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Middle East

3 takeaways 20 years after the invasion of iraq.

Scott Neuman

Larry Kaplow

U.S. Marine Maj. Bull Gurfein pulls down a poster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on March 21, 2003, a day after the start of the U.S. invasion, in Safwan, Iraq. Chris Hondros/Getty Images hide caption

U.S. Marine Maj. Bull Gurfein pulls down a poster of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on March 21, 2003, a day after the start of the U.S. invasion, in Safwan, Iraq.

Two decades ago, U.S. air and ground forces invaded Iraq in what then-President George W. Bush said was an effort to disarm the country, free its people and "defend the world from grave danger."

In the late-night Oval Office address on March 19, 2003, Bush did not mention his administration's assertion that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. That argument — which turned out to be based on thin or otherwise faulty intelligence — had been laid out weeks before by Secretary of State Colin Powell at a U.N. Security Council meeting.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell holds a vial representing the small amount of anthrax that closed the U.S. Senate in 2002 during his address to the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, 2003, in New York City. Powell was making a presentation attempting to convince the world that Iraq was deliberately hiding weapons of mass destruction. Mario Tama/Getty Images hide caption

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell holds a vial representing the small amount of anthrax that closed the U.S. Senate in 2002 during his address to the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, 2003, in New York City. Powell was making a presentation attempting to convince the world that Iraq was deliberately hiding weapons of mass destruction.

Bush described the massive airstrikes on Iraq as the "opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign" and pledged that "we will accept no outcome but victory."

20 years ago, the U.S. warned of Iraq's alleged 'weapons of mass destruction'

However, Bush's caveat that the campaign "could be longer and more difficult than some predict" proved prescient. In eight years of boots on the ground, the U.S. lost some 4,600 U.S. service members , and at least 270,000 Iraqis, mostly civilians, were killed. While the invasion succeeded in toppling Saddam, it ultimately failed to uncover any secret stash of weapons of mass destruction. Although estimates vary, a Brown University estimate puts the cost of the combat phase of the war at around $2 trillion.

When Ryan Crocker, who at the time had already been U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Kuwait and Syria and would go on to hold the top diplomatic post in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, first saw Bush's televised speech announcing the start of combat operations, he was at an airport heading back to Washington, D.C.

"I was thinking, 'Here we go,' " he recalls. But it was a sense of dread, not excitement. Crocker wondered, "God knows where we're going."

Peter Mansoor, a colonel attending the U.S. Army War College at the time, was concerned about his future, knowing that he'd soon be in command of the first brigade of the 1st Armored Division, which would go on to see action in Iraq.

"I was very interested in the outcome of the invasion and what would happen in the aftermath," says Mansoor, who is now a military history professor at Ohio State University. "I didn't expect the Iraqi army to be able to put up much resistance beyond a few weeks."

Meanwhile, Marsin Alshamary, an 11-year-old Iraqi American growing up in Minneapolis, Minn., when the invasion occurred, says "seeing planes and bombing over where my grandparents lived made me cry." Alshamary, who is now a Middle East policy expert at the Brookings Institution, says to her at the time, the possibility that Saddam would be deposed seemed "unreal."

Crocker, Mansoor and Alshamary recently shared their thoughts with NPR on lessons learned from one of America's longest conflicts — the war in Iraq. Here are their observations:

Wars aren't predictable. They're chaotic — and costlier than anyone anticipates

U.S. optimism for a quick and relatively bloodless outcome in Iraq was apparent even before the invasion.

In the months leading to the 2003 invasion, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in a radio call-in program , predicted that the coming fight would take "five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than that." Bush, in what's been dubbed his "mission accomplished" speech on May 1, 2003, declared that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."

Rumsfeld's prediction would prove hopelessly optimistic. In the days and weeks after Baghdad fell, a growing insurgency took root and U.S. forces began to come frequently under fire from hostile militias.

