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A look at what actually helps the poor, and what doesn’t.
For the 2.5 billion people who live on less than $2 per day , shocks such as illness, crop failures, livestock deaths, farming-equipment breakdowns and even wedding or funeral expenses can be enough to tip them, their families, or even an entire community below the poverty line. A major challenge for international development efforts is determining which financial tools provide durable buffers against such setbacks.
BUSINESS PLAN PRISMA MICROFINANCE, INC.
2 Claremont Street Boston, Massachusetts 02118
Prisma MicroFinance, Inc., is a private, mission-driven company with operating subsidiaries in Central America that provide "microcredit" to entrepreneurs. Since 1995, Prisma has provided lending and savings services to people in the developing world considered "unbankable" by formal financial institutions. By operating a profitable private-equity funded business in the Nicaraguan microfinance market—where most competitors are nonprofits—the company seeks to revolutionize and to grow the world's microfinance industry.
Company overview, target market, operations & management, growth strategy & milestones, marketing & sales strategy, financial analysis, impact analysis & social return on investment.
Prisma MicroFinance, Inc., is a private, mission-driven company with operating subsidiaries in Central America that provide "microcredit" to entrepreneurs. Since 1995, Prisma has provided lending and savings services to people in the developing world considered "unbankable" by formal financial institutions. By operating a profitable private-equity funded business in the Nicaraguan microfinance market—where most competitors are nonprofits— the company seeks to revolutionize and to grow the world's microfinance industry. The company upholds a dual mission of providing affordable capital to "unbankable" individuals while operating an efficient, profitable business.
At Prisma MicroFinance, access to affordable credit is considered a right, not a privilege. Providing affordable capital is a business model that will allow the company to offer reliable financial returns and significant social returns to its investors, while providing a valuable service to its borrowers. "We believe in doing well by doing good."
Prisma's management team has a total of over 25 years of experience in the microfinance industry. They have worked together for five years and their track record proves that they have the necessary skills to guide the company as it expands throughout Nicaragua and Central America.
The worldwide microfinance market is large, underserved, and growing at a rate of 30 percent annually. The worldwide market is estimated to be $270 billion, with current annual cash turnover of $2.5 billion. The Nicaraguan market is $300 million, with $50 million being lent at rates averaging 60 percent APR. There are more than 20 significant entities in Nicaragua providing microfinance services, with no single one holding more than 13 percent of market share.
Prisma's customers are individuals who are not in an economic position to secure funding from traditional financial institutions. The majority are small-business owners, operating in the Nicaraguan capitol of Managua. Prisma has a strong lending history with taxicab owneroperators, and it plans to solidify its reputation within this market. By FY2004, its customer base will be an equal split of micro, small, and medium-size business owners.
Prisma embodies a profitable business model with four major components: local and inexpensive labor, market penetration in cooperative taxi financing, externalization of costs by partnering with third parties, and the use of effective technology. Unlike its competition, Prisma has operated without subsidies or grants since day one for over five years while also providing healthy returns to its financial backers. Moreover, Prisma lends at rates of 31-34 percent APR, two thirds of the average competitor's rate.
Prisma's marketing and sales strategy has been extremely successful, yet extremely cheap. As word of mouth has been Prisma's biggest source of sales, marketing activities have been focused on keeping clients happy and recognizing their accomplishments. The social structure and business culture that has made this approach a success in Nicaragua exists throughout Central America.
Net Income | 23,888 | 53,781 | 417,534 | 931,289 |
% Growth in Net Income by Year | -19% | 125% | 676% | 123% |
ROA (Industry Standard = 3.08%) | 1.00% | 0.60% | 3.50% | 4.10% |
Prisma is raising $1.5 million in its Series "B" round to grow and expand business, both the total number of customers it serves and the region in which it offers service. The company has planned an aggressive, but realistic, expansion strategy. By the end of FY2004, Prisma will be lending 4,800 loans profitably in four Nicaraguan cities and a second Central American country with a total lending portfolio of $10.56 million.
Prisma seeks to expand its current successful model. The funds from the sale of stock will be used to leverage debt in order to expand the loan portfolio.
Prisma MicroFinance, Inc.'s, Mission Statement:
To provide our customers superior financial services, fostering opportunities for wealth and employment creation, while maximizing social and economic returns for our investors.
Prisma MicroFinance, Inc. (Prisma) is a United States corporation registered in the state of Massachusetts. The company was founded to be a development bank—making loans in small amounts widely available to people in the developing world. This growing industry is known as "microfinance."
The necessary capital to operate Prisma is raised through private equity and debt from individual and institutional investors in the developed world. With $1.5 million in new equity, the company will be able to support expansion efforts and leverage at least this amount in debt financing. This capital will accelerate growth, exponentially increasing the number of customers and amount lent. Prisma's customers are primarily business owners who do not have access to affordable capital to finance their operations because they are considered unbankable by traditional financial institutions. Although these poor business owners may operate on a very small scale, their operations are profitable. They remain locked in the poverty cycle because of the premium they pay for being perceived as a risky investment. Prisma's experience, and that of the microfinance industry in general, has proven just the opposite. Lending to poor individuals poses risks because of the precarious nature of their cash flows, but providing them access to affordable capital allows them to even out cash flows and break out of the poverty cycle.
Prisma does not conduct its operations for charity. It is at the forefront of the B2-4B revolution—meaning it is finding business solutions for the four million poor people of the world. Companies such as Hewlett-Packard are investing significant capital into this area not only because of the social upshot, but because it is good business. Prisma has operated profitably for five years by targeting a market opportunity that is large, underserved, and in which the competition is fragmented by industry standards. Prisma offers less expensive products to consumers with better service than its competitors.
"Prisma" means "prism" in Spanish. Prisma MicroFinance, Inc. "refracts" private capital investment from the developed world, funneling it to small business owners in Central America who traditionally have lacked access to capital but who are entrepreneurial and commercially savvy operators.
Prisma's spectrum covers providing access to credit and financial services for people living in the developing world. The diversity in loan size creates a balanced portfolio serving a range of people. A single loan officer can easily and profitably manage a cost-effective portfolio that includes loans of different sizes. In this way, Prisma embraces its dual business focus of:
Prisma was begun in 1995 as a savings and loan cooperative called SINAI, R. L. (Support and Incentives for Autonomous Initiatives) founded by a Nicaraguan, Roger Aburto, and an American, David J. Satterthwaite. They shared a common interest in assisting poor business owners overcome barriers to success. The two founders started operations completely through grassroots efforts with $1,000 in personal start-up capital and a $4,000 loan from American businessman George Kraus, who is now a Board Member. For its first two years, the company conducted its activities out of a single room in Roger's house with a home computer.
Prisma has grown steadily from the beginning, averaging 387 percent annual growth rate as measured by total loan portfolio under management.
Number of Loans, Year End | 99 | 310 | 530 | 395 | 236 |
Portfolio Balance | $39,400 | $396,557 | $698,381 | $649,066 | $855,177 |
The organization's growth has been funded completely with private investment. In December of 2000, the Nicaraguan loan portfolio was at just over $850,000 distributed to 236 loans. The average loan is $3,000 and is repaid within 22 months. Phenomenally, in 1,500 loans, Prisma's default rate is less than 1 percent. The single most limiting factor throughout Prisma's history has been lack of capital. At present, the organization has nearly 200 approved loans waiting for sufficient funds to grant them.
Prisma's first client in 1995, Arroya Rios Vallejos, borrowed $500 for inventory for her corner store. She has since received and repaid four loans, and now owns her own home.
Unlike the overwhelming majority of microfinance institutions that depend on donations, Prisma's entire loan portfolio has instead been financed by debt from individuals and commercial institutions. Prisma has consistently offered interest rates at 31-36 percent APR, significantly lower than the competition's rates of 60-80 percent APR. The company has continually sought to maintain efficient and modern operations, thus creating a vibrant business culture prepared to confront a demanding marketplace.
Prisma is a financial institution. Its principal operations are as a lender to customers typically viewed by the industry as "unbankable." Prisma makes loans, at risk-adjusted market rates, from $50 to $15,000 dollars. This range is often referred to in the lending profession as "microfinance" because of the size of the loans.
All customers require a co-signer and character references for loan approval, creating a circle of trust for lenders. All loans over $500 require guarantees and/or collateral. Interest rates start at 24 percent a year, plus fees. Loan interest rates vary depending on loan size, customers' credit, and other risk factors. Loan terms have ranged from 3 months to 3 years. For the Nicaraguan operations, the median loan term to date from the last 300 loans was 2.4 years.
Prisma has ongoing relationships with customers over the life of the loan. By maintaining contact with customers, early interventions save troubled loans. For example, the company offers customers in good standing (taxi owners in particular) additional working capital lines of credit. This ensures that their business is not disrupted due to cash flow crunches or unexpected occurrences including a car accident, a sick family member, or "inclement weather." Prisma also encourages evening out cash flows by requiring that customers put 5 percent of every loan into a savings account. For first-time borrowers, this amount is folded into the loan amount.
