freedom of expression in uk essay

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Simon Burke
Oct 10, 2023

The Great Debate: Balancing Freedom of Expression with Legal Limitations in the UK

Freedom of expression is an essential element of a modern democracy, allowing citizens to share and express their views freely. However, there are limits to this right, as outlined in UK law. In this blog post, we will explore the great debate of how to balance freedom of expression with legal limitations in the UK. We will consider the laws that protect freedom of expression, the limitations imposed by UK law, and the implications for society.

The Concept of Freedom of Expression in the UK

Freedom of expression is a fundamental right in the UK, allowing individuals to voice their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs without fear of censorship or reprisal. It encompasses various forms of expression, such as speech, writing, art, and even non-verbal communication. This right to express oneself freely is crucial for the functioning of a democratic society.

The concept of freedom of expression in the UK is deeply rooted in the right to protest and the freedom of speech. It allows citizens to openly criticise the government, participate in public debates, and advocate for social change. It is the cornerstone of a vibrant and pluralistic society, where diverse voices can be heard.

However, it is important to note that freedom of expression is not absolute. The law places limitations on this right in order to protect other rights and interests, such as national security, public safety, and the rights and reputations of others. These limitations are necessary to maintain a balanced society and prevent harm or injustice.

The concept of freedom of expression in the UK is constantly evolving and subject to ongoing debate. As society changes and new challenges arise, it is crucial to continue examining and refining the boundaries of this right. Balancing freedom of expression with legal limitations is a complex task, but one that is essential for upholding democratic values and ensuring a fair and just society for all.

The Importance of Balancing Freedom of Expression with Legal Limitations

Freedom of expression is a crucial aspect of any democratic society, allowing individuals to freely express their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. However, it is equally important to strike a balance between this fundamental right and the legal limitations in place.

The right to protest and freedom of speech are at the heart of the concept of freedom of expression in the UK. These rights enable citizens to openly criticise the government, engage in public debates, and advocate for social change. They are the backbone of a diverse and inclusive society where all voices can be heard.

At the same time, it is essential to recognise that freedom of expression is not absolute. Legal limitations exist to protect the public interest and prevent harm or injustice. These limitations safeguard national security, public safety, and the rights and reputations of others.

The delicate task of balancing freedom of expression with legal limitations is vital for maintaining a fair and just society. It ensures that the right to express oneself freely does not impinge upon the rights and well-being of others. By setting boundaries, we create an environment that encourages open dialogue and fosters a culture of respect and responsibility.

Striking the right balance is not without challenges. As society evolves and new issues arise, the boundaries of freedom of expression must be constantly reevaluated. It is essential to engage in ongoing discussions and debates to refine and update these limitations to meet the needs of a changing world.

Ultimately, balancing freedom of expression with legal limitations is crucial for upholding democratic values and creating a society that respects and protects the rights of all individuals. By finding the right equilibrium, we can ensure that freedom of expression thrives while preserving the harmony and fairness that underpin our democratic system.

The Role of Laws and Regulations in Protecting Public Interests

Laws and regulations play a crucial role in safeguarding public interests when it comes to freedom of expression in the UK. Whilst freedom of expression is a fundamental right, it is not without limitations. These limitations are put in place to protect the well-being of individuals, society, and the nation as a whole.

One of the key roles of laws and regulations is to ensure the right to protest and freedom of speech are exercised responsibly and within the boundaries of the law. By setting clear guidelines, the legal system can prevent the abuse of these rights and ensure that public interests are not compromised. For example, laws may prohibit hate speech, incitement to violence, or the spread of harmful misinformation.

Furthermore, laws and regulations help to maintain a fair and just society by balancing competing rights and interests. For instance, defamation laws protect the rights and reputations of individuals against false statements or damaging allegations. Similarly, laws relating to national security and public safety prevent the misuse of freedom of expression that could pose a threat to the safety and well-being of the public.

In essence, the role of laws and regulations is to provide a framework within which freedom of expression can flourish whilst also ensuring that it does not infringe upon the rights and interests of others. By upholding these laws, the legal system ensures that the values and principles of a democratic society are protected, creating a harmonious and inclusive environment for all individuals.

Examples of Legal Limitations on Freedom of Expression in the UK

When it comes to freedom of expression in the UK, there are certain legal limitations in place to ensure that the rights and well-being of individuals and society are protected. These limitations are designed to prevent harm or injustice and maintain a fair and just society.

One example of a legal limitation on freedom of expression is hate speech. Whilst individuals have the right to express their opinions, hate speech that incites violence or promotes discrimination is not protected. Laws against hate speech help to maintain social harmony and prevent the spread of harmful ideologies.

Another limitation is defamation laws. Whilst freedom of expression allows individuals to voice their opinions, it does not protect false statements or damaging allegations that harm someone's reputation. Defamation laws provide a means for individuals to seek legal redress if their reputation is unjustly tarnished.

Additionally, laws and regulations exist to protect national security and public safety. Whilst individuals may have the right to express their views, advocating for violence or spreading harmful misinformation that poses a threat to public safety is not protected by freedom of expression.

These examples demonstrate that whilst freedom of expression is a crucial right in the UK, it is not absolute. Legal limitations are in place to balance the right to express oneself with the need to protect public interests and ensure a fair and just society for all.

The Challenges in Enforcing Freedom of Expression Rights

The enforcement of freedom of expression rights in the UK comes with its own set of challenges. One of the main challenges is determining where the line is drawn between protected speech and speech that crosses the boundaries of legality. It can be difficult to navigate the nuances of language and intent when assessing whether certain expressions qualify as hate speech or incitement to violence.

Another challenge lies in striking a balance between protecting the rights and reputations of individuals and upholding freedom of expression. Defamation laws, for example, aim to prevent false statements that harm someone's reputation. However, it can be challenging to determine what constitutes defamation and where the line is drawn between fair criticism and harmful allegations.

Additionally, with the rise of the internet and social media, enforcing freedom of expression rights has become increasingly complex. The anonymous nature of online platforms can lead to a proliferation of hate speech, harassment, and the spread of harmful misinformation. It can be challenging for law enforcement agencies to identify and address these issues effectively.

Lastly, the evolving nature of technology and communication platforms poses a challenge in keeping up with the changing landscape of freedom of expression. As new forms of communication emerge, such as social media platforms and online forums, the legal framework must adapt to address the unique challenges and complexities they bring.

Despite these challenges, it is crucial to find effective ways to enforce freedom of expression rights while also safeguarding the well-being and rights of individuals and society. Ongoing discussions, collaborations between stakeholders, and a commitment to upholding democratic values are essential in navigating these challenges and ensuring a fair and just society.

Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression

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Published: 01 November 2020
Volume 22 , pages 91–108, ( 2021 )

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The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’ the freedom of expression on certain grounds, such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Examples from around the world show that the freedom of individuals to express their opinions, convictions, and beliefs is often imperilled when states are not required to meet a substantial justificatory burden when limiting such freedom. This article critiques one of the common justificatory approaches employed in a number of jurisdictions to frame the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression—the proportionality test. It presents a case for an alternative approach that builds on the merits and addresses some of the weaknesses of a typical proportionality test. This alternative may be called a ‘duty-based’ justificatory approach because it requires the state to demonstrate—through the presentation of publicly justifiable reasons—that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the expressive conduct in question. The article explains how this approach is more normatively compelling than a typical proportionality test. It also illustrates how such an approach can better constrain the state’s ability to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations by limiting the freedom of expression of minorities and dissenting voices.

The Bill of Rights and Freedom of Belief and Expression: They Provide for Liberty, Not License

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Introduction

The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’ the freedom of expression for certain reasons. International and domestic law empowers the state to impose limitations on the freedom of expression in order to advance broad aims such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Yet cases from around the world demonstrate that the freedom of expression is vulnerable to unwarranted restrictions.

One of the most common tests used to determine whether a limitation on the freedom of expression is justified has come to be known as the ‘proportionality test’. In this article, I critique the typical proportionality test that is applied in many jurisdictions. I then offer a justificatory approach that reframes this typical test to address some of its normative and practical weaknesses. This alternative approach places individual ‘duties of justice’ at the heart of the state’s burden to justify a limitation on the freedom of expression.

The first section of this article discusses the unique place that the freedom of expression occupies in the liberal tradition, and explains why a robust justificatory approach is needed to protect the freedom of expression from unwarranted limitations. The second section explores some of the main weaknesses of a typical proportionality test when applied in relation to limitations on the freedom of expression. I take examples from a number of countries to illustrate the recurring tendency for the freedom of expression to be subjected to unwarranted restrictions. In the final section, I make a case for a ‘duty-based’ justificatory approach. The approach would require the state to demonstrate—by presenting publicly justifiable reasons—that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the expressive conduct in question. I explain how this approach addresses some of the normative weaknesses of a typical proportionality test. I will also illustrate how such an approach can better deal with the state’s ability to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations by limiting the freedom of expression of minorities and dissenting voices.

The Value of the Freedom of Expression

The freedom of expression broadly involves the communication of ideas, opinions, convictions, beliefs, and information. International legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognise the ‘freedom of expression’ as a right that can be exercised ‘either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of [the individual’s] choice’ (art 19, para 2).

Taking the freedom of expression seriously involves acknowledging it both as a ‘liberty’ and a ‘claim right’. A ‘liberty’, conceptually speaking, refers to the absence of any competing duty to do or refrain from doing something (Hohfeld 1919 , pp. 36–39). Footnote 1 The freedom of expression is a liberty, as it involves absence of constraints on what an individual is free to express. For example, a person may have the liberty to advocate for a country’s ratification of the ICCPR, as there may be no competing duty owed to others to refrain from such advocacy. A ‘claim right’ meanwhile corresponds to another’s duty to do or refrain from doing something (Hohfeld 1919 , p. 39; see also George 1995 , pp. 119–122). The normative significance of a ‘right’ is that it is in some way claimable (O’Neill 1996 , p. 131; Hart 1955 ), i.e. that the rights-holder has an entitlement to claim, from duty-bearers, the performance of duties (Feinberg 1970 , p. 243). The freedom of expression entails ‘claim rights’, including the claim right to non-interference with the expression in question. Since claim rights correspond to duties, the freedom of expression imposes duties on others to refrain from interfering with the expression in question. For example, an individual’s claim right to advocate for the election of a particular candidate contemplates the imposition of duties on others, including the state, to refrain from interfering with such advocacy.