Mansoor says the Bush administration "made a certain set of planning assumptions that didn't pan out."

"They basically planned for a best-case scenario, where the Iraqi people would cooperate with the occupation, that Iraqi units would be available to help secure the country in the aftermath of conflict, and that the international community would step in to help reconstruct Iraq," he says. "All three of those assumptions were wrong."

Although many Iraqis were happy to see Saddam gone, "there was a significant minority who benefited from his rule. And they weren't going to go quietly into the night," Mansoor says.

That was not only the Iraqi army, but government bureaucrats who owed their livelihoods to Saddam.

15 Years After U.S. Invasion, Some Iraqis Are Nostalgic For Saddam Hussein Era

The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army a couple of months later — thus leaving 400,000 disgruntled and combat-trained Iraqi men with no income — proved a turning point in the conflict. It helped fuel the insurgency and is credited by some historians with having helped to spawn the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group.

Iraqi children sit amid the rubble of a street in Mosul's Nablus neighborhood in front of a billboard bearing the logo of the Islamic State group on March 12, 2017. Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Iraqi children sit amid the rubble of a street in Mosul's Nablus neighborhood in front of a billboard bearing the logo of the Islamic State group on March 12, 2017.

"The Iraq conflict sucked thousands, if not tens of thousands, of jihadi terrorists into the country," Mansoor says. "It also created a battleground in Iraq where ... civil war could take place."

"None of this was foreseen," he says. "But the outcome of removing Saddam's regime enabled that."

Alshamary calls the Bush administration's approach to the Iraq invasion "outrageous."

"There has been no history of short, successful interventions that have resulted in successful regime change. So the arrogance of assuming that could happen was astounding," she says.

Instead of a conflict that lasted weeks or months, as Bush's Cabinet officials and advisers had hoped, a years-long occupation ensued that would be inherited by the administration of President Barack Obama. The word "quagmire" — largely disused since the Vietnam War — was dusted off to describe the situation in Iraq.

The potential for a protracted occupation should have been foreseen, says Crocker. "To overthrow someone else's government and occupy the country is going to set into motion consequences that aren't just third and fourth order. They're 30th and 40th order — way beyond any capacity to predict or plan."

"In Iraq, we paid for it in blood as well as money," the former ambassador says. "Somebody tell me when we decide if it was worth those 4,500 lives, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of lives that Iraqis lost."

If you set out to "reshape" a region, you may not like the shape it becomes

Key figures in the Bush administration believed that regime change would make Iraq a U.S. ally in the region and provide a pro-American bulwark against neighboring Iran, while reducing the threat of terrorism at home. Alshamary calls that notion, at least in relation to Iran, "wishful thinking."

Instead, she says, Tehran may have been the biggest beneficiary of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iran and Iraq fought a brutal eight-year conflict in the 1980s and were still bitter enemies at the start of the U.S. invasion. Today, the Iraqi army is just half its pre-invasion size. And s ome analysts argue that the Iraq War has made it much more difficult for the international community to respond to Iran's efforts to build nuclear weapons.

Instead of containing Tehran, the invasion of its neighbor and rival only "created a vacuum of power that Iran filled," Mansoor says.

It's a view shared by Crocker. "We basically left the field to adversaries with greater patience and more commitment," he says. "That would, of course, be al-Qaida to the west and Iran and its affiliated militias to the east."

The Islamic State also exploited sectarian tensions following the invasion to entrench itself in both Iraq and Syria, causing the U.S. to send troops back to Iraq three years after first withdrawing from the country.

The Two-Way

Obama: 275 troops will go to iraq as militants take ground.

A woman from an Arabic family cries after her family was denied entry to a Kurdish-controlled area from an ISIS-held village in late 2015 near Sinjar, Iraq. John Moore/Getty Images hide caption

A woman from an Arabic family cries after her family was denied entry to a Kurdish-controlled area from an ISIS-held village in late 2015 near Sinjar, Iraq.

