990 ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/06/20/belousov-so-slovami-tolko-poprobuyte-prigrozil-podchinennomu-sudom-i-popal-na-video/

[48] https://t.me/agentstvonews/6376

[49] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/865656

[50] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20631329 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19108191 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/68075; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2023

[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024

[52] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/droni-sbu-atakuvali-naftobazi-tambovskiy-1718871899.html

[53] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1803715008179667300; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1803761058504446076; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1803715714047520971; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1803713638139584784

[54] https://t.me/egorovmb/3788

[55] https://t.me/muratkumpilov/10380

[56] https://t.me/rybar/61114; https://t.me/opershtab23/8121

[57] https://t.me/vizioner_rf/8346; https://t.me/dva_majors/45582

[58] https://t.me/opershtab23/8122

[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/39977;

[60] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/16282; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/1837 ; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1803793193944727658; https://t.me/VARVARGROUP/261

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot/24023 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24029 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/24060

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot/24032

[63] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10742

[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11993 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VgRr73WxAQDnQoGaQCJ8DH4ksdsNAk3BBBjW2ebM7ziLE5KZq2TquUwGykfcZ3GNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gkhCNw7XuKiVqydUeL5R9Cus5Czr6bz8Kwte3oTfkNCrQfxzf3SaMdgUznRpWRJhl

[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/541

[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/20604 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11998

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gDTctyFzPYDbNNfGBVf8mNLnMuZwUxboE68pBuNMYZZxCQYvak3cvfhA8vRGpZSzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VgRr73WxAQDnQoGaQCJ8DH4ksdsNAk3BBBjW2ebM7ziLE5KZq2TquUwGykfcZ3GNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tKMSBWwX2KcyVimMeR7HuJaV23UdnRwiEY3NoGReBGKFVfRhfLtjPzH15vKt59qhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl

[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70753; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11972

[69] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70790 (Kupyansk); https://t.me/ButusovPlus/11262 (Borova)

[70] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1593787267851688; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1803802206421795017; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/ua/news/%20video%20-vidbito-shturm-okupantiv-na-siverskomu-napryamku-znishcheno-2-bronoviki-ta-pihotu-protivnika/

[71] https://t.me/motopatriot/24035; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11985

[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11984

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tKMSBWwX2KcyVimMeR7HuJaV23UdnRwiEY3NoGReBGKFVfRhfLtjPzH15vKt59qhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl

[74] https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1803529024100245726; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/19732

[75] https://t.me/motopatriot/24017; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11988; https://t.me/project_nd/90 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127431

[76] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/541

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VgRr73WxAQDnQoGaQCJ8DH4ksdsNAk3BBBjW2ebM7ziLE5KZq2TquUwGykfcZ3GNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tKMSBWwX2KcyVimMeR7HuJaV23UdnRwiEY3NoGReBGKFVfRhfLtjPzH15vKt59qhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70753; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11988;

[78] https://t.me/spainrus/1316

[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/45581; https://t.me/rybar/61109; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18142; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18140; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70753; https://t.me/rybar/61101

[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tKMSBWwX2KcyVimMeR7HuJaV23UdnRwiEY3NoGReBGKFVfRhfLtjPzH15vKt59qhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl

[81] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1803695626208579602; https://t.me/strikedronescompany/296; ttps://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11989

[82] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1803540016578396205; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27092

[83] https://t.me/rybar/61117; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18140; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70753; https://t.me/wargonzo/20604; https://t.me/rezervsvo/60207 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127434

[84] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/541

[85] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gkhCNw7XuKiVqydUeL5R9Cus5Czr6bz8Kwte3oTfkNCrQfxzf3SaMdgUznRpWRJhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gDTctyFzPYDbNNfGBVf8mNLnMuZwUxboE68pBuNMYZZxCQYvak3cvfhA8vRGpZSzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VgRr73WxAQDnQoGaQCJ8DH4ksdsNAk3BBBjW2ebM7ziLE5KZq2TquUwGykfcZ3GNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tKMSBWwX2KcyVimMeR7HuJaV23UdnRwiEY3NoGReBGKFVfRhfLtjPzH15vKt59qhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl; https://t.me/rybar/61101; https://t.me/rybar/61117; https://t.me/rusich_army/15320

[86] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1803527125804171753; https://t.me/TOF_VMF/3367 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27088 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70724

[87] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gDTctyFzPYDbNNfGBVf8mNLnMuZwUxboE68pBuNMYZZxCQYvak3cvfhA8vRGpZSzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VgRr73WxAQDnQoGaQCJ8DH4ksdsNAk3BBBjW2ebM7ziLE5KZq2TquUwGykfcZ3GNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VgRr73WxAQDnQoGaQCJ8DH4ksdsNAk3BBBjW2ebM7ziLE5KZq2TquUwGykfcZ3GNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl ; https://t.me/rybar/61117 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70753 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20604 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/15318

[88] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70778; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12394

[89] https://t.me/voin_dv/9247 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gDTctyFzPYDbNNfGBVf8mNLnMuZwUxboE68pBuNMYZZxCQYvak3cvfhA8vRGpZSzl

[90] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gDTctyFzPYDbNNfGBVf8mNLnMuZwUxboE68pBuNMYZZxCQYvak3cvfhA8vRGpZSzl

[91] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gDTctyFzPYDbNNfGBVf8mNLnMuZwUxboE68pBuNMYZZxCQYvak3cvfhA8vRGpZSzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01S4MqPLtvSzdMVGoAttWQkqkMa9VQi9n74eBojXDYB9KGhoii5EXZW1z1Ceuj1Fvl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10080

[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/45593

[93] https://t.me/dva_majors/45629

[94] https://t.me/ComAFUA/317

[95] https://t.me/mod_russia/40021

[96] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2967; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2968; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2970

[97] https://t.me/dtek_ua/1624

[98] https://t.me/dtek_ua/1625

[99] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13853

[100] https://t.me/vinnytskaODA/12933

[101] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10569

[102] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10569

[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/45589

[104] . https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45628

[105] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21147323

[106] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21140181

[107] https://life dot ru/p/1667247

[108]  https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and

[109] https://t.me/MID_Russia/42210

[110] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024

[111] https://t.me/tass_agency/255686 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45603 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20198 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16253 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20198

[112] https://ria dot ru/20240620/zelenskiy-1954160355.html

[113] https://t.me/tass_agency/255691; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21149443

[114] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024

[115] https://t.me/modmilby/39611

• Impact Case Study: The Economic Impacts Of Russia’s Invasion Of Ukraine

Impact Case Study: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 resulted in an immediate response from the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States of America and other Western allies. While initially a humanitarian and geopolitical crisis, there were clearly also going to be implications for the global economy due to the war and sanctions.

What we did

By using our global econometric model (NiGEM), we could quickly assess the likely impact and understand the range of potential scenarios. A policy report with these findings was released within the first week (2 March), and a webinar scheduled for 3 March. A follow-up blog was published on 7 March.

What we found

Primarily, we estimated that the conflict in Ukraine could reduce the level of global GDP by 1 per cent by 2023 (approximately a US$1 trillion reduction) and add up to 3 percentage points to global inflation in 2022 and a further 2 percentage points in 2023.

We highlighted that Europe would be the region affected most, given trade links and reliance on Russian energy and food supplies, with higher public spending to support a massive inflow of asylum-seekers from Ukraine and to bolster military spending.

For Russia’s economy, we estimated that inflation would soar above 20 per cent this year and, although the sanctions costs would be partly offset by higher prices for oil and gas exports, Russian GDP would be expected to contract by 1.5 per cent this year and more than 2.5 per cent by the end of 2023.

What happened next

Our policy report received widespread media coverage with a dedicated piece appearing on Bloomberg (and reposted by a multitude of foreign outlets) and the analysis mentioned in all the major broadsheet newspapers. Separately we were quoted in pieces by The Financial Times, The New Statesman, The Independent and The Times. The publication, and subsequent webinar, also prompted an invitation to give evidence before the Treasury Select Committee on this topic and drove wider engagement with specialist briefings to government departments . In April, we convened a special session for the Royal Economic Society annual conference, with the papers being subsequently published in The World Economy.

Related Publications

The Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

02 Mar 2022

Policy Papers

Re-evaluating the Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

11 May 2022

Global Economic Outlook Topical Feature

Related Events

Related Blogs

What is the economic impact of the russia-ukraine conflict.

Patricia Sánchez Juanino

Stephen Millard

07 Mar 2022

One Year On: The Economic Costs and Lessons of the Russo – Ukrainian War

27 Feb 2023

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Understanding Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

• Aaron Stein
• Maia Otarashvili
• February 24, 2022
• Eurasia Program

Introduction 

On February 24, 2022 Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. 

In times of crisis, balanced, in-depth analysis and trusted expertise is paramount. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) remains committed in its mission to provide expert analysis to policy makers and the public on the most pressing foreign policy challenges.

To help you understand this evolving crisis, we have compiled a list of publications, event recordings, and podcasts to help explain current events in Ukraine. FPRI has also included resources about other protracted conflicts, the neighboring Baltic states, and the role of NATO in managing the fallout from the war.