The reason we recognise certain claimable rights is often linked to the underlying interests these rights set out to protect. Joseph Raz observes a person has a ‘right’ when his interests are sufficient reason for holding others to be under a duty (Raz 1986 , p. 166). The importance of the interests that underlie the freedom of expression point to why we ought to, and indeed do, recognise it as a claimable right. Recalling such value is important, as the process through which we justify limitations on the freedom of expression is contingent on the value we attach to it.

On the one hand, the freedom of expression is of inherent value to the individual, as it involves the external communication of an individual’s ‘ forum internum ’ or inner realm of thoughts, beliefs, and convictions—a realm that is arguably inviolable (Boyle and Shah 2014 , p. 226). The freedom of expression is then connected to certain foundational values associated with the forum internum , such as personal autonomy and human dignity. On the other hand, the freedom of expression has consequentialist and epistemic value. It is certainly valuable to democracy, as political participation, criticism of government, media freedom, and indeed the very act of voting are aspects of the freedom of expression. John Stuart Mill’s defence of the freedom of expression points to its epistemic value. Mill argues that human fallibility justifies greater tolerance of the freedom of expression, as there can be no certainty with respect to what is true and what is false (Mill 1859 , pp. 19–21). He contends that there is no inherent justification for suppressing the beliefs and opinions of others through coercive means, even if one believes that those beliefs and opinions are untrue, as they may in fact be true, and the alternative beliefs and opinions untrue. Mill also claims that truth can only be ascertained in a ‘clearer’ and ‘livelier’ form when it is permitted to collide with error (p. 19), and adds that ‘conflicting doctrines’ often ‘share the truth between them’ (p. 44).

The inherent, consequentialist, and epistemic value of the freedom of expression suggests that it should not be limited without meeting a substantial burden of justification. When the conduct in question relates to the freedom of expression, this justificatory burden falls on those who wish to restrict the conduct. Such a scheme is consistently featured in the liberal tradition, and is consistent with the ‘fundamental liberal principle’ (Gaus 1996a , pp. 162–166)—that freedom is the norm and the limitation is the exception; so ‘the onus of justification is on those who would use coercion to limit freedom’ (Gaus 1996b ; Feinberg 1987 , p. 9). Therefore, in the case of the freedom of expression, the starting point in the process of reasoning is clear: an individual is ordinarily entitled to engage in the conduct associated with the freedom of expression, unless a restriction on the conduct is carefully and convincingly justified.

The Proportionality Test

Justification involves providing good reasons for an action, omission, or belief. According to Raz, a reason is ‘a consideration in favour of doing, believing, or feeling something’ (Raz 1999 , pp. 16–17; see also Scanlon 1998 , p. 17). Given the special value we attach to the freedom of expression, a reason must be of a particular kind when deployed to limit the freedom of expression. I accordingly approximate good reasons—in the specific context of justifying limitations on the freedom of expression—to what John Rawls called ‘public reason’ (Rawls 2005 , pp. 212–254). Rawls explains that ‘public reason’ entails the justification of political decisions through the use of values and standards that are publicly available and acceptable (pp. 227–228). Reasons can be characterised as ‘public’ when citizens who are equal accept them as valid (p. 213). Crucially, a reason does not fall within the rubric of public reason merely because the majority in society view it as a good reason. Even if, for instance, the overwhelming majority view some minority group as ‘culturally inferior’, public reason would exclude such inferiority as a justification for discriminating that group. It would be excluded because such perceived inferiority is not a reason that is publicly available and acceptable to all citizens on the basis of equal citizenship. Therefore, ideals of equality are imbedded into the concept of public reason; Equality is a constituent element that necessarily excludes purely majoritarian reasoning.

In this section, I examine one of the ‘prominent’ approaches (Möller 2014 , p. 32) to justifying limitations on the freedom of expression: the proportionality test. I aim to explain the typical features of this test, and point to some of its main weaknesses, particularly when applied to limitations on the freedom of expression.

A typical proportionality test assesses whether a limitation on a right can be ‘justified by reference to gains on some other interest or value’ (Urbina 2014 , p. 173). Most jurisdictions in Europe, and treaty bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee, apply the proportionality test when evaluating the permissibility of limitations. The test usually contains four limbs (Tridimas 2007 , p. 139). First, the state must pursue an aim that serves a ‘compelling’ (Kumm 2004 , p. 593) or ‘legitimate’ interest (Tremblay 2014 , p. 865; Barak 2012 ) when limiting the right. This limb contains a normative requirement, as certain interests that are ‘illegitimate’ would not be permissible at the outset. For example, the aim to destroy a population would not qualify as ‘legitimate’. Second, there must be a rational nexus between the specific measure used to limit the right and the legitimate interest. This limb is sometime referred to as the ‘suitability test’ (Arai-Takahashi 2005 , p. 32; Van Dijk and Van Hoof 1998 : pp. 771–773). Third, this measure must be necessary to advancing, or preventing setbacks to, that legitimate interest. This limb is naturally termed the necessity test. Finally, the measure must be, in the ‘strict sense’, proportionate, i.e. it must involve a net gain, when the reduction in the enjoyment of the right is weighed against the level to which the interest is advanced (Rivers 2006 , p. 181). According to Aharon Barak, proportionality stricto sensu ‘requires a balancing of the benefits gained by the public and the harm caused to the…right through the use of the means selected by law to obtain the proper purpose’ (Barak 2012 , p. 340). Grégoire Webber meanwhile notes that such ‘balancing’ is designed to demonstrate a ‘proportionality’ between the negative effect (on the freedom of expression, for instance) on the one hand, and the beneficial effect of the limitation (in terms of the legitimate interest) on the other hand (Webber 2009 , pp. 71–72).

Different versions of the proportionality test have been applied in different jurisdictions. The German Federal Constitutional Court, for instance, applies a four-part test that considers the question of ‘balancing’ only in the final stage of the test. This version of the test has come to reflect a general rule of law within European Community law (Arai-Takahashi 2005 , p. 29). By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court considers ‘balancing’ at earlier stages as well, i.e. under the legitimacy and necessity subtests (Grimm 2007 ). The Court has found that, under the legitimacy subtest, the legitimate interest must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding the right in question (R v. Oakes 1986 ; Choudhry 2006 ). Moreover, under the necessity subtest, the selected measure must, when compared to the available alternatives, impair the right the least . Accordingly, the Canadian version of the test expects some balancing to be undertaken when determining which aims are legitimate for the purpose of justifying a limitation, and when determining whether the measure in question is the least restrictive among available options. Meanwhile, in the United States (U.S.), ‘content-based’ limitations on the freedom of expression attract ‘strict scrutiny’, i.e. the highest level of judicial scrutiny of the restrictive measure. This approach is essentially founded on an American common law idea that the right to the freedom of expression—protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution—is a highly valued individual right (Strauss 2002 ). In the U.S., the state must accordingly meet the heaviest justificatory burden when restricting certain types of speech, such as political speech. By contrast, ‘content-neutral’ limitations on the freedom of expression (for example, restrictions on the form, extent, timing, or medium of the expression in question) are reviewed under a ‘intermediate scrutiny’ test. The U.S. Supreme Court formulated a four-part test to determine whether a content-neutral limitation is constitutional (United States v. O’Brien 1968 ; see also Zoller 2009 , p. 906; Stone 1987 ): (1) the limitation must be within the constitutional power of government; (2) the limitation must further an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of the freedom of expression; and (4) the limitation must be narrowly tailored—no greater than necessary. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court devised a fifth limb: the limitation must leave open ample opportunity for communication (Ladue v. Gilleo 1994 ). Although the justificatory approach prevalent in the U.S. is rarely termed a ‘proportionality test’, it clearly contains elements of balancing. Whichever version of the test is employed, it is apparent that the proportionality test generally involves a justificatory burden of a particular form: the limitation on the freedom of expression is justified only if the countervailing interests outweigh the individual’s interests in the freedom of expression. It is for this reason that the very notion of proportionality is described as ‘inevitably flexible and open-textured in nature’ (Arai-Takahashi 2005 , p. 34).

A typical proportionality test has a number of weaknesses worth noting. There is an ongoing scholarly debate on the suitability of the test, and in the course of discussing some of the weaknesses I detect in the typical version of the test, I shall touch on some of the elements of this debate. Of course, proponents of proportionality often argue that the weaknesses pointed out by critics are with respect to cases in which the test is misapplied, and that the proportionality test is sound if it is applied correctly (e.g. Möller 2014 ; Kumm 2010 ). However, the strength of the test lies in how it is applied in practice. In this context, I set out to evaluate the ‘typical’ proportionality test, which contains both normative and political weaknesses when applied to assess limitations on the freedom of expression. In doing so, I leave open the potential for the test to be applied in a more robust manner. In fact, my proposal conceives of a more robust version of the test.