Borrowers in good standing, called class "A" customers, gain more latitude in available credit, which they use to restructure existing loans or get new ones. Customers increase their standard of living as a direct result of these loans.
LOAN REVENUE: The revenue stream from a loan is derived from three sources.
Additional revenue is derived from:
Smart people are not confined to the developed world…. Any company that doesn't figureout a way to get connected with the poor [of the Third World] will not tap huge potential. —Carly Fiorina, CEO, Hewlett-Packard
Prisma MicroFinance, Inc., operates in the large, growing, yet underserved market of microfinance lending. The MicroCredit Virtual Library estimates that there are currently 7,000 microfinance institutions worldwide, serving approximately 16 million poor people. The total cash turnover for these institutions is $2.5 billion.
Of the estimated 500 million people who operate micro or small businesses around the world, only 10 million have access to financial support for their businesses (Source: Micro-credit Summit).
Worldwide demand for credit by this population is almost limitless. Based on an average loan size worldwide of $550, demand for microloans is approximately $270 billion. The annual growth rate of the world microloan portfolio is 30 percent, with some estimates as high as 70 percent (Source: Micro-credit Summit).
The spectacular growth rate of the microfinance industry is in large part due to the difficulty that the vast majority of people in the developing world face in gaining access to credit. The strict demands and cronyism of commercial banks makes it nearly impossible for an average citizen to get a loan.
Prisma focuses its activities in the markets with which it is most familiar—Central America. With five years of profitable operations in Nicaragua, the company knows how to conduct successful business in these markets. Currently, the company operates in Managua, the capitol city of Nicaragua, and has made approximately 1,500 loans to date. Lending is limited only by the amount of capital available to lend.
Nicaragua is an attractive market for microfinance. Despite the American image of the country as economically volatile and politically unstable, Nicaragua has had open markets since 1990. In 1990, Nicaraguans elected as president Violetta Barrios de Chamorro who enacted market economy reforms in 1991, privatizing 351 state industries. The 1996 election of Arnoldo Alleman marked the continuation of government policies favoring a market economy. These policies remain in place today.
The economy largely consists of coffee, cereal grains, sesame, cotton, and bananas. Agriculture provides 34 percent of Nicaragua's GDP, the highest in Central America; however, over the past decade, there has been a shift in the workforce away from the agricultural sector toward urban, service sector jobs. Approximately 46 percent of the labor force is now employed in the service industry, compared to 28 percent in agriculture and 26 percent in manufacturing, construction, and mining. Nicaragua's major trading partner is the United States and its major exports are cotton, sugar, seafood, meat, and gold. Economic highlights about the country include:
The Nicaraguan Small Business Bureau estimates that the number of micro and small, nonagricultural businesses in Nicaragua is 152,607, excluding informal businesses, such as street hawkers and market vendors. Micro and small businesses are defined as having less than 5 employees. They employ 267,000 individuals, and are largely family-run enterprises. Informal businesses, typically a one-person operation, are estimated to be up to double those numbers. The government estimates that 60 percent of urban economic activity is conducted at the small, micro, or informal sector—a major driver of the local economy. With the average micro or small loan in Nicaragua estimated to be $585, based on industry data, this indicates an almost $300 million market in Nicaragua alone. The microfinance market, as a segment, is currently underserved. The total outstanding loan portfolio for Nicaraguan microfinance institutions is $47.9 million. Based on Prisma's experience, approximately 50 percent of all businesses in the country have access to some form of credit, either from formal institutions, family/friends, nonprofit microfinance lenders, or moneylenders. This number skews disproportionately to the larger companies, namely those with at least 20 employees or who are involved in export. Lending available to this population is at rates or terms less attractive than Prisma offers. Nonprofit lenders typically charge 60-80 percent APR, moneylenders are as high as 40 percent a month, and capital from family/friends is highly limited.
Within the large number of businesses operating in Nicaragua, there are numerous segments that are especially attractive for microfinance lending. Some unifying characteristics include:
Specific businesses that have been excellent customers to date include:
The Prisma target customer is a self-employed businessperson, either female or male, who lives in an urban area with his or her family. One of the most lucrative market segments Prisma loans to is taxi owners.
Although the countries in Central America are diverse, all have one thing in common: taxi cooperatives. There are more than 8,000 taxis operating in Nicaragua and the market is expanding. The Transportation Department estimates the number of new licenses granted will increase the total at least 10 percent a year for the next three years.
In Nicaragua, taxis are owner-operated and are considered medium-sized businesses. The owners are called "taxistas." They are organized nationally into 240 cooperatives. The cooperative structure gives the members bargaining power, purchasing power, and a strong social network.
In 2000, Prisma held about 2 percent of the taxi finance market within a fragmented market where no single competitor dominates. Taxi financing is a patchwork of banks, finance companies, car dealers, and other sources of informal financing. No financial institution has captured this market.
Expansion Strategy: Prisma will specialize in financing "taxistas" as a spearhead to establishing operations nationwide in Nicaragua and in other countries in Central America.
Prisma has made 250 loans to date to this population. Because the market is regulated through licenses, business is lucrative for the "taxistas" and loan repayment has been impeccable. Furthermore, in a recent Prisma survey of 80 drivers, 80 percent said they had or needed financing, whereas only half have existing access to financing.
Of the 3,200 "taxistas" who currently want financing, Prisma is positioned to capture the best of these clients, assuming the following:
This market segment is worth $11.52 million. For Prisma, further penetration into this market is currently limited only by capital. The Nicaraguan operations currently have 200 pending loans that have been approved, but there is not sufficient capital to lend.
Prisma will specialize in financing "taxistas" as a spearhead to establishing operations nationwide in Nicaragua and in other countries in Central America. Small, low overhead offices will be established in other urban centers. Strategic partnerships with a national bank and car dealers will enable Prisma to centralize lending and collections processes while still maintaining national coverage. This strategy coincides with market trends: new licenses are currently overwhelmingly granted outside the capitol.
Taxi owners are low-risk customers with excellent sources for collateral. They have the insured vehicle itself and an operating license that has value within the cooperative with which Prisma has outstanding relations. Moreover, the cooperatives must co-sign on a Prisma loan. This provides an important set of organizational incentives to re-pay loans. Finally, all taxi loans must be guaranteed by a lien on real-estate.
Serving this market segment is an excellent example of Prisma's double bottom line. Loans made by Prisma to "taxistas" serve independent business people while also placing large amounts of capital quickly and securely. A loan to this population enables a customer to have an annual income of approximately $1,000, almost twice the national average. Given that the average "taxista" has 6 dependents, Prisma's lending helps a huge number of people achieve a decent, although still precarious, standard of living. In this way, the Prisma social return, like the Prisma loan portfolio, is balanced: the emerging middle-class is encouraged while also supporting those on the economic margins.
The total outstanding loan portfolio for Nicaraguan microfinance institutions is $47.9 million and Prisma currently has 1.2 percent of the market. Prisma's major competitors, in order of threat to the company, are:
Prisma is confident that its customer network is established enough to overcome the first three threats through word of mouth. In reverse order, here is an overview of each.
Potential Customers Not Borrowing: The most common action by potential customers at this time is not to access capital or credit, due to fear, lack of understanding, or no market opportunity. This dynamic clearly drags the economy in a number of ways, creating a significant dis-incentive for individuals to participate in the market economy.
Borrowing from Family and Friends: When individuals cannot turn to institutions, they turn to family and friends. On the practical level, this typically results in under-capitalization of potential successful businesses because family and friends are confronting the same dearth of capital.
Money Lenders: These are usually local individuals that lend money to people at interest rates that reflect their ability to provide capital quickly for their customers with limited focus on due diligence. Interest rates for this immediate access to capital are frequently as high as 480 percent APR. Prisma's significantly lower interest rates make it an attractive alternative to money lenders even if the turn-around on loan issuance is not immediate.
Other Formal Lending Institutions: There are a wide variety of formal lending institutions in Nicaragua who serve business owners. For the most part, these institutions would only be interested in Prisma's clients who take out the largest loans, namely the taxi cooperatives, because the others would be viewed as too risky. Prisma has a competitive advantage over formal lending institutions because it has been directly serving this target market for five years, knows the customers, and wants to serve them where the formal banks do not.
Other Microfinance Institutions: These institutions are Prisma's biggest threat. Many have as much experience as Prisma; however, their interest rates are much higher, hovering anywhere between 60-100 percent APR. Prisma's competitive advantage over these institutions is that its interest rates are considerably lower. Prisma is also a nimble company, with the ability to adapt its loans to the needs of the customer. Prisma is among the top twenty players in the Nicaraguan microfinance landscape, which controls at least 80 percent of the total market, the remainder of the market being served by money lenders. Even with this relatively small number of players in the market, it is still fragmented, with the largest organization controlling approximately 13 percent and the smallest less than 1 percent. The following table gives a breakdown of competitors' loan portfolios and growth.