Not all outcomes are bad

Despite the huge loss of life and the other consequences from the U.S. invasion, Alshamary, Mansoor and Crocker agree that Iraq is a fundamentally freer country today than it was before 2003.

Yes, there's crippling corruption , unemployment , poverty and a complete reliance on oil as a source of wealth , Alshamary says. On the other hand, Iraq has elections "that aren't perfectly free and fair but are actually a lot better than people think they are."

Iraqi protesters helped spur new elections. But many doubt their votes will matter

Even so, attacks on activists and journalists are not uncommon. Recent street protests have been forcefully quashed by authorities. Two years ago, Iraq's prime minister narrowly survived an assassination attempt , allegedly by an Iranian-backed militia group.

Despite these problems, Iraq has held together. It's a democracy with peaceful transitions of power — things that wouldn't exist without the U.S. intervention, Mansoor says.

Meanwhile, Crocker points to a recent visit to Iraq, where he met with a group of recent university graduates. What was Iraq's biggest problem? he asked.

"Corruption," was the answer. "And it starts at the top, including the PM."

"I noted they were saying this in the PM's guest house," he says.

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Presidential Speeches

August 8, 1990: address on iraq's invasion of kuwait, about this speech.

George H. W. Bush

August 08, 1990

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In the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes these choices are not easy. But today as President, I ask for your support in a decision I've made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong, all in the cause of peace.

At my direction, elements of the 82d Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland. No one commits America's Armed Forces to a dangerous mission lightly, but after perhaps unparalleled international consultation and exhausting every alternative, it became necessary to take this action. Let me tell you why.

Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2d, Iraqi Armed Forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq's tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours. With more than 100,000 troops, along with tanks, artillery, and surface-to-surface missiles, Iraq now occupies Kuwait. This aggression came just hours after Saddam Hussein specifically assured numerous countries in the area that there would be no invasion. There is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression.

A puppet regime imposed from the outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our desire for peace; and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression.

Four simple principles guide our policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that both freeze all Iraqi assets in this country and protected Kuwait's assets. The stakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world. Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.

We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remain stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will require no less. We're beginning a new era. This new era can be full of promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930's, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Only 14 days ago, Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And 4 days ago, he promised the world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean: His promises mean nothing.

In the last few days, I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas; and I've met with Prime Minister Thatcher, Prime Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait.

We agree that this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem: It is the world's problem. And that's why, soon after the Iraqi invasion, the United Nations Security Council, without dissent, condemned Iraq, calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. The Arab world, through both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, courageously announced its opposition to Iraqi aggression. Japan, the United Kingdom, and France, and other governments around the world have imposed severe sanctions. The Soviet Union and China ended all arms sales to Iraq.

And this past Monday, the United Nations Security Council approved for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These sanctions, now enshrined in international law, have the potential to deny Iraq the fruits of aggression while sharply limiting its ability to either import or export anything of value, especially oil.

I pledge here today that the United States will do its part to see that these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait.

But we must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its ambitions. Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Given the Iraqi government's history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.

And therefore, after consulting with King Fahd, I sent Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to discuss cooperative measures we could take. Following those meetings, the Saudi Government requested our help, and I responded to that request by ordering U.S. air and ground forces to deploy to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Let me be clear: The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the longstanding friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression. Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi Armed Forces to defend the Kingdom.

I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America does not seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America will stand by her friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf.

We are working around the clock to deter Iraqi aggression and to enforce U.N. sanctions. I'm continuing my conversations with world leaders. Secretary of Defense Cheney has just returned from valuable consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hassan of Morocco. Secretary of State Baker has consulted with his counterparts in many nations, including the Soviet Union, and today he heads for Europe to consult with President Ozal of Turkey, a staunch friend of the United States. And he'll then consult with the NATO Foreign Ministers.