At a normative level, the typical test often fails to adequately recognise and account for the special value of the freedom of expression. Such a weakness is particularly evident where the court or tribunal concerned glosses over the first three limbs of the test and focuses instead on the final stage of balancing. Kai Möller, referring to German practice in particular, observes that typically, ‘the balancing stage dominates the legal analysis and is usually determinative of the outcome’ of the assessment of whether a limitation is permissible or not (Möller 2014 , p. 34). When the emphasis of the assessment is on balancing alone, the court or tribunal would often rely on practical reasoning to determine the permissibility of a limitation (Kumm 2010 , p. 147). It is for this reason that many rights scholars have criticised the proportionality test for its failure to give adequate normative weight to individual rights (Letsas 2007 ; Tsakyrakis 2009 ). According to these critics, proportionality treats rights on par with any other interest or value, and such an equation undermines the special importance we attach to rights. Many of these critics rely on well-known ‘rights-based’ approaches to justifying limitations on rights, such as the approaches advocated by Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. According to Dworkin, individual rights, such as the right to the freedom of expression, ‘trump’ other non-rights interests (Dworkin 1977 , p. xi). He argues that non-rights interests, such as collective interests, should be ruled out when justifying limitations on individual rights (Dworkin 1984 , p. 153; see also Waldron 1993 , p. 210). This approach is based on the view that rights have peremptory value; they exist, and ought to be protected, even if the community is genuinely worse off due to their existence or protection (Dworkin 1985 , p. 350). Understood this way, the right to the freedom of expression constrains the state’s pursuit of collective interests, and sets out a protected realm that the state cannot interfere with even when collective interests could be served through such interference. Rawls meanwhile argues that basic liberties, such as the freedom of expression, can only be limited for its own sake or for the sake of other basic liberties (Rawls 1999 , p. 220). These basic liberties have ‘lexical priority’ Footnote 2 over all other types of interests. Accordingly, basic liberties such as the freedom of expression would have ‘absolute weight’ with respect to interests unrelated to basic liberties (Rawls 2005 , p. 294). For example, the freedom of expression cannot be denied to an individual on grounds such as ‘economic efficiency and growth’ (pp. 294–295). Therefore, all reasons that are not related to basic liberties of similar importance to the freedom of expression will be excluded (at the outset) from the justificatory process. In sharp contrast to these rights-based approaches, the proportionality test expects a court or tribunal to weigh rights such as the right to the freedom of expression with collective interests such as national security, or public order, health, or morals. Such weighing—it could be argued—places the freedom of expression on the same normative plane as these collective interests, thereby undermining its peremptory value.

This normative challenge is strongly linked to the textual framework of many international and domestic instruments that set out the basis for limiting the freedom of expression. For example, article 19, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR, and article 10, paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), explicitly permit states to limit the freedom of expression on the grounds of collective interests, such as public order and public health. Similarly, the constitutions of numerous countries permit limitations on the freedom of expression on the basis of a host of collective interests. The challenge may then also be doctrinal, as the typical proportionality test often suffers from normative weaknesses essentially because the legal doctrine that sets out the test reflects these weaknesses. Accordingly, the ICCPR and the ECHR can encounter normative problems in practice, as the limitation regimes found in these instruments contemplate broad governmental discretion when imposing limitations on the freedom of expression. Such discretion has raised serious concerns among scholars with respect to how well proportionality meets normative priorities such as the rule of law, or legal predictability (Von Bernstorff 2014 , p. 66; Urbina 2014 , p. 180).

At a political level, a typical proportionality test is vulnerable to two risks associated with granting the state wide discretion to limit the freedom of expression. First, the state can use a limitation regime to advance majoritarian interests. The freedom of expression of minorities and political dissenters may be targeted for reasons that are not publicly justifiable. In this context, majoritarian interests can infiltrate limitation grounds such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Second, the state can, in the course of limiting an individual’s freedom of expression, attempt to offload its own positive obligations owed to society. An individual’s expressive conduct can appear to ‘cause’ others to react in ways that harm third parties. Such cases often arise when the expressive conduct has a religious dimension. Although the expressive conduct may also be classified as religious manifestation or practice, it is difficult to exclude such conduct from the broader domain of the freedom of expression. In such cases, the state may choose to restrict the specific expressive conduct rather than focus on the wrongdoers who engage in violence. It is the state that owes citizens a positive obligation to maintain law and order, and it is up to the state to prevent violence, and punish those who engage in it for whatever cause. However, when the violence is committed by members of the majority community, the state may look to target the individual whose conduct appeared to ‘cause’ the wrongdoing, rather than risk confronting the majority community. In such circumstances, it may attempt to justify a restriction on the expressive conduct of the individual concerned, ostensibly to maintain public order and protect citizens from the violent reactions of others. It may do so regardless of how unreasonable such reactions are.

The typical proportionality test has no convincing answer to the political risks associated with state authority to limit the freedom of expression. It relies heavily on the good faith of the state, and the ability of a court or tribunal to convincingly weigh the competing interests at stake. Yet several examples from a variety of jurisdictions demonstrate that courts and tribunals are often compelled to offer the state wide discretion. The proportionality test only requires the adjudicative body to assess which of the two interests—the individual’s interest in the freedom of expression or the legitimate interest being pursued by the state—is weightier. It would not contemplate any specific threshold that signals that the competing interest is sufficiently weighty. Scholars such as Francisco Urbina accordingly point out that the incommensurability of competing values and interests makes the proportionality test unsuited to determining the permissibility of limitations on rights (Urbina 2015 ). Given that it is so difficult to undertake the task of balancing with any precision, the adjudicative body would often defer to the state.

A number of illustrations demonstrate both the normative and political weaknesses inherent in a typical application of the proportionality test. Admittedly, some of these cases overlap with the terrain of other rights, such as the freedom of religion or belief. Yet the point about the freedom of expression is that it is a general core right that underlies many other rights. The inherent weaknesses of the typical proportionality test are best observed precisely in these complex cases where several rights are at play. Three classes of cases may be briefly cited to illustrate the weaknesses I am referring to.

First, the state may rely on majoritarian conceptions of morality to restrict certain expressions deemed contrary to those conceptions. The classic example of such restrictions on the freedom of expression is the landmark case of the European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. The United Kingdom ( 1976 ). In this case, the Court upheld the seizure of an educational book that dealt with the subject of sex, and found no violation of the freedom of expression in terms of article 10 of the ECHR. The limitation was justified on the basis of public morals. A similar example is the restriction of the advocacy of same-sex rights in Russia. In Fedotova v. The Russian Federation ( 2012 ), the complainant displayed posters that read ‘homosexuality is normal’ and ‘I am proud of my homosexuality’. The posters were displayed near a secondary school. The complainant claimed that the purpose of the expression was to promote tolerance towards gay and lesbian individuals. She was convicted of public actions aimed at ‘propaganda of homosexuality’ among minors. The state asserted that the conviction was necessary in the interests of children ‘to protect them from the factors that could negatively impact their…moral development’ (para 5.6 of the Decision of the Human Rights Committee). The Human Rights Committee relied on the principle of non-discrimination, and found that the limitation was discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation. It did not actually apply a typical proportionality test to deal with the limitation, and instead relied on an additional normative basis to find a violation of the freedom of expression. The case serves as a reminder that a typical proportionality test would only require the balancing of the individual’s interests in the freedom of expression with the asserted public interest in morality and moral development. Such a test would not account for the fact that the asserted interest in public morals is actually a majoritarian—for instance, heteronormative—conception of morality. The typical test would need to be bolstered to deal with the challenge. The Committee accordingly bolstered the test by relying on the principle of non-discrimination. However, if a more general prohibition on expressions about sex had been instituted, such as, for example, the censoring of a book dealing with sex education, the Committee’s reliance on the principle of non-discrimination alone would not have sufficed.

Second, the state may rely on majority values and interests to restrict certain types of expressions deemed a threat to these values and interests. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights offers a number of examples of such restrictions. In these cases, the doctrine set out in the text of article 10 of the ECHR has governed the Court’s reasoning. The Court has typically applied a four-part test: the limitation must (1) be provided by law; (2) pursue a legitimate aim listed in the article; (3) be necessary in a democratic society; and (4) be proportionate stricto sensu . Some proponents of the proportionality test adopted by the European Court of Human Rights have suggested that the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ entails a commitment to pluralism, and is a check on majoritarianism (Zysset 2019 , p. 235). Indeed, the Court has viewed certain aspects of the freedom of expression, such as press freedom, and the criticism of public officials, as vital due to their relevance to the democratic process. It has accordingly placed a heavy justificatory burden on the state when expressive conduct associated with ‘democracy’ is being restricted (Thoma v. Luxembourg 2001 ). Yet, this counter-majoritarian check is not always evident in the Court’s jurisprudence, particularly when the religious sentiments of the majority community are at stake. In the case of İ.A. v. Turkey ( 2005 ), the managing director of a publishing house was convicted of blasphemy for publishing a novel that was deemed deeply offensive to Muslims. The applicant complained that the conviction violated his freedom of expression under article 10 of the ECHR. In response, the state argued that ‘the criticism of Islam in the book had fallen short of the level of responsibility to be expected of criticism in a country where the majority of the population were Muslim’ (para. 20 of the judgement). Accordingly, the Court was called upon to weigh the individual’s freedom of expression with the majority community’s interests in their own freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The majority of the Court held that the novel contained statements that amounted to ‘an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam’ (para. 29). It concluded that the restriction was reasonable, as it ‘intended to provide protection against offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims’ (para. 30). It accordingly found that there was no violation of article 10, and that the measures under consideration satisfied the proportionality test.

The European Court’s observations in İ.A. v. Turkey relied heavily on the doctrine of margin of appreciation, which is often applied to afford states some ‘latitude’ when limiting rights (Arai-Takahashi 2002 , p. 2). The doctrine was applied in the case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom ( 1976 ), and has since been relied upon to justify some level of judicial deference to states on questions of limitations. For example, in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria ( 1995 ) and in Wingrove v. The United Kingdom ( 1996 ), the Court relied on the margin of appreciation doctrine to hold that the restriction of expressions that caused public offence to the majority religious group (in both cases the majority group was Christian) was permissible under the ECHR. In each case, the Court found no violation of article 10 of the ECHR, and held that the restrictions on the public screening of films deemed offensive to a religious majority were proportionate.