If you have not already done so, be sure to follow the FPRI fellows listed below for further reading and resources. For press inquiries, please contact [email protected]

Russian Aggression in Ukraine & Russian Defense 

• Moscow’s Mind Games: Finding Ideology in Putin’s Russia – February 2023
• The Confrontation with Russia and US Grand Strategy – February 2023
• Tanks a Lot (Well, Actually Not That Many for Ukraine) – February 2023
• Wagner Group Redefined: Threats and Responses – January 2023
• ‘Let’s Make a Deal’? Ukraine and the Poor Prospects for Negotiations with Putin – January 2023
• Will Russia Survive Until 2084? – December 2022 
• How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success – December 2022 
• Ecological Path to Peace Is Possible in Ukraine – November 2022 
• Putin’s Philosophers: Reading Vasily Grossman in the Kremlin – November 2022 
• The Russian-Ukrainian War Triggers an Energy Revolution – September 2022 
• Ukraine’s Defense Industry and the Prospect of a Long War – September 2022
• Understanding Russia’s Efforts at Technological Sovereignty – September 2022
• Watching the War on Russian Television – August 2022
• War Crimes in Ukraine: In Search of a Response – August 2022
• Why Russian Elites Are Standing By Putin – July 2022
• Climate Action Meets Energy Security: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Adds a New Dimension to Energy Transition – June 2022
• The War’s Impact on Russia’s Economy and Ukrainian Politics – June 2022
• The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days   – June 2022
• How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine has Affected Kazakh Politics – June 2022
• Russia’s Use of Cyberattacks: Lessons from the Second Ukraine War – June 2022
• What’s Next for Ukraine’s (and its Neighbors’) Domestic and Foreign Policy? – June 2022
• Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine – May 2022
• Food Prices, Elections, and the Wagner Group in Africa – April 2022
• Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes – April 2022
• Ukraine War Sparks Suspicion over Russia’s Designs on Kazakhstan – April 2022
• Do Russians Really “Long for War” in Ukraine? – March 2022
• Kadyrov’s Ukraine Gamble – March 2022
• Lukashenka’s Fatal Mistake – March 2022
• What We Can Learn about Russian Strategy from Ivan III – March 2022
• The Russian Navy in the Russia-Ukraine War Scare – February 2022
• How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis? – January 2022
• Moscow’s Compellence Strategy – January 2022
• Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting – September 2021 
• Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy – August 2021 
• Russia’s Forever Wars: Syria and Pursuit of Great Power Status – September 2021
• Understanding Russia’s Cyber Strategy – July 2021
• Russia’s Nuclear Strategy: A Show of Strength Despite COVID-19 – May 2021
• Even Thieves Need a Safe: Why the Putin Regime Causes, Deplores, and Yet Relies on Capital Flight for its Survival – November 2021
• Five Years of War in the Donbas – October 2019 
• Coal Mines, Land Mines and Nuclear Bombs: The Environmental Cost of the War in Eastern Ukraine – September 2019
• ​​ Volodymyr Zelensky: Ukraine’s Servant of the People? – September 2019 
• Russia’s Tragic Great Power Politics – March 2019
• Ukraine’s Presidential Election and the Future of its Foreign Policy – March 2019
• Bond of War: Russian Geo-Economics in Ukraine’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring – September 2018
• The Ukrainian Military: From Degradation to Renewal – August 2018
• Reflecting on a Year of War – February 2023
• Will Russia Survive Until 2084? – January 2023
• The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for Azerbaijan – July 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Uncompromising Objectives and an Uncertain Future – June 2022 
• The State of Play in Ukraine – May 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Nukes, Negotiations, and Neutrality – April 2022 
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Implications for China  – March 2022
• What the West Needs to Know About Russia’s War in Ukraine – March 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Analyzing the Western Military and Economic Response – March 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Humanitarian Crisis and Prospects for Resolution – March 2022
• Russia’s Long Shadow and the Future of Europe – February 2022
• Russia-Ukraine Tensions: Will Moscow’s Compellence Strategy Work? – January 2022 
• Interview with Russian Dissident Ilya & Former Duma Member Ilya Ponomarev – January 2022
• Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy  – August 2021
• FPRI Special Briefing: U.S. Sanctions Against Russia – March 2021
• FPRI Special Briefing: Alexeyi Navalny and U.S.-Russia Relations – February 2021
• Don’t Mention the War – April 2023
• Torn in the USA: How Important is the War in Ukraine for the United States? – March 2023
• Ukraine One Year In: The Helpers – March 2023
• Reflecting on a Year of War – February 2023 
• Mobilize This – January 2023
• War in Ukraine: A Firsthand Account – December 2022 
• Public Opinion in Russia: What Do We Know, What Can We Know? – November 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Strategic Picture – September 2022
• Russia’s Manpower Conundrum in Ukraine – May 2022
• The Air War Over Ukraine – March 2022 
• Debating a No Fly Zone: The Risk of Escalation with Moscow – March 2022
• Examining Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – March 2022
• The Risk of War: Russia’s Options for War in Ukraine – February 2022
• The Risk of War in Ukraine: Moscow’s Military Posture – February 2022
• Tensions Over Ukraine: Russia’s Rationale for War – February 2022
• Russian Perceptions of Military AI and Automation – February 2022
• Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon: Understanding Russia’s ASAT Test – November 2021
• How Do You Solve a Problem Like Navalny? – September 2021
• Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Looking Back at the Ukraine Crisis – August 2021
• Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – May 2021
• Learning From Our Adversaries: Russian Aerial Operations in Syria – April 2021

Protracted Conflicts: Moldova and Georgia

• War As a Neighbor: Moldova and the Challenges of Facing Russian Aggression in Ukraine – April 2023
• Strategic Connectivity in the Black Sea: A Focus on Georgia – December 2021
• Taking Stock of U.S. Military Assistance to Georgia – December 2021 
• Georgia’s Democracy is in Trouble, It’s Time for Closer Engagement – November 2021 
• Russia’ Permanent War Against Georgia – March 2021
• Georgia’s Doomed Deep-Sea Port Ambitions: Geopolitics of the Canceled Anaklia Project – October 2020
• Anatomy of a Fraud: The Moldovan Parliamentary Elections – March 2019
• Geopolitical Games Expected Ahead of Moldova’s 2018 Elections – October 2017 
• The Future of US Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities for the Biden Administration – October 2021
• Tug of War in the Black Sea: Defending NATO’s Eastern Flank – July 2021
• The Turkish Veto: Why Erdogan Is Blocking Finland and Sweden’s Path to NATO – March 2023
• Article 5 for the Next Decade of NATO – December 2022 
• The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape – November 2022 
• The Baltics Predicted the Suspension of the Ukraine Grain Deal — and Contributed to its Resumption – November 2022
• Good and Bad Neighbors: Perceptions in Latvian Society – September 2022
• Europe’s Wait for Turkmen Natural Gas Continues – September 2022 
• From the Migrant Crisis to Aggression in Ukraine: Belarus is Still on the Baltic Agenda – July 2022 
• Two Less Obvious Lessons for Baltic Defense from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – June 2022
• The Baltic Road to Energy Independence from Russia Is Nearing Completion – May 2022
• America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia – April 2022
• Baltic Sea Mining as an Extension of the Russian Gray Zone – April 2022
• The Significance of the Turkish Straits to the Russian Navy – March 2022
• Fear, Solidarity, and Calls for Further Action in the Baltics as Russia Invades Ukraine – March 2022
• Latvia’s First Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine – March 2022
• Turkey’s Careful and Risky Fence-Sitting between Ukraine and Russia – February 2022
• At the Double: Poland’s Military Expansion – January 2022 
• Turkey’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis – January 2022 
• Afghanistan was a Turbulent NATO Proving Ground for the Baltic States – December 2021
• Crowded Pond: NATO and Russian Maritime Power in the Baltic Sea – December 2021 
• Baltic Perspectives on U.S. and Transatlantic Nuclear Negotiations with Russia – October 2021
• Namejs vs. Zapad: Military Exercises on Both Sides of the Frontline – September 2021 
• Reconceptualizing Lithuania’s Importance for U.S Foreign Policy – July 2021
• Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – April 2021
• Nord Stream 2: Germany’s Faustian Bargain with Gazprom and Why it Matters for the Baltics – December 2020
• Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – May 2021
• America’s Approach to the Three Seas Initiative – May 2021
• The Baltic States as NATO Heavyweights – March 2023 
• The Future of European Energy – February 2023
• What’s Happening With Russian Speakers in Latvia? – January 2023
• We Can France if We Want To: What Does Paris Want for Ukraine and Europe? – November 2022 
• Giorgia on My Mind: Italy’s Rightward Turn and Its Implications – October 2022 
• Stuck in the Magyar: Why is Hungary the “Bad Boy” of Europe? – October 2022 
• Bloc Party: The EU and the War in Ukraine – September 2022 
• The View from Ukraine: An interview with Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk – August 2022 
• What Does Erdogan, Erdo-want? – July 2022
• Baltic Power Hour – July 2022
• No More Niinistö Nice Guy: Has Finland’s Security Calculus Changed? – June 2022
• Swedening the Deal: Stockholm Turns to NATO – June 2022
• The Energy Trilemma: An interview with Dr. Andrei Belyi – May 2022
• The Sejm Difference? Poland and the New, Old Europe – May 2022
• Bundes-where? Germany’s Politics and Security in Changing Times – May 2022
• Ukrainian Refugees in Latvia: An interview with Agnese Lāce  – April 2022
• Who Speaks For Eastern Europe? – February 2022
• Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs on Latvia’s Foreign Policy Challenges – November 2021 
• Reframing the Baltic states: An Interview with Dr. Andres Kasekamp – October 2021