Nicaraguan Microfinance Institutions: Portfolio and Client Data in Thousands of Dollars (Source: ASOMIF)
FAMA | 2,688.10 | 6,230.90 | 15,218 | 409.4 | 132% |
FDL | 1,935.60 | 5,858.90 | 6,609 | 886.5 | 203% |
ACODEP | 1,180.60 | 4,563.90 | 14,769 | 309 | 287% |
FINDE | 1,128.00 | 3,505.20 | 2,862 | 1,224.70 | 211% |
CEPRODEL | 1,103.60 | 2,930.00 | 4,125 | 710.3 | 165% |
CHISPA | 1,646.00 | 2,524.60 | 6,557 | 385 | 53% |
PRESTANIC | 3,247.00 | 2,480.50 | 5,502 | 450.8 | -24% |
CARUNA | 1,227.90 | 2,302.90 | 6,213 | 370.7 | 88% |
ASODERI | 976.5 | 2,238.20 | 3,500 | 639.5 | 129% |
FIDESA | 988.4 | 2,092.70 | 1,542 | 1,357.10 | 112% |
F.J.N. | 893.9 | 2,010.00 | 2,435 | 825.5 | 125% |
FINCA | 650 | 1,680.00 | 14,351 | 117.1 | 158% |
FUNDENUSE | 441.6 | 1,062.00 | 2,370 | 448.1 | 140% |
FUDESI | 453.6 | 1,000.00 | 955 | 1,047.10 | 120% |
F/LEON 2000 | 379 | 979.2 | 2,367 | 413.7 | 158% |
F/4i 2000 | 210 | 789.4 | 2,213 | 356.7 | 276% |
CESADE | 200 | 430.5 | 850 | 506.5 | 115% |
CARMA | 160 | 250.7 | 300 | 835.7 | 57% |
FONDEFER | 190 | 198.6 | 1,309 | 151.7 | 5% |
OTRAS | 3,500.00 | 4,135.10 | 16,319 | 253.4 | 18% |
Potential future competition: In this growing market, there are potential future competitors. Banks may move "down the line" to capture a portion of this market share, and direct competitors within Nicaragua may expand their operations. Prisma will draw on the relationships it has established throughout the Nicaraguan microfinance industry, its knowledge of government regulations, and its understanding of industry dynamics to preempt this competition.
In-House Knowledge: Running a microfinance company requires extensive knowledge of banking, financial management, sales, and community outreach. A successful MFI needs a staff with a unique blend of skills. Prisma MicroFinance has attracted employees that bring these skills and has also spent time and energy on professional development. Organizations interested in starting a microfinance company will have to be dedicated to developing the requisite internal capacity as Prisma has done, and this can be costly and time consuming.
Staffing: Microfinance has been driven by nongovernmental agencies. As such, management and individuals working in the field usually come from a social service delivery background rather than a business background. However, microfinance is based on business fundamentals. Attracting individuals from the business sector has historically proven challenging because of the pay differential and lack of compensation incentives such as employment stock option plans. Prisma has already been able to attract staff from the business sector by offering competitive salaries; by converting to a for-profit stock company Prisma is now in a position to offer ESOPs, thus narrowing the differential between for-profit and nonprofit compensation packages. New ventures not in a position to do this will be hard pressed to attract employees with the skills necessary to run a successfully microfinance company.
The managers and directors have worked together since the beginning of operations in Nicaragua in 1995, boasting over 25 years of combined experience in the microfinance industry.
President, CEO, & Co-Founder: David J. Satterthwaite has six years of microfinance experience in Nicaragua and Latin America. David has also worked as a business consultant, researcher, and teaching assistant. He graduated with honors from Haverford College in Pennsylvania and is currently completing graduate work in Social Economy at Boston College.
General Manager (COO): Carlos Alberto Aburto Villalta has been responsible for Nicaraguan operations since 1998 and held previous management positions within the company prior to becoming COO. He holds a five-year undergraduate business degree from the Universidad Centro Americano (UCA) in Managua, Nicaragua, and is currently a candidate for a master's degree in business from the UCA.
Portfolio Manager: Honey Maria Aburto Villalta has been the loan portfolio manager since 1998. She holds a five-year undergraduate law degree from the Universidad Centro Americano (UCA) in Managua, Nicaragua, and is currently a candidate for her master's degree in labor law from the UCA.
Roger Aburto: Co-founder of Prisma. Roger currently runs Xilonem, a cooperative spin-off from Prisma, which manages the insurance fund and past-due collections. Roger's experience includes: manager for a regional micro-credit fund for 8 years, a small-business owner, and a veteran. His education includes graduate work on the Nicaraguan informal economy.
Richard Burnes: Co-founder and Principle of Charles River Ventures (CRV is not associated with Prisma). Rick has been an investor in Prisma since its beginning in 1995.
George Kraus: As a retired entrepreneur, George supports a variety of humanitarian and business projects in Nicaragua. He has been an investor in Prisma since its beginning in 1995.
1 | Róger Aburto García | Director | $500 |
2 | David Satterthwaite (in the U.S.) | President | $2,400 |
3 | Carlos Aburto Villalta | General Manager | $500 |
4 | Ivette López Blanco (PT) | Assistant Manager | $270 |
5 | Honey Aburto Villalta (PT) | Portfolio Manager | $270 |
6 | Carlos García Palma | Accountant | $295 |
7 | Rafael Gutiérrez Román | Information Technology | $295 |
8 | Rafael Gutiérrez Tellez | Collections | $200 |
9 | Ramón Román Gutiérrez | Legal Council | $275 |
10 | Ernestina Olivares Vallejos | Teller | $200 |
11 | Armando López Torrez | Security | $75 |
12 | Pablo D. Johanes López | Market Investigation and Development | $175 |
Erica Mills, Master of Public Administration, marketing and communications consultant
Drew Tulchin, Master of Business Administration, business consultant
Brady Miller, former Director of Finance for Ex-Officio, finance consultant
Nicaraguan professionals:.
Marco Morales, CPA
Oscar Silva, Legal Counsel, Delaney y Asociados
Tom Herman, Legal Counsel, Smith & Duggan, LLP
Howard Brady, CPA, MFI Consulting, Inc.
Daniel MacLeod, Graphic Designer, Visual Braille, Inc.
Prisma's operations and management has five years of successful, profitable lending experience in the Nicaraguan market. The company has developed successful activities for ensuring it is providing excellent service and developing strong relationships with solid customers, ensuring that the loans will be repaid.
Key Management Philosophy: Prisma conducts business in a highly professional and open manner. The company's philosophy is centered on knowing customers, working with them to be successful, making sure they understand how their loans work, and rewarding good behavior.
Streamlined Processing: Customers are classified from A-D based factors including: payment timeliness, credit history, savings, referring new business, and peer performance (those they referred or referred them). The taxi co-ops are classified according to the same criteria by each co-op as a group. There are rewards and tangible benefits for "A" customers, knowledge of which is spread among customers through word of mouth.
Balanced and Cost-effective Loan Portfolio: The existing relationship with Taxi Cooperatives provides an inroad for nationwide market penetration. A single loan officer covers the costs of his/her position with only 20 taxi loans (approximately $5,000 each). Microfinance industry data indicates loan officers can manage 150-300 loans at one time. Therefore, because the breakeven point for an additional lender is low, Prisma can financially afford to have a balanced portfolio with an equal number of micro and small loans. Although smaller loans are less lucrative, they are financially viable for the business and promote the social mission of ensuring there is access to credit for all. In addition, they provide the benefits of being repaid faster, requiring less due diligence, and producing a high number of referrals.
Hand-held Technology and Centralized Due Diligence: In order to minimize infrastructure costs, back-office support for loan officers will be centralized. Loan officers will utilize advanced technology to conduct their business. Hand-held devices will be used in the field to mechanize the application and monitoring process. The loan portfolio data is stored electronically to minimize onerous paperwork. This equipment investment pays for itself in the reduced paperwork, time savings (especially in approving applications and transferring data). Electronic loan processing and bi-weekly visits to the main office will allow the due-diligence of loan guarantees to be performed with adequate legal review, in a timely manner.
In addition to this technology, Prisma will also take advantage of technology being designed by groups like Hewlett Packard's World e-Inclusion team that is developing networked tools with the express purpose of making microlending more efficient. With a commitment of selling, leasing, or donating $1 billion in products and services to this initiative, it could prove a valuable source of technology enhancement.
