utilitarianism vs egoism essay

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• Antecedents of utilitarianism among the ancients
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utilitarianism

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• Santa Clara University - Markkula Center for Applied Ethics - Calculating Consequences:The Utilitarian Approach to Ethics
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• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - The History of Utilitarianism
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utilitarianism , in normative ethics , a tradition stemming from the late 18th- and 19th-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill according to which an action (or type of action) is right if it tends to promote happiness or pleasure and wrong if it tends to produce unhappiness or pain—not just for the performer of the action but also for everyone else affected by it. Utilitarianism is a species of consequentialism , the general doctrine in ethics that actions (or types of action) should be evaluated on the basis of their consequences. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories are in opposition to egoism , the view that each person should pursue his or her own self-interest, even at the expense of others, and to any ethical theory that regards some actions (or types of action) as right or wrong independently of their consequences ( see deontological ethics ). Utilitarianism also differs from ethical theories that make the rightness or wrongness of an action dependent upon the motive of the agent—for, according to the utilitarian, it is possible for the right thing to be done from a bad motive. Utilitarians may, however, distinguish the aptness of praising or blaming an agent from whether the action was right.

(Read Peter Singer’s Britannica entry on ethics.)

The nature of utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question “What ought a person to do?” The answer is that a person ought to act so as to maximize happiness or pleasure and to minimize unhappiness or pain.

In the notion of consequences the utilitarian includes all of the good and bad produced by the action, whether arising after the action has been performed or during its performance. If the difference in the consequences of alternative actions is not great, some utilitarians would not regard the choice between them as a moral issue. According to Mill, acts should be classified as morally right or wrong only if the consequences are of such significance that a person would wish to see the agent compelled, not merely persuaded and exhorted, to act in the preferred manner.

In assessing the consequences of actions, utilitarianism relies upon some theory of intrinsic value : something is held to be good in itself, apart from further consequences, and all other values are believed to derive their worth from their relation to this intrinsic good as a means to an end. Bentham and Mill were hedonists ; i.e, they analyzed happiness as a balance of pleasure over pain and believed that these feelings alone are of intrinsic value and disvalue. Utilitarians also assume that it is possible to compare the intrinsic values produced by two alternative actions and to estimate which would have better consequences. Bentham believed that a hedonic calculus is theoretically possible. A moralist, he maintained, could sum up the units of pleasure and the units of pain for everyone likely to be affected, immediately and in the future, and could take the balance as a measure of the overall good or evil tendency of an action. Such precise measurement as Bentham envisioned is perhaps not essential, but it is nonetheless necessary for the utilitarian to make some interpersonal comparisons of the values of the effects of alternative courses of action.

As a normative system providing a standard by which an individual ought to act and by which the existing practices of society, including its moral code, ought to be evaluated and improved, utilitarianism cannot be verified or confirmed in the way in which a descriptive theory can, but it is not regarded by its exponents as simply arbitrary. Bentham believed that only in terms of a utilitarian interpretation do words such as “ought,” “right,” and “wrong” have meaning and that, whenever people attempt to combat the principle of utility , they do so with reasons drawn from the principle itself. Bentham and Mill both believed that human actions are motivated entirely by pleasure and pain, and Mill saw that motivation as a basis for the argument that, since happiness is the sole end of human action, the promotion of happiness is the test by which to judge all human conduct.

One of the leading utilitarians of the late 19th century, the Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick , rejected such theories of motivation as well as Bentham’s theory of the meaning of moral terms and sought to support utilitarianism by showing that it follows from systematic reflection on the morality of “ common sense .” Most of the requirements of commonsense morality , he argued, could be based upon utilitarian considerations. In addition, he reasoned that utilitarianism could solve the difficulties and perplexities that arise from the vagueness and inconsistencies of commonsense doctrines.

Most opponents of utilitarianism have held that it has implications contrary to their moral intuitions—that considerations of utility, for example, might sometimes sanction the breaking of a promise. Much of the defense of utilitarian ethics has consisted in answering these objections, either by showing that utilitarianism does not have the implications that its opponents claim it has or by arguing against the opponents’ moral intuitions . Some utilitarians, however, have sought to modify the utilitarian theory to accommodate the objections.

One such criticism is that, although the widespread practice of lying and stealing would have bad consequences, resulting in a loss of trustworthiness and security, it is not certain that an occasional lie to avoid embarrassment or an occasional theft from a rich person would not have good consequences and thus be permissible or even required by utilitarianism. But the utilitarian readily answers that the widespread practice of such acts would result in a loss of trustworthiness and security. To meet the objection to not permitting an occasional lie or theft, some philosophers have defended a modification labelled “ rule ” utilitarianism. It permits a particular act on a particular occasion to be adjudged right or wrong according to whether it is in keeping with or in violation of a useful rule, and a rule is judged useful or not by the consequences of its general practice . Mill has sometimes been interpreted as a “rule” utilitarian, whereas Bentham and Sidgwick were “ act” utilitarians.

Another objection, often posed against the hedonistic value theory held by Bentham, holds that the value of life is more than a balance of pleasure over pain. Mill, in contrast to Bentham, discerned differences in the quality of pleasures that make some intrinsically preferable to others independently of intensity and duration (the quantitative dimensions recognized by Bentham). Some philosophers in the utilitarian tradition have recognized certain wholly nonhedonistic values without losing their utilitarian credentials. Thus, the English philosopher G.E. Moore , one of the founders of contemporary analytic philosophy , regarded many kinds of consciousness —including friendship, knowledge, and the experience of beauty—as intrinsically valuable independently of pleasure, a position labelled “ ideal ” utilitarianism. Even in limiting the recognition of intrinsic value and disvalue to happiness and unhappiness, some philosophers have argued that those feelings cannot adequately be further broken down into terms of pleasure and pain and have thus preferred to defend the theory in terms of maximizing happiness and minimizing unhappiness. It is important to note, however, that, even for the hedonistic utilitarians, pleasure and pain are not thought of in purely sensual terms; pleasure and pain for them can be components of experiences of all sorts. Their claim is that, if an experience is neither pleasurable nor painful, then it is a matter of indifference and has no intrinsic value.

Another objection to utilitarianism is that the prevention or elimination of suffering should take precedence over any alternative act that would only increase the happiness of someone already happy. Some modern utilitarians have modified their theory to require this focus or even to limit moral obligation to the prevention or elimination of suffering—a view labelled “negative” utilitarianism.

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Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims I morally ought to perform some action if and only if, and because, performing that action maximizes my self-interest. Rational egoism claims that I ought to perform some action if and only if, and because, performing that action maximizes my self-interest. (Here the “ought” is not restricted to the moral “ought”.)

1. Psychological Egoism

2. ethical egoism, 3. rational egoism, 4. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

All forms of egoism require explication of “self-interest” (or “welfare” or “well-being”). There are three main theories. Preference or desire accounts identify self-interest with the satisfaction of one’s desires. Often, and most plausibly, these desires are restricted to self-regarding desires. What makes a desire self-regarding is controversial, but there are clear cases and counter-cases: a desire for my own pleasure is self-regarding; a desire for the welfare of others is not. Objective accounts identify self-interest with the possession of states (such as virtue or knowledge) that are valuable independently of whether they are desired. Hybrid accounts give a role to both desires (or pleasure) and states that are valuable independently of whether they are desired. For example, perhaps the increase to my well-being brought about by a satisfied desire (or a pleasure) is even greater if it is a desire for (or pleasure in) knowledge. Or perhaps the increase to my well-being brought about by a piece of knowledge is even greater if I desire (or take pleasure in) it. Hedonism, which identifies self-interest with pleasure, is either a preference or an objective account, according to whether what counts as pleasure is determined by one’s desires.

Psychological egoism claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. This allows for action that fails to maximize perceived self-interest, but rules out the sort of behavior psychological egoists like to target — such as altruistic behavior or motivation by thoughts of duty alone. It allows for weakness of will, since in weakness of will cases I am still aiming at my own welfare; I am weak in that I do not act as I aim. And it allows for aiming at things other than one’s welfare, such as helping others, where these things are a means to one’s welfare.

Psychological egoism is supported by our frequent observation of self-interested behavior. Apparently altruistic action is often revealed to be self-interested. And we typically motivate people by appealing to their self-interest (through, for example, punishments and rewards).

A common objection to psychological egoism, made famously by Joseph Butler, is that I must desire things other than my own welfare in order to get welfare. Say I derive welfare from playing hockey. Unless I desired, for its own sake, to play hockey, I would not derive welfare from playing. Or say I derive welfare from helping others. Unless I desired, for its own sake, that others do well, I would not derive welfare from helping them. Welfare results from my action, but cannot be the only aim of my action.

The psychological egoist can concede that I must have desires for particular things, such as playing hockey. But there is no need to concede that the satisfaction of these desires is not part of my welfare. My welfare might consist simply in the satisfaction of self-regarding desires. In the case of deriving welfare from helping others, the psychological egoist can again concede that I would not derive welfare without desiring some particular thing, but need not agree that what I desire for its own sake is that others do well. That I am the one who helps them may, for example, satisfy my self-regarding desire for power.

A bigger problem for psychological egoism is that some behavior does not seem to be explained by self-regarding desires. Say a soldier throws himself on a grenade to prevent others from being killed. It does not seem that the soldier is pursuing his perceived self-interest. It is plausible that, if asked, the soldier would have said that he threw himself on the grenade because he wanted to save the lives of others or because it was his duty. He would deny as ridiculous the claim that he acted in his self-interest.