FPRI Experts to Follow 

• Rob Lee – @RALee85   Eurasia Senior Fellow, PhD Student at King’s College, London
• Bob Hamilton – @BobHam88   Black Sea Fellow, Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College  
• Maia Otarashvili – @MaiaVanRijn Deputy Director of Research
• Aaron Stein – @aaronstein1  
• Chris Miller – @crmiller1 Director of Eurasia Program, Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School, Tufts University
• Nikolas Gvosdev @FPRI_Orbis   Editor, Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs, Captain Jerome E. Levy Chair in Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College
• Clint Watts – @SelectedWisdom Distinguished Research Fellow , National Security Contributor for NBC News and MSNBC
• Indra Ekmanis – @indraekmanis Baltic Sea Fellow and Editor of the Baltic Bulletin
• Una Bergmane @UnaBergmane Baltic Sea Fellow, Researcher at the University of Helsinki
• Mitchell Orenstein @m_orenstein   Eurasia Senior Fellow, Professor of East European and Russian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
• Stephanie Petrella @sdpetrella  Eurasia Fellow
• Sara Ashbaugh @sara_ashbaugh Editor in Chief, BMB Russia
• Eilish Hart @EilishHart    Eurasia F ellow, Eurasia Program
• Clara Marchaud @ClaraMarchaud Editor of BMB Ukraine

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Ukraine invasion — explained

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine go back decades and run deep. The current conflict is more than one country fighting to take over another; it is — in the words of one U.S. official — a shift in "the world order." Here are some helpful stories to make sense of it all.

The ripple effects of Russia's war in Ukraine continue to change the world

Scott Neuman

Alyson Hurt

A year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine sparked the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, the repercussions continue to reverberate around the world. Not only has the war in Ukraine set off a geopolitical realignment, but it has caused economic hardship far from the epicenter of the fighting.

The Feb. 24, 2022, invasion has touched off a refugee crisis, as Ukrainians flee the conflict in their homeland and many Russian men seek to avoid conscription. Meanwhile, it has spurred a process toward expanding NATO, with Finland and Sweden pursuing membership after decades of official neutrality.

Ukraine and Russia are key exporters of wheat, barley, corn and cooking oil, particularly to African and Middle Eastern countries. Turkey and the United Nations brokered a deal last summer to allow Ukrainian grain to pass through Black Sea ports, but Russia is reportedly still hindering shipments . Russia is also a major producer of fertilizer and petroleum. Disruptions to the flow of these goods are compounding other supply chain and climate challenges, driving up food and gas prices and causing shortages in places such as Chad , Tunisia and Sri Lanka .

More than 8 million refugees have fled Ukraine in what the World Health Organization describes as "the largest movement of people in the European Region since the Second World War." Many have been involuntarily relocated by Russia. Others have put a strain on resources, as well as schools and hospitals, in Poland and Germany .

A 21st century war in Europe — led by a nuclear power — is pushing the world toward realignment. It has rattled NATO, the European Union and the U.N ., forcing countries to take sides in ways that have led to escalating tensions and diplomatic shifts. For example, Turkey , despite being a NATO member, has increased trade with Russia since the start of the war and has thrown up objections to allowing Sweden and Finland into the alliance.

Russia is one of the world's largest producers of oil and fuel. European countries have banned the Russian oil, gas and diesel they relied on, which initially caused a steep spike in prices. However, moves by European nations to lock in alternative sources , along with conservation efforts and a mild winter, have largely alleviated those price hikes. Now prices have returned to pre-invasion levels.

Russia has more nuclear weapons than any other country. Its attack on Ukraine has notably reenergized NATO, with the U.S. and other member states funneling tens of billions of dollars worth of military equipment into Ukraine. Early weapons deliveries included anti-tank rockets such as the U.S.-made Javelin. In the latest moves, the U.S ., Germany and Britain have promised to provide state-of-the-art tanks.

NPR's Will Chase, Alex Leff, Pam Webster, Desiree F. Hicks and Nishant Dahiya contributed to this report. The text and graphics build on previous work by Alina Selyukh, Connie Hanzhang Jin and Nick Underwood.

• Russia-Ukraine war

Find Accurate Information. Get Involved.

Ways you can help

Background Video of South asian countries and their people

Understanding the War

On February 24, 2022, the world watched in horror as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inciting the largest war in Europe since World War II. In the months prior, Western intelligence had warned that the attack was imminent, amidst a concerning build-up of military force on Ukraine’s borders. Learn about the war and its historical context.

Expert Analysis

Learn factual information on Ukraine, the war, and the historical context to the conflict. HURI’s faculty, staff, and associates offer their knowledge and insights in articles, interviews, podcasts, and other media.

Resources for Ukrainians

Find immigration resources, ways to preserve your data, and opportunities for scholars, students, writers, and cultural workers.

Voices from Ukraine

Today, on the one-year after of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I look back and see what a difficult, tragic, sometimes unspeakably horrific path of transformation I, and perhaps the whole of Ukraine, have gone through.

Kseniia , psychologist, 38 years old. Feb 24, 2023

Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has shifted the lives of Ukrainians irrevocably on personal and societal levels. As Ukraine closes in on one full year of war, people have had to adjust to an aggressive new climate, reconstruct their habits and work schedules, and mentally acclimate to a harsh new reality.

Dmytro and Boris , medical professionals, Kyiv region. Dec 2022

Today I saw tanks passing by my building. They looked dirty, outdated and out of place. Although I knew they must have been on the way to the military base right outside of the city, it was unsettling to see.

Regina L, Mykolaiv , age 50. March-May

What You Can Do

Support for Ukraine takes many forms, from helping refugees find safe haven to assisting with the procurement and delivery of essential military and humanitarian supplies. Find ways that your time and skills can make a difference for Ukrainians.

Take Part in Local Action

Demonstrate global support for Ukraine by attending rallies and other events. Encourage lawmakers to keep sending aid. Assist local efforts to welcome refugees.

Ukraine needs financial support for its military defense and to aid vulnerable citizens impacted by the violence. We encourage supporting organizations with minimal overhead costs, efficient operations, transparency in spending, and local expertise.

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• Published: 28 June 2024

Disinformation on the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War: Two sides of the same coin?

• Rocío Sánchez del Vas   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6161-3631 1 &
• Jorge Tuñón Navarro   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0393-6560 1  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  11 , Article number:  851 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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• Cultural and media studies

Recently, Europe has been embroiled in serious disinformation crises. In 2020, the WHO declared the term “infodemic” due to the massive increase in hoaxes about the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was dubbed the first digital world war. In this context, this research aims to establish similarities and differences between disinformation disseminated in Europe related to the pandemic during 2020–2021 and the war between Russia and Ukraine throughout 2022–2023. The methodology is based on triangulation, combining quantitative content analysis of fact-checking publications ( N  = 812) from eight fact-checkers representing four European countries (Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Poland) and qualitative interviews with specialized agents ( N  = 8). Regarding the main findings, the frequency and nature of verified hoaxes during critical events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine conflict, are closely intertwined with peaks in current events. Initially, both crises saw a surge in hoax verifications, but this trend gradually declined, particularly in the case of the Ukraine conflict. Hoaxes related to the pandemic were primarily disseminated in written form, whereas the complexities of the Russian-Ukraine war hindered widespread hoax dissemination in an audiovisual way. The typology of hoaxes correlated with their format, with fabricated content predominant in pandemic hoaxes and out-of-context images prevalent in those related to the conflict. Social media, notably Facebook and X (Twitter), emerged as the primary platforms for hoax dissemination, overshadowing traditional media channels. In both events, disinformation aimed to provoke emotional responses and polarize audiences, emphasizing the role of social networks in amplifying disinformation during crises.

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Introduction.

The world is embedded in a moment governed by change and uncertainty. The current geopolitical context is marked by warfare situations, the rise of populism, and the polarization and fragmentation of societies. Meanwhile, the media system turns towards a hybrid nature (Chadwick, 2017 ), consisting of various information channels where users are placed at the center of the production process (Palau‐Sampio and Carratalá, 2021 ). In this media landscape, social networks have emerged as the cradle of disinformation, becoming the space where audiences regularly consume content and news.

In this sense, information disorders have become a subject of research and debate within academic communication studies. Del-Fresno-García ( 2019 ) defines information disorders as intentional productions aimed at generating doubts and false controversies for economic or ideological gain. These disorders are characterised by their interconnection and rely on post-internet technologies, which have transformed the nature of collective interpersonal communication. Among these products, terms such as disinformation, fake news, hoaxes, propaganda, and post-truth can be found.

The concept of post-truth was introduced globally in 2016 as a hallmark of an era (Estrada-Cuzcano et al. 2020 ). In this regard, Sánchez-Illán ( 2021 ) describes it as the deliberate distortion of reality, in which objective facts have less influence than appeals to emotions and personal beliefs, with the aim of creating and shaping public opinion and influencing social attitudes. Thus, the term post-truth refers to a context marked by information disorders.

Disinformation, on the other hand, is considered as “any false information content that has been deliberately created and disseminated” (Wardle, 2018 ). The concept “hoax” is generally used to specifically refer to disinformative content. Additionally, fake news is a type of disinformation characterised by imitating news. It exploits existing public beliefs to influence and destabilise society, creating confusion and uncertainty within it (Waisbord, 2018 ).