Strategic Banking Partnership: To minimize expansion costs and accelerate the amount of lending possible, Prisma plans to partner with a bank with national presence. By utilizing their existing infrastructure and brokering the deals, remote offices avoid the complications of handling cash. This provides benefits in efficiency and also safety/security. Prisma has a developed a relationship with Banco de Finanza, a national leader in web-based delivery of banking services.
Vested Managers: A generous Employee Stock Option Plan creates a vested management team. Vested managers are important to providing motivation for the growth strategy. With these economic incentives for employees, Prisma has a competitive advantage compared to other microfinance lenders, including:
Prisma's market niche in taxi financing allows management to plan significant portfolio growth while minimizing overhead. Prisma will specialize in taxi financing as a spearhead to establishing operations nationwide in Nicaragua and in other countries in Central America. Using Prisma's specialization in taxi finance in this way drives penetration of the micro-credit market while still maintaining healthy profit margins.
In fiscal year 2002, Prisma will relocate its Managua office to prepare for national and international expansion. The new office space will accommodate the additional staff needed for expansion, while remaining in a geographically strategic location that will be convenient for Prisma's borrowers. In FY2003, the first satellite office in Nicaragua will be established, with two more additional national offices in FY2004. Also, in FY2004 Prisma will begin operating in a second country in Central America, to be determined depending on market opportunity.
Loan Officers: Prisma can realistically project rapid portfolio growth because of the proven demand for taxi financing and Prisma's track record financing taxis. Assuming that a single loan officer will manage 200 loans (a conservative estimate by industry standards), management estimates needing 25 loan officers by FY2004 when the total loan portfolio will be worth almost $11 million, distributed among 4,800 clients.
Scalability: Management forecasts steady profits for FY2001, although net income is projected to be slightly lower than FY2000 due to the integration of the U.S. operations. FY2002 will see a 100 percent growth in net income over FY2001, although management will advise reinvesting the profit into the company to support the growth strategy. Investment toward scalability during these two years will begin to pay off in FY2003, when management forecasts a 10.9 percent return on shareholder equity. Between FY2002 and FY2004, the portfolio balance per loan officer in order to break-even drops from an aggressive (but tenable) $470,000 down to $225,000 (total portfolio/total expenses). Securing the taxi financing niche and introducing operational improvements such as the use of hand-held technology makes the Prisma business model scalable.
Taxi Financing Market Share: Assuming that three-fourths of all medium-sized loans will be taxi loans and a 10 percent annual growth in the taxi sector, Prisma will claim a 22 percent market share by FY2004.
Central American Expansion: Nicaragua serves as a launch pad for entering the Central American market. In FY2004, Prisma plans to open operations in a second Central American country. This is a large and important market. (A Central American target market analysis can be found in the appendices.) The central challenge in expansion will be hiring effective management; for this reason, we are adopting a conservative expansion schedule. The taxi finance market will serve as a spearhead regardless of which country is deemed most appropriate.
Scalability Goal: Equity in Prisma is a long-term, non-liquid investment. The objective of achieving scale in the microfinance industry requires patient capital. "Scale" signifies at least the $50 million portfolio necessary to credibly solicit commercial capital investment. This will take 5-10 years. Scale is Prisma's mandate in order to be a leader in establishing new private equity capital markets for the microfinance industry.
The founders' choice in 1995 not to accept donations or subsidies to run this business was unheard of in the microfinance field at the time. However, since day one, Prisma has been dedicated to utilizing the essential potential of microfinance to eradicate poverty: making it economically attractive for capitalists to invest in "unbankable" business people. This choice has resulted in two truisms: private capital seeks scale to maximize profits and in order to achieve scale, equity is required. Therefore, consideration of the liquid event on this investment is imperative.
Because there are currently no secondary markets for Prisma stock and no one has yet to systematically "securitize" microloans, the most viable exit strategy for investors is acquisition.
Prisma has had discussions with major U.S. banks and has a clear understanding of what characteristics would be needed in order for an acquisition to occur. A national or international loan portfolio in taxi finance and a total loan portfolio of at least $50 million will make Prisma an attractive acquisition to larger banking institutions. These are the principal reasons that Prisma seeks to capture a niche market and grow its loan portfolio—to bring value to investors supporting micro-loans, which at present are unproven in secondary markets.
First and foremost, Prisma is committed to providing its investors with dividends, even in the early stages of growth. Prisma has been profitable for five years, since its first day of operation. This proven viability legitimizes the plan of paying dividends. Management thinks it imprudent to forecast the value of dividends at this time. The financial projections indicate healthy profits in FY2003 and FY2004 of 10.9 percent and 11.5 percent respectively, once scale is achieved.
Moreover, Prisma seeks capital appreciation for its investors. Prisma anticipates that capital appreciation will be augmented in the future by the creation of business spin-offs and offering of additional products. Business spin-offs could include auto repair, auto parts, car insurance and collections. Additional products might be credit cards, mortgage financing, or home-improvement loans.
Like a bank, Prisma is a profitable lending business. But Prisma stands apart from its commercial counterparts for two reasons:
Social returns constitute positive impact beyond the immediate benefits offered by a product —in this case small loans. Micro-lending is a business and development strategy widely acknowledged to bring extensive and diverse social returns to local communities. Well-managed, sustainable programs have been proven to successfully empower borrowers, strengthen families, catalyze communities, and expand local markets.
When an individual generates income from a small loan, the benefits extend a great distance and in many directions. Borrowers become more responsive to the needs of their families, and more active in their communities. Breadwinners are able to provide improved healthcare and education to their families, so children grow up healthier and with greater opportunities to realize their own potential. Families become stronger through access to working capital and the resulting opportunities. The fabric of communities becomes more tightly woven when it has a greater stake in its own development and can realize the benefits of its own efforts.
Prisma's clients and investors are able to realize tremendous social returns precisely because the company is profitable. Based on our estimates, every dollar lent generates $21 of social benefit for the borrower. For Prisma, profitability and sustainability are indicators that customers are using and repaying their loans successfully. This, in turn, means resources are more readily available for loans, and the social returns mentioned above go hand in hand with the unfettered availability and successful use of working capital.
Finally, as a market-driven social initiative, Prisma provides social returns at a larger scale with accelerated impact because it attracts investment.
Because Prisma is mindful of the fiscal operations and expenses necessary to run a profitable enterprise, the marketing budget is, by design, small and highly focused on very basic, interpersonal efforts. Only those activities that provide proven return and bring in new loans to achieve the intended growth and projection figures are undertaken.
Grassroots marketing and establishing trust with customers has been the hallmark of the Nicaraguan operations to date. These efforts led to a 207 percent growth in Prisma's loan portfolio between 1996-2000. Ensuring positive customer experience has led to word of mouth as the leading source for new client acquisition. In a country like Nicaragua, where relationships and community are the mainstays of business activity, the "word on the street" is the best marketing channel and a strong indicator of a company's reputation. It is also inexpensive.
Other channels for publicity, especially formal channels including print media, television, and radio, will not yield sufficient response for their cost. The target customers are typically distrustful and skeptical of formal institutions, if not outright intimidated. Therefore, relationship marketing like face-to-face communication and rewarding referrals has a much larger impact, not to mention lower acquisition cost.
Marketing activities follow the same standards as operations, described earlier. This includes knowing customers, working with them to be successful, making sure they understand how their loans work, and rewarding good behavior. Customers are classified from A-D based factors including: payment timeliness, credit history, savings, referring new business, and peer performance (those they referred or referred them). The taxi co-ops are classified according to the same criteria by each co-op as a group. There are known rewards and tangible benefits for "A" customers—including better interest rates.
New loans are most easily made through the "chain of trust," whereby existing or old clients vouch (co-sign) for new customers. The practice of allowing "A" clients to co-sign, helping friends and family secure loans, provides Prisma with essentially a free sales force, minimizes default rates, and provides a support network to support struggling customers. Customers are highly loyal; they support the lending institution because they are supporting each other and helping themselves.
Promotional activities include simple and basic activities for existing customers and important members of the community including receptions, small gifts, and a newsletter. An annual reception is held to thank customers and share what the organization is doing. Customers feel valued and that they are contributing to economic development in their country. "A" clients receive little gifts on holidays. These gifts are inexpensive but customers appreciate them.
When entering a new market—first in other cities in Nicaragua and later in other Central American countries—the same tactics will be used. A major key to success is in effective new hires with strong professional and social networks that can share what Prisma does. Word of mouth is effective among family, friends, and the taxi co-operatives—all of which have connections in locations targeted for expansion and are just waiting for Prisma to establish operations there.
Indicators for measuring the success of marketing efforts is in how little money is spent to achieve Prisma's growth milestones. Customer satisfaction will remain the lynchpin of Prisma's marketing strategy.
As noted in previous sections, this enterprise is not starting from scratch. Prisma has five years of profitable operations upon which to base its sales activities. Most of the efforts will be on maintaining the current methods and practices that have made the company successful to date—lending to individuals in groups that know each other, providing excellent service, building trust with customers, and working with customers to ensure a successful loan.