The margin of appreciation doctrine has also been applied in cases involving religious expression, including wearing certain religious attire. Cases such as S.A.S v. France ( 2014 ) and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ( 2005 ) essentially concerned article 9 of the ECHR, which protects the freedom to manifest religion or belief. However, the applicants in both cases also claimed that the limitations in question violated their freedom of expression under article 10. The Court upheld restrictions on the niqāb (a full-face veil) and the Islamic headscarf on the basis that such attire is incompatible with ‘European’ values such as ‘living together’ and ‘secularism’, and found that these restrictions did not violate article 10 of the ECHR. In such cases, the Court has sought to balance the individual’s right to the freedom of expression (including the freedom to engage in certain types of religious expression) with broader societal aims such as secularism, and has held that the limitations in question were proportionate. In each case, the Court has relied on the margin of appreciation doctrine to evaluate the permissibility of the limitation on the freedom of expression. The doctrine has thus attracted intense criticism from scholars—primarily due to the fact that the Court has often lacked a coherent and consistent approach to applying the doctrine (Letsas 2006 ).

Third, the state may rely on broad conceptions of ‘public order’ to restrict expressions that may ‘cause’ others to react in a violent or disorderly manner. In the case of Zaheeruddin v. State ( 1993 ), the Pakistani Supreme Court speculated that the public expressions of the Ahmadi community claiming that they are ‘Muslim’ would provoke outrage among the Sunni majority (Khan 2015 ). It therefore justified restricting the public display of the Kalimah Footnote 3 on the basis of public order. The Human Rights Committee has also considered cases involving limitations on the freedom of expression on the basis that the expression in question could cause others to engage in disruptive conduct. In Claudia Andrea Marchant Reyes et al. v. Chile ( 2017 ), the Committee considered the removal and destruction of a work of art on the grounds of ‘public order’. The work of art contained fifteen banners commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the military coup d’état in Chile. The complainant had in fact obtained the necessary approvals to display the banners at nine bridges. The state, however, argued that the removal of the banners was necessary to prevent ‘potential disruption to public order arising out of the burning of the banners’, and that it was the state’s ‘duty’ to safeguard public order. It argued that the limitation was for the ‘benefit of persons who crossed the bridges in question on a daily basis, given that the banners could have been burned precisely at the times of the greatest movement of people and caused injury’ (para 4.3 of the Committee’s decision). In this particular case, the Committee found that the limitation was unwarranted, as the state provided ‘no evidence of what specific information it had that gave rise to fears that the work might be burned’ (para 7.5). Its decision may have been different if in fact there was such evidence. In any event, the case remains a good example of how the state may seek to offload its obligation (to maintain public order) onto the individual concerned by limiting the individual’s freedom of expression—a vulnerability to which the typical proportionality test has no coherent response.

Majoritarian conceptions of certain public interests, including public order and morals, often drive the state’s justification for a limitation on the freedom of expression. The state can also offload its positive obligations to maintain public order in the course of limiting an individual’s freedom of expression, and seek to justify restrictions on expressions that attract majority outrage. These types of justifications can infiltrate the reasoning of the court or tribunal tasked with assessing the proportionality of the limitation. In essence, the typical proportionality test, which asks the adjudicative body to do no more than weigh competing interests, does not avoid these political risks. In the final section of this article, I present an alternative justificatory approach that attempts to build on the merits, and address the weaknesses, of a typical proportionality test.

A Duty-Based Justificatory Approach

The alternative justificatory approach I have in mind is not a radical departure from the typical proportionality test. The alternative approach also contemplates ‘balancing’. Its main departure from the typical proportionality test is that it seeks to direct the state’s justificatory burden towards the demonstration of an individual ‘duty of justice’ towards others. I imagine such redirection can be done within the parameters of a test that still features proportionality as part of its final limb. The state would simply be required to demonstrate—in the course of meeting the first three limbs of the test—that the individual concerned owes a duty of justice to others. Even when such a duty is demonstrated, the question of proportionality would remain relevant, as the specific means by which the restriction is imposed may be subject to the requirement of proportionality. For example, a duty of justice may ground the state’s justification for restricting the public display of obscene material. However, the state is still bound by considerations of proportionality. While it may be proportionate to fine a person for displaying obscene material in a public place, it may be disproportionate to incarcerate that person. Bearing this scheme in mind, I shall argue that a duty-based approach addresses some of the more fundamental normative and political weaknesses associated with the typical proportionality test.

Duties of Justice

The freedom of expression is an individual liberty. According to the Hohfeldian conception of a ‘liberty’, which is both widely accepted and conceptually compelling, a liberty can only be constrained by a competing duty that correlates to another’s claim right. Not all duties correlate to rights. For instance, imperfect moral duties (Mill 1861 ) or ‘duties of charity’ (Goodin 2017 ) do not correlate to rights. For example, a duty to water a plant on behalf of a neighbour does not correlate to the neighbour’s ‘right’ that the plant is watered (Raz 1986 , p. 77). By contrast, an individual’s ‘duties of justice’ are duties that correspond to the rights of others; scholars such as Robert Goodin rightly observe that the state can ‘justifiably compel people to perform’ such duties (Goodin 2017 , pp. 268–271).

Conceptually speaking, duties of justice shape the extent and scope of individual liberty. For example, if X has the liberty to say φ, X has no duty of justice to refrain from saying φ, i.e. no other person has a claim right that X refrains from saying φ. But if X owes Y a duty to refrain from saying λ, X ’s freedom of expression does not extend to saying λ. Only the sphere that is not duty-bound corresponds to A ’s freedom of expression. If individual liberty is constrained by competing duties of justice, it follows that an individual’s ‘liberty’ to express something means they do not owe others a duty of justice to refrain from expressing that thing. If an individual owes others a duty of justice to refrain from expressing something, the individual has no liberty to express that thing. In such cases, the state may be justified in restricting the conduct. A duty of justice is, therefore, not the starting point of the reasoning process, but the endpoint. It is the destination one arrives at when one convincingly demonstrates that the competing interests against the conduct in question are important enough to constitute a claim right against the conduct, thereby imposing on the individual concerned a duty of justice to refrain from the conduct.

What would a duty-based approach to justifying limitations on the freedom of expression look like? The duty-based approach that I have in mind has two features. First, it incorporates the idea of ‘public reason’ to ensure that only publicly justifiable reasons may be put forward by the state when justifying a limitation on the freedom of expression. This element would necessarily strengthen the legitimacy limb of the proportionality test. Only aims that are publicly justifiable would be considered legitimate, and could form the basis for a limitation on the freedom of expression. Aims that societies cannot find agreement on would not be eligible. For instance, the aim of ensuring ‘the glory of Islam’—an aim found in article 19 of Pakistan’s Constitution—would not by itself suffice as a legitimate ground on which the freedom of expression can be limited. Similarly, ‘secularism’, if not an aim shared by many religious minorities in a country, would not in and of itself be valid grounds for limiting the freedom of expression.

Second, the approach I am proposing requires the state to demonstrate a direct responsibility on the part of the individual concerned. This feature of the duty-based approach is consistent with the doctrine of double effect discussed by scholars such as Seana Shiffrin. According to Shiffrin, the double-effect doctrine ‘asserts that it may, sometimes, be more permissible to bring about harm as a foreseen or foreseeable but unintended side effect of one’s otherwise permissible activity than to bring about equally weighty harmful consequences as an intended means or end of one’s activity (emphasis added)’ (Shiffrin 2003 , pp. 1136–1139). A similar principle is found in tort law, under which ‘one would not be held liable for harm…if the harm resulted from deliberate intervention of another agent’ (Marmor 2018 , p. 153). Individual liberty is ultimately shaped by the ‘horizontal’ duties the individual concerned owes others (Knox 2008 , p. 2). These are horizontal to the extent that one individual owes other individuals, or the community at large, a duty to refrain from engaging in intentional conduct that would cause them harm. Therefore, one’s duties of justice are confined to the sphere in which one has direct responsibility for the intended consequences. If, for instance, the violent reactions of others are in fact an intended consequence of the expressive conduct—such as in cases of incitement to violence—it follows that one fails to fulfil a duty of justice to refrain from harming others. Yet if the reactions of others are unintended , it is difficult to maintain that a duty of justice was unfulfilled. One cannot take responsibility for the violent acts of others.

A duty-based justificatory approach is more normatively compelling and politically appealing than a typical proportionality test. The scheme I am proposing addresses the normative weakness associated with the typical proportionality test wherein the special importance we attach to the freedom of expression is often undermined. When certain expressive conduct is presumptively associated with the freedom of expression, the conduct cannot be restricted unless the competing interests at play form a sufficient reason to impose on the individual a duty of justice to refrain from the conduct. The state would need to demonstrate that the individual concerned owes such a duty of justice. A duty of justice, once demonstrated, becomes the placeholder for the publicly justifiable reasons we might have for imposing coercive legal measures against the conduct in question.

The distinction I wish to draw between a duty-based approach and a typical proportionality test can be illustrated as follows. A typical proportionality test would require the state to establish that the interest in the freedom of expression is outweighed by the competing interests at play. A duty-based approach simply rejects the idea that a limitation on the freedom of expression can be justified by claiming that the competing interest is weightier than the individual’s interest in freedom of expression. The freedom of expression, after all, has special normative value, and should not be merely weighed against competing interests. A duty-based approach requires the state to demonstrate that the competing interests are sufficiently weighty to impose a duty on the individual to refrain from engaging in the expressive conduct in question. This justificatory burden is different to a burden to merely demonstrate that the competing interest is weightier than an interest in the freedom of expression. Instead of asking which interest is weightier, a duty-based justificatory burden requires the state to demonstrate that the competing interest is weighty enough to constitute a claim right (held by others), and a duty of justice (owed by the individual concerned). Under a duty-based approach, the weight of the interest in the freedom of expression is not actually compared with the weight of any competing interest. Instead, specific expressive conduct can be excluded (on the basis of public reason) from the scope of the freedom of expression in view of the fact that the individual concern owes others a duty to refrain from such conduct. This approach retains the normative significance of the freedom of expression instead of subjecting it to consequentialist balancing.