The psychological egoist might reply that the soldier is lying or self-deceived. Perhaps he threw himself on the grenade because he believed that he could not bear to live with himself afterwards if he did not do so. He has a better life, in terms of welfare, by avoiding years of guilt. The main problem here is that while this is a possible account of some cases, there is no reason to think it covers all cases. Another problem is that guilt may presuppose that the soldier has a non-self-regarding desire for doing what he takes to be right.

The psychological egoist might reply that some such account must be right. After all, the soldier did what he most wanted to do, and so must have been pursuing his perceived self-interest. In one sense, this is true. If self-interest is identified with the satisfaction of all of one’s preferences, then all intentional action is self-interested (at least if intentional actions are always explained by citing preferences, as most believe). Psychological egoism turns out to be trivially true. This would not content defenders of psychological egoism, however. They intend an empirical theory that, like other such theories, it is at least possible to refute by observation.

There is another way to show that the trivial version of psychological egoism is unsatisfactory. We ordinarily think there is a significant difference in selfishness between the soldier’s action and that of another soldier who, say, pushes someone onto the grenade to avoid being blown up himself. We think the former is acting unselfishly while the latter is acting selfishly. According to the trivial version of psychological egoism, both soldiers are equally selfish, since both are doing what they most desire.

The psychological egoist might handle apparent cases of self-sacrifice, not by adopting the trivial version, but rather by claiming that facts about the self-interest of the agent explain all behavior. Perhaps as infants we have only self-regarding desires; we come to desire other things, such as doing our duty, by learning that these other things satisfy our self-regarding desires; in time, we pursue the other things for their own sakes.

Even if this picture of development is true, however, it does not defend psychological egoism, since it admits that we sometimes ultimately aim at things other than our welfare. An account of the origins of our non-self-regarding desires does not show that they are really self-regarding. The soldier’s desire is to save others, not increase his own welfare, even if he would not have desired to save others unless saving others was, in the past, connected to increasing his welfare.

The psychological egoist must argue that we do not come to pursue things other than our welfare for their own sakes. In principle, it seems possible to show this by showing that non-self-regarding desires do not continue for long once their connection to our welfare is broken. However, evidence for this dependence claim has not been forthcoming.

Indeed, when examining the empirical evidence, two sorts of approach have been used to argue against psychological egoism.

First, Daniel Batson and colleagues found that increased empathy leads to increased helping behaviour. One hypothesis is altruistic: empathy causes a non-instrumental desire to help. There are many competing egoistic hypotheses. Empathy might cause an unpleasant experience that subjects believe they can stop by helping; or subjects might think failing to help in cases of high empathy is more likely to lead to punishment by others, or that helping here is more likely to be rewarded by others; or subjects might think this about self-administered punishment (e.g., guilt) or reward. In an ingenious series of experiments, Batson compared the egoistic hypotheses, one by one, against the altruistic hypothesis. He found that the altruistic hypothesis always made superior predictions. Against the unpleasant experience hypothesis, Batson found that giving high-empathy subjects easy ways of stopping the experience other than by helping did not reduce helping. Against the punishment by others hypothesis, Batson found that letting high-empathy subjects believe that their behaviour would be secret did not reduce helping. Against the self-administered reward hypothesis, Batson found that the mood of high-empathy subjects depended on whether they believed that help was needed, whether or not they could do the helping, rather than on whether they helped (and so could self-reward). Against the self-administered punishment hypothesis, Batson found that making high-empathy subjects believe they would feel less guilt from not helping (by letting them believe that few others had volunteered to help) did not reduce helping.

One might quibble with some of the details. Perhaps subjects did not believe that the easy ways of stopping the painful experience Batson provided, such as leaving the viewing room, would stop it. (For an account of an experiment done in reply, favouring Batson, see Stich, Doris and Roedder 2010, as well as Batson 2011 135–145.) Perhaps a Batson-proof egoistic hypothesis could be offered: say that subjects believe that the only way of stopping the pain (or avoiding self-punishment) is by helping (though whether subjects have this belief might be tested for on its own). But on the whole, Batson’s experiments are very bad news for psychological egoism. (For further discussion of Batson, see May 2011a and Slote 2013.)

Second, Elliot Sober and David Wilson argue that evolutionary theory supports altruism. Parental care might be explained on egoistic grounds: a belief about the child’s distress causes the parent pain that the parent believes she can alleviate by helping, or the parent believes that she will be caused pain if she does not help. Parental care might also be explained on altruistic grounds: the parent has a non-instrumental desire that the child do well. Lastly, parental care might be explained by a combination of these mechanisms. Sober and Wilson argue that more reliable care would be provided by the altruistic or combination mechanisms. Given the importance of parental care, this is a reason for thinking that natural selection would have favoured one of these mechanisms. The egoistic mechanism is less reliable for several reasons: beliefs about the child’s distress may fail to cause the parent pain (even bodily injury does not always cause pain, so pain is unlikely to be always caused by beliefs about distress); the parent may fail to believe that helping will best reduce her pain; there may not be enough pain produced; the combination view has the advantage of an extra mechanism.

This argument has drawbacks. Natural selection does not always provide back-up mechanisms (I have but one liver). Natural selection sometimes has my desires caused by feelings that are produced by a belief rather than directly by the belief (my desire to run away from danger is often caused by my fear, rather than by the mere belief that there is danger). And in these cases, as in the case of the imperfectly correlated pain and bodily injury, there seems usually to be enough feeling. The altruistic hypothesis also has some of the same problems: for example, just as there might not be enough pain, the non-instrumental desire that the child do well might not be strong enough to defeat other desires. Indeed, without an estimate of how strong this desire is, there is no reason to think the egoistic hypothesis is less reliable. It may have more points at which it can go wrong, but produce more care than a direct but weak altruistic mechanism. (For many of these worries, and others, see Stich, Doris and Roedder 2010.)

Even if evolutionary arguments can be met, however, psychological egoism faces the problems noted earlier. In response, the psychological egoist might move to what Gregory Kavka (1986, 64–80) calls “predominant egoism:” we act unselfishly only rarely, and then typically where the sacrifice is small and the gain to others is large or where those benefiting are friends, family, or favorite causes. Predominant egoism is not troubled by the soldier counter-example, since it allows exceptions; it is not trivial; and it seems empirically plausible. (For other weakened positions, see LaFollette 1988 and Mercer 2001.)

Ethical egoism claims that I morally ought to perform some action if and only if, and because, performing that action maximizes my self-interest. (There are possibilities other than maximization. One might, for example, claim that one ought to achieve a certain level of welfare, but that there is no requirement to achieve more. Ethical egoism might also apply to things other than acts, such as rules or character traits. Since these variants are uncommon, and the arguments for and against them are largely the same as those concerning the standard version, I set them aside.)

One issue concerns how much ethical egoism differs in content from standard moral theories. It might appear that it differs a great deal. After all, moral theories such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality require that an agent give weight to the interests of others. They sometimes require uncompensated sacrifices, particularly when the loss to the agent is small and the gain to others is large. (Say the cost to me of saving a drowning person is getting my shirtsleeve wet.) Ethical egoists can reply, however, that egoism generates many of the same duties to others. The argument runs as follows. Each person needs the cooperation of others to obtain goods such as defense or friendship. If I act as if I give no weight to others, others will not cooperate with me. If, say, I break my promises whenever it is in my direct self-interest to do so, others will not accept my promises, and may even attack me. I do best, then, by acting as if others have weight (provided they act as if I have weight in return).

It is unlikely that this argument proves that ethical egoism generates all of the standard duties to others. For the argument depends on the ability of others to cooperate with me or attack me should I fail to cooperate. In dealings with others who lack these abilities, the egoist has no reason to cooperate. The duties to others found in standard moral theories are not conditional in this way. I do not, for example, escape a duty to save a drowning person, when I can easily do so, just because the drowning person (or anyone watching) happens never to be able to offer fruitful cooperation or retaliation.

The divergence between ethical egoism and standard moral theories appears in other ways.

First, the ethical egoist will rank as most important duties that bring her the highest payoff. Standard moral theories determine importance at least in part by considering the payoff to those helped. What brings the highest payoff to me is not necessarily what brings the highest payoff to those helped. I might, for example, profit more from helping the local Opera society refurbish its hall than I would from giving to famine relief in Africa, but standard moral theories would rank famine relief as more important than Opera hall improvements.

Second, the cooperation argument cannot be extended to justify extremely large sacrifices, such as the soldier falling on the grenade, that standard moral theories rank either as most important or supererogatory. The cooperation argument depends on a short-term loss (such as keeping a promise that it is inconvenient to keep) being recompensed by a long-term gain (such as being trusted in future promises). Where the immediate loss is one’s life (or irreplaceable features such as one’s sight), there is no long-term gain, and so no egoist argument for the sacrifice.

An ethical egoist might reply by taking the cooperation argument further. Perhaps I cannot get the benefits of cooperation without converting to some non-egoist moral theory. That is, it is not enough that I act as if others have weight; I must really give them weight. I could still count as an egoist, in the sense that I have adopted the non-egoist theory on egoist grounds.

One problem is that it seems unlikely that I can get the benefits of cooperation only by conversion. Provided I act as if others have weight for long enough, others will take me as giving them weight, and so cooperate, whether I really give them weight or not. In many situations, others will neither have the ability to see my true motivation nor care about it.

Another problem is that conversion can be costly. I might be required by my non-egoist morality to make a sacrifice for which I cannot be compensated (or pass up a gain so large that passing it up will not be compensated for). Since I have converted from egoism, I can no longer reject making the sacrifice or passing up the gain on the ground that it will not pay. It is safer, and seemingly feasible, to remain an egoist while cooperating in most cases. If so, ethical egoism and standard moralities will diverge in some cases. (For discussion of the cooperation argument, see Frank 1988; Gauthier 1986 ch. 6; Kavka 1984 and 1986 Part II; Sidgwick 1907 II.V.)