The Nicaraguan operation has worked well with the taxi cooperatives. Since 80 percent of taxi drivers report requiring external funding to ensure they can operate successfully, this is a target market with very likely customers. Furthermore, most cannot or choose not to be served by more formal banks. Even better, the taxi cooperatives are close-knit business and social circles. Therefore, taxi drivers easily see what a loan from Prisma does for their business because a co-worker and friend has directly benefited from it. Drivers ensure their colleagues do not default on their loans because they are co-signers and do not want to lose this resource for affordable capital (and an "A" rating). In the event of a default, the entire cooperative could lose the lending service and the co-signers will be stuck with the bill.
Prisma's business model makes two assumptions:
Prisma's five years of profitable operations confirms the first assumption. From its inception, Prisma has been financed through debt. Prisma has serviced these debts and remained profitable, but relying solely on debt capital has limited the company's growth as evidenced by the fact that Prisma has 200 approved loans waiting to be financed.
The New York Times' front-page article "On Wall Street, More Investors Push Social Goals," from February 11, 2001, bolsters the second assumption. Increasingly, investors are realizing that there "is a correlation between good practices and good investment results" and are placing their money accordingly. An analysis of "Socially Responsible Investing" proves that investors are increasingly adopting an investment approach that integrates social and environmental concerns into investment decisions. Prisma provides a viable option for investors interested in making money and making a difference.
Prisma's fiscal year runs July 1 through June 30. The $1.5 million currently being raised in Series "B" round is scheduled to close in July 2001. Therefore, the equity appears in FY2002, beginning July 2001. During fiscal year 2001, the management established a U.S. office to raise funds and promote the company's activities. A central strategy is leveraging equity with additional debt to grow operations. In FY2002, a conservative leverage ratio of less than 1 to 1 is assumed; a similar ratio is also assumed in FY2003.
The $1.5 million of sought equity will fully impact revenue in FY2002. By FY2003, management projects a 10.9 percent return on $2.7 million in equity. By comparison, ROE for other financially self-sufficient microfinance institutions is 6.05 percent according to the MicroBanking Bulletin . Return on assets for these institutions hovers at 3.08 percent; by FY2004 management projects ROA of 4.1 percent. Throughout FY2002 and FY2003, investment in scaling operations is assumed. The goal is to achieve appropriate scale to secure another round of equity investment of $4 million in July of 2003 (beginning of FY2004).
Additional assumptions in the financials include:
To claim that tangible assets should be measured and valued, while intangibles should not—or could not—is like stating that "things" are valuable, while "ideas" are not.
—Barach Lev, Professor Stern School of Business, New York University
Receiving a Prisma loan generates significant social impact in the following areas:
Prisma's impact on human capital development results from the positive externalities generated by each dollar lent. The positive externalities start a ripple effect, which leads to improved diet as a result of having a stable cash flow and increased education level for borrowers' children who can stay in school rather than be forced to drop out to increase family income. Improvements to borrowers' lives can be seen in all areas of basic need as a result of having a higher standing of living.
In addition to improving individual borrower's economic situation, Prisma's loans also fuel community development, which in essence is the aggregated effect of the individual loans. The loans improve the standing of individual borrowers, thus stabilizing economies at the community level.
The sense of empowerment that comes from economic stability also leads to greater community involvement. This involvement can take many forms, including being involved with public health projects such as latrine building, providing for community members who are sick or in a time of crisis, and skills transfer to other local business owners. These activities and interactions build healthy, sustainable communities.
Prisma is offering a balanced, inclusive equity structure that extends to every employee. Senior management is indigenous, except for David Satterthwaite, the CEO and President, who worked in Nicaragua for five years. There is local representation on the board, currently one third of the membership. Equity incentives in Latin America, including ESOPs, are far from the norm, especially for a small company. However, by doing so Prisma is promoting a new business culture of equitable private property ownership in an American company—this is globalization at its most positive.
According to Jeffrey Ashe, founder of Boston's Working Capital and former Vice-President of Accion International, there are approximately four billion people throughout the developing world without access to affordable credit. Entrepreneurs with excellent skills and incredible ideas are restricted in their opportunity due to lack of financial resources. Even the small amount of money needed as investment capital to start micro-enterprises like weaving baskets and selling them at the local market is beyond the grasp of the majority of the world's poor.
The world's "unbankable" populations have three options:
Frequently, family and friends cannot generate the necessary capital and the moneylender's rates are too high to be able to pay them back. This being the case, only a loan from an institution like Prisma can result in the successful growth of a new business that may break the cycle of poverty.
According to industry sources, less than $10 billion currently is invested in the worldwide microfinance industry. This does not even scratch the surface towards serving this market. Microcredit is not a panacea solution for social problems. But, it is a useful tool for many to bridge the gap out of poverty and improve their lives. In addition to this activity providing a social return, there are equally compelling market driven motivations to undertake these operations using private capital—providing this service produces financial return.
As with any industry sector, once an example of a successful model is provided, others will enter the field. Following Prisma's lead, microfinance will become a viable commercial market, serving billions of the world's poor.
While some of Prisma's Social Impact Areas are easily quantifiable, others are best evaluated in terms of qualitative impact analysis. Human Capital Development and Community Economic Development are included in the quantitative analysis using number of dollars lent as the unit of measurement. The qualitative methods analyze aspects of all four impact areas. The following sections outline Prisma's quantitative and qualitative methodology for measuring SROI.
Current SROI Analysis: In developing its quantitative methodology, Prisma has drawn from models developed by Roberts Endowed Development Fund (REDF), one of the leaders in social enterprise. The use of a social benefit/cost ratio, adjusted for present value, gives a clear sign as to whether the social benefits outweigh the social costs and by what degree. Based on traditional cost/benefit analysis benchmarks, if the ratio is greater than or equal to one, the project should be pursued.
SROI Ratio = Present Value of Social Benefits/Present Value of Social Costs
Social benefits accounted for in the quantitative analysis of SROI include ripple effects from improving one's financial situations through receiving a loan. These include:
These benefits are cited extensively in microfinance literature, including by industry leaders such as FINCA and Accion International. The dollar amounts in the table below are taken from the financial projections for Prisma's loan portfolio. They represent the total number of dollars Prisma expects to lend in each year. (Social benefit and social cost are calculated on a per year basis and then aggregated.) As social benefits are directly correlated to loans, the social benefits are captured in terms of dollars lent to borrowers.
Prisma has always borrowed capital at market rates therefore eliminating the social cost of subsidies or grants often included as social costs in SROI analysis. We have included a small social cost that reflects loan loss due to Prisma's choice to make loans to extremely high-risk individuals. As the company's loan loss has historically been under 1 percent, the estimated social cost per dollar lent of $. 05 used in the model reflects our acknowledgment that in undertaking an expansion strategy into new geographic markets, we run the risk of an increase in the loan loss rate.
Benefits | $906,272 | $1,309,380 | $4,427,150 | $5,449,600 | $10,648,000 | $22,740,402 |
PV of Benefits | $906,272 | $1,138,591 | $3,347,561 | $3,583,200 | $6,088,029 | $15,063,654 |
Costs | $45,336 | $65,469 | $221,358 | $272,480 | $532,400 | $1,137,043 |
Present Value of Costs | $45,336 | $56,930 | $167,378 | $179,160 | $304,401 | $753,205 |
A benefit/cost ratio of 21 means that for every unit of cost, 21 units of social benefit are derived. As the unit of measurement in this model is dollars, the social return is interpreted as $21 of social benefit for every $1 of social cost incurred. The fact that Prisma's SROI ratio is as high as 21 indicates that in terms of benefit/cost analysis, it is an attractive project, with an extremely high social return on investment.
Future SROI Analysis: Ideally, Prisma would quantify its SROI in terms of the increase in income derived directly from the loan. Measuring income generated specifically from a Prisma loan is complicated in that it would involve measuring a portion of each borrower's increase in income, rather than their total income. This approach would require an in-depth understanding of loan usage and the borrower's expenditures. Prisma proposes to develop this understanding through the qualitative methods described below.
A SROI analysis based on incremental increases in income would enable Prisma to project the increase per month in income over time. The company would then calculate the social net present value of that increase and calculate the appropriate social internal rate of return.
Prisma has historically collected some of the information described below, such as customer finances, professional activities, age, and gender. Based on its experience, Prisma believes the most effective way to gather information on a going forward basis is to administer questionnaires at the loan's beginning, closing, and annually thereafter (on a voluntary basis), in conjunction with qualitative interviews. These new methods will standardize the process of information gathering and enable Prisma to do more rigorous quantitative analysis, in addition to maintaining a clear sense of its customer base—even as it rapidly expands. Information gathered from customers will include both economic and social indicators.