In contrast, we find the concept of misinformation, which is also widely used in the scientific literature. It can be described as false, erroneous, or misleading information (Fetzer, 2004 ) although it is likely not intended to deceive (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2018 ). Therefore, it refers to inaccuracies that, while potentially harmful, are not intentional.

On the other hand, the term “propaganda” is also frequently used and is described as the art of influencing, manipulating, controlling, promoting, changing, inducing, or achieving the acceptance of opinions, attitudes, actions, or behaviours (Martin, 1958 ) and is primarily directed at the general population (Taddeo, 2012 ; Milina, 2012 ). It is important to note that the general use of the word “propaganda” is confusing, as organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the European Parliament (EP) have used it to refer to disinformation, using both concepts interchangeably (Bayer et al. 2019 ). However, although these terms are intrinsically linked, they are not the same, since while propaganda employs disinformation as a tool for manipulation and control, disinformation can also serve non-propagandistic purposes.

In 2020, the health crisis brought about an unprecedented impact on our society, as it took on multiple forms to reshape genuine information (Brennen et al. 2020 ; Naeem et al. 2021 ; Salaverría et al. 2020 ). Additionally, it profoundly influenced news, journalism, and the media system (Casero-Ripollés, 2020 ; García-Marín, 2020 ; Aguado-Guadalupe and Bernaola-Serrano, 2020 ). Initially, one of the pandemic’s characteristics was that we were unaware of how much we knew (Rogers, 2020 ), as the initial uncertainty was compounded by the sense of unreality stemming from a common event occurring simultaneously worldwide (Alba, 2020 ). Moreover, the pandemic’s evolution on an international scale, along with restrictive measures and subsequent lockdowns, altered how the population accessed and shared information (Magallón, 2020 ; Peña et al. 2021 ), posing an effort to organize and confront informational disorder (Masip and Palomo, 2020 ). In this scenario, science could not resolve these issues as quickly, leaving an informational void exploited by purveyors of falsehoods, such as anti-vaccine campaigners, denialists, and even populist political parties. This triggered the susceptibility of any news event to become a conspiracy theory.

During the COVID-19 confinement, there was a reported increase in the use of digital platforms and applications, which have become significant information intermediaries (Fernández-Roldán-Díaz, 2021 ). In this context, social networks serve as the public arena where hoaxes go viral (Vázquez and Pulido, 2020 ; Bak et al. 2020 ; Rosenberg et al. 2020 ; Wetzelhütter and Martin, 2021 ), significantly exacerbating the adverse effects of disinformation (Alonso-López et al. 2021 ; Martel et al. 2020 ; Novotná et al. 2023 ; Haq et al. 2022 ) by amplifying its reach across multiple formats (Sundar et al. 2021 ; Amorós-García, 2018 ; Rodríguez-Pérez, 2021 ) and channels. Indeed, social networks such as TikTok (Chayka, 2022 ), Facebook (Allcott et al. 2019 ), and X (Twitter) (Gutiérrez-Coba et al. 2020 ) provide fertile ground for alternative facts and emotions to take precedence over indisputable facts (Magallón, 2020 ; Alonso-González, 2021 ). According to Lelo and Fígaro ( 2021 ), disinformation can be more appealing than truthful information because its creators prioritise rapid content generation.

Just two years later, the world plunged into another internationally scaled event that would profoundly affect Europe, unleashing another wave of disinformation and propaganda: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Giovanna-Sessa, 2022 ; García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey, 2023 ). On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on television the start of a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Subsequently, Russian troops crossed the border and invaded the neighboring country amidst bombings in major Ukrainian cities. That same day, the Ukrainian government denounced the invasion on its X (Twitter) account with a meme, accompanied by the hashtags #StopRussianAggression and #RussiaInvadedUkraine (Tuñón-Navarro et al. 2024 ). This underscores a before and after in the conception of contemporary warfare, more hybrid than ever, emerging as “the first digital world war” (Carrión, 2022 ; Morejón-Llamas et al. 2022 ; Aso, 2022 ).

This conflict is a continuation of the military and propaganda operation initiated by Russia in 2014 (Veebel, 2015 ), which resulted in the invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. However, the difference between both conflicts lies in the use of technology (Lucas and Pomeranzev, 2016 ; Colom-Piella, 2020 ). Indeed, the current invasion features unprecedented media representation, being covered by both journalists and YouTubers, as well as anonymous individuals on TikTok. This way of narrating the war originated in the Syrian conflict, where technological revolution and citizen journalism gained unprecedented relevance. Furthermore, the use of social media in the Arab Spring, as well as in the Occupy Wall Street movement or the 15-M, served as a learning experience for Russian propaganda systems (Magallón, 2022 ).

Moreover, the war has strained the global geopolitical landscape, leading to a geostrategic reconfiguration that has once again resulted in a bipolar world, where disinformation has become an “asymmetric and indirect military method” (Milosevich-Juaristi, 2017 ). Thus, one of its primary objectives is to polarise and divide audiences (Sobieraj and Berry, 2011 ; Hwang et al. 2014 ), focusing on “the other” (Fandiño, 2014 ), a common enemy (Hopp et al. 2020 ) who becomes the target of disinformation.

Furthermore, this conflict has firsthand experienced the impact of hybrid warfare, where, in addition to asymmetric equipment and armament technology, informational warfare has played a key role. All of this directly affects the functioning of communities, societies, and democracies (Matakos et al. 2017 ; Cinelli et al. 2021 ), making the war in Ukraine the first conflict where lies have been experienced live from minute one (Montes, 2022 ).

Precisely, both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine are particularly paradigmatic in Europe, as they are the two major events that have marked the third decade of the 21st century on an international scale (Sánchez-del-Vas and Tuñón-Navarro, 2023 ). In fact, disinformation is capable of spreading up to six times faster than accurate information, multiplying exponentially in times of crisis (Vosoughi et al. 2018 ), such as the COVID-19 pandemic or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So, both have revealed a new way of using disinformation, with consequences both online and offline, becoming an effective external weapon to definitively win public opinion’s favor.

To combat disinformation, fact-checkers worldwide joined forces in the fight against fake news (Tuñón and Sánchez-del-Vas, 2022 ). In fact, fact-checking can be defined as the process by which data and information about a given content are checked and disproved (Pamment and Kimber Lindwall, 2021 ). Particulary, the pandemic propelled collaborative fact-checking, which has been refined with the viral disinformation spread throughout the invasion of Ukraine (Morejón-Llamas et al. 2022 ). The speed in the verification process provided by international fact-checker alliances has been crucial in shedding light on disinformation processes disseminated internationally.

Research methodology

This research has been grounded in a mixed methodology that combines both quantitative and qualitative techniques. This methodological triangulation has allowed for the integration and validation of the findings obtained, thereby strengthening the reliability of the results. Thus, it has provided a broader perspective of the study object.

Research objectives and hypotheses

Main objective: To study the characteristics of disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine in the four countries under analysis, over the specified time period.

Specific objective: To establish the similarities and differences between the hoaxes of both case studies, considering their frequency, format, typology, platform, and purpose.

Hypothesis I: Peaks of dissemination of debunked hoaxes were observed in both the pandemic and the war at their onset, which declined more rapidly in the case of the war due to its lack of direct impact on the audiences of the selected European fact-checkers.

Hypothesis II: During the pandemic, the viral spread of disinformation primarily took the form of textual fabrications, whereas in the war, there was greater use of contextually detached images due to the language barrier separating the conflict from the rest of Europe.

Hypothesis III: In both the pandemic and the war, verified hoaxes utilized social media as their most prolific channels of disinformation, a trend that polarized audiences against a common (other) enemy.

Fact-checks as the unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is defined as “each of the elements to be quantified” (Wimmer and Dominick, 1996 p. 170), “susceptible to be expressed and broken down into categories and subcategories” (Fernández-Chavez, 2016 p. 38). In this regard, an approach to hoaxes has been chosen through verifications, as known as fact-checks, conducted by eight fact-checking media outlets from four European countries. Therefore, the unit of analysis consists of the verifications published by these outlets.

The use of verification media as a tool to study hoaxes has been employed in previous research. Notable among them are studies by Salaverría et al. ( 2020 ); Aguado-Guadalupe and Bernaola-Serrano ( 2020 ); García-Marín ( 2020 ); Naeem et al. ( 2021 ); Brennen et al. ( 2020 ); Alonso-González ( 2021 ); García-Vivero and López-Martínez ( 2021 ); Almansa-Martínez et al. ( 2022 ); Ruiz Incertis et al. ( 2024 ), among others.

Comparative analysis of case studies

Comparing case studies provides the opportunity to make generalizations about similarities between empirical phenomena shared by a set of assumptions. This aims to discover what is common to each case (Landman and Carvalho, 2003 ) and to make inferences about possible future conclusions based on the presence of antecedent factors. Thus, the paper is grounded in one of the comparative design systems proposed by Landman and Carvalho ( 2003 ), “the most similar systems design” (MSSD). In this line, this research revolves around the following case studies: two international events, four European countries, and eight fact-checking media outlets.