There is another way to try to show that ethical egoism and standard moral theories do not differ much. One might hold one particular objective theory of self-interest, according to which my welfare lies in possessing the virtues required by standard moral theories. This requires an argument to show that this particular objective theory gives the right account of self-interest. It also faces a worry for any objective theory: objective theories seem implausible as accounts of welfare. If, say, all my preferences favor my ignoring the plight of others, and these preferences do not rest on false beliefs about issues such as the likelihood of receiving help, it seems implausible (and objectionably paternalistic) to claim that “really” my welfare lies in helping others. I may have a duty to help others, and the world might be better if I helped others, but it does not follow that I am better off by helping others. (For a more optimistic verdict on this strategy, noting its roots in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the British Idealists, see Brink 1997 and 2003.)

Of course the divergence between ethical egoism and standard moral theories need not bother an ethical egoist. An ethical egoist sees egoism as superior to other moral theories. Whether it is superior depends on the strength of the arguments for it. Two arguments are popular.

First, one might argue for a moral theory, as one argues for a scientific theory, by showing that it best fits the evidence. In the case of moral theories, the evidence is usually taken to be our most confident common-sense moral judgments. Egoism fits many of these, such as the requirements of cooperation in ordinary cases. It fits some judgments better than utilitarianism does. For example, it allows one to keep some good, such as a job, for oneself, even if giving the good to someone else would help him slightly more, and it captures the intuition that I need not let others exploit me. The problem is that, as the discussion of the cooperation argument shows, it also fails to fit some of the confident moral judgments we make.

Second, one might argue for a moral theory by showing that it is dictated by non-moral considerations -- in particular, by facts about motivation. It is commonly held that moral judgments must be practical, or capable of motivating those who make them. If psychological egoism were true, this would restrict moral judgments to those made by egoism. Other moral judgments would be excluded since it would be impossible to motivate anyone to follow them.

One problem with this argument is that psychological egoism seems false. Replacing psychological with predominant egoism loses the key claim that it is impossible to motivate anyone to make an uncompensated sacrifice.

The ethical egoist might reply that, if predominant egoism is true, ethical egoism may require less deviation from our ordinary actions than any standard moral theory. But fit with motivation is hardly decisive; any normative theory, including ethical egoism, is intended to guide and criticize our choices, rather than simply endorse whatever we do. When I make an imprudent choice, this does not count against ethical egoism, and in favor of a theory recommending imprudence.

The argument has other problems. One could deny that morality must be practical in the required sense. Perhaps morality need not be practical at all: we do not always withdraw moral judgments when we learn that the agent could not be motivated to follow them. Or perhaps moral judgments must be capable of motivating not just anyone, but only idealized versions of ourselves, free from (say) irrationality. In this case, it is insufficient to describe how we are motivated; what is relevant is a description of how we would be motivated were we rational.

Finally, if I do not believe that some action is ultimately in my self-interest, it follows from psychological egoism that I cannot aim to do it. But say I am wrong: the action is in my self-interest. Ethical egoism then says that it is right for me to do something I cannot aim to do. It violates practicality just as any other moral theory does.

So far a number of arguments for ethical egoism have been considered. There are a number of standard arguments against it.

G. E. Moore argued that ethical egoism is self-contradictory. If I am an egoist, I hold that I ought to maximize my good. I deny that others ought to maximize my good (they should maximize their own goods). But to say that x is “my good” is just to say that my possessing x is good. (I cannot possess the goodness.) If my possession of x is good, then I must hold that others ought to maximize my possession of it. I both deny and am committed to affirming that others ought to maximize my good. (Sometimes Moore suggests instead that “my good” be glossed as “ x is good and x is mine.” This does not yield the contradiction above, since it does not claim that my possession of x is good. But it yields a different contradiction: if x is good, everyone ought to maximize it wherever it appears; egoists hold that I ought to maximize x only when it appears in me.)

One reply is that egoism can be stated without using “my good.” The egoist can hold (as Sidgwick usually does) that she ought to maximize her happiness or self-interest (Prichard 2002: 176).

Another reply is that one might keep “my good” but deny that if my possessing x is good, others ought to maximize my possession of it. C. D. Broad writes that the egoist can hold that “equally pleasant states of mind are equally good things, no matter whose states of mind they may be. But...each of us is properly concerned, not with all good things, but only with a certain restricted class of good things, viz., those which are states of his own mind” (Broad 1930: 243; also Broad 1942: 44–6, 1971c: 347–50, Prichard 2002: 217, Ewing 1965: 33). As Broad notes, this sort of position is not unique to egoists; deontologists also deny that one ought always maximize the good.

There is another way to deny that if my possessing x is good, others ought to maximize my possession of it. One might hold that “my good” should not be analyzed in terms of what Moore calls “good absolutely” but rather is a distinct concept, good-for-me, linked only to agent-relative reasons (Mackie 1976, Smith 2003). It does not follow from “my possession of x is good-for-me” that others ought to maximize what is good-for-me.

Moore also suggests that the reason for me to pursue my good is the goodness of the thing I obtain. If what I obtain is good, then there is reason for everyone to pursue it, not just in me, but anywhere. Again, moving to good-for-me avoids this consequence. But something close to this argument is plausible, especially for some bad things. One might argue that it is the way my pain feels — its badness — and not any connection between me and the pain that gives me reason to alleviate it. If so, I have reason to alleviate the pain of others (Nagel 1986, Rachels 2002). (This argument can be directed against rational egoism as well.)

A second argument against ethical egoism was made by H. A. Prichard. He argues that self-interest is the wrong sort of reason. I do not, for example, think the reason I have a duty to help a drowning child is that helping benefits me (Prichard 2002 1, 9, 26, 29, 30, 122, 123, 171, 188). Similarly, Prichard chastises Sidgwick for taking seriously the view that there is “a duty ...to do those acts which we think will lead to our happiness” (Prichard 2002 135).

This may be convincing when “duty” means “moral duty.” It is less convincing when, as Prichard also thinks, the issue is simply what one ought to do. He takes there to be only one sense of “ought,” which he treats as “morally ought.” Any other “ought” is treated as really making the non-normative claim that a certain means is efficient for attaining a certain end. But ethical egoism can be seen as making categorical and normative ought-claims. And the historical popularity of ethical or rational egoism (see Crisp 2019), which Prichard so often notes, indicates that self-interest is not obviously irrelevant to what one ought to do.

A third argument, like Moore’s, claims that ethical egoism is inconsistent in various ways. Say ethical egoism recommends that A and B both go to a certain hockey game, since going to the game is in the self-interest of each. Unfortunately, only one seat remains. Ethical egoism, then, recommends an impossible state of affairs. Or say that I am A and an ethical egoist. I both claim that B ought to go to the game, since that is in her self-interest, and I do not want B to go to the game, since B’s going to the game is against my self-interest.

Against the first inconsistency charge, the ethical egoist can reply that ethical egoism provides no neutral ranking of states of affairs. It recommends to A that A go to the game, and to B that B go to the game, but is silent on the value of A and B both attending the game.

Against the second inconsistency charge, the ethical egoist can claim that she morally recommends that B go to the game, although she desires that B not go. This is no more odd than claiming that my opponent in a game would be wise to adopt a particular strategy, while desiring that he not do so. True, the ethical egoist is unlikely to recommend ethical egoism to others, to blame others for violations of what ethical egoism requires, to justify herself to others on the basis of ethical egoism, or to express moral attitudes such as forgiveness and resentment. These publicity worries may disqualify ethical egoism as a moral theory, but do not show inconsistency.

A fourth argument against ethical egoism is just that: ethical egoism does not count as a moral theory. One might set various constraints on a theory’s being a moral theory. Many of these constraints are met by ethical egoism — the formal constraints, for example, that moral claims must be prescriptive and universalizable. Ethical egoism issues prescriptions — “do what maximizes your self-interest” — and it issues the same prescriptions for people in relevantly similar situations. But other constraints are problematic for ethical egoism: perhaps a moral theory must sometimes require uncompensated sacrifices; or perhaps it must supply a single, neutral ranking of actions that each agent must follow in cases where interests conflict; or perhaps it must respect principles such as “that I ought to do x is a consideration in favor of others not preventing me from doing x ;” or perhaps it must be able to be made public in the way, just noted, that ethical egoism cannot. (For sample discussions of these two objections, see Baier 1958 189–191; Campbell 1972; Frankena 1973 18–20; Kalin 1970.)

The issue of what makes for a moral theory is contentious. An ethical egoist could challenge whatever constraint is deployed against her. But a neater reply is to move to rational egoism, which makes claims about what one has reason to do, ignoring the topic of what is morally right. This gets at what ethical egoists intend, while skirting the issue of constraints on moral theories. After all, few if any ethical egoists think of egoism as giving the correct content of morality, while also thinking that what they have most reason to do is determined by some non-egoist consideration. One could then, if one wished, argue for ethical egoism from rational egoism and the plausible claim that the best moral theory must tell me what I have most reason to do.

Rational egoism claims that I ought to perform some action if and only if, and because, performing that action maximizes my self-interest. (As with ethical egoism, there are variants which drop maximization or evaluate rules or character traits rather than actions. There are also variants which make the maximization of self-interest necessary but not sufficient, or sufficient but not necessary, for an action to be the action I ought to perform. Again, I set these issues aside.) Rational egoism makes claims about what I ought, or have reason, to do, without restricting the “ought” or “reason” to a moral “ought” or “reason.”