Economic Indicators As a bank, Prisma must make loans that are fiscally responsible and will be paid back. Therefore, it needs to determine a borrower's financial status before, during, and at the end of the loan. During the loan application process, loan officers will collect information about customers and their finances, including their professional activities, income, historical income, family financial resources, and projected future income. This builds on the information Prisma currently collects and believes is reasonable to collect in the future. Social Indicators Because of the level of trust Prisma staff establishes with customers, they have been consistently helpful in providing information enabling us to track their status. At the time of the loan, social indicators including age, gender, economic condition of borrower, number of family members, and current income are provided. Throughout the term of the loan, it is easy to track the number of employees, business income, and changes in standard of living. This is done implicitly by following the timeliness of loan payments and seeing if loan payments are made on time or late. Receipt of late payments usually indicates a change for the worse in the borrower's status. Prisma will also begin using a standardized method for tracking the ongoing conversations Prisma staff has with customers, through which much information about social indicators is gathered. At the end of the loan, the same information will be formally gathered with an exit questionnaire. Plus, because of its active involvement in the communities it serves and the fact that many customers renew loans for additional working capital, Prisma will be able to track social indicators longitudinally.
Information gathered through loan review, questionnaires, and interviews will be included in Prisma's Annual Report. This will enable our investors to track the SROI and ensure that Prisma stays true to its mandate of doing well by doing good.
If we are looking for one single action which will enable the poor to overcome their poverty, I would focus on credit.
—Dr. Muhammad Yunus
Founder, The Grameen Bank
Market description.
Prisma MicroFinance, Inc., is a U.S. microfinance company with Nicaraguan operations where loans are made to residents in the urban area of capitol, Managua. The loans range in size from U.S. $50-$15,000, and are used for both personal and business purposes. Loans to taxi cab cooperatives account for the larger loans and act as a subsidy for the smaller loans to individuals, primarily women.
Managua is Nicaragua's economic center and has a population of more than 1,000,000. Although Nicaragua's economy is still driven by agriculture, service jobs in the urban areas represent an increasing number of jobs.
This trend holds true throughout Central America. The table below demonstrates the size of the market for international microfinance in Central America's urban areas—the geographic areas that Prisma will target as it expands—expressed in terms of population and GDP. The countries are ranked by size of capital city, beginning with the largest, Guatemala City.
Guatemala | 12,700,000 | $18.9 million |
Guatemala City | 2,000,000 | $1,750 |
El Salvador | 5,900,000 | $11.9 billion |
San Salvador | 1,300,000 | $1,960 |
Nicaragua | 4,275,000 | $2.3 billion |
Managua | 1,000,000 | $430 |
Honduras | 5,800,000 | $4.49 billion |
Tegucigalpa | 800,000 | $774 |
Panama | 2,800,000 | $9.14 billion |
Panama City | 700,000 | $3,310 |
Costa Rica | 3,700,000 | $5 billion |
San Jose | 330,000 | $1,351 |
Belize | 250,000 | $700 million |
Belize City | 55,000 | $3,000 |
Many Central American countries are rebuilding after years of political, social, and economic unrest. Microentrepreneurs play an integral role as economic drivers in this rebuilding and will need access to affordable capital.
Prisma's target customers include:
These target customers look for microfinance institutions (MFIs) that are professional, while still understanding the specific needs of poorer borrowers. They would not have access to banks or traditional financial institutions, so if they decide to take out a loan their options are limited to friends/family, moneylenders, or MFIs. The resources of friends and family are extremely limited, and the exorbitant rates charged by moneylenders (ranging from 360-480 percent APR) make them unattractive in terms of repayment possibilities. (Moneylenders are attractive because there are no conditions to qualify for a loan.) Prisma is in competition with other MFIs.
Prisma has been in operation for six years. In each of these six years, it has expanded its outreach and refined its operations. With a strong management team in place, Prisma is now ready to significantly expand its operations. It is already the market leader for lending to taxi cab cooperatives and plans to make this its market niche over the next year. This will position Prisma to expand its outreach to other microentrepreneurs and individuals, particularly women.
Through its experience in the Managua area, Prisma has learned that there is a significant demand for microloans. With its economy continuing to grow, this demand will only increase.
Other capitol cities throughout Central America are experiencing a similar shift toward an expansion of economic activity in the urban centers. The need for microentrepreneurs to access affordable capital will expand along with the urban-based economies. Clearly, there is a demand for reputable MFIs to meet this need and Prisma has established a way to reach this market.
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A bussiness Plan for a microfinance institution in the slums of East Cairo.
Ephron Ndahimana
Aishwarya Nair
Kerathum Juma
Giacomo Aghina
This paper is a research on the development of the Islamic microfinance sector in three countries: Yemen, Egypt and Indonesia. The main purpose of this study is to find out which factors are essential for the expansion of the mentioned sector, and if they are comparable to other countries.
Giacomo Aghina , Idir Boundaoui
This paper is a research on the development of the Islamic microfinance sector in three countries: Yemen, Egypt and Indonesia. The main purpose of this study is to find out which factors are essential for the expansion of the mentioned sector, and if they are comparable to other countries. The research shows that the government's input is a crucial factor for the expansion of the Islamic microfinance sector. In the studied case of Yemen, the government's input has been led by a previous demand research addressed to the population. However, due to the lack of surveys, statistics and, in general, of scientific researches, the confirmation of the last premise – if this demand of first importance is essential for the expansion of the Islamic microfinance- needs to be confirmed by a future specific research within the population/countries selected.
Sunny Ogbonna
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The new handbook provides detailed guidance on using version 3 of Microfin, the latest version of the Excel-based financial modeling tool specifically designed for MFIs.
Part 1 provides a brief overview of the key elements of strategic planning:
Part 2 covers the main elements of operational planning from the perspective of developing detailed financial projections.Step-by-step projections are created from case study data using the Microfin model, an Excel-based financial modeling tool developed expressly for microfinance institutions. The steps in operational planning and financial modeling include:
The handbook's last chapter discusses how to use the business plan and financial projections as ongoing management tools. Once readers have practiced with the Microfin model using the data provided in the case study, they can use the model to develop detailed financial projections for their own institution.
The handbook also includes several annexes with further information on the Microfin model. These explain how to install the software, present printouts from the model, list data requirements, and provide an exercise on modeling lending activity.
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So, you’ve got an idea and you want to start a business —great! Before you do anything else, like seek funding or build out a team, you'll need to know how to write a business plan. This plan will serve as the foundation of your company while also giving investors and future employees a clear idea of your purpose.
Below, Lauren Cobello, Founder and CEO of Leverage with Media PR , gives her best advice on how to make a business plan for your company.
Build your dream business with the help of a high-paying job—browse open jobs on The Muse »
According to Cobello, a business plan is a document that contains the mission of the business and a brief overview of it, as well as the objectives, strategies, and financial plans of the founder. A business plan comes into play very early on in the process of starting a company—more or less before you do anything else.
“You should start a company with a business plan in mind—especially if you plan to get funding for the company,” Cobello says. “You’re going to need it.”
Whether that funding comes from a loan, an investor, or crowdsourcing, a business plan is imperative to secure the capital, says the U.S. Small Business Administration . Anyone who’s considering giving you money is going to want to review your business plan before doing so. That means before you head into any meeting, make sure you have physical copies of your business plan to share.
The four main types of business plans are:
Internal business plans, strategic business plans, one-page business plans.
Let's break down each one:
If you're wondering how to write a business plan for a startup, Cobello has advice for you. Startup business plans are the most common type, she says, and they are a critical tool for new business ventures that want funding. A startup is defined as a company that’s in its first stages of operations, founded by an entrepreneur who has a product or service idea.
Most startups begin with very little money, so they need a strong business plan to convince family, friends, banks, and/or venture capitalists to invest in the new company.
Internal business plans “are for internal use only,” says Cobello. This kind of document is not public-facing, only company-facing, and it contains an outline of the company’s business strategy, financial goals and budgets, and performance data.
Internal business plans aren’t used to secure funding, but rather to set goals and get everyone working there tracking towards them.
As the name implies, strategic business plans are geared more towards strategy and they include an assessment of the current business landscape, notes Jérôme Côté, a Business Advisor at BDC Advisory Services .
Unlike a traditional business plan, Cobello adds, strategic plans include a SWOT analysis (which stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) and an in-depth action plan for the next six to 12 months. Strategic plans are action-based and take into account the state of the company and the industry in which it exists.
Although a typical business plan falls between 15 to 30 pages, some companies opt for the much shorter One-Page Business Plan. A one-page business plan is a simplified version of the larger business plan, and it focuses on the problem your product or service is solving, the solution (your product), and your business model (how you’ll make money).
A one-page plan is hyper-direct and easy to read, making it an effective tool for businesses of all sizes, at any stage.