The 2020s have been marked by two significant international events impacting Europe: the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, both accompanied by high levels of disinformation. While these events differ in nature, it’s deemed relevant to identify common disinformation patterns and strategies while acknowledging differences. Comparing them offers insights into hoaxes’ impact in Europe. The selection of Spain, Germany, United Kingdom, and Poland aligns with Hallin and Mancini’s media model ( 2004 ). The authors identify three distinct media models: First, the polarised pluralist model, in which the media are closely related to politics. Second, the democratic corporatist model, where there is a relationship between the media and both political and economic powers. Third, the liberal model, in which the media maintain ties with economic power. This classification offers a comprehensive framework for analysing the structure and functioning of media systems across various contexts. It facilitates systematic comparison and elucidates the interplay between media institutions and their sociopolitical environments.

While Hallin and Mancini’s model omits Eastern European countries, including Poland enhances the research’s European representativeness and diversity. Eight specialized fact-checking media outlets in four selected countries were analyzed to study disinformation in Europe regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war: Newtral and Maldito Bulo (Spain), CORRECTIV Faktencheck and BR24 Faktenfuchs (Germany), FullFact and Reuters Fact Check (United Kingdom), and Demagog and FakenewsPL (Poland).

It should be noted that to carry out the comparative analysis of case studies, hoaxes were grouped by country and by pair of years. That is, all verified content by selected fact-checkers related to the pandemic (2020–2021) as well as the war (2022–2023) respectively in each region. This has allowed the establishment of similarities and differences between both phenomena in the four countries, considering variables that will be explained further below.

Variables and categories of investigation

The following variables, categories, and subcategories have been followed to conduct the coding for the research analysis.

Variable 1 (V1): The frequency of fact-checking refers to the rate at which false claims are verified on a daily basis by the fact-checkers.

Variable 2 (V2): Format of hoaxes. Refers to the communicative code used to spread hoaxes. Categories of V2: Text; Image; Video; Audio; Combined (subcategories: text and image; text and video; text and audio).

Variable 3 (V3): The hoax typology quantifies the different types of problematic contents found in the information ecosystem. This variable is based on the classification made by Wardle ( 2017 ). Categories of V3: Fabricated content: Completely false content created with the intention to deceive; Manipulated content: When real information or multimedia content is manipulated to deceive; Imposter content: When authentic sources are impersonated; False context: Real content that goes viral taken out of context; Misleading content: Hoaxes that use information misleadingly to accuse someone or something; False connection: When the content is not supported by headlines, images, or subtitles.

Variable 4 (V4): Hoax platform studies the channels where the studied hoaxes have been verified. Categories of V4: Social networks; Blogs; Media.

Variable 5 (V5): The purpose of the rumour analyses the possible motivation of the disinformers. This variable has been based on the categorisation carried out by Wardle ( 2017 ), who asserts that it is grounded in a classification conducted by British journalist Eliot Higgings. Categories of V5: Poor Journalism: Dissemination of erroneous information due to a lack of journalistic rigor; Parody: Disinformation with satirical purposes created to entertain, but which may be mistaken as genuine information; Provocation: Rumours intended to create controversy or agitation, aiming to manipulate public opinion or divide society; Economic Gain: Seeking economic returns by attracting traffic to websites or platforms, increasing audience for advertising, or promoting deceptive products or services; Empowering a common enemy: It entails inadvertently strengthening or validating a shared adversary’s position or influence through actions intended to oppose them; Political Power or Influence: Utilisation of disinformation to influence public opinion, employing information to gain political advantages or maintain power.

Content analysis

Content analysis is a fundamental research technique in communication studies, utilized in both Spanish and Anglo-Saxon contexts (Wimmer and Dominick, 1996 ). To analyze disinformation through fact-checkers’ verifications, only publications refuting hoaxes have been considered, a methodological choice seen in previous research such as Brennen et al. ( 2020 ).

Regarding the temporal period under study, it has been chosen to analyze the month of March for four consecutive years: 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. This month has been selected as it coincides with significant milestones for this research. In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic erupted; in March 2021, vaccination was widespread in most European countries; in March 2022, there was a surge of disinformation regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Likewise, it was deemed appropriate to continue with the temporal pattern and analyze the evolution of hoaxes in 2023.

Since the aim is to study disinformation related to both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine, it has been chosen to filter only those verifications that revolve around these topics. In order to establish the proposed comparisons, in March 2020 and 2021, only hoaxes related to the pandemic were analyzed, while in March 2022 and 2023, only publications about the war between Russia and Ukraine were studied. Finally, the selection of the sample publications, following the previously established criteria, resulted in 812 verifications that have been the subject of study. Specifically, 515 verifications correspond to the years 2020 and 2021, while 297 are related to the war between Russia and Ukraine.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the research, a systematic and coordinated approach was employed between two coders. The protocol for applying the coding manual to the various variables involved initially establishing the categories into which each variable was divided, based on an initial analysis of 10% of the sample. After this preliminary round, the coders divided the sample equitably and conducted the coding in parallel, consulting each other to reach a consensus on cases that might present more ambiguity or complexity in their categorization.

After this round of manual coding, the level of agreement between the coders and compatibility was found for 92% of the statements. Before processing the data for detailed analysis, a final joint review was conducted for verification purposes, ensuring that the results obtained are the product of a unified working method. This rigorous approach ensured that the categorisation was both reliable and valid, enhancing the overall robustness of the research findings.

Semi-structured interviews with specialized agents

As a secondary and qualitative technique, eight in-depth interviews with specialized agents have been conducted. The interview is the qualitative research technique that grants the most freedom to the actors in the interaction, allowing the interviewer to obtain responses to the questions presented through an informal conversational atmosphere, detached from a predetermined standardized form. In this way, eight professionals specialized in the subject of this research have been selected and the interviews have been conducted in the form of online personal communication, through Google Meets. This modality has been adopted because online interviews offer greater flexibility in scheduling, accommodating the diverse availability of participants and ensuring a higher participation rate. Additionally, this method mitigates geographical constraints, allowing the inclusion of participants from a broader range of locations, thereby enhancing the diversity and representativeness of the sample.

Moreover, the interviewees were chosen on the basis of their professional profiles and specialization areas, which are detailed in the Table 1 :

Profile 1: Experts in fact-checking, disinformation and media. This category includes various fact-checkers, academics, and professionals in the field. This profile has enabled an understanding of how falsehoods are monitored and refuted from a fact-checking perspective, as well as providing insights into the characteristics of disinformation associated with the phenomena studied.

Profile 2: Experts in disinformation on digital platforms and IA. This profile is associated with researchers in the fields of engineering and computing. The selected experts are leaders in the study of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the analysis of disinformation on social networks. Their perspectives have allowed for a deeper exploration of how falsehoods go viral on digital platforms and how their algorithms function.

Profile 3: Experts in disinformation in Europe and European regulation of disinformation. Given that the study is framed within Europe, it has been deemed relevant to engage with various professionals specialising in the investigation of disinformation on the continent. Their contributions have been particularly valuable for a profound understanding of the phenomenon, its challenges, and the policies adopted for its containment.

These discussions were transcribed and coded. Additionally, they have been completely anonymised based on the following table.

Before conducting the interviews, three provisional scripts, each containing among 10 and 12 questions, were prepared in accordance with the hypotheses underpinning this research. Given the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the questions varied according to the interviewees, their specific areas of expertise, and the flow of the conversation. Each interview lasted between 30 and 45 min.

The following outlines the topics and segments investigated during the interviews, organized based on the participants’ profiles and specialized domains:

In the interviews with profile 1, the focus was on comparing and analyzing viral disinformation in various contexts, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The discussion highlighted identifying similarities and differences in misleading narratives, key actors like Russian propaganda, and underlying motives. It also explored different types and formats of disinformation, primary channels for dissemination, and how disinformation adapts to current events. The dialogue concluded with predictions about the future impact and implications of disinformation.

In Profile 2, the interviews focused on how digital platforms facilitate the dissemination of disinformation, with a particular emphasis on the role of algorithms. The questions aimed to identify the platforms and algorithms most conducive to disinformation dissemination, quantify disinformation from orchestrated campaigns, and track its trajectory from the pandemic to current conflicts. Furthermore, the discussion addressed how current social media trends intersect with disinformation dissemination and examined potential benefits for digital platforms. The dialogue also assessed the current and future role of artificial intelligence in generating disinformation.

Experts from Profile 3 were asked regarding the impact of disinformation on the European public sphere and European regulatory frameworks, exploring how disinformation destabilises Europe’s public sphere and why the region is vulnerable to it on social networks. The interviews also examined the role of external actors such as China and Russia in amplifying instability in Europe, particularly during ongoing conflicts. Interviewees were also asked about the European Union’s response to disinformation, as well as predictions about the future of disinformation in Europe.

Frequency of verified hoaxes

Disinformation is a phenomenon that is intrinsically linked to current events and, consequently, fluctuates adapting to it (Interviewee 7, personal communication, April 26, 2023), as audiences do not continuously pay attention to a topic but rather go through peaks of interest (Interviewee 5, personal communication, May 1, 2023). In this regard, as can be seen in Fig. 1 , out of the 812 verifications analyzed in this research, the highest verification peaks are observed in March 2020 (41% of the total sample of hoaxes) and March 2022 (32% of the sample of hoaxes).

Own elaboration.

Additionally, the country reporting the highest percentage of publications throughout the analyzed temporal period is Spain ( N  = 390; 48% of the total), followed by the United Kingdom ( N  = 188; 23% of the total), Germany ( N  = 98; 12% of the total), and Poland ( N  = 136; 17% of the total). It is worth noting that in Spain, several factors converge leading to a significantly higher sample than in the rest of the analyzed cases. “On one hand, it serves as the gateway and exit point for certain narratives that circulate rapidly in Latin America, and on the other hand, its fact-checkers are among the best in the world” (Interviewee 4, personal communication, April 12, 2023). In this sense, their highly qualified teams, along with their greater capacity to monitor content, allow them to verify more hoaxes in the same amount of time as other fact-checking media.