Like ethical egoism, rational egoism needs arguments to support it. One might cite our most confident judgments about rational action and claim that rational egoism best fits these. The problem is that our most confident judgments about rational action seem to be captured by a different, extremely popular theory — the instrumental theory of rationality. According to the instrumental theory, I ought to perform some action if and only if, and because, performing that action maximizes the satisfaction of my preferences. Since psychological egoism seems false, it may be rational for me to make an uncompensated sacrifice for the sake of others, for this may be what, on balance, best satisfies my (strong, non-self-interested) preferences. This conflict with the instrumental theory is a major problem for rational egoism.

The rational egoist might reply that the instrumental theory is equally a problem for any standard moral theory that claims to give an account of what one ought rationally, or all things considered, to do. If, for example, a utilitarian claims that I have most reason to give to charity, since that maximizes the general happiness, I could object that giving to charity cannot be rational given my particular preferences, which are for things other than the general happiness.

A different problem for rational egoism is that it appears arbitrary. Suppose I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of blue-eyed people, but not of other people. Unless I can explain why blue-eyed people are to be preferred, my claim looks arbitrary, in the sense that I have given no reason for the different treatments. As a rational egoist, I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of one person (myself). Unless I can explain why I should be preferred, my claim looks equally arbitrary.

One reply is to argue that non-arbitrary distinctions can be made by one’s preferences. Say I like anchovies and hate broccoli. This makes my decision to buy anchovies rather than broccoli non-arbitrary. Similarly, my preference for my own welfare makes my concentration on my own welfare non-arbitrary.

There are two problems for this reply.

First, we do not always take preferences to establish non-arbitrary distinctions. If I defend favoring blue-eyed people simply by noting that I like blue-eyed people, without any justification for my liking, this seems unsatisfactory. The rational egoist must argue that hers is a case where preferences are decisive.

Second, if psychological egoism is false, I might lack a preference for my own welfare. It would follow that for me, a distinction between my welfare and that of others would be arbitrary, and the rational egoist claim that each ought to maximize his own welfare would be unjustified when applied to me. The proposal that preferences establish non-arbitrary distinctions supports the instrumental theory better than rational egoism.

Another reply to the arbitrariness worry is to claim that certain distinctions just are non-arbitrary. Which distinctions these are is revealed by looking at whether we ask for justifications of the relevance of the distinction. In the case of my maximizing of the welfare of the blue-eyed, we do ask for a justification; we do not take “because they’re blue-eyed” as an adequate defense of a reason to give to the blue-eyed. In the case of my maximizing my own welfare, however, “because it will make me better off” may seem a reasonable justification; we do not quickly ask “why does that matter?”

In a much-quoted passage, Sidgwick claimed that rational egoism is not arbitrary: “It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently ‘I’ am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an individual” (Sidgwick 1907, 498). This can be interpreted in various ways (Shaver 1999, 82–98; Shaver 2020; Phillips 2011, ch. 5).

On the most natural interpretation, Sidgwick is noting various non-normative facts. I have a distinct history, memories, and perhaps special access to my mental contents. But it is not clear how these facts support the normative conclusion Sidgwick draws. Utilitarians, for example, agree about these facts. (Some of the facts may also not give the sharp distinction Sidgwick wants. I may usually know more about my pain than yours, but this difference seems a matter of degree.)

Sidgwick might instead be claiming that attacks on rational egoism from certain views of personal identity fail because they rest on a false view of personal identity. He might have in mind Humean views (as in Parfit, discussed below). Perhaps more likely, he might have in mind Schopenhauer’s view — which Schopenhauer deploys against egoism — that there is a “real identity of any one ego with all others” (Sidgwick 1896: 281; Schopenhauer 1965: 204–7). (Schopenhauer thinks this follows from Kant’s view that space and time belong only to appearances.) But this would only defend a presupposition of rational egoism — that there are separate individuals. It would not follow that the distinction between them matters.

Finally, Sidgwick might be claiming that my point of view, like an impartial point of view, is non-arbitrary. But there are other points of view, such as that of my species, family or country. Sidgwick finds them arbitrary. It is hard to see why my point of view, and an impartial point of view, are non-arbitrary, while anything in between is arbitrary. For example, in favour of my point of view, Sidgwick could note that I am an individual rather than a hive-member. But I am a member of various groups as well. And if my being an individual is important, this cuts against the importance of taking up an impartial point of view just as it cuts against the importance of taking up the point of view of various groups. Similarly, if the impartial point of view is defended as non-arbitrary because it makes no distinctions, both the point of view of various groups and my individual point of view are suspect.

Debate over rational egoism was revitalized by Parfit 1984 pts. II-III. Parfit gives two main arguments against rational egoism. Both focus on the rational egoist’s attitude toward the future: the rational egoist holds that the time at which some good comes is by itself irrelevant, so that, for example, I ought to sacrifice a small present gain for a larger future gain.

First, one could challenge rational egoism, not only with the instrumental theory, but also with the “present-aim” theory of rationality. According to the present-aim theory, I have most reason to do what maximizes the satisfaction of my present desires. Even if all of these desires are self-regarding, the present-aim theory need not coincide with rational egoism. Suppose I know that in the future I will desire a good pension, but I do not now desire a good pension for myself in the future; I have different self-regarding desires. Suppose also that, looking back from the end of my life, I will have maximized my welfare by contributing now to the pension. Rational egoism requires that I contribute now. The present-aim theory does not. It claims that my reasons are relative not only to who has a desire — me rather than someone else — but also to when the desire is held — now rather than in the past or future. The obvious justification an egoist could offer for not caring about time — that one should care only about the amount of good produced — is suicidal, since that should lead one not to care about who receives the good. One reason the present-aim theory is important is that it shows there is a coherent, more minimal alternative to rational egoism. The rational egoist cannot argue that egoism is the most minimal theory, and that standard moral theories, by requiring more of people, require special, additional justification. (For a very different argument to show again that an alternative to morality is less minimal than expected — directed more at the instrumental theory than rational egoism — see Korsgaard 2005.)

Second, rational egoism might be challenged by some views of personal identity. Say half of my brain will be transplanted to another body A . My old body will be destroyed. A will have my memories, traits, and goals. It seems reasonable for me to care specially about A , and indeed to say that A is identical to me. Now say half of my brain will go in B and half in C . Again B and C will have my memories, traits, and goals. It seems reasonable for me to care specially about B and C . But B and C cannot be identical to me, since they are not identical to one another (they go on to live different lives). So the ground of my care is not identity, but rather the psychological connections through memories, etc. Even in the case of A , what grounds my care are these connections, not identity: my relation to A is the same as my relation to B (or C ), so what grounds my care about A grounds my care about B (or C ) — and that cannot be identity. (To make the point in a different way — I would not take steps to ensure that only one of B and C come about.) If so, I need not care specially about some of my future selves, since they will not have these connections to me. And I do have reason to care specially about other people who bear these connections to me now.

One worry is that psychological continuity might substitute for identity. Say F 1 and F 2 are psychologically connected because (for example) F 2 has a memory of F 1 ’s experiences. Suppose that F 3 has a memory of F 2 ’s experiences but no memory of F 1 . F 1 and F 3 are psychologically continuous , though not psychologically connected. (Parfit’s view is that psychological connection and continuity both ground special care, if special care is grounded at all.) In the cases above, A , B and C are continuous with me. An egoist might claim that continuity alone matters for special care; that fits the cases. If so, I do have reason to care specially about all of the future selves I am continuous with, and do not have this reason to care specially about others with whom I am not continuous. (For this and other worries about Parfit, see Brink 1992, Johnston 1997, Hills 2010 111–116.)

Parfit could reply that continuity might not suffice for special care. It is not clear that F 1 has reason to care specially about F 3 — F 3 might seem a stranger, perhaps even an unlikeable one. When young, some worry about becoming someone they would not now like. They see no reason for special care for this future person. This worry makes sense, but if continuity were sufficient for special care, it would not. If so, perhaps both continuity and connection, or perhaps continuity and admirability, are needed. This would let Parfit keep the conclusion that I need not care specially for some of my future selves, but would not justify the conclusion that I have reason to care specially about other people who are merely connected to me now (or are merely admirable).

A worry is that some do care specially about merely continuous future selves. With opposed intuitions about when special care is due, the tactic of arguing from intuitions about special care to the grounds of this care is indecisive.

There is a much simpler argument. Prichard argued that self-interest does not give a reason. This might be convincing if “reason” means “moral reason.” It is not convincing against a rational egoist, whose reasons are “flavourless” (see previous section). But Prichard’s argument might be improved. Suppose, unlike Prichard, we admit reasons that are not specifically moral (or think there are moral reasons to benefit oneself). The egoist still holds a counter-intuitive position. As A. C. Ewing notes, the egoist thinks there is only one sort of reason. The egoist denies, for example, that, by itself, the fact that the child will otherwise drown gives me any reason to save her. The egoist denies that, by itself, the fact that I have made a promise gives me any reason to keep it. Even if I have reason to do what promotes my self-interest, most think I have other reasons as well. The egoist needs to explain why this is not so (Ewing 1965: 28; Shaver 2022).