I will ask oil-producing nations to do what they can to increase production in order to minimize any impact that oil flow reductions will have on the world economy. And I will explore whether we and our allies should draw down our strategic petroleum reserves. Conservation measures can also help; Americans everywhere must do their part. And one more thing: I'm asking the oil companies to do their fair share. They should show restraint and not abuse today's uncertainties to raise prices.

Standing up for our principles will not come easy. It may take time and possibly cost a great deal. But we are asking no more of anyone than of the brave young men and women of our Armed Forces and their families. And I ask that in the churches around the country prayers be said for those who are committed to protect and defend America's interests.

Standing up for our principle is an American tradition. As it has so many times before, it may take time and tremendous effort, but most of all, it will take unity of purpose. As I've witnessed throughout my life in both war and peace, America has never wavered when her purpose is driven by principle. And in this August day, at home and abroad, I know she will do no less.

Thank you, and God bless the United States of America.

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Text of President Bush's Speech

By The New York Times

• March 19, 2003

Following is a transcript of President Bush’s address to the nation from the Oval Office in Washington on the beginning of the war in Iraq as recorded by The New York Times.

My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.

On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war.

These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are giving crucial support, from the use of naval and air bases to help with intelligence and logistics to the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving in our common defense.

To all the men and women of the United States armed forces now in the Middle East, the peace of a troubled world and the hopes of an oppressed people now depend on you. That trust is well placed. The enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you liberate will witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military.

In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military, a final atrocity against his people.

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Bush, 9/11, and the Roots of the Iraq War

A declassified document reveals how the attacks shaped his thinking, by melvyn p. leffler.

Twenty years ago this month, President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq, the most important foreign policy decision of his eight years in office and, arguably, the most significant since the end of the Cold War. The U.S.-led invasion—and the insurgency, counterinsurgency, and sectarian strife that followed—led to the deaths of over 200,000 Iraqis and the displacement of at least nine million. More than 9,000 U.S. soldiers and contractors sacrificed their lives in the war and it cost U.S. taxpayers over $2 trillion. The invasion besmirched the United States’ reputation, fueled a sense of grievance among Muslims, complicated the “global war on terror,” divided the American people, and sundered trust in government.  

A newly declassified 31-page memorandum—released in November 2022 by the National Archives after years of administrative hurdles and legal adjudication—helps explain why the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq and why the invasion went so badly. On April 29, 2004, members of the 9/11 Commission met with Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney in the Oval Office for almost three hours. Philip Zelikow , the executive director of the commission, took notes, which constitute the nonverbatim record of the conversation. The purpose of the interview, like those with many other high-level officials, was to gather information about the attack on September 11, 2001 , and to extrapolate lessons to prevent another such tragedy in the future.  

The document, kept secret for almost 20 years, reveals a great deal about how leaders perceive threats, the difficulties of interpreting intelligence, the challenges of coordinating the machinery of government, and the political vulnerabilities of the president of the United States. Most important, it helps illuminate why the United States invaded Iraq and why things went wrong.

THE DECIDER

Bush—the key decision-maker inside the administration—was relaxed and congenial, spoke without notes, and responded directly to queries. He dominated the discussion with the 9/11 Commission, answering almost all the questions and only occasionally allowing Cheney to insert a few comments. During the interview, he quipped that he and the vice president got along just fine—he knew Cheney did not want his job and he didn’t want Cheney’s.  

The president expressed much admiration for George Tenet, the director of the CIA, and for Condoleezza Rice, his national security adviser and point person for coordinating policy. But Bush made it clear that he made key decisions during his intelligence briefings with Cheney, Rice, Tenet, and Michael Morell, his daily intelligence briefer. Yet Bush acknowledged that his administration took too long to respond to the warnings of an al Qaeda attack, too long to work out a plan for dealing with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and too long to address the root causes of terrorism.     

Bush hoped the commissioners would not treat the investigation as a “gotcha” moment.