In Spain, in March 2020, 239 hoaxes about the pandemic were verified, a figure that decreased to 54 in 2021. In March 2022, 89 verifications related to the war were published, while in 2023, only 8 were reported.

In Germany, during March 2020, 26 hoaxes related to the coronavirus were published, while in 2021 the figure decreased to 39. However, in March 2022, 25 verifications about the invasion were recorded, which decreased to 8 in 2023.

In the United Kingdom, in March 2020, 33 hoaxes about the health crisis were verified, while in 2021, 67 were reported. Subsequently, in March 2022, 76 verifications related to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict were published, which experienced a significant decrease in 2023, with 12.

In Poland, in March 2020, 33 hoaxes related to the pandemic were verified, decreasing to 24 in 2021. However, in March 2022, 66 verifications about the war were published, while in 2023, 13 were reported.

Format of hoaxes

In general, in the two years analyzed for the COVID-19 pandemic, the primary format of viralized disinformation has been text. In fact, 45% of the hoaxes studied during this period were presented in written form. Meanwhile, in the case of hoaxes related to the war between Russia and Ukraine, the predominant format through which these contents were disseminated was combined (71%), specifically through images and text. “In the image, you don’t need to translate anything. A montage of Zelenski with a swastika works the same in Burma, Bolivia, and Spain, which makes hoaxes spread even faster” (Interviewee 2, personal communication, May 22, 2023). This trend is also observed specifically in the four countries studied, as illustrated in Fig. 2 .

In Spain, in 2020 and 2021, 38% of the analyzed contents went viral in text form, 25% corresponded to images, and 20% to a combined format of image and text. Video (9%) and audio (7%) had much lower representation. Meanwhile, in 2022 and 2023, it can be observed how this trend changes significantly, as 67% of the contents went viral in a combined format of text and image, 18% as single images, 8% as video, and 7% as text.

In Germany, in 2020 and 2021, 48% of the analyzed contents were presented as text, 22% as videos, and 12% had a combined format of text and images. Likewise, the representation of images and audio was 9% in both cases. In 2022 and 2023, 55% of the analyzed hoaxes were in a combined format of text and images, 24% corresponded to single images, 15% to videos, and 6% to audio.

In the United Kingdom, in 2020 and 2021, 52% of the sample hoaxes were in text format, 17% in a combined format of text and images, 14% in single images, as well as in video, 2% in audio, while in 1% of the sample, its distribution format was not specified. In 2022 and 2023, significant differences are observed, as 84% of the contents were disseminated in a combined format of text and images, 8% in the form of videos, with almost non-existent representation of text alone (6%), and single images (2%).

In the case of Poland, 2020 and 2021 were marked by textual hoaxes, corresponding to 63% of the sample. 16% of the sample was represented as videos, 11% as combinations of text and images, 9% as single images, while 2% were audio. Again, in 2022 and 2023, significant differences are observed. 67% of the contents were viralized in a combined format of text and images, 16% only in text, while 9% in video, and 8% in single images.

Typology of hoaxes

In general terms, the pandemic (2020–2021) was marked by fabricated content. 47% of all hoaxes analyzed during this period corresponded to this typology. Meanwhile, in 2022 and 2023, 44% of the analyzed hoaxes have been identified as false context. This is a trend that is also observed specifically in the four case studies, as evidenced in Fig. 3 . “The war in Ukraine has had a much more visual imprint than the pandemic. Therefore, many images taken out of context and manipulated have been observed” (Interviewee 1, personal communication, May 13, 2023).

In Spain, in 2020 and 2021, 52% of the country’s sample corresponds to fabricated contents, 19% to manipulated, 12% to false context, and 8% to impostor content, while 5% are represented as misleading content and false connection, in both cases. In 2022 and 2023, 54% of the analyzed hoaxes were reported as false context, 24% as fabricated content, and 11% as manipulated. Less representation is found in impostor content and misleading content, both at 5% of the sample and finally, false connection (1%).

In Germany, in 2020 and 2021, fabricated content predominates (38%), followed by misleading content (35%). Thus, manipulated content and false context represent each 11% of the sample. Meanwhile, impostor content and false connection are reflected in 3 and 2% respectively. In 2022 and 2023, 36% of the contents correspond to false context and 30% to fabricated content. 21% is represented as manipulated content, and impostor content and misleading content occupy 6% each.

In the case of the UK, 2020 and 2021 were marked by fabricated content (45%), followed by misleading content (27%). False context represents 13% and manipulated content 12%. Impostor content is only reflected in 3% of the sample. In 2022 and 2023, 55% of the hoaxes correspond to false context, while 19% to fabricated content. 13% are manipulated content, 11% false connection, and 2% impostor content.

For Poland, in 2020 and 2021, 47% of the analyzed hoaxes corresponded to fabricated contents, followed by manipulated (21%) and false context (19%). Likewise, 12% is reported as misleading content. In 2022 and 2023, 59% of the hoaxes are represented as fabricated content, 24% correspond to false context, 8% to misleading content, and 5% to manipulated content. Impostor content and false connection only represent 3 and 1%, respectively, of the sample.

Platform of hoaxes

In general, over the four years studied, a near-total hegemony of social networks can be observed as the predominant channel for the dissemination of erroneous content. In the case of the pandemic, in 2020 and 2021, 76% of the hoaxes in the sample were primarily viralized through digital platforms. A figure that increases in the studied hoaxes about the war in 2022 and 2023, rising to 89%. This slight increase is also reported individually in the four countries studied, as detailed in Fig. 4 . “Platforms are a very cheap means of disinformation, as you don’t need to have a website or infrastructure, you just need to viralize the information” (Interviewee 5, personal communication, May 1, 2023).

Thus, in Spain, in 2020 and 2021, 77% of the contents were viralized through social networks. Specifically, WhatsApp (41% of social networks), X (Twitter) (18% of social networks), and Facebook (14% of social networks). Blogs accounted for 7% of dissemination channels, while media accounted for 5%. Additionally, in 11% of the cases, the origin of the hoaxes was not specified. In 2022 and 2023, social networks represented 79% of the sample. In particular, X (Twitter) (42% of social networks) and Facebook (35% of social networks) stood out. Blogs were the dissemination channel in 2% of the cases, while traditional media were only in 1%. It is worth noting that the origin of the hoaxes was not referenced in 18% of the cases.

In Germany, in 2020 and 2021, 72% of the analyzed contents were disseminated on social networks, mainly on Facebook (50% of social networks) and WhatsApp (23% of social networks). Thus, 20% went viral on blogs and 6% on media. Additionally, the platform was not specified in 2% of the cases. As for 2022 and 2023, social networks accounted for 86% of the sample, especially Facebook (45% of social networks) and X (Twitter) (23% of social networks), while the rest (14%) were found on blogs.

Regarding the UK, in 2020 and 2021, 83% of the hoaxes were spread through social networks, specifically Facebook (67% of social networks) and X (Twitter) (13% of social networks), 9% through media, and 4% through blogs. The origin of 4% of the hoaxes was not indicated. On the other hand, in 2022 and 2023, 100% of the hoaxes were viralized through social networks, with Facebook (44% of social networks) and X (Twitter) (46% of social networks) standing out.

In Poland, in 2020 and 2021, social networks emerged as the most prominent format (65%), particularly Facebook (65% of social networks), followed by blogs (25%) and traditional media (8%). In 3% of the cases, the dissemination channel was not reported. As for 2022 and 2023, 92% of the hoaxes were disseminated on social networks such as Facebook (61% of social networks) and X (Twitter) (25% of social networks), 5% on blogs, and 3% on media.

Purpose of hoaxes

In the set of countries studied, both in the hoaxes about the pandemic and about the war, similar results regarding their purpose can be observed, as referenced in Fig. 5 . During the pandemic, 42% of the analyzed hoaxes aimed to provoke, while, in the case of the war, this intention is reflected in 45% of the cases. Likewise, the promotion of a common enemy is observed in 32% of the analyzed hoaxes about the pandemic and in 44% in those corresponding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “A common enemy is what allows all positions to be unified no matter how different they are. The search for culprits serves any narrative” (Interviewee 7, personal communication, April 26, 2023).

In the case of Spain, in 2020 and 2021, 53% of the analyzed hoaxes aimed to provoke, while 25% sought to promote a common enemy and 16% to obtain economic benefit. Parody (4%), political influence (1%), and poor journalism (1%) had less representativeness. In 2022 and 2023, 48% of the analyzed contents aimed to provoke and 36% to promote a common enemy. With a 5% representativeness, political influence, as well as parody. At the same time, 3 and 2% are occupied by economic benefit and poor journalism, respectively.

In Germany, in 2020 and 2021, 35% of the contents aimed to promote a common enemy, 25% to provoke, and 22% to obtain economic benefit. Political influence accounts for 15%. Thus, parody and poor journalism represent 2% each. In 2022 and 2023, both provocation and promotion of the common enemy represent 45% of the sample, respectively. Meanwhile, 6% aim to influence politically, and 3% to parody.