One might object to Prichard-style arguments that (a) they are question-begging, since egoists will hardly agree that my reason for helping is something other than the benefit to me, and (b) given disagreement over this claim about my reason, the appropriate response is to suspend judgment about it. Alison Hills, in 2010 parts II and III, replies to (a) that moralists can assure themselves by giving arguments that start from premises like [H] “I have a reason to help regardless of whether doing so contributes to my self-interest,” provided [H] is not inferred from the falsity of rational egoism — perhaps it is self-evident (see also Rachels 1974). In reply to (b), she argues that disagreement over [H] does not require moralists to suspend judgment about it, although disagreement over an egoistic premiss like “I have reason to help only because doing so benefits me” does require egoists to suspend judgment. The difference, she argues, is that rational egoists (like others making non-moral claims) aim at knowledge, and for putative knowledge, in cases of disagreement between epistemic peers, suspension of belief is required. If we disagree, and both of us know that one of us is no more likely to be right than the other, we should each suspend belief. Moralists, Hills argues, have a different aim: they aim primarily not at knowledge but at the ability to draw, on their own, true moral conclusions from the evidence. She takes this to be supported by the thought that moral worth requires this ability. Since aiming at this ability requires not giving weight to the conclusions of others, suspension of belief in cases of disagreement is not required of moralists.

Obviously, much here depends on the claim about the aim of moralists. One might object that moralists care much more about getting true moral conclusions than about arriving at them on their own. If I could guarantee that I do the right act by relying on a Moral Answers Machine (and not otherwise), I ought to do so. In addition, since moralists do want true moral conclusions, and peer disagreement is relevant to pursuing truth (see the entry on disagreement ), Hills’ moralists both need and cannot (by one means) pursue truth.

There is another recent argument against rational egoism (Rachels and Alter 2005, Tersman 2008, and especially de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014). (1) Believing that rational egoism is true increases my reproductive fitness, whether or not rational egoism is true. (2) Therefore my belief that rational egoism is true (or, better, that rational egoism appears to me true upon reflection) does not help to justify rational egoism, since I would have that belief whether or not rational egoism is true. (3) For some other normative beliefs (such as belief in utilitarianism), having the belief does not increase reproductive fitness. (4) Therefore my belief that (say) utilitarianism is true can help justify utilitarianism. (Without (3) and (4), there is no argument against rational egoism in particular.)

Here I put aside general objections to evolutionary debunking arguments (see, for example, Shafer-Landau 2012 or Schafer 2010). I also put aside the possibility of debunking arguments that would target the impartiality of utilitarianism (Andes 2019).

One worry is that what best increases reproductive fitness is acting as a kin altruist rather than as a rational egoist (Crisp 2012, Other Internet Resources). Presumably, then, it is believing that I ought to act as a kin altruist, rather than as a rational egoist, that best increases my reproductive fitness. (If there is a tie between what increases reproductive fitness and belief, and believing that rational egoism is true is best for reproductive fitness, one would expect many to believe that rational egoism is true. But very few do, while many endorse Broad’s “self-referential altruism” (Broad 1971b).) De Lazari-Radek and Singer reply that the recommendations of rational egoism are very close to those of kin altruism, and much closer to those of kin altruism than are the recommendations of utilitarianism (2014 194). But rational egoism and kin altruism do make opposed recommendations. For example, kin altruism might recommend that I sacrifice myself for my family, whether I care about them or not, whereas rational egoism would recommend sacrifice only if my welfare were to be higher were I to sacrifice and die rather than not sacrifice and live. It is also hard to think of a plausible argument which has kin altruism as a premiss and rational egoism as the conclusion, so doubts about kin altruism do not seem to undercut arguments for rational egoism. Nor is it clear how noting a difference in the closeness of recommendations justifies concluding that rational egoism is debunked and utilitarianism not debunked.

Another worry is that if my belief that I have reason to care about my own well-being is unjustified, an argument that starts with that reason as a premiss, and then adds that the focus on my own well-being is arbitrary and so should be broadened to include everyone, is undercut. One might reply (with de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014 191) that there are other ways of arriving at the conclusion that I have reason to care about the well-being of everyone. Perhaps something like utilitarianism is justified as self-evident rather than inferred from some other reasons. The evolutionary argument targets conclusions that can be reached only by appeal to a belief whose support can be undercut by noting that we would have the belief whether or not it is true. It is then open to the rational egoist to say that there is some other way of arriving at rational egoism. Perhaps this is unpromising, since the obvious way to justify rational egoism, as self-evident, is to be undercut by (1) and (2). However, (i) if believing that one ought to act as a kin altruist rather than as a rational egoist is what best increases reproductive fitness, rational egoism is, like utilitarianism, not undercut by (1) and (2). (ii) A component of utilitarianism (and any plausible theory), the belief that pain is bad, seems to be a belief that best increases reproductive fitness whether or not it is true (see Kahane 2011 and 2014; for some replies, see Bramble 2017 and Jaquet 2018). Even if nothing is good or bad, believing that pain is bad might increase my motivation to avoid pain and so lead me to survive longer.

A further worry is that it is not clear that having the belief best increases reproductive fitness. De Lazari-Radek and Singer argue, in reply to the objection that their argument takes away the justification for believing that pain is bad, that there is no advantage to believing that pain is bad; I am sufficiently motivated to avoid pain without any such belief (de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014 268–269; for the general point, see Parfit 2011 v. 2 527–30). The same seems to go for rational egoism: I am sufficiently motivated to act egoistically without any belief in the truth of rational egoism.

Prospects for psychological egoism are dim. Even if some version escapes recent empirical arguments, there seems little reason, once the traditional philosophical confusions have been noted, for thinking it is true. At best it is a logical possibility, like some forms of scepticism.

Ethical egoists do best by defending rational egoism instead.

Rational egoism faces objections from arbitrariness, Nagel and Rachels, Parfit, Ewing, and evolutionary debunking. These worries are not decisive. Given this, and given the historical popularity of rational egoism, one might conclude that it must be taken seriously. But there is at least reason to doubt the historical record. Some philosophers stressed the connection between moral action and self-interest because they were concerned with motivation. It does not follow that self-interest is for them a normative standard. And many philosophers may have espoused rational egoism while thinking that God ensured that acting morally maximized one’s self-interest. (Some were keen to stress that virtue must pay in order to give God a role.) Once this belief is dropped, it is not so clear what they would have said (Shaver 1999 ch. 4; see also Crisp 2019).

Psychological Egoism

• Batson, C. D., 1991, The Altruism Question , Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, part III.
• –––, 2011, Altruism in Humans , Oxford: Oxford University Press, part II.
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• Butler, J., 1900, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel , in The Works of Bishop Butler , ed. J. H. Bernard, London: Macmillan, Sermons I and XI.
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• Hume, D., 1975, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , in Enquiries , ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Appendix II.
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• Sidgwick, H., 1907, The Methods of Ethics , Indianapolis: Hackett, seventh edition, 1981, I.IV.
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• Stich, S., J. M. Doris, E. Roedder, 2010, “Altruism,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook , ed. Doris, New York: Oxford, 147–205.

Ethical Egoism

• Baier, K., 1958, The Moral Point of View , Ithaca: Cornell.
• Brink, D., 1997, “Self-love and Altruism,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 14: 122–157.
• Brink, D., 2003, Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Broad, C. D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory , London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Broad, C. D., 1942, “Certain Features of Moore’s Ethical Doctrines,” in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore , ed. P. Schilpp, New York: Tudor, 41–67.
• Broad, C. D., 1971c, “G. E. Moore’s Latest Published Views on Ethics,” in Broad, Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy , London: George Allen and Unwin.
• Burgess-Jackson, K., 2013, “Taking Egoism Seriously,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 16: 529–42.
• Campbell, R., 1972, “A Short Refutation of Ethical Egoism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 2: 249–54.
• Crisp, R., 2019, Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-Interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Frank, R. H., 1988, Passions Within Reason , New York: Norton.
• Frankena, W. K., 1973, Ethics , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
• Gauthier, D., 1986, Morals By Agreement , Oxford: Clarendon.
• Hobbes, T., 1968, Leviathan , ed. C. B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, chs. 14–15.
• Hurka, T., 2010, “Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral Obligation,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 27 (2): 111–134.
• Kalin, J., 1970, “In Defense of Egoism,” in D. Gauthier, Morality and Rational Self-Interest , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
• Kavka, G., 1984, “The Reconciliation Project,” in Morality, Reason, and Truth , ed. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld.
• –––, 1986, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Part II), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Mackie, J. L., 1976, “Sidgwick’s Pessimism,” Philosophical Quarterly , 26: 317–27.
• McConnell, T. C. 1978, “The Argument from Psychological Egoism to Ethical Egoism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 56: 41–47.
• Moore, G. E., 1903, Principia Ethica , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, sec. 59.
• Nagel, T., 1986, The View From Nowhere , New York: Oxford University Press, Ch. 8.
• Prichard, H. A., 2002, Moral Writings , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rachels, S., 2002, “Nagelian Arguments against Egoism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 80: 191–208.
• Sidgwick, H., 1907, The Methods of Ethics , Indianapolis: Hackett, seventh edition, 1981, II.V and concluding chapter.
• Smith, M., 2003, “Neutral and Relative Value after Moore,” Ethics , 113: 576–98.