Every business plan is different, and the steps you take to complete yours will depend on what type and format you choose. That said, if you need a place to start and appreciate a roadmap, here’s what Cobello recommends:
Before writing your business plan, you’ll want to do a thorough investigation of what’s out there. Who will be the competitors for your product or service? Who is included in the target market? What industry trends are you capitalizing on, or rebuking? You want to figure out where you sit in the market and what your company’s value propositions are. What makes you different—and better?
The purpose of your business plan will determine which kind of plan you choose to create. Are you trying to drum up funding, or get the company employees focused on specific goals? (For the former, you’d want a startup business plan, while an internal plan would satisfy the latter.) Also, consider your audience. An investment firm that sees hundreds of potential business plans a day may prefer to see a one-pager upfront and, if they’re interested, a longer plan later.
Every business plan needs a company description—aka a summary of the company’s purpose, what they do/offer, and what makes it unique. Company descriptions should be clear and concise, avoiding the use of jargon, Cobello says. Ideally, descriptions should be a few paragraphs at most.
A business plan should be centered around the company’s goals, and it should clearly explain how the company will generate revenue. To do this, Cobello recommends using actual numbers and details, as opposed to just projections.
For instance, if the company is already making money, show how much and at what cost (e.g. what was the net profit). If it hasn’t generated revenue yet, outline the plan for how it will—including what the product/service will cost to produce and how much it will cost the consumer.
How will you promote the business? Through what channels will you be promoting it? How are you going to reach and appeal to your target market? The more specific and thorough you can be with your plans here, the better, Cobello says.
What will you do with the money you raise? What are the first steps you plan to take? As a founder, you want to instill confidence in your investors and show them that the instant you receive their money, you’ll be taking smart actions that grow the company.
Creating a business plan is in some ways akin to building a legal case, but for your business. “You want to tell a story, and to be as thorough as possible, while keeping your plan succinct, clear, interesting, and visually appealing,” Cobello says. “Supporting documents could include financial projects, a competitive analysis of the market you’re entering into, and even any licenses, patents, or permits you’ve secured.”
A business plan is an individualized document—it’s ultimately up to you what information to include and what story you tell. But above all, Cobello says, your business plan should have a clear focus and goal in mind, because everything else will build off this cornerstone.
“Many people don’t realize how important business plans are for the health of their company,” she says. “Set aside time to make this a priority for your business, and make sure to keep it updated as you grow.”
Michael Henson Content Writer
Jun 19, 2024
You’re a small business owner, but you have big dreams. You want to see your business grow to become robust and profitable, but you aren’t sure how best to go about it. That’s why you need to take a serious approach to planning for business growth.
Planning for growth means creating a successful small business financial plan, one which considers business goals, financial goals, and risk management . Working with a financial advisor is the best way to create a plan that includes retirement planning, funding options, and preparing for worst case scenarios. This article gives you financial planning tips to get you started to make informed decisions.
To set your small business up for success, you need a solid financial plan that includes both short-term and long-term business and financial goals, as well as strategies to achieve them. Then you can make informed decisions, access funding, and prepare for risks. Here are some tips to get you started:
Every effective financial plan is built on accurate and reliable financial information. If you don’t already have a small business budget that charts your revenue, outgoings, and profit margins, now is the time to create one. You can download our small business budget planning template to simplify the process.
Next, figure out your key business and personal goals. Do you want to increase revenue by 20% this year? Expand into a new market? Be able to retire by the age of 50? Your financial plan should cover both short-term goals for stability and growth as well as long-term goals to build wealth.
Now it’s time to evaluate potential risks and expenses. Speak to a financial advisor to determine appropriate risk management strategies for possibilities like economic downturns, loss of key customers, or expensive equipment failures. Your balance sheet shows your financial health, so look for ways to cut excess spending and budget for unexpected costs. Successful small businesses plan for worst-case scenarios to avoid crises.
Think about how you will fund expanding your goals and operations. Options include business loans, lines of credit, crowdfunding, and personal investment. Meet with a financial advisor to evaluate what makes sense for your needs and risk tolerance. They can help you find good options and negotiate the best rates.
As a small business owner, you need to define your business goals and plan for risks to set yourself up for growth. These should include personal and business goals, and both short-term aims and long-term plans. You can then assess potential risks that could hold you back from achieving your goals, and work out ways to avoid or mitigate them.
As a small business owner, your personal and business finances are closely linked. Think about your own financial goals, like saving for retirement, college funds for your kids, or paying off debt. A financial advisor can help you create a comprehensive plan that includes both business and personal financial goals.
Think about why you started your business and what you want to achieve in the next 1-3 years. Do you want to increase revenue or profits? Open a new location? Setting specific, measurable goals will help guide your financial planning. Work with a financial advisor to determine how much money you need to achieve your goals and the funding options available, like small business loans, crowd-funding, or business credit cards.
Identify potential risks to your cash flow and profits, like economic downturns, loss of key customers, or supply chain issues. Come up with a worst-case scenario plan that includes cutting costs, alternative funding sources, and ways to increase revenue. Planning for risks will help you make better informed decisions if problems arise. You’ll want to revisit your risk assessments regularly as your business grows and evolves.
To set your small business up for growth, you need to get a handle on your finances. As a small business owner, this means developing realistic business and financial goals, managing risks, and planning how to fund future growth.
Successful small businesses monitor their financial health regularly and make changes to support growth and stability. That’s why you need to look at your balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, and key ratios to determine your company’s financial health.
The balance sheet shows your assets, liabilities, and equity at a given point in time. The income statement shows your revenue, expenses, and profits over a period of time. Analyzing these financial statements will tell you if you have enough cash on hand, if expenses are too high, if you’re overleveraged with debt, or if profits are growing.
Saving for retirement is crucial for your long term financial health, and requires balancing your business’s financial health today with your own financial goals for the future. Speaking to a financial advisor who specializes in small business planning can help determine the right mix based on your business goals and risk tolerance. There are several options tailored to small businesses that provide tax benefits and flexibility.
A SEP IRA allows you to contribute up to 25% of your salary, or $66,000 for 2023 , whichever is less. Contributions are tax-deductible and the plan is easy to set up and administer. A SEP IRA provides flexibility, since you can vary contributions from year to year based on your business’s financial performance.
An individual 401(k), or solo 401(k), operates similar to a traditional 401(k) but is designed for self-employed individuals and small business owners. For 2024, you can contribute up to $23,000 as an employee , plus up to 25% of your compensation as an employer, for a total of $69,000. A solo 401(k) allows for loans and hardship withdrawals, and contributions can be made up until your tax filing deadline.
A profit-sharing plan allows you to contribute a percentage of your business’s profits to a retirement plan. Contributions are discretionary and the plan provides flexibility in how profits are distributed to employees. The contribution limit is 25% of compensation or $69,000 for 2024 , and contributions are tax deductible. Profit sharing plans require non-discrimination testing to ensure benefits are fairly distributed among employees.
By following these tips and taking advantage of resources for planning for small business, you can develop a successful small business financial plan to guide your company to growth and prosperity. Keep refining and revising your plan as your business evolves. With the right plan in place, you can make informed decisions to ensure the financial health and success of your business for years to come.
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The Government of Cambodia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore Cambodia remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including opening a victim support center, cooperating with foreign governments on anti-trafficking investigations, and launching an online trafficking victim identification training course available to government officials. However, corruption and official complicity – including by high-level senior government officials – in trafficking crimes remained widespread and endemic during the reporting period; this included the exploitation of tens of thousands of victims in forced criminality in online scam operations in Cambodia. Officials actively impeded countervailing efforts, including reportedly undermining anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim protection efforts and dispelling reported accusations through minimization and denial in public messaging of the prevalence and severity of online scam operations, including reports of government complicity. Some senior government officials and advisors owned – either directly or through businesses – properties and facilities known to be utilized by online scam operators used to exploit victims in labor trafficking and financially benefitted directly from these crimes. Involvement of officials and economic elites resulted in selective and politically motivated enforcement of laws, inhibiting effective law enforcement action against trafficking crimes, which remained widespread during the year. The government consistently failed to screen foreign and Cambodian workers for trafficking indicators and selectively intervened in cases involving foreign victims from online scam operations, and often only when foreign governments applied consistent advocacy for their citizens. In addition, authorities provided selective referrals of foreign potential labor trafficking victims of online scam operations to services, and officials reportedly inappropriately penalized such potential victims for crimes committed as a direct result of being trafficked by holding these victims in prolonged detention and, in some cases, also re-trafficking them into further exploitation until they paid bribes to police for release, or a foreign embassy funded their return flights home. The government appointed individuals with past and ongoing public allegations of official complicity in human trafficking-related cases to positions overseeing, or with significant influence over, the government’s anti-trafficking response. The government did not report prosecuting any labor traffickers despite widespread reporting across multiple industries of adult and child labor trafficking. Authorities did not investigate or hold criminally accountable any officials involved in widespread, credible reports of complicity, in particular with unscrupulous business owners who subjected thousands of men, women, and children throughout the country to human trafficking in brick kilns and entertainment establishments.