In the British case, in 2020 and 2021, 48% of the hoaxes promote a common enemy and 31% seek to provoke. Likewise, 9% aim to obtain economic benefit, followed by poor journalism in 5% of cases, political influence in 4%, and parody in 3%. Similarly, in 2022 and 2023, provocation (53%) and promotion of a common enemy (33%) are the most prominent purposes. Political influence (8%), parody (2%), poor journalism (2%), and economic benefit (1%) follow.

For the Polish case, in 2020 and 2021, the main purpose was to promote a common enemy (32%), as well as to obtain economic benefit (32%), followed by provocation (30%). With less representativeness are political influence (4%) and poor journalism (4%). Meanwhile, in 2022 and 2023, promoting a common enemy is reflected in 65% of the cases and provocation in 32%. In this case, political influence (3%) and parody (1%) hardly have representativeness within the sample.

Discussion of results

In light of the obtained results, we proceed to discuss them through an analysis and comparison of the various identified trends, addressing the research objectives outlined at the beginning of the study.

Trends in the frequency, format, and typology of disinformation

During periods of high informational intensity, linked to extraordinary and unpredictable events, the populace necessitates an increase in their information consumption (Magallón, 2020 ). Therefore, as inferred from the sample of this investigation, the volume of verified disinformation regarding the pandemic was substantially higher in March 2020 (64% of the total sample of pandemic-related falsehoods) than in March 2021. The same trend was observed in March 2022 (86% of the sample of false content regarding the war), compared to March 2023.

In this regard, a special report by the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO, 2023a ) suggests that the most relevant examples of disinformation about the health crisis circulated in the early stages of the pandemic in 2020. Concerning the war in Ukraine, the peak of disinformation was reached in March 2022. A frequency that has since steadily decreased, as also evidenced by the results of our article.

In this sense, Interviewee 1 (personal communication, May 13, 2023) confirms that, although there was an explosion of false content about the pandemic in March 2020, falsehoods continued to spread relatively consistently (with their corresponding peaks), given that the health crisis directly affected citizens’ lives. However, in the case of the war in Ukraine, although there was an explosion of falsehoods and verifications in March 2022, public interest gradually waned. “One year after the war, informational fatigue and the visible consequences of the war in our daily lives lead to a disconnection by the citizenry” (Interviewee 4, personal communication, April 12, 2023).

This decrease in attention from European citizens is due to the fact that the war affects European citizens less directly than the coronavirus pandemic (with the exception of Poland). According to the Flash Eurobarometer published in December 2022 by the European Commission ( 2022 ), while approximately eight out of ten citizens of the member countries followed news related to the war in Ukraine, there was a considerable decrease in the frequency of these news consultations, shifting from daily to weekly. The same occurred with discussions about the war and its effects.

This is intrinsically linked to disinformation since falsehoods target areas where there is a demand for information from users, directly influencing the work of verifiers. In a fact-checking newsroom, Interviewee 2 (personal communication, May 22, 2023) notes that when selecting content to verify, if the organization does not find many inquiries about the topic of Ukraine from users and observes that disinformation on the subject does not have much exposure on social media, they pay less attention when verifying it.

However, it is interesting to note that, in both the case of the pandemic and the war, although disinformation occupies less space on the verifiers’ agenda, falsehoods have not disappeared. “We are moving away from the pandemic in terms of time, but there are still many falsehoods related to vaccines, their side effects, or criticisms of masks. The same happens with the topic of the war in Ukraine. Even narratives that were considered past return with an original focus” (Interviewee 7, personal communication, April 26, 2023).

Regarding format, the data obtained in this study demonstrate that the predominant formats for the dissemination of falsehoods have been significantly different between disinformation about the pandemic and that related to the war between Russia and Ukraine. On one hand, between 2020 and 2021, most false contents referencing the health crisis were presented in text form (45%). Examples of this were viral chains on Facebook or WhatsApp about the adverse effects of vaccination or supposed home remedies to cure the disease.

The COVID-19 pandemic became an internationally scaled event that affected humanity as a whole and, of course, Europe (Tuñón-Navarro et al. 2023 ). The world was engulfed in a context of unprecedented chaos in which there was an excessive eruption of information demands. Since science could not provide an immediate response to these concerns, disinformers found a clear path to fabricate and disseminate falsehoods with minimal effort. As a consequence, the cheapest method of disinformation, text, was employed.

This is compounded by the fact that during this period, fact-checkers had to exponentially increase their efforts to verify erroneous information as quickly as possible. Therefore, since debunking disinformation based on audiovisual languages requires more working time, verifiers may have prioritized debunking text-based falsehoods. These results are consistent with the research of Salaverría et al. ( 2020 ), García-Marín ( 2020 ), and Aguado-Guadalupe and Bernaola-Serrano ( 2020 ), which indicate the predominance of text in published verifications about COVID-19-related falsehoods.

On the other hand, the sample of falsehoods about the pandemic is marked by the predominance of fabricated content (47% of the analyzed sample during that period), constituting the most detrimental typology due to its high intent to deceive (Wardle, 2017 ). Other typologies such as manipulated content (17%) and, to a lesser extent, misleading content (16%) and false context (13%) also stand out. This trend remained practically uniform across the four studied countries during the years 2020 and 2021.

These observations are supported by the research of Naeem et al. ( 2021 ) and Salaverría et al. ( 2020 ), who demonstrate that the most serious disinformation fabrications have been the most viral during the pandemic. However, they contrast with the study by Brennen et al. ( 2020 ), where configured information, that is, information involving the re-elaboration of truth, remained above completely fabricated contents during the pandemic.

In the case of the war between Russia and Ukraine, a substantial change can be observed in the way disinformation has been disseminated compared to the pandemic, as images, specifically, the combined format of images and text, become particularly relevant in the spread of falsehoods (71% of the analyzed sample during that period). Taking into consideration the context, as mentioned previously, this international event did not have a direct impact on the daily lives of citizens who were outside the conflict. Additionally, the language barrier hindered the rapid viralization of falsehoods, so it became crucial to use images since, not being on the ground and unaware of the language, they allow the introduction of elements that distort the context (Interviewee 4, personal communication, April 12, 2023).

Moreover, images are processed more superficially than other formats (Sundar et al. 2021 ), which is why many disinformative contents are illustrated with impactful photographs (Amorós-García, 2018 ). “Visual effects are the most attractive to the brain and the human perception of reality,” confirms Interviewee 3 (personal communication, June 14, 2023). Derived from the format, false context constituted the predominant typology of falsehoods in the sample between 2022 and 2023 (44% of the sample). This is a strategy mainly used in cases where disinformative contents are presented in visual formats (Salaverría et al. 2020 ; Rodríguez-Pérez, 2021 ).

Likewise, the results coincide with those of other research, such as Morejón-Llamas et al. ( 2022 ), which demonstrates how the analyzed contents about the war between Russia and Ukraine mostly utilized archived images to complement false texts. García-Marín and Salvat-Martinrey ( 2023 ) reported that a large part of the falsehoods about the invasion, verified by fact-checkers, employed the decontextualization of photographs, videos, parts of movies, or video games.

Despite growing concerns about the use of AI for creating deepfakes, no substantial evidence has been found within the studied sample. “Artificial Intelligence could generate disinformative content much faster, effectively, and scalably. However, today I am not seeing widespread use,” (Interviewee 6, personal communication, May 22, 2023). Similarly, Interviewee 2 (personal communication, May 22, 2023) points out that a clear example of people being copiously deceived by AI-generated content has not been detected.

Trends in the platform and purpose of disinformation

Regarding the dissemination channel, in both the case of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, there is an almost exclusive predominance of social media as the dissemination channels for the analyzed misinformation (76 and 89% of the sample analyzed in their respective periods). In fact, other studies have demonstrated that disinformation about both events has spread more rapidly through digital platforms (Bak et al. 2020 ; Rosenberg et al. 2020 ; Wetzelhütter and Martin, 2021 ).

Digital platforms play an increasingly indispensable role in the lives of Europeans. However, in recent years, technological development has facilitated the professionalization of disinformation and propaganda tools (Colom-Piella, 2020 ), becoming the most effective tool for influencing the minds of communities and even entire nations (Milina, 2012 ).

In particular, both in the pandemic and in the war, the most used social networks to disseminate this content have been Facebook and X (Twitter). In this regard, Allcott et al. ( 2019 ) suggest that Facebook is the main channel through which fake news tends to go viral. In fact, this social network presents favorable characteristics for the spread of fake news, as its users are more interconnected than on other platforms.

On the other hand, Gutiérrez-Coba et al. ( 2020 ) have found that X (Twitter) has a great capacity to generate sub-communities and echo chambers, overexposing audiences to algorithmically suitable content for their tastes and needs. As a consequence, this creates an environment conducive to the spread of false information. In fact, as pointed out by Vosoughi et al. ( 2018 ), when a user makes a claim about a topic in a tweet and others disseminate it by retweeting, a hoax cascade occurs. Specifically, they note that fake news is 70% more likely to be retweeted than real news.

In this regard, Interviewee 6 (personal communication, May 22, 2023) emphasizes that X (Twitter) “has a great capacity for expansion, being the simplest platform for the message to reach everyone.” All this in an apparently intimate dialogue with the screen, which generates that users feel that they are not being manipulated, but that the conclusions they have reached are their own, unique, and exclusive (Aso, 2022 ).