A political case can also be made for adopting a duty-based justificatory approach. Such an approach can place a counter-majoritarian check on state authority to impose limitations on the freedom of expression. A typical proportionality test does not have a specific answer to majoritarian infiltration of interests such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. It does not have a coherent response to common instances in which majoritarian interests are advanced under the guise of these ‘public’ interests. It also often fails to contend with cases in which the state seeks to offload its own positive obligations by limiting an individual’s freedom of expression. Such offloading is common when members of a majority community violently react to expressions that are unpopular or considered offensive. The state can then use limitation grounds such as ‘public order’ to limit the individual’s freedom of expression for presumably ‘causing’ the violent reaction, rather than focus on the violent reaction itself.

A duty-based approach to justifying limitations on the freedom of expression makes it more difficult for the state to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations. For instance, if the competing interest concerns public order, the state would need to demonstrate that the ‘public order’ interests at stake are actually sufficient reason to constitute a claim right against the expressive conduct in question. It is not at all obvious that an individual merely expressing something offensive owes a duty to refrain from such expression, even when such offence can lead to lawlessness—especially when the individual does not intend to incite lawlessness. Under a duty-based approach, the competing interests that form the basis of a limitation on the freedom of expression must be sufficient to ground in the individual concerned a duty of justice to refrain from the conduct in question.

An illustration may help explain the political case for the duty-based approach. Let us assume an animal rights activist criticises ritual animal slaughter by the majority religious community in the country. The ritual is considered deeply sacred to the customs of the majority community, and the criticism outrages a number of those belonging to the community. There are subsequent calls to arrest the activist and ban such criticism. The state takes no action at first, and as a result, several members of the majority community engage in violent and disruptive protests in public spaces. The state initially arrests some of the perpetrators, but also decides to prohibit the activist and others from engaging in any further criticism of ritual animal slaughter. It justifies the prohibition on the basis that the impugned conduct, i.e. the criticism of animal slaughter, ‘causes’ others to engage in violent and disruptive behaviour, which impairs public order . The state may articulate its justification for the limitation in the following manner: others have an interest in public order, and if certain criticism directly causes persons to engage in acts of public disorder, the state is justified in restricting such criticism. There is no doubt that the interest in public order is important. Such an interest, for instance, grounds a positive obligation in the state to prevent violent and disruptive behaviour. Individuals meanwhile have duties to refrain from such behaviour. But at no point is it apparent that an individual engaging in contentious and unpopular criticism owes a duty of justice (i.e. a duty that directly corresponds to the claim rights of others) to refrain from such criticism—even if such criticism appears to have ‘caused’ others to react violently. A typical proportionality test does not confront this problem, as it does not necessarily require the state to deal with intentionality when limiting the freedom of expression. It would only require the adjudicative body to weigh the individual’s interest in the freedom of expression against the interests of others in public order; a restriction on such criticism could conceivably be justified if the court or tribunal decided that the competing interests outweighed the interest in the freedom of expression. The state’s intention to appease a majority community, or offload its positive obligations, may very well go unchecked.

A duty-based approach directs the state to demonstrate an individual duty of justice, which necessarily incorporates public reason, and the direct responsibility of the individual. In terms of the illustration concerning ritual animal slaughter, to say that interests in public order are publicly justifiable reasons to restrict an activist’s criticism seems unreasonable, as it ignores the fact that it is someone else’s conduct and not the activist’s conduct that actually results in setbacks to public order. Therefore, the state would need to do much better to demonstrate that the activist concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from criticising animal slaughter if a limitation on the activist’s freedom of expression in that respect was to be justified. The state is then, to some extent, prevented from offloading its positive obligation (to prevent public disorder) onto the activist. This is the fundamental political value of a duty-based justificatory approach. It is not only a more normatively compelling approach, wherein the special importance of the freedom of expression is better preserved; it is also a politically appealing approach, as it requires the state to justify a limitation on the freedom of expression based on the specific horizontal relationship that exists between the individual and others in society.

Is the Language of Duties Dangerous?

The language of duties can be hijacked by those seeking to diminish the scope of rights. It is therefore natural for the language of duties to attract scepticism and suspicion. For example, the ‘Asian values’ project advanced by political actors such as former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew relied on a language of ‘duties’ (among other terms such as ‘obedience’ and ‘loyalty’) as a means of deflecting concern for human rights (Sen 1997 ). Moreover, in 2007 and thereafter, the UK witnessed a surge in interest among political actors to frame a new bill of ‘rights and duties ’. The discourse enabled some political actors to call for the replacement of the UK’s Human Rights Act of 1998 with a new bill that focuses both on individual rights and responsibilities. It is therefore natural for the language of duties to attract scepticism and suspicion. But as pointed out by Samuel Moyn, ‘the need to guard against destructive ideas of duty is a poor excuse for ignoring beneficial liberal ones’ (Moyn 2016 , p. 11).

Despite the obvious risks, adopting the language of duties to describe a more robust justificatory approach is valuable, both for methodological and ethical reasons. First, it is not possible to articulate each and every ‘claim right’ in terms of well-recognised ‘human rights’. A person’s claim right that another person refrains from doing something specific cannot always be articulated as a ‘human right’. For instance, a person’s claim right that another person refrains from causing public unrest is certainly a ‘claim right’, but cannot easily be framed in terms of a specific ‘human right’ found in, say, the ICCPR or ECHR. By contrast, it can easily be framed as an interest that both these treaties recognise—‘public order’. A person’s interest in public order, in certain circumstances, is sufficient reason to impose on another person the duty to refrain from expressive conduct that could directly harm that interest. In such circumstances, that person would have a claim right and the other would have a duty of justice to refrain from such conduct. Framing the state’s burden to justify the limitation in terms of ‘rights’ could lead to confusion, as it may prompt us to look for a ‘human right’. Instead, the relevant ‘claim right’ is contingent on the outcome of a reasoning process whereby the importance of the public order interest, in the specific circumstances under consideration, is sufficient reason to impose on an individual a duty to refrain from conduct that directly impairs the interest. This justificatory approach may be better described as a ‘duty-based’ approach because the outcome of the reasoning process is the demonstration of an individual duty of justice to refrain from engaging in the conduct in question.

Second, there is an ethical benefit to reclaiming the language of duties. Such language can help individuals make ethical sense of how their expressive conduct impacts others. David Petrasek correctly observes that the language of duties introduces a certain ‘global ethic’ to modern human rights discourse (Petrasek 1999 , p. 7), which is currently missing. Moyn poignantly notes: ‘Human rights themselves wither when their advocates fail to cross the border into the language of duty’ (Moyn 2016 , p. 10). Such language can then ‘instil in individuals the idea that they should act in ways that support basic shared values’ (Petrasek 1999 , p. 48), and motivate them to be more aware of their ethical obligations to others. Framing a limitation only as a means of advancing legitimate interests, or relying purely on the language of proportionality, cannot offer this ethical dimension. Therefore, the risks associated with the language of duties are ultimately outweighed by its methodological and ethical benefits.

In this article, I evaluated a typical proportionality test when applied to cases concerning limitations on the freedom of expression, and discussed some of the normative and political weaknesses associated with the test. I presented a case for an alternative approach that places duties of justice at the centre of the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression. This alternative approach does not completely discard the proportionality test; it instead attempts to address some of the weaknesses of the test. I termed this alternative approach a ‘duty-based justificatory approach’ for certain methodological and ethical reasons. I argued that, when individual conduct concerns the freedom of expression, the state’s burden to justify the restriction on such conduct must involve demonstrating that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from engaging in the conduct.

Once we fully appreciate the value of the freedom of expression, we begin to see the sense in requiring the state to demonstrate a duty of justice when justifying limitations on the freedom of expression. Such an approach is normatively valuable, as it better sustains the normative primacy and peremptory value of the freedom of expression. The state would need to compellingly demonstrate that the various interests that compete with the individual’s interest in the freedom of expression are sufficient reason to impose a duty of justice on the individual concerned. It would have to rely on public reason to demonstrate such a duty, and it would ultimately have to prove that the individual concerned has a direct responsibility for any harmful consequences emanating from the conduct in question. Apart from such normative value, we have seen that a duty-based approach can be politically valuable. It places a clearer burden on the state to demonstrate how the individual concerned directly owes a duty of justice to others to refrain from engaging in the impugned conduct. The state is accordingly constrained from advancing certain majoritarian interests, or offloading its positive obligations by limiting the individual’s freedom of expression.

There appears to be a compelling normative and political case to place duties of justice at the centre of the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression. Such an approach would not radically depart from the proportionality test, which retains its place as a ‘core doctrinal tool’ (Möller 2014 , p. 31) to determine the permissibility of limitations on the freedom of expression. The alternative approach I have proposed instead adds crucial scaffolding to the typical proportionality test. It sets out to reinforce the state’s burden to confine itself to the realm of public reason, and insists that the state demonstrates that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the impugned conduct. Such an approach would enhance the state’s justificatory burden when it seeks to limit one of our most cherished values: the freedom of expression.

Wesley Hohfeld’s reference to liberty (what he called ‘privilege’) appears to be analogous to Isaiah Berlin’s conception of ‘negative liberty’, which he describes as the area within which a person ‘is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference’ (Berlin 1969 , p. 2)

‘Lexical priority’ typically refers to the order in which values or principles are prioritised. Rawls argued that basic liberties, such as the freedom of expression, had lexical priority over other interests.

The Kalimah in question is the specific declaration: ‘There is none worthy of worship except Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’.

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Dr Nazila Ghanea, Dr Godfrey Gunatilleke, Tom Kohavi, Shamara Wettimuny, and Wijith de Chickera for their generous time in reviewing previous versions of this article, and for their valuable feedback.