Rational Egoism

• Andes, P., 2019, “Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology,” Utilitas , 31: 361–377.
• Bramble, B., 2017, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Our Shared History of Pain,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy , 12: 94–101.
• Brink, D., 1992, “Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism,” in Essays on Henry Sidgwick , ed. B. Schultz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Broad, C. D., 1971b, “Self and Others,” in Broad, Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy , London: George Allen and Unwin.
• Ewing, A. C., 1965, Ethics , New York: Free Press.
• Jaquet, F., 2018, “Evolution and Utilitarianism,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 21: 1151–61.
• Johnston, M., 1997, “Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves,” in Reading Parfit , ed. J. Dancy, Oxford: Blackwell, 149–179.
• Kagan, S., 1986, “The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality,” Ethics , 96: 746–759.
• Hills, A., 2010, The Beloved Self , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kahane, G., 2011, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” Noûs , 45: 103–25.
• –––, 2014, “Evolution and Impartiality,” Ethics , 124: 327–41.
• Korsgaard, C, 2005, “The Myth of Egoism,”, in Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays , ed. P. Baumann and M. Betzler, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 59–91.
• Lazari-Radek, K. de, and Singer, P., 2014, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 7.
• Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1986, Reply to Kagan, Ethics , 96: 843–846, 868–869.
• –––, 2011, On What Matters , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Phillips, D., 2011, Sidgwickian Ethics , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rachels, J., 1974, “Two Arguments Against Ethical Egoism,” Philosophia , 4: 297–314.
• Rachels, S. and Alter, T., 2005, “Nothing Matters in Survival,” Journal of Ethics , 9: 311–330.
• Schafer, K., 2010, “Evolution and Normative Scepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 88: 471–88.
• Schopenhauer, A., 1965, On the Basis of Morality , trans. E. F. Payne, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
• Shafer-Landau, R., 2012, “Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism, and Moral Knowledge,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy , 7.1. doi:10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68
• Shaver, R., 1999, Rational Egoism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2020, “Sidgwick’s Distinction Passage,” Utilitas , 32: 444–453.
• –––, 2022, “The Decline of Egoism,” Utilitas , 34: 300–316.
• Sidgwick, H., 1896, Outlines of the History of Ethics, London: Macmillan.
• –––, 1907, The Methods of Ethics , Indianapolis: Hackett, seventh edition, 1981, II.I, IV.II, and concluding chapter.
• Sterba, J., 2013, From Rationality to Equality , Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 3.
• Tersman, F., 2008, “The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 86: 389–405.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Crisp, R., 2012, Summary of a Discussion at PEA Soup: Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, ‘The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason’ .
• Papers on altruism and psychological egoism , at PhilPapers.org.

Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | Hobbes, Thomas | Hume, David | Moore, George Edward: moral philosophy | moral psychology: empirical approaches | personal identity: and ethics | Plato: shorter ethical works | Prichard, Harold Arthur | prisoner’s dilemma | Rand, Ayn | Sidgwick, Henry | Stoicism | well-being

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Ethics is an important area of philosophy that deals with the principles of right and wrong. It can help us to understand our own values and determine how to act in various situations. Three of the most common ethical theories are virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. These theories each have their own approach to determining what is right and wrong and provide guidance for making ethical decisions. Virtue ethics focuses on building good character traits , such as integrity and compassion, as the basis for making ethical decisions.

Utilitarianism looks at the consequences of an action to determine if it is right or wrong. Deontology looks at the intentions behind an action and whether it follows a moral law. In this article, we will explore the three main ethical theories – virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology – in more detail. We will look at their similarities and differences, how they are applied in practice, and how they can help us make more informed ethical decisions. The first theory is Virtue Ethics . This theory focuses on the character traits of an individual as the basis of moral decisions.

This means that an action should be judged not by its intention, but by its results. Finally, deontology is a non-consequentialist ethical theory which states that there are certain moral obligations that people have regardless of their consequences. According to this theory, an action is only considered morally right if it follows certain moral rules or duties. It is important to note that these ethical theories are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, it can be difficult to determine which theory is the most applicable to a given situation. For example, when deciding whether or not to donate money to a charity, a person may consider both utilitarianism and deontology.

Utilitarianism might suggest that donating the money will bring more happiness to the greatest number of people, while deontology could suggest that donating money is a moral obligation regardless of its consequences. To illustrate how these theories can be applied in different scenarios, consider a situation in which a person must decide whether or not to lie. Using virtue ethics, the decision should be based on whether or not lying goes against the individual’s moral character. Utilitarianism might suggest that lying would produce the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness for everyone involved. Finally, deontology might suggest that lying would go against a moral obligation or duty. It is important to remember that these ethical theories are not rigid rules which must be followed in every situation.

Virtue Ethics

It is important to understand these virtues and strive to embody them in order to make moral decisions. An individual's character is seen as the key factor in making ethical decisions. In addition, Virtue Ethics acknowledges that each person is unique, and that there is no one-size-fits-all answer when it comes to determining what is ethical. Virtue Ethics can be applied in various scenarios.

For example, when faced with a difficult decision, an individual can use their understanding of what makes up a good character to inform their choices. This could involve considering whether or not a course of action would lead to a more virtuous character, or if it would have a negative impact on their character. Virtue Ethics also emphasizes the importance of considering the consequences of one's actions, as well as the motivations behind them. Ultimately, Virtue Ethics encourages individuals to strive for moral excellence by developing their character and understanding of the virtues that make up good character.

It can be used to justify decisions that may be seen as counterintuitive or unpopular, as long as they bring about the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. For example, utilitarianism may be used to justify certain government policies, such as raising taxes in order to fund social welfare programs or increasing safety regulations in order to reduce the risk of accidents or injuries. Similarly, it can be used to make decisions about how resources should be allocated, such as deciding which medical treatments should be funded or which areas of research should be prioritized. Utilitarianism can also be applied in everyday life.

This means that the morality of an action should be judged solely on whether it conforms to ethical codes and principles, not on the consequences it produces. This theory is important in making ethical decisions because it provides a clear set of moral principles that can be used to guide decision-making. By adhering to these principles, individuals can ensure that their decisions are in line with their moral values and responsibilities. For example, if one is considering whether or not to lie, a deontologist would evaluate the action based on whether it violates an ethical principle such as 'do not lie'.

Deontology can also be applied in various scenarios. For example, if an individual is considering whether to participate in a particular activity that could potentially harm another person, they would evaluate their decision based on whether it violated a moral principle such as 'do not hurt others'. Similarly, if an individual is considering whether or not to donate money to a charity, they would evaluate their decision based on whether it violated a moral principle such as 'do not neglect those in need'. Overall, deontology is an important ethical theory in making decisions because it provides a clear set of moral principles that can be used to guide decision-making.

The purpose of this article was to explain three major ethical theories – virtue ethics , utilitarianism , and deontology – and how they can be applied in various scenarios. It is important to remember that these theories are not rigid rules which must be followed in every situation but can help individuals make more informed decisions. Each theory provides a unique perspective on ethical decision-making, and understanding their differences and similarities can help people navigate complex ethical issues.

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Consequentialism and Utilitarianism

Author: Shane Gronholz Category: Ethics Word Count: 1000

1. Consequences Matter

Think about something you did today. Chances are, you did it because you wanted to make something happen, to accomplish some goal, to achieve some end, to bring about certain  consequences . It could have been an important end: maybe you gave someone CPR to save their life. Or it could have been relatively insignificant: maybe you had Cap’n Crunch cereal for breakfast because you knew you would enjoy it.

Upon reflection, it starts to seem as though everything we do is to bring about some consequence. What does it mean to  bring about a consequence ? This is a way of changing the world, in a small or a large way: I want the world to be thus-and-so, but it’s not currently thus-and-so, so I will perform this action.

We often, maybe always, do things to bring about certain consequences. 1  Why would you do anything if you didn’t think it was going to have some result? 2

If all our actions are done for the sake of bringing about some consequence, and the consequences are ultimately what we care about, then it makes sense to judge actions, that is, to determine the  moral status  of actions (e.g., wrong, permissible, obligatory), by their consequences.

This view is known as  consequentialism : that the consequences of an action are all that matter in moral assessment. What should we do, according to consequentialism? Consequentialists typically argue that we are obligated to do whatever action has the best  overall  consequences, for all who are affected by the action. Utilitarianism, the most prominent version of consequentialism, makes a further claim about what consequences actually count as good, namely, those that increase the total sum of happiness in the world and/or decrease the total amount of pain.

This essay introduces consequentialism. 

2. Problems for Consequentialism

Consequences  do  seem to dominate our moral thinking. Why should I donate to a charity? Because people in need will be made better off. Why is it wrong to vandalize property? Because you will likely make the space uglier, and it would be costly to fix it. It’s difficult to think of an immoral action that has no bad consequences. Why is lying often wrong? Because if I lie, it might cause you to not trust me in the future, or it might hurt your feelings were you to find out. But many of us think that if a lie would truly be harmless, with no bad consequences, then there wouldn’t be anything wrong with it. That is just what a “white lie” is, and many of us think there is usually nothing wrong with white lies.

While consequentialism sounds appealing at the outset, it has some troubling implications. If you’ve ever said, “The ends do not justify the means,” you were expressing a non-consequentialist sentiment. There are many actions that consequentialism entails are perfectly fine, or even obligatory, that many people think are very wrong.

Suppose your friend, on her deathbed, makes you promise to spread her ashes in the Rocky Mountains. After her death, you realize it would be much more convenient to simply flush her ashes down the toilet. You would save a lot of time and money, and no one would be harmed. Since this act appears to have no bad consequences, consequentialism entails there would be nothing wrong with this. But most of us think there would be.

Another example: five “A-list” celebrities need transplant organs, or they will soon die. No viable organs have been found so far, but while reviewing your medical records for a routine physical, doctors notice that your organs are perfect matches. A plan is hatched to kill you, in secret, making it look like an accident, to save the celebrities. This is thought to be an  overall better consequence  than your living and the five celebrities dying, and their millions of fans devastated. It’s hard to see how a consequentialist could explain how this is wrong. And yet, we tend to think this would be profoundly wrong.

There are many more examples philosophers have considered. I invite you to try to think of some of your own.