It is also worth mentioning the increase in the appearance of hoaxes on the TikTok social network, specifically regarding the war. “At the beginning of the pandemic, TikTok was not as powerful as in the war in Ukraine” (Interviewee 1, personal communication, May 13, 2023). As some researchers state, the invasion in Ukraine constitutes the “first war reported on TikTok” (Chayka, 2022 ; Aso, 2022 ). In fact, some studies (Alonso-López et al. 2021 ) establish that it is easy to spread disinformation through this platform thanks to the use of generic hashtags and challenges, which, although not directly related to the content, have high levels of popularity.

Despite the results and the bibliographic review carried out, it should not be considered that the reported social networks are the channels through which the most disinformation has been disseminated about the pandemic and the war since the selected sample is subject to the fact-checkers’ bias. Therefore, as Interviewee 6 (personal communication, May 22, 2023) asserts that it is risky to say that on X (Twitter) or on public networks more is spread since it is much more difficult to enter private networks. In some cases, the main responsibility for distributing disinformation lies with those private platforms where it is very complex to monitor, control, and see what is happening (Interviewee 8, personal communication, April 13, 2023).

Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that the company Meta works with fact-checkers belonging to the IFCN, who are responsible for tracking false information viralized on Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp and later debunking it. In fact, in 2020, the IFCN itself reported that 43% of the fact-checking media surveyed obtained a substantial part of their funding through this program (Mantas, 2021 ), providing them with income and visibility (Tuñón and Sánchez-del-Vas, 2022 ). Similarly, TikTok also has a program in which it collaborates with some fact-checkers from the IFCN, so it is not surprising that the studied verifiers have allocated part of their resources and efforts to refute viralized content on these social networks, thus justifying the high number of debunkings made on this platform.

Regarding the purpose of hoaxes, the results of the study report that the majority of the analyzed false content has the intention of provoking emotions, as well as of promoting a common enemy, the so-called “other” (Fandiño, 2014 ). Both categories are characterized by polarizing individuals. In this sense, between 2020 and 2021, 42% of the hoaxes aimed to provoke, and 32% aimed to promote a common enemy. Meanwhile, between 2022 and 2023, 45% of the hoaxes aimed to provoke, and 44% sought to promote a common enemy. As Aso ( 2022 ) argues, professionalized algorithms allow reaching the intimacy of individuals, bombarding them with arguments in search of polarization in favor of one side or the other. That is why the purpose of hoaxes is closely linked to their dissemination channel.

Some studies have demonstrated both correlational and causal relationships between trust in emotion and increased belief in disinformation (Martel et al. 2020 ). Within the sample of this research, hoaxes such as videos of people suffering attacks after being inoculated with the COVID-19 vaccine in March 2021, or images of children shared as if they were from the war in Ukraine in March 2022 stand out. In them, a strong emotional component can be appreciated with which it is intended to provoke audiences. Even Interviewee 3 (personal communication, June 24, 2023) points out that the networks that were specifically designed during the pandemic to target hesitant users were used in the invasion of Ukraine to further increase their uncertainty.

It is also interesting to analyze the willingness of hoax emitters to configure a common enemy. In the case of the pandemic, many hoaxes were detected that went against a “corrupt elite,” while in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the intention was to make Ukraine the enemy. Putin’s own speech on February 21, 2022, already showed this trend. In it, the Kremlin’s president affirmed the intention to “denazify” and “liberate” Ukraine, which he unjustly accused of plotting “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” in Donbás (Giovanna-Sessa, 2022 ).

In this regard, some researchers point out that, in certain cases, disinformation can foster the feeling of “us against them” (Hopp et al. 2020 ), based on the negative perception of “the others” (Iyengar and Simon, 2000 ), which increases polarization and the division of audiences (Sobieraj and Berry, 2011 ; Hwang et al. 2014 ). When a society is divided into two main factions, usually related to an issue, polarization around these issues has a corrosive and detrimental effect on the functioning of communities, societies, and democracies (Matakos et al. 2017 ; Cinelli et al. 2021 ).

In this way, Interviewee 7 (personal communication, April 26, 2023) asserts that “the hoaxes [about the pandemic and the war] are based on institutional discredit and the search for culprits. For example, in the case of Ukrainian refugees, the narratives that already existed against other migrants have been adapted to them.” Interviewee 2 (personal communication, May 22, 2023) agrees that, in the case of the invasion, since political parties and the media were clear about their pro-Ukraine stance, alternative thinking materialized in pro-Russian narratives.

On the other hand, the research by Novotná et al. ( 2023 ) shows that social networks polarized even more during the pandemic, extending to the Russian-Ukrainian war. Their study reported that people who denied the pandemic and vaccines were very likely to be supporters of Russia. And it is that Interviewee 5 (personal communication, May 1, 2023) detected a dialogue between the anti-vaccine, the pro-Russian, and those who spoke out against climate change. “They are the same and they are shifting.”

In this regard, Interviewee 2 (personal communication, May 22, 2023) and Interviewee 1 (personal communication, May 13, 2023) observed how certain groups that had been dedicated to spreading disinformation about the pandemic began to do so about the war. This was also reported in a report published by Maldita in mid-March 2022 (Maldita, 2022 ), which shows how the large denialist communities automatically switched from spreading disinformation about the pandemic to defending Russia’s attack on Ukraine. This shift in themes within the same denialist groups could be due to factors such as the evolution of interest in current events, an economic component, as well as the desire to maintain a sufficient critical mass to continue with the existing community (Interviewee 4, personal communication, April 12, 2023).

The studied crises demonstrate how social networks can originate a bipolar discourse in audiences (Haq et al. 2022 ). This polarization became evident through the reinforced uncivil character of communication, criticism of the low quality of discourse, and the negative evaluation of opponents (Novotná et al. 2023 ).

Conclusions

Throughout the research, the characteristics of disinformation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine within the European context have been examined. Considering the three hypotheses proposed at the outset and based on the findings, this study confirms the following: Firstly, the frequency of verified hoaxes is intrinsically linked to peaks of current events and the evolution of the phenomenon in question. While it is true that, in the initial weeks of the pandemic as well as the war, there was a considerable increase in verifications of hoaxes in the cases analyzed, this trend gradually decreased. However, the decline was much more pronounced in the hoaxes concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Experts suggest that the shift in information trends, along with the waning interest of audiences in the topic, may have led to a reduction in the efforts of fact-checkers to debunk hoaxes related to it. Meanwhile, disinformation about the pandemic remained consistently prevalent, as the impact of the health crisis on the public was direct. Thus, the first hypothesis is confirmed.

Regarding the format of hoaxes, it was observed that the majority of verifications published regarding the coronavirus pandemic were disseminated in written form, without any associated multimedia content. Due to the crisis, the public was much more susceptible to receiving false information. Therefore, it was not necessary to employ highly developed disinformation techniques, and text offered a quick and direct way to reach audiences. In contrast, in the war, several factors converged that hindered the widespread dissemination of hoaxes beyond the borders of the conflict, such as the language barrier. Therefore, images emerged as the primary format upon which disinformation narratives were constructed. It is also worth noting that the typology of hoaxes is closely linked to their format, as they follow a similar trend. In the case of the pandemic, the most commonly used type of hoax was fabricated content, i.e., entirely invented. Meanwhile, hoaxes about the invasion utilized genuine images taken out of context, in order to tailor them to the interests of the disseminators. Thus, the second hypothesis is validated.

Furthermore, in both the pandemic and the war, it was observed that the majority of verified hoaxes were spread through social media, surpassing blogs or traditional media channels. Especially prominent were Facebook and X (Twitter). While the nature of social networks, subject to algorithmic control, allows for the rapid dissemination of erroneous content, one must not overlook the bias of fact-checkers. In many cases, they have collaboration agreements with these digital platforms to verify potentially false content circulating through them. Similarly, the purpose of hoaxes is directly related to their dissemination channel. In this regard, social networks have the capacity to polarize audiences, especially in times of crisis. Thus, most of the hoaxes in the sample, both in the case of the pandemic and the war, aimed to directly attack the emotions of the audiences, provoking them and promoting a common enemy. In fact, the objective in both cases was the search for culprits and the discrediting of institutions in the face of alternative thinking. These results confirm the third hypothesis.

On one hand, one limitation of this research is that the sample was based on hoaxes selected in advance by the fact-checking organizations studied. While these fact-checking organizations have deontological principles aligned with the quality standards of the IFCN, their work is biased. Additionally, the temporal limitation for conducting this research led to selecting a specific number of case studies. Greater geographic coverage and a more extensive timeframe would have provided more precise conclusions about the object of study. Despite this, the present study represents a significant advancement in understanding the nature and scope of disinformation in Europe, laying the groundwork for future, more comprehensive research.

Data availability

Fact-checking publications analysed during this study are public and can be extracted from the selected media sites. Nevertheless, the datasets generated during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. The interviews conducted in the form of personal communication cannot be accessed while ensuring the anonymity of the interviewees.

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This article is part of an European Chair funded by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), belonging to the European Commission, Jean Monnet (Erasmus+), “Future of Europe Communication in times of Pandemic Disinformation” (FUTEUDISPAN), Ref: 101083334-JMO-2022-CHAIR), directed between 2022 and 2025, from the University Carlos III of Madrid, by Professor Jorge Tuñón. However, the content of this article is the sole responsibility of the authors and EACEA cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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Sánchez del Vas, R., Tuñón Navarro, J. Disinformation on the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War: Two sides of the same coin?. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 11 , 851 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03355-0

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