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Gunatilleke, G. Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression. Hum Rights Rev 22 , 91–108 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00608-8

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00608-8

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Article 10 /

Freedom of expression

We have the right to express ourselves freely and hold our own opinions – even if our views are unpopular or could upset or offend others.

Political expression – including peaceful protests and demonstrations
Artistic expression
Commercial expression – particularly when it also raises matters of legitimate public debate and concern.
The right to free expression would be meaningless if it only protected certain types of expression. So Article 10 protects both popular and unpopular expression – including speech that might shock others – subject to certain limitations.

Limitations

Article 10 may be limited in certain circumstances. Any limitation must:

be covered by law
be necessary and proportionate
national security, territorial integrity or public safety
preventing disorder or crime
protecting health
protecting other people’s reputation or rights
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

When considering whether free expression should be limited, courts will question whether doing so could have a ‘chilling effect’ on free speech, the value of the particular form of expression and the medium used.

Limiting free expression usually involves restrictions on publication, penalties for publication, requiring journalists to reveal their sources, imposing disciplinary measures or confiscating material.

Article 10 in action

David miranda's story.

David Miranda was detained by police at Heathrow Airport for nine hours in August 2013.

He was questioned under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and freed only when officers reached the legal time limit for either arresting or releasing him. His electronic equipment was confiscated and he was questioned for hours without a lawyer present.

Miranda is the partner of journalist Glenn Greenwald who had recently written several stories about the Snowden surveillance revelations for The Guardian. He was helping Greenwald with this work and was on his way back to their home after meeting with a filmmaker, also working on the surveillance revelations, when he was detained.

The ostensible purpose of the stop was to determine what information Miranda was carrying and ascertain whether its release or dissemination would be severely damaging to UK national security interests. The Court found that this purpose did fall properly within Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act.

Liberty intervened in the case, arguing that it was a violation of Article 10 that Schedule 7 could be used in this way. The Judge accepted that the stop constituted an indirect interference with press freedom – but held that the interference was justified and found it lawful.

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What is freedom of speech?

'Freedom of speech is the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, by any means.'

Is freedom of speech a human right?

In the UK, Article 10 of the 1998 Human Rights Act protects our right to freedom of expression:

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

Are freedom of speech and freedom of expression the same thing? In the UK, freedom of speech is legally one part of the wider concept of freedom of expression.

Does freedom of speech have limits?

...and when it can't.

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Protest is not only a human right. It is a powerful way to change the world ✊🏽 People in power, afraid of change & afraid to be held accountable, want us to think that coming together to protect our rights doesn’t work. 🧵 5 protests that show #PeoplePower can win human rights — Amnesty UK (@AmnestyUK) August 23, 2023

Checks and balances

National security and public order.

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Media and journalists, whistleblowers, rights and responsibilities.

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Article 10: Freedom of expression

Published: 3 June 2021

Last updated: 3 June 2021

The Human Rights Act
Article 2: Right to life
Article 3: Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
Article 4: Freedom from slavery and forced labour
Article 5: Right to liberty and security
Article 6: Right to a fair trial
Article 7: No punishment without law
Article 8: Respect for your private and family life
Article 9: Freedom of thought, belief and religion
Article 11: Freedom of assembly and association
Article 12: Right to marry
Article 14: Protection from discrimination
Article 1 of the First Protocol: Protection of property
Article 1 of Protocol 13: Abolition of the death penalty
Article 2 of the First Protocol: Right to education
Article 3 of the First Protocol: Right to free elections

What countries does this apply to?

Article 10 protects your right to hold your own opinions and to express them freely without government interference.

This includes the right to express your views aloud (for example through public protest and demonstrations) or through:

published articles, books or leaflets
television or radio broadcasting
works of art
the internet and social media

The law also protects your freedom to receive information from other people by, for example, being part of an audience or reading a magazine.

Although you have freedom of expression, you also have a duty to behave responsibly and to respect other people’s rights.

Public authorities may restrict this right if they can show that their action is lawful, necessary and proportionate in order to:

protect national security, territorial integrity (the borders of the state) or public safety
prevent disorder or crime
protect health or morals
protect the rights and reputations of other people
prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence
maintain the authority and impartiality of judges

An authority may be allowed to restrict your freedom of expression if, for example, you express views that encourage racial or religious hatred.

However, the relevant public authority must show that the restriction is ‘proportionate’, in other words that it is appropriate and no more than necessary to address the issue concerned.

This right is particularly important for journalists and other people working in the media.

They must be free to criticise the government and our public institutions without fear of prosecution – this is a vital feature of a democratic society.

But that doesn't prevent the state from imposing restrictions on the media in order to protect other human rights, such as a person's right to respect for their private life .

Example case - Observer and The Guardian v United Kingdom [1991]

The Guardian and The Observer newspapers published excerpts from Peter Wright’s book Spycatcher, which included allegations that MI5 had acted unlawfully.

The government obtained a court order preventing the newspapers from printing further material until proceedings relating to a breach of confidence had finished.

But when the book was published, The Guardian complained that the continuation of the court order infringed the right to freedom of expression.

The European Court of Human Rights said that the court order was lawful because it was in the interests of national security.

However, it also said that that wasn't enough reason to continue the newspaper publication ban once the book had been published, because the information was no longer confidential anyway.

This text is taken directly from the Human Rights Act .

Article 10 of the Human Rights Act: Freedom of expression

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

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UN Human Rights Council 56: UK Statement on the right to freedom of opinion and expression

Interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Delivered by UK Human Rights Ambassador, Rita French.

Madam Special Rapporteur, we welcome your report and recognise the threats faced by exiled journalists, as well as their vital role informing audiences at home and abroad.

We are committed to the safety of all journalists, reflecting their contribution to an open, functioning democracy. We oppose all attempts to restrict press freedom, silence debate, abuse journalists, or spread misinformation - whether online or offline.

The UK has supported journalists exiled from Myanmar with emergency grants and taken strong and effective action against Iran-backed plots to kill journalists on UK soil. We continue to raise the suppression of independent local media in Hong Kong, exemplified by the closure of Stand News and the prosecution of Jimmy Lai, and to call for the release of all those detained for their reporting in China.

In the UK, we have refreshed our National Action Plan for the Safety of Journalists and are working across Government Ministries, relevant agencies and law enforcement to protect journalists and others identified as being at risk.

Mr Vice President,

Given the specific threats to journalists in exile, will the UN Plan of Action be updated to reflect this?

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Article 10 U.K. Freedom of expression

1 U.K. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2 U.K. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

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p. 457 18. Freedom of expression

Neil Parpworth Neil Parpworth Associate Professor in Law, De Montfort University
https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192856579.003.0018
Published in print: 28 April 2022
Published online: September 2022

This chapter focuses on some of the laws relating to freedom of expression in the UK. Freedom of expression is widely considered to be a necessary feature in any democratic state. The chapter considers the extent to which restrictions are placed on the freedom of expression in the UK in two particular contexts. It considers laws for the control of obscenity and indecency, the publication of obscene matter, the test of obscenity, defences, powers of search and seizure, and the possession of pornographic images. The discussion also considers that part of the law of contempt of court which relates to restricting the ability of the media to report court proceedings. This chapter is confined to the law relating to obscenity and indecency and contempt of court on the basis that they share the important characteristic of being regulated by both statute and the common law.

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Freedom of Expression Essay

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Searching for freedom of expression essay? Look no further! This argumentative essay about freedom of expression, thought, & speech, will inspire you to write your own piece.

Introduction

The Key Concepts

Freedom of expression refers to the right to express one’s opinions or thoughts freely by utilizing any of the different modes of communication available. The ideas aired should, however, not cause any intentional harm to other personality or status through false or ambiguous statements. Communication of ideas can be achieved through speech, writing or art. Freedom of expression, unlike freedom of thought, may be regulated by the appropriate authorities in any society in order to avoid controversies between different individuals.

The extent to which this limitation or censorship is done varies from nation to nation and is dependent on the government of the day. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every individual has the right to search for information, access and impart variety of ideas irrespective of the frontiers.

Freedom of Expression: The Key Concepts

The subject of freedom of expression has always been controversial, especially when considering political aspects. A state is perceived to have the mandate to impede people from convening groups in which they air their opinions if those views can result in direct harm to other people.

However, the interference would only be an exception if doing so results in more beneficial outcomes than standing aside. For one to be in a position to gauge the eventuality of a gain or a loss, then there should be absolute freedom of expression on all matters irrespective of the nature of the sentiments made.

Arguments for absolute freedom of expression can be a made by evaluating the purpose for which the ideas are expressed and the manner in which we evaluate what is true or false. According to Mill (Eisenach, 2004), the right to express one’s opinions offers humanity a rare chance to switch over an error for the truth if the idea expressed happens to be true.

In case the opinion happens to be wrong, mankind stands a chance of getting a clearer picture of the known truth through collusion with a mistake. Therefore, freedom of expression acts in the best interests of mankind as it endeavors to progress and its limitation deprives people of the prospects of growth.

Whether we let expression of an opinion to be limited or censored, whereas it could be true, then we present ourselves as beyond reproach. We consider all that we know to be the truth and therefore dispel all opinions that question this truth. It is possible for people or authorities to be in fault. For instance, what we consider to be morally right or wrong may not be so.

The lines that define moral rights and wrongs were set by people who could possibly have mistaken. In order to draw the limit, one must differentiate between sureness and the truth. Our certainty that a particular idea is false does not in any way excuse its expression. Suppressing such an idea would not only justify our confidence of the opinion being wrong, but also proves that we are flawless.

If limitation of people’s freedom of expression in matters such as racism is based on certainty that mankind does not stand to lose any benefit, then this sureness should be founded in the freedom itself. We can only consider ourselves to be certain when there have been no opinions raised to question the truths we hold. Therefore, in order to boost our certainty, we have to leave room for the opposing beliefs.

There are governments that censor the expression of certain ideas not because they are false, but because they are considered to be hazardous to the society. Mill argues that in such a situation, the hazard in the expressed opinions is questionable. The only way to ascertain that the opinion is in fact dangerous is not to suppress its expression but to allow its free discussion.