How might a consequentialist respond to these cases? One strategy is to show that, in fact, these actions will have bad consequences. Perhaps your friend’s mother will find out what you did with her daughter’s ashes. You might be good at keeping secrets, but keeping secrets is mentally and emotionally taxing. And suppose someone found out that the hospital killed an unsuspecting patient. That would have terrible consequences: fewer sick people would visit hospitals now, for fear of being killed.

But these are fairly weak responses. We can sometimes be pretty certain our actions won’t have any bad consequences. 3  In that case, the consequentialist must admit that flushing the ashes down the toilet was the right thing to do. But perhaps that’s not so bad. If nothing bad whatsoever follows from your action, why not do it after all? No harm, no foul. This response is more satisfying in some cases than others. It might satisfy some in the ashes case, but it’s much less satisfying when it comes to killing innocent people.

3. Rule-Consequentialism

Another way to avoid these problems is to resort to rule-consequentialism. 4  According to rule consequentialism, we should not simply perform the  individual action  that will produce good consequences. Instead, we should follow rules that, when followed, lead to good consequences.

For example, in general, torture has terrible consequences. Always following the rule “do not torture” would have good consequences, 5  so we should follow that rule, even if there could be cases of torture that do not have the terrible consequences torture tends to have.

But this view has a major problem. If what you care about are indeed the consequences, and you realize you could bring about  better  consequences by breaking the rule, why would you continue to abide by the rule? This view seems to undercut its very motivation.

4. Conclusion

Consequentialism initially seems a promising and intuitive moral theory, but it can yield strange moral results. This might show that consequentialism is false, or that consequences aren’t all that matter in moral assessment. Or maybe consequentialism is true after all, and true morality doesn’t always jibe with our everyday intuitions.

1  Of course, sometimes we’re bad at anticipating the consequences of our actions. Maybe I make a bad investment because I am shortsighted. But even in that case, I was thinking about the consequences (getting more money) – I just wasn’t doing a very good job of predicting the consequences.

2  This has led some thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill, to reason, “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.”

3  For example: Maybe your friend has no other loved ones, so there is no one who would know about what you did, no one who would get upset, no one from whom you would have to keep it secret.

4  The view we have been discussing so far is known as act-consequentialism.

5  Or would at least avoid bad consequences.

Bentham, Jeremy,  An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1823).

Mill, John Stuart,  Utilitarianism (1861).

Moore, G. E.,  Principia Ethicia  (1903).

Ross, W. D.,  The Right and the Good . Ed. Philip Stratton-Lake. Oxford: Clarendon (2002).

Sidgwick, Henry,  The Methods of Ethics (1874).

Related Essays 

Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility  by Dale E. Miller

John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures  by Dale E. Miller

Happiness by Kiki Berk

“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals  by Daniel Weltman

Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers by Theron Pummer

The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics? by Gabriel Andrade

W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties  by Matthew Pianalto

The Repugnant Conclusion by Jonathan Spelman

Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics  by Andrew Chapman

Virtue Ethics  by David Merry

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About the Author

Shane Gronholz has a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He holds a B.A. from Whitworth University where he double majored in philosophy and religion. Shane is interested in metaethics, ethical theory, practical rationality, and philosophy of religion. He lives in Washington with his wife (Stephanie), son (Maxwell), and dog (Benny). TrivialorFalse.com

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Taking Egoism Seriously

• Published: 04 June 2012
• Volume 16 , pages 529–542, ( 2013 )

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• Keith Burgess-Jackson 1  

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Though utilitarianism is far from being universally accepted in the philosophical community, it is taken seriously and treated respectfully. Its critics do not dismiss it out of hand; they do not misrepresent it; they do not belittle or disparage its proponents. They allow the theory to be articulated, developed, and defended from criticism, even if they go on to reject the modified versions. Ethical egoism, a longstanding rival of utilitarianism, is treated very differently. It is said to be “refuted” by arguments of a sort that apply equally well to utilitarianism. It is said to be “unprovable,” when many of the greatest utilitarians themselves, such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), admitted that no normative ethical theory, including their own, is provable. Critics of ethical egoism seldom discuss the various theoretical moves that utilitarians are routinely allowed to make, such as (1) fighting the facts, (2) transforming the theory from “act utilitarianism” to “rule utilitarianism,” and (3) biting the bullet. This essay argues that every defensive move made by utilitarians can be made, with equal vigor (if not also plausibility), by ethical egoists. The conclusion is that ethical egoism deserves to be taken more seriously than it is.

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Epistemic modesty in ethics

The ethical self in the later foucault: the question of normativity, enlightenment, reason and universalism: kant ’ s critical insights, explore related subjects.

• Medical Ethics

One prominent philosopher who did not treat Rand dismissively is Robert Nozick ( 1971 ).

According to its new coauthor, Stuart Rachels (the son of James), The Elements of Moral Philosophy is “the best-selling textbook in philosophy.” Rachels 2011 .

Rachels 1974 , 298. Rachels also calls it “a pernicious doctrine.” Ibid., 297. Perhaps Rachels (a utilitarian) was projecting, for a recent empirical study discloses that “the endorsement of utilitarian solutions to a set of commonly-used moral dilemmas correlates with a set of psychological traits that can be characterized as emotionally callous and manipulative—traits that most would perceive as not only psychologically unhealthy, but also morally undesirable” (Bartels and Pizarro 2011 , 154).

Rolston 1988 , 294 (emphasis in original).

Ewing 1944 , 130. “Preposterous” means “utterly absurd; outrageous” or “contrary to nature, reason, or common sense.” The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide 1999 , 785.

A similar conclusion is drawn by James Cornman, Keith Lehrer, and George Pappas, who claim, in their textbook, that “ethical egoism ought to be rejected . . . because there is no sound argument to support it and because it prescribes certain morally repugnant actions.” Cornman et al. 1982 , 289–90 (ellipsis added). To be fair, these authors also claim that utilitarianism “is clearly wrong” and “should be rejected.” Ibid., 305. In other words, there is no sound argument to support utilitarianism, either.

William Shaw, a utilitarian, points out that “Although many philosophers reject utilitarianism, those working in normative ethics, legal theory, or social and political philosophy cannot avoid situating themselves with reference to it.” Shaw 1999 , ix.

For an attempt to work out a deontological (i.e., a nonconsequentialist) version of egoism, see Burgess-Jackson 2003 .

For a more in-depth discussion of the similarities and differences between egoism and utilitarianism, see Burgess-Jackson ( 2012 ).

See Sidgwick 1981 , 84, for a discussion of the similarities between the theories.

The colorful name for this move, which is said to occur while criticizing a constructive dilemma, is “grabbing (or grasping) the bull by the horn.”

Smith 2005 , 271. As this example shows, egoism is every bit as austere and demanding as utilitarianism. However, instead of requiring strict impartiality between individuals , where the temptation is to favor certain individuals (including oneself), it requires strict impartiality between temporal stages of one’s self , where the temptation is to favor one’s current self. As C. I. Lewis put it, “There is no automatic inclination always on the side of prudence. Instead we natively incline to choose the immediate or nearer goods, to the prejudice of more remote ones and of the rational interest in the greatest or highest good in a whole lifetime. Meeting the requirements of prudence calls for self-government” (Lewis 1969 , 108).

Two decades after coining the term “rule worship,” Smart apologized to rule utilitarians for his use of it. See Smart 1977 , 135. By 1991, however, he was back to his old ways, describing rule utilitarianism as “absurd rule worship.” See Smart 1991 , 371.

Kavka 1986 , chap. 9. Stephen Darwall concurs, though without characterizing Hobbes as a rule egoist. What Hobbes denies, Darwall writes, “is that it is ever wise to break a covenant, even in a state of nature, unless the contract has been voided by reasonable suspicion of the other’s defaulting. Hobbes’s reason was that even if there are cases where breaking a covenant might be beneficial, one can never know for sure that one is in such a situation, and the risks and costs are such that the wisest policy is always to keep a covenant rather than taking a chance.” Darwall 1998 , 105 (emphasis in original).

Kavka 1986 , 358–9. Kavka calls this principle “REP,” for rule-egoistic principle.

An exception is Kagan 1998 , 194–204, esp. 199.

Feldman, for example, devotes three chapters to act utilitarianism and one to rule utilitarianism, for a total of four chapters on utilitarianism. He devotes one chapter to egoism. He does not consider rule egoism. It might be said that the reason rule egoism is not discussed by critics is that it has had no proponents (other than Hobbes). This is false. John Hospers ( 1973 ) described (and named) such a theory in 1973. In that essay, Hospers suggested that Ayn Rand is best interpreted as a rule egoist. See ibid., 393–4. More recently, Stephen Buckle has interpreted Peter Singer (!) as a rule egoist (though without using that label). See Buckle 2005 , 187 (“It seems . . . that, for Singer, ethics must rest on a foundation of carefully-calculated (or as he calls it, ‘prudent’) egoism” [ellipsis added]).

Another attempt to modify utilitarianism so as to avoid its many unsavory implications is R. M. Hare’s two-level approach. See Hare 1981, chap. 2. Hare writes:

The two kinds of utilitarianism . . . can coexist at their respective levels; the critical thinker considers cases in an act-utilitarian or specific rule-utilitarian way, and on the basis of these he selects . . . general prima facie principles for use, in a general rule-utilitarian way, at the intuitive level” (Hare 1981, 43 [ellipses added]).

The words “utilitarianism” and “utilitarian” can be replaced, respectively, by “egoism” and “egoistic.” I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for recommending that I consider Hare’s approach as falling under this heading (viz., “ Modifying the Theory ”).