The president said blame should not be assigned for 9/11. He hoped the commissioners would not treat the investigation as a “gotcha” moment. His advisers labored diligently, Bush noted, but they were behind the curve. “His frustration was because it took so long to get a plan on his desk to eliminate the entire threat—the big strategy,” wrote Zelikow.   “He knew it was in process. It just took a long time.”   

Bush sounded most defensive when commissioners suggested that he ignored intelligence about an impending attack. He insisted that the warnings involved threats outside the United States, not inside. Before 9/11, there was only one report of threats to the homeland, he claimed, and he had asked for it. And that report—the President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001—Bush noted, was historical in nature. Bush said the analysts “didn’t see any actionable intelligence.” The briefing simply “reminded [him] that al Qaeda was dangerous, that it was a problem to be dealt with.” The president told the commissioners that he “knew that” and “was developing a strategy to eliminate it.”    

The commissioners did not allow Bush off the hook. Again and again, respectfully, they reminded him about the shrill warnings of an impending attack, that his subordinates missed key intelligence information, that the Federal Aviation Agency was not at a heightened level of security, and that there had been many reports that suggested planes could be used for suicide missions. Bush deflected these accusations and reiterated that “there was no actionable intelligence.” But he conceded, “If there was [another] attack on our watch, [I] would bear the responsibility for that.” Bush knew he was the decider.

THREAT PERCEPTION

And there was plenty of reason to expect another attack. The interview highlighted the confusion, the difficulties in communication, and the magnitude of threats in the days, weeks, and months after September 11, 2001. Expecting another assault, the Secret Service minimized the amount of time Bush and Cheney spent together. The Speaker of the House, third in line to the presidency, was temporarily relocated away from Washington, D.C. Meanwhile, the president met each day with Tenet, Cheney, Rice, and Morell to sort through ongoing threats and to decide what to do. If a fully developed plan had existed before 9/11, Bush stressed, he would have tried to implement it. It would have been difficult—given the lack of political support prior to 9/11—but he would have tried. He was now being criticized for not preemptively launching military operations in Afghanistan and for preemptively launching them in Iraq—that irony irritated him.  

When asked, Bush dismissed the idea that he was inappropriately focused on Iraq on the night after the attack, as claimed by Richard Clarke, a counterterrorism expert at the National Security Council, in his memoir. In fact, during the interview, the president scarcely mentioned Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s dictator, except to emphasize that suspicions of his complicity should not have surprised anyone given Saddam’s history of funding suicide bombers. “He was a threat,” said Bush.  

Yet without discussing Saddam , the interview reveals much about the attitudes, challenges, and decision-making that prompted the invasion of Iraq and the ensuing debacle.   The commissioners vented about all the signs that Bush supposedly missed regarding al Qaeda’s intentions, and it was clear, as the president had feared since the fall of 2001, that the bountiful evidence for Saddam’s past use of weapons of mass destruction, his obstruction of inspections, his lust for chemical and biological weapons, and his links to terrorist groups would be used against Bush should another attack take place. Although Bush repeatedly stated during the interview that the collection and assessment of intelligence were formidable tasks open to divergent, ambiguous, indecisive conclusions, he knew that if he erred—and another attack occurred—he would be pilloried by his political foes and repudiated by the American people. More important, if he did not take the intelligence seriously, and if he did not demand that Saddam reveal and destroy his alleged weapons of mass destruction, Bush would have deemed himself negligent about his most fundamental responsibility as president of the United States: to prevent another attack and protect the American people. That he had failed to take effective steps before 9/11 haunted him—the interview makes that clear.  

LESSONS LEARNED?

Learning from the failures of his dealings with the Taliban pre-9/11, Bush ordered his defense officials in late November 2001 to prepare plans to confront Saddam. The absence of such plans, he told the commissioners, had hampered his ability to shape an effective strategy toward Afghanistan and al Qaeda before 9/11, and he was determined not to allow that to happen again. The memoirs of his advisers and interviews with many of his aides suggest that he did not know if he would invade Iraq. Nonetheless, he believed he had to confront Saddam with the prospective use of military force in order to get the Iraqi dictator to allow inspectors and relinquish his alleged weapons of mass destruction or face regime change.  