Secondly, if the opinion that is being limited is true, then the alternative view held by the government must be false. Experience has shown that all beliefs that are false are never constructive in the long run. Therefore, the government that prefers to hold a false conviction in place of a hazardous truth does not act in the best interests of its people.

In many instances, the silenced view may be a mistake. However, most of these mistakes do carry with them a scrap of truth. On the other hand, the existing view on each of the different topics often does not contain the entire truth. By listening to the opinions of others on the matter, an opportunity to learn the rest of the uncovered truths presents itself.

For instance in politics, we could have two political parties with different agendas. One wants to institute reforms while another desires to ensure stability. People may not be in a position to discern what should be retained or altered, but ensuring the parties at opposing ends ensures each party checks on the performance of the other. In the long run, we strike for a beneficial balance between their supposed agendas (Bhargava, 2008).

Moreover, if the opinion being expressed is entirely true, it may not be considered so with certainty. For confidence to feature, these views must be contested against other rational opinions of others in order to single out the supporting arguments. It is expected that those who believe in their opinions will place strong arguments in their favor (Matravers, 2001).

If an authority believes in the rationality of its ideas, then it should leave room for the expression of opposing ideas. For instance, if any reigning political party has faith in the views it has concerning the development of the country’s economy, it should not be wary of an opposition party with contradicting views. After all what they stand for has factual backing (O’Rourke, 2001).

Lastly, the battle for supremacy between different opinions opens up a more comprehensive understanding of our beliefs. We begin to comprehend what is required of us and are, thus, in a position to act on them. Human beliefs do not exhibit any motivation and the debates that arise are what add fuel to the fire.

Holding beliefs with a conservative mindset only serves to hinder our acceptance of the possible alternatives (Jones, 2001). Therefore, opposition exhibited in the freedom of speech opens up a lee way for open-mindedness besides posing a challenge to hypocrisy and logical sluggishness.

The absence of restrictions on people’s freedom of oppression allows for the exchange of error for truth or the clarification of the existing truth. It also reinforces our certainty in the opinions we consider true besides increasing our open-mindedness and thoughtfulness. For governments, it ensures those entrusted with the leadership of the country have reasonable opinions that work for the common good of the country’s citizens.

Free discussion and analysis of different ideas will, thus, result in the prosperity of mankind rather than the detrimental effects it is assumed to bring.

Freedom of Expression FAQ

What Is Freedom of Expression? Freedom of expression is the ability of individual people and groups to express their thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and ideas without any restrictions or censorship from the government. This freedom is protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.
How Does Freedom of Expression Protect Individual Liberty? The First Amendment of the US Constitution guarantees freedom of expression to all citizens. This means that the US Congress does not have the right to restrict the media or people from speaking freely. People also have the right to peaceful assemblies and petitions to the government.
Why Is Freedom of Expression Important for Democracy? Freedom of expression is an essential human right. It guarantees the free exchange of information, opinions, and ideas in the public space, allowing people to independently form their own views on all the essential issues.

Bhargava, H. (2008). Political Theory: An Introduction . Delhi: Pearson Education.

Eisenach, E. (2004). Mill and Moral Character . New York: Penn State Press.

Jones, T. (2001). Modern Political Thinkers and Ideas: An Historical Introduction . New York: Routledge.

Matravers, D. (2001) Reading Political Philosophy: Machiavelli to Mill . New York: Routledge.

O’Rourke, K. (2001). John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression: The Genesis of a Theory . Connecticut: Taylor & Francis.

The Importance of Freedom of Speech
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IvyPanda. (2018, November 6). Freedom of Expression Essay. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-expression/

"Freedom of Expression Essay." IvyPanda , 6 Nov. 2018, ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-expression/.

IvyPanda . (2018) 'Freedom of Expression Essay'. 6 November.

IvyPanda . 2018. "Freedom of Expression Essay." November 6, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-expression/.

1. IvyPanda . "Freedom of Expression Essay." November 6, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-expression/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Freedom of Expression Essay." November 6, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-expression/.

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Protesters outside the Ugandan High Commission in London, including Peter Tatchell, call for action over Uganda's anti-LGBTI+ laws. The UK should call out the Ugandan government more on its free expression violations . Photo: Maggie Jones via Flickr (PDM 1.0 DEED)

Political parties in the UK are now in the final stages of campaigning as they approach the general election on 4 July 2024. During the circus of the campaigning season, important issues can and have slipped through the cracks. We, the undersigned, want to ensure that the next government, whoever it may be, will stand firmly on the side of free expression.

Back in January, Rishi Sunak laid out key targets he wished to deliver before the end of his term, with varying degrees of success. In this spirit, we have compiled our own manifesto outlining key issues relating to free speech that we would like the next UK government to address. They are:

Enact Anti-SLAPP Legislation

Strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs, are a means for those with money to abuse the legal system by threatening critics with costly lawsuits in order to intimidate them into abandoning their position. They have become a silencing tactic in recent years, with journalists in particular being targeted, alongside environmental defenders, writers and sexual violence survivors.

Particularly worrying is the current trend of SLAPPs becoming more common throughout Europe. Over 820 cases were registered by Case, the Anti-SLAPP Coalition, in 2023, 161 of which were lawsuits filed in 2022, a significant jump compared to the 135 filed in 2021. Such lawsuits are a stain on our free speech and media freedom credentials. Many journalists live in fear of them. In addition to the lawsuits we know about there are likely scores of articles that never make it to print because newsrooms fear the potential legal ramifications, articles that could serve the public interest.

Prior to the election being called, a private members bill, called the Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Bill, had been put forward by MP Wayne David in an attempt to address the issue. Although the bill itself contained significant flaws and was weaker than many had hoped , it was at least a promising starting point from which to address the problem. However, with the announcement of the general election, the bill is dead.

We call upon the next government to take up the mantle against SLAPPs and to push forward with another, stronger bill that takes a much firmer approach to resolve the problem.

Protect the right to protest

The UK has seen a number of concerning attacks being made on protest rights in recent years. Legislation such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the 2023 Public Order Act have given the police and government sweeping powers to restrict protest, a move criticised by rights groups such as Amnesty International.

In May 2024, former Home Secretary Suella Braverman was ruled by a high court to have acted unlawfully by making it easier to criminalise peaceful protests. Various groups conducting peaceful protests have suffered as a result, such as environmental activists being handed lengthy prison sentences and pro-Palestine protesters being arrested .

Index has previously spoken out against the increasingly authoritarian approach to protesting in the UK and the worrying climate this creates for those wishing to peacefully exercise their right to free assembly and free expression. We would like to see the next government address the issues raised by repealing these alarming pieces of legislation, ensuring that peaceful protesters are no longer restricted in such fashion, and releasing and/or compensating those who have already been punished.

Take a stand against transnational repression

Transnational repression refers to the various ways that authoritarian governments, such as Russia, China, Iran, Rwanda and Saudi Arabia, reach across borders in order to silence dissent, using a range of tactics including online smear campaigns, threats and physical violence. Awareness of transnational repression has increased in recent years but so too has the phenomenon, not least in the UK.

The most famous example is probably the poisoning of Russian ex-spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury in 2018. Other examples include high-profile Hong Kong activists, Iranian journalists and Saudi comedians being assaulted on UK soil. Even on a less violent level, there are too many reports of students being spied on and university courses changed in acts of appeasement.

In November 2022 the UK government formed the Defending Democracy Taskforce, which is meant to be reviewing the UK’s approach to transnational repression. Late last year the taskforce announced it would be taking a more active role in coordinating electoral security, which is welcome given several hacks that have been traced back to China. But as for the broader issue of protecting dissidents overseas, and indeed those who challenge authoritarian regimes, there is little movement.

Index, for example, has worked extensively to highlight the dangers of transnational repression and we ask the next government to take a more proactive approach to tackle it by both protecting those within the state and sanctioning foreign states who utilise such tactics.

Support journalists in exile and in the UK

In May 2024, the BBC reported that the number of BBC World Service journalists working in exile is estimated to have nearly doubled since 2020 , in part due to crackdowns in countries such as Russia, Afghanistan and Ethiopia. Similarly, in 2023 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) provided financial assistance to 460 journalists in exile – nearly twice as many as in 2022 – after being inundated with requests from journalists who had been threatened for their work.

As the number of media workers forced to flee their home country grows, the need for the international community to step in and help intensifies. The UK has an obligation to support and protect journalists in this situation by prioritising press freedom in their foreign policy objectives and calling for accountability for those countries who violate it.

For a journalist facing the distressing and difficult reality of living in exile, one of the most useful pieces of aid is a visa. By holding a visa they can live without fear of being sent back to a country where they face persecution, and can continue their work. We call upon the next government to ensure that journalists from abroad who are living in exile are able to obtain emergency visas in order to be kept safe from authoritarian regimes.

At the same time we’d like to go one step further; the next government should place attacks on the media high on the list of their foreign policy priorities, calling for true accountability for those violating press freedom. Ideally emergency visas shouldn’t be necessary as journalists everywhere are protected and we ask the next government to lead the way in upholding and defending media freedom.

In the process the government must show it respects media freedom in the UK. Stories like “ Braverman criticised for shutting out Guardian and BBC from Rwanda trip ” must become a thing of the past and some of the sections of the 2023 National Security Act should be repealed given their concerning implications for both journalists and whistleblowers.

Don’t go soft on authoritarian regimes

Over the years, the UK has had a habit of welcoming leaders from authoritarian states and overlooking their poor records on human rights. T his was a common theme when David Cameron was prime minister , for example. He welcomed, among others, Egyptian President General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi less than two years after 800 unarmed protesters were killed at Rabaa al-Adawiya square in Cairo and Chinese leader Xi Jinping just days after the arrest of bookseller Gui Minhai.