According to philosopher and lexicographer Robert M. Martin, “The phrase [viz., “biting the bullet”] comes from old movies, in which wounded cowboys bit down on a bullet to help them stand the pain of surgery without anaesthetic” (Martin 2002 , 44).

Singer 1974 , 516. Shelly Kagan, another revisionary utilitarian, replies to the objection that consequentialism (a superset of utilitarianism) is too demanding by suggesting that “Perhaps our moral intuitions should be given little or no weight in general.” Kagan 1998 , 159.

Here is a flagrant example of the double standard. In 1974, James Rachels argued that egoism is “not correct” because it has what he considers to be a false implication. Rachels 1974 , 309. In 1979, he rejected a similar argument against utilitarianism, claiming that “The most famous objections to act-utilitarianism . . . are little more than descriptions of the theory, with the question-begging addendum, ‘Because it says that , it can’t be right’” (Rachels 1979 , 169 n. 12 [italics in original; ellipsis added]). That is to say, Rachels allows utilitarians, but not egoists, to bite the bullet. Another example comes from William Shaw, who writes: “[E]goism is an implausible theory of right and wrong. By reducing everything to individual self-interest, egoism permits any action whatsoever—theft, extortion, arson, or murder—as long as it advances the interests of the agent” (Shaw 1999 , 17). One could just as easily have written the following: “ Utilitarianism is an implausible theory of right and wrong. By reducing everything to the maximization of utility , utilitarianism permits any action whatsoever—theft, extortion, arson, or murder—as long as it advances utility .” The problem Shaw identifies inheres in consequentialism , of which utilitarianism and egoism are but two species. It does not inhere in egoism per se .

According to Alan Donagan, “Every moral system gives rise to hard cases, in which those who accept it must, contrary to their desire, cause harm or permit it” (Donagan 1977 , 180). Put differently, every normative ethical theorist must bite at least one bullet.

According to Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas ( 1982 , 297), “Bentham was right: There is no direct proof of the principle of utility or of any other ultimate ethical principle.” R. M. Hare believes that utilitarianism follows logically from two formal features of moral judgments, viz., their universalizability and their prescriptivity. See Hare 1981 , 111: “[T]he requirement to universalize our prescriptions generates utilitarianism.” Not everyone agrees that this constitutes a proof, however, for (1) not everyone shares Hare’s view of the formal features of moral judgments (in other words, not everyone is a universal prescriptivist) and (2) even some of those who share Hare’s view of the formal features of moral judgments (or accept it for the sake of argument) reject the inference. See, e.g., Mackie 1977 , chap. 4. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of Hare’s putative proof and for recommending that I discuss it, however briefly.

Lewis 1969 , 195. See also ibid., 142–3, 199.

See also Broad 1930 , 243 (“The first point to notice is that the Egoist’s doctrine, when thus stated, cannot be accused of any arbitrariness or partiality. He does not claim anything for his Ego which he is not prepared to allow to any other Ego” [italics in original]).

Smart, a utilitarian, admits forthrightly that “many people find utilitarianism repugnant.” Smart 1981 , 461. An anonymous reviewer of this essay conjectures that many of those who find utilitarianism repugnant find egoism even more so. They may believe, for example, that while utilitarianism sometimes disrespects persons, it at least endorses impartialism . Egoism not only fails to endorse impartialism; it endorses the most extreme form of partialism . I concede the force of this objection, but note that it fails to show that egoism should not be taken seriously as a normative ethical theory. The most it shows is that the seriousness with which a theory should be taken varies inversely with the degree to which people find it repugnant. I suspect (though I cannot prove) that a sophisticated version of egoism would differ little in its results from a sophisticated version of utilitarianism, in which case the degree of repugnance felt toward the two theories may be similar. To put the point differently, if egoism were taken more seriously than it is (i.e., if it were given the benefit rather than the detriment of the doubt by its critics), there might not be the same degree of aversion to it.

As Sidgwick noted, the attraction is not limited to philosophers. “[I]t seems sufficient to point to the wide acceptance of the principle that it is reasonable for a man to act in the manner most conducive to his own happiness” (Sidgwick 1981 , 119).

“Almost any normative theory is likely to have its counterintuitive aspects, and people can sincerely disagree as to which theory is, on balance, the most attractive. That is why there are few or no ‘knockdown’ arguments in ethics (or anywhere, for that matter). All you can do is point out the attractive features of your own favored theory, explain why you are prepared to live with its various unattractive features, and try to show that the alternatives are even worse” (Kagan 1998 , 16). This seems to me exactly right.

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Acknowledgments

This essay is dedicated to my canine companion Shelbie, who, for the past nine years, has made every day a joy. Her happiness is an important component of my happiness. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this periodical for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions. One of the reviewers went above and beyond the call of scholarly duty. Neither of the reviewers is responsible for what remains. I am also grateful to the editor in chief, Bert Musschenga, for his courtesy, promptness, and professionalism.

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Burgess-Jackson, K. Taking Egoism Seriously. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16 , 529–542 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9372-5

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Accepted : 22 May 2012

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9372-5

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7 Egoism, Utilitarianism, and the Dualism of Practical Reason

• Published: June 2015
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This chapter examines Sidgwick’s views on egoism, utilitarianism, and the conflict between the two that he called ‘the dualism of practical reason’. Sidgwick’s view that egoism is based on the metaphysical distinction between individual persons is explained, along with his ‘objective’ consequentialism. Sidgwick’s views on equality, non-human animals, and future generations are discussed critically. His arguments for utilitarianism are spelled out: these are either intuitionist or based on the notion that utilitarianism ‘controls and completes’ common-sense morality. There follows an examination of Sidgwick’s careful and balanced discussion of the relation between utilitarianism and common-sense morality, including his famous admission that utilitarianism may recommend its own partial suppression. The final part of the chapter concerns Sidgwick’s famous dualism. It is suggested that had Sidgwick seen his principles of prudence and benevolence as pro tanto principles guiding judgement about particular cases the dualism could have been avoided.

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Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against Essay

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Introduction

Rule egoism.

Egoism is the theory that shows that one’s self should be the motivation and goal of one’s own action. This theory implies that people are motivated by their own desires and self-interests.

In Ethical egoism, it is believed that it is moral for one to promote one own good. Therefore people should do what interests them. In the pursuit of their interest, they should not mind the consequences of their actions to the lives of other people. Ethical egoism can be grouped into three groups;

• Individual ethical egoist.
• Personal ethical egoists.
• Universal ethical egoist.

In individual ethical egoists, the theory shows that everybody should do whatever benefits him/her. In personal ethical egoists, the belief is that one should pursue his or her own interest without telling other people what they are ought to do. In this process, one should follow his/her own interests, desires, and goals without involving other people in his/her business. In universal egoists, all people should pursue their own interests.

In the rule egoism, people are driven to do things not by their interest or desires but by some rules that guide everybody to do things in a certain manner for a common interest for all people. This process helps to bring harmony among different people with dissimilar and conflicting interests.

Even though it is believed in ethical egoism that it is moral for one to promote one good it cannot apply all the time. This is because people live in a society that comprises people that holds different beliefs, interests, desires, and goals. Therefore it is not possible for all these people to act in their own interest and live together at peace. This is because these people will be in constant conflict now and then in their day-to-day activities as everyone tries to do what pleases him/her. To help in overcoming this problem, in every society there are some rules and regulations that have been laid down to guide all the people on how certain things should be done.

This ensures there is harmony in the society.. Through this process, everybody in that community is made to act in a certain manner whether it is in his or her own interest or not for the benefit of all the people in the society. Otherwise, if there was no rule egoism in the society people should be at war always due to their conflicting interests. This is because our actions can have a positive, neutral, or negative effect on other people. Therefore the rules laid down to govern people help to safeguard all people from some negative effects that can results as some people pursue their own interests.

It’s not clear how an ethical egoist would act as a moral judgment in cases where the egoist’s happiness is involved. Suppose I am an ethical egoist, so I believe that everyone ought to act for his/her own benefit. Say Terry wants to have sex with you, and you’re thinking about it, but you’re not really sure it’s a good idea, so you and Terry discuss it. Suppose Terry knows it would be better for you if you didn’t sleep with Terry; but Terry also thinks it would be in Terry’s interest if you did. Now you ask Terry what you should do. What answer does Terry give, supposing Terry is an ethical egoist? Remember Terry’s view is that everyone ought to act to benefit him/herself. Does Terry give you the advice that benefits you or the advice that benefits Terry?. Therefore ethical egoism cannot hold at all times.

From this discussion, we can conclude by saying that people should follow their own desires and interests. This is because in this way many people will be able to achieve their goals in life through the intrinsic motivation associated with one’s interests. On the other hand, people should be conscious as they pursue their own interests not to affect the lives of other people negatively through their actions. To ensure peaceful society rule egoism should be put into place to regulate the ethical egoists as they act in their own interests.

Rachel. S. (1995) Elements of moral philosophy. McGraw Hill: London.

Ruth B. The Challenge of Cultural Relativism. Oxford University Press: London.

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IvyPanda. (2021, August 30). Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against. https://ivypanda.com/essays/ethical-egoism-arguments-for-and-against/

"Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against." IvyPanda , 30 Aug. 2021, ivypanda.com/essays/ethical-egoism-arguments-for-and-against/.

IvyPanda . (2021) 'Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against'. 30 August.

IvyPanda . 2021. "Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against." August 30, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/ethical-egoism-arguments-for-and-against/.

1. IvyPanda . "Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against." August 30, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/ethical-egoism-arguments-for-and-against/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Ethical Egoism: Arguments For and Against." August 30, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/ethical-egoism-arguments-for-and-against/.