Bush developed a strategy after 9/11 known as “coercive diplomacy,” but he did not apply it effectively. He did not set priorities (regime change, elimination of weapons of mass destruction , democracy promotion) or offer inducements to elicit Iraq’s compliance. Nor did he resolve the issues that plagued decision-making within his administration. In the interview with the 9/11 commissioners, he acknowledged the need to integrate his domestic and national security teams, but he seemed unaware that he had failed to address the problems of coordination and planning. The president extolled Rice’s ability to deal with the “stars” in his administration, such as Cheney, Tenet, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. She was “phenomenal,” Bush said in the interview. “She is not afraid to call them to account,” he added. He seemed unconcerned, even in April 2004, with Rice’s inability to deal with the acrimony among Bush’s stars, which led her to shut down the National Security Council machinery regarding Iraq in the spring of 2003, devolve responsibility to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, and defer to Rumsfeld’s insistence on pruning American forces for the postwar stabilization tasks that he did not care much about—all of which contributed to the chaotic aftermath of the invasion.

During the interview, Bush said his task as president was “to pick a good group [of advisers], then expect them to do their job with the right strategy.” But the history of his Iraq policy shows that despite his many leadership abilities, Bush delegated too much authority to these advisers and did not monitor the design and implementation of plans for the policies he preferred, such as democracy promotion. Indifferent to the nasty bickering among his subordinates—acrimony that went well beyond personality conflicts—Bush let issues linger in bureaucratic wastelands. Motivated by fear, he wanted freedom to prevail in the long run, but nothing in the interview illuminated that he would plan systematically for that outcome.    

Immediately after 9/11, Bush was far more interested in killing terrorists and confronting their state sponsors than in bolstering freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq. He had learned that “killing the terrorists was the best strategy," , he told the commissioners. “It was the only way to do it. Kill them before they kill us. . . . If bin Laden had weapons of mass destruction, he would likely kill more. In the short term, we had to find them.” And he believed they might be located in Iraq.

RECKONING WITH THE EVIDENCE

As he discussed the events surrounding 9/11 and extrapolated lessons for the future, Bush revealed a great deal about why he would choose to confront Saddam: fear that terrorists who hated the United States might get the world’s most deadly weapons from Iraq and fear that Iraq’s possession of such weapons might in the future check the exercise of U.S. power . During the interview, the president also illuminated, however inadvertently, the factors that would continue to plague his administration and contribute to the post-invasion debacle: ambiguous and inadequate intelligence, inept planning, and bureaucratic feuding.  

Since he left office and wrote his memoir, Bush has said little about his thinking and actions before and after 9/11. Although much of the U.S. archival record remains closed, this newly declassified document helps explain the mindset and the dynamics that would set the stage for the “forever wars.” Bush’s fears made sense, his sense of responsibility was laudable, and his preoccupation with the political repercussions was expedient yet understandable. But striving to connect the dots and avert a worst-case scenario, he did not probe the reliability of the evidence that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction; he ignored judgments by some analysts that Saddam would not hand off his weapons to terrorists even if he had them; he provided few incentives and inducements to make his coercive diplomacy work effectively; and he failed to assess the costs and consequences of an invasion should coercive diplomacy fail to elicit a positive response from his adversary. Tragedy occurred not because Bush was deceitful or motivated by missionary fervor but because he overestimated U.S. power and failed to plan wisely and execute effectively.

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• MELVYN P. LEFFLER is Edward Stettinius Professor Emeritus at the University of Virginia and the author of Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq .
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The Flawed Logic That Produced the War Is Alive and Well

Stephen Wertheim

Blundering into baghdad.

The Right—and Wrong—Lessons of the Iraq War

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