The tradition has continued since. Under current Prime Minister Rishi Sunak the UK has developed a unique relationship with Rwanda, with the state being at the centre of the Conservative’s policy on asylum seekers. It was recently revealed that Rwanda’s top diplomat in the UK oversaw the use of the international justice system to target critics of the regime overseas in a clear example of transnational repression.

Indeed Cameron, in his new role as foreign secretary, went to Saudi Arabia in April for the World Economic Forum and did not press them on their poor human rights record, which amongst other issues sees many punished under draconian blasphemy laws or, in the case of Salma al-Shehab, for simple retweets . Meanwhile senior British government officials last month congratulated the newly appointed head of the Ugandan army, a man accused of abusing critics and of torture. The list could go on.

The next government would do well to choose its friends wisely, rather than helping authoritarian rulers maintain their grip on power and improve their international status.

Reform the Online Safety Act

The aim of the Online Safety Act – to protect children and adults online – is a commendable one. However, there are elements of the bill that are problematic when it comes to the protection of free speech, particularly those relating to encryption. One section of the act seemingly requires service providers to search for illegal content online by breaking end-to-end encryption, which threatens both privacy and cyber-security, as well as leaving the door open for government interference and surveillance.

Encryption is vital to ensure people can express themselves online safely, especially when they’re living under a repressive regime. Not only does the Online Safety Act put the privacy of online users at risk in the UK, the problematic language used in the bill can also be co-opted by other countries with more sinister intentions.

The next UK government needs to address the issues that have been raised by the bill’s passing by reforming and re-wording the legislation.

Advocate for a global limit on commercial surveillance

Another growing threat to free speech both globally and in the UK is the rise in spyware. This problem has worsened as technology has advanced, with highly sophisticated surveillance software – such as the infamous hacking software Pegasus – becoming readily available to governments around the world.

Pervasive surveillance clearly encroaches on people’s right to privacy and data protection and is a threat to free speech more broadly. People can be put off political participation, or even just from expressing their opinion freely, if they think they are being spied upon by the state. Spyware also often targets individuals like journalists, politicians and activists as a means of repression and intimidation.

We call upon the UK government to support the implementation of a global moratorium on commercial spyware until proper safeguards are put in place to deal with these threats. Controls and guardrails must be enforced globally to ensure that any surveillance tools comply with human rights.

Preserve academic freedom

Threats to academic freedom are widely viewed to be more of a problem in the USA than the UK. That said there have been worrying signs here which ought to be addressed before the problem escalates.

The number of reports of university events and speakers being cancelled has grown in recent years . This was supposedly the motivation behind the government’s introduction of a free speech tsar in the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act, which came into effect in 2023 and has been criticised by some for being “lip service” to free speech issues .

The tsar, Arif Ahmed, said at the time of his appointment that he would remain politically neutral in his efforts to combat attacks to free speech on campus. We can only hope he is true to his word. The current government has tried to interfere in universities, such as threatening to regulate certain academic approaches (in 2020 the then-equalities minister Kemi Badendoch condemned critical race theory – an academic field focussed on discussions of white privilege and structural racism – and the government declared itself “unequivocally against” the concept, for example).

Another threat is aforementioned – that of transnational repression – with students reporting growing fears of surveillance on campus, especially Chinese students. When you add in increasing fears around book banning in school libraries, there is a clear argument that free speech in education needs close attention in order to truly preserve academic freedom. But this must not come from a party-political position. Politics must not enter the classroom or lecture hall.

Support British nationals overseas

There are several British nationals overseas who are currently in prison, serving time for no crime at all. They are people who have been committed to free expression, human rights and democracy and for this they have lost their own freedom. Three of the most prominent are Jimmy Lai, a media mogul who is in jail in Hong Kong, Alaa Abd el-Fattah, a writer and activist who has been in and out of prison in Egypt for a decade now, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, a journalist and activist who has been behind bars since 2022.

The UK government has demonstrated a lack of commitment to help free these three men and we urge the next government to reverse this trend. The unjust imprisonments of them, and others like them, must be a priority and must then act as a blueprint for future action if other British nationals find themselves at the mercy of authoritarian regimes.

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Freedom of Expression
The freedom of expression in English law is a residual liberty therefore observation of the operation of the freedom comes from looking at the restrictions imposed throughout English Law. The wide range of law the restrictions cover make it a 'well developed area of law [which] adds to the usefulness of freedom of expression as a field of ...
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Freedom of expression as a value. This holds that more scope for expression is generally preferable to less. It can be used as a measure to judge private and state organisations. Freedom of expression as a fundamental right. This holds that freedom of expression relates to non-interference by the state. Freedom of expression as a positive ...
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Freedom of expression is a fundamental right in the UK, allowing individuals to voice their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs without fear of censorship or reprisal. It encompasses various forms of expression, such as speech, writing, art, and even non-verbal communication. This right to express oneself freely is crucial for the functioning of a ...
Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression
The freedom of expression broadly involves the communication of ideas, opinions, convictions, beliefs, and information. International legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognise the 'freedom of expression' as a right that can be exercised 'either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of [the ...
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Article 10 of the Human Rights Act protects a right that's fundamental to our democracy - our freedom of expression is fundamental to our democracy. It means we're free to hold opinions and ideas and to share them with others without the State interfering. Liberty and other human rights groups have used Article 10 to challenge the UK ...
PDF GUIDANCE LEGAL FRAMEWORK Freedom of expression
mework in Great Britain.Summary of key pointsFreedom of expression is a fundamental right protected under the Human Rights Act 1998 by Article. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rig. s. It is also protected under the common law.Protection under Article 10 extends to the expression of views that may shock, distu.
What is freedom of speech?
Wrong. 'Freedom of speech is the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, by any means.'. Freedom of speech and the right to freedom of expression applies to ideas of all kinds including those that may be deeply offensive. But it comes with responsibilities and we believe it can be legitimately restricted.
Freedom Expression
For the purposes of this essay it will be important to define the terms of reference with sufficient clarity to enable analysis. Article 10 of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 defines freedom of expression as including; "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and ...
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A fundamental characteristic of modern democratic states is the existence of the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by the public authority. The right to freedom of expression is not only a primary cornerstone of democracy, but also ...
PDF Freedom of expression
Freedom of expression also supports artistic, scientific and commercial development. When we talk about freedom of expression, we mean both the spoken and written word, as well as actions, gestures and the display of images intended to show meaning. In this guide, 'freedom of expression' also includes 'freedom of speech'. 1. See for ...
Article 10: Freedom of expression
Article 10 of the Human Rights Act: Freedom of expression. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing ...
UN Human Rights Council 56: UK Statement on the right to freedom of
Interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Delivered by UK Human Rights Ambassador, Rita French.
Human Rights Act 1998
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
Freedom of Expression Essay
Freedom of Expression Essay. Freedom of Expression Essay. Module. Constitutional Law. 204 Documents. Students shared 204 documents in this course. University University of Oxford. Academic year: 2019/2020. Uploaded by: Anonymous Student. This document has been uploaded by a student, just like you, who decided to remain anonymous.
18. Freedom of expression
This chapter focuses on some of the laws relating to freedom of expression in the UK. Freedom of expression is widely considered to be a necessary feature in any democratic state. The chapter considers the extent to which restrictions are placed on the freedom of expression in the UK in two particular contexts. It considers laws for the control of obscenity and indecency, the publication of ...
PDF Freedom of expression,
In the absence of formal constitutional protection for freedom of expression, the approach of the UK is residual in nature. That is to say, the extent of a person's freedom of expression is what is left after statutory and common law (judge-made) incursions into the freedom. Notwithstanding the pa ssage of the Human Rights Act 199 8, it ...
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Introduction. Freedom of expression refers to the right to express one's opinions or thoughts freely by utilizing any of the different modes of communication available. The ideas aired should, however, not cause any intentional harm to other personality or status through false or ambiguous statements.
Freedom of Expression and Right To Privacy
The UK adopted the ECHR by enacting the Human Rights Act (HRA) in 1998. The HRA came into full effect on 2 October 2000. ... Beatson J., Cripps Y., Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams (2002) Oxford University Press. Feldman D., Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 2 Edition ...
Freedom of Expression
Freedom of speech. Freedom of speech, or freedom of expression, applies to ideas of all kinds, including those that may be deeply offensive. While international law protects free speech, there are instances where speech can legitimately restricted under the same law - such as when it violates the rights of others, or, advocates hatred and incites discrimination or violence.
Freedom Of Expression
Political Expression 1. General Human Rights Act art 10: 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of ...
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Freedom of expression is essential in enabling democracy to work and public participation in decision-making. Citizens cannot exercise their right to vote effectively or take part in public decision-making if they do not have free access to information and ideas and are not able to express their views freely.
Law on Freedeom of Assembly and Expression in Public Protests
Article 11 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) sets out that 'everyone has a right to freedom of peaceful assembly' [1] and article 11 (2) provides that restrictions placed on this right must be 'prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety.'.
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Common law has provided protection to reputation through the law of defamation. It has been recognized for a long time that protection of reputation can conflict with freedom of expression. This is the main reason why the relationship 'between the protected interest in reputation and the competing interest in freedom of expression' [ 1] has ...
The Meaning Of Freedom Of Expression
The freedom of speech is defined as the freedom to speak without censorship and limitation or both. It goes on to give political rights that enable one to share ideas. Basically, the Freedom of Expression comprises of things that enable one to impart, receive and seek information without looking at the strategy used.
Our manifesto: the next UK government's necessary actions to restore
Preserve academic freedom. Threats to academic freedom are widely viewed to be more of a problem in the USA than the UK. That said there have been worrying signs here which ought to be addressed before the problem escalates. The number of reports of university events and speakers being cancelled has grown in recent years.
Reactions to Julian Assange's flight to freedom after US plea deal
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange is due to plead guilty on Wednesday to violating U.S. espionage law, in a deal that will set him free after a 14-year British legal odyssey and allow him to return ...

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