Investigate and prosecute traffickers involved in forced labor crimes in online scam operations, including complicit officials. * Fully implement victim identification guidelines, apply them to domestic and foreign suspected victims, and train officials in all areas of the country on their use. * Screen all individuals in immigrant detention or custody for human trafficking indicators, including foreign workers, men and boys, LGBTQI+ individuals, and persons with disabilities. * Investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Increase funding to anti-trafficking law enforcement units and disburse it in advance of investigations, rather than by reimbursement. * Allocate increased resources to anti-human trafficking police to better facilitate the monitoring of defendants released under judicial supervision pending trial. * Increase or initiate unannounced labor inspections in high-vulnerability professions, especially in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and at brick kilns, entertainment venues, construction sites, and plantations, with a focus on identifying labor trafficking and debt bondage and holding business owners accountable to the law. * Increase the availability of services for male victims, especially men and boys exploited in commercial fishing abroad. * Incentivize domestic and foreign victims’ participation in criminal and civil proceedings, including by establishing a victim’s fund and granting permission to work, temporary residency, or other relevant immigration status to foreign victims wishing to remain in country during proceedings. * Implement a system for monitoring, collecting, and reporting data on anti-trafficking prosecution and victim protection efforts, and disseminate data among the relevant government agencies in a manner that protects victims’ identities and privacy. * Eliminate recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by Cambodian labor recruiters and ensure they are instead paid by employers. * Increase inspection and oversight of lending institutions, including private micro-finance organizations, to reduce vulnerability to debt-based coercion among economically disadvantaged communities. * Allow restitution upon conviction of the trafficker and establish and train relevant officials on procedures for calculating and granting restitution. * Establish and allocate resources to implement systematic procedures at diplomatic missions to assist Cambodian victims abroad, including in countries without Cambodian diplomatic representation. * Amend regulations on labor recruitment licensure and contract requirements to include strengthened language on worker protections and labor rights. * Strengthen efforts to inspect private labor recruitment agencies and their sub-licensed brokers for fraudulent recruitment and other trafficking indicators. * Incorporate NGO input into the policy for formally transferring custody of child victims.
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts; official complicity remained a significant concern. The 2008 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. NGOs reported that in practice the government did not issue criminal penalties under the anti-trafficking law for labor traffickers; instead, it utilized the labor law to issue fines and/or short jail sentences of six days to one month, which did not represent sufficient punishment to deter future crimes or provide justice for victims.
The government did not maintain a centralized record or database of investigations and judicial proceedings; therefore, overall law enforcement data was incomplete. The government reported investigating 27 trafficking cases, nine of which remained ongoing by the end of the reporting period. The government did not report an update on the three month police operation to investigate 600 human trafficking cases across the country from the previous reporting period, including whether any prosecutions or victim identification resulted from those investigations. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) personnel manually collected prosecution and conviction data from each district court throughout the country. In 2023, the government reported initiating prosecutions for approximately 600 suspected traffickers involved in 354 cases, but did not disaggregate between prosecutions conducted under the anti-trafficking law and non-trafficking laws, or by type of trafficking. The government did not report prosecuting any labor trafficking cases. This compared with 88 total cases prosecuted under the anti-trafficking law in 2022; 16 of which involved sex trafficking, 24 involved forced labor, and 48 involved unspecified forms of trafficking. The government reported it convicted 109 traffickers under the trafficking law, but did not provide disaggregated data for type of trafficking; this compared with 174 traffickers convicted in 2022, including 13 for sex trafficking and 42 for forced labor. As in prior reporting periods, judicial authorities may have included cases of rape and other crimes outside the international definition of trafficking in their reported data; therefore, the true number of trafficking prosecutions and convictions was likely lower than reported. Courts also may have convicted in absentia traffickers who evaded arrest. The law allowed for retrials for suspects who evaded arrest and were convicted in absentia, and observers reported courts often acquitted traffickers convicted in absentia upon retrial because of corruption and official complicity. The government reported they did not have trafficking-specific courts or specialized prosecutors, but all prosecutors received trafficking-specific training.
Nationwide law enforcement authorities often did not effectively investigate or prosecute suspected traffickers despite credible allegations because of resource constraints and official complicity. As previously reported, some defendants may have fled prior to their trial dates as judicial police lacked resources to monitor them when released on “judicial supervision” pending trial; courts tried and convicted such suspected traffickers in absentia. Authorities rarely issued arrest warrants for absconded defendants unless NGOs assisted in tracking and apprehending them. Cambodian criminal procedural code featured no guidelines, monitoring provisions, or language outlining specific law enforcement duties with regard to judicial supervision. Citing resource constraints, prosecutors and investigating judges did not advance all of the trafficking cases for which police had supplied evidence. The government increased anti-trafficking operations in provinces outside the capital, but rural and remote communities did not benefit from equitable implementation of the law because of official complicity and corruption, as law enforcement in these regions did not prosecute alleged traffickers with connections to government officials.
The government reported conducting 315 law enforcement patrols in locations of suspected sex trafficking, including guesthouses, massage parlors, and karaoke bars, but did not report whether it screened for or identified any trafficking victims. Law enforcement actions on establishments where authorities believed sex trafficking occurred were sometimes unsuccessful because of advanced warning from local police. Some police reportedly protected the establishments in exchange for monthly payments from the business owners or commercial sex acts from potential victims. Authorities often overlooked, denied, or downplayed labor abuses – including forced child labor – in factories and at brick kilns, and colluded with brick manufacturers to arrest, jail, and return indentured laborers who had attempted to escape. Civil society also noted with concern the appointment of a government official to a high-level law enforcement position overseeing the government’s trafficking response who had been indicted previously for accepting bribes and protecting brothel owners in child commercial sexual exploitation; the case was not prosecuted. The courts convicted the official’s subordinate of similar charges, but ultimately overturned the conviction in a previous reporting period.
The government reported the MOJ continued to operate a special working group to monitor and investigate reports of large human trafficking operations in “high risk” areas, including Preah Sihanouk, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Svay Rieng, Takeo, and Kandal provinces. Observers reported government officials with knowledge of police operations alerted the online scam operators prior to police law enforcement actions. NGOs reported high-ranking officials harassed and intimidated human trafficking advocates involved in combating forced labor in online scam operations. Authorities reported removing an unspecified number of deputy chiefs from duty for extorting money from online scam operations.
The government reported the Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Police (AHTJP) cooperated with foreign governments, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Thailand, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada on investigations, but it did not disaggregate data between labor disputes and human trafficking crimes. Foreign governments reported the government’s cooperation on investigating reported trafficking of foreign nationals in online scam operations and supporting the removal of specified victims from such compounds; in one case, however, observers reported a high-level government official requested financial payment from a foreign government to investigate a compound holding their citizens. The government cooperated with a foreign government to investigate a group of “tourists” (27 Philippine nationals, three PRC nationals, one Malaysian national, and six Cambodian nationals) in Cambodia. The 27 Philippine nationals did not have possession of their passports and reported inconsistent information on the situation; the General Commissariat of the National Police reportedly referred these 27 to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSAVY) for victims services. The government also maintained formal bilateral agreements and MOUs outlining cross-border anti-trafficking efforts, including information sharing, investigations, and prosecutions, with India, Malaysia, the PRC, Thailand, and Vietnam. The government finalized a police cooperation MOU with Indonesia and five other ASEAN country members that included anti-trafficking provisions. The government continued to cooperate with a foreign government through a law enforcement task force dedicated to combating online child sexual exploitation and other child sex crimes.
The government – in collaboration with and through funding from NGOs and other donors – increased training for police, prosecutors, judges, and other government officials on anti-trafficking laws, investigative techniques, evidence collection, victim identification, and protection guidelines. During the reporting period, the government reported launching an online trafficking victim identification training course available to government officials. Many police – particularly in rural areas – remained unaware of how to conduct anti-trafficking work, as most did not receive training on basic law enforcement techniques. Moreover, law enforcement and judicial officials lacked the necessary equipment to handle trafficking cases appropriately, including vehicles, computer and communications equipment, and forensic tools. As a result, criminals’ technical sophistication in hiding and destroying evidence during police law enforcement actions limited the collection of evidence and hindered the government’s ability to prosecute perpetrators. The government required the funding of all anti-trafficking investigative work to be conducted through reimbursement, forcing individual police units to cover relevant expenses with personal funds. NGOs reported some officers waited months for this reimbursement, which was sometimes not repaid in full, and the ensuing financial hardships made some police units more susceptible to corruption. As previously reported, local organizations and some officials continued to stress an urgent need for more sophisticated evidence collection techniques – including more undercover investigations – to decrease reliance on witness testimony and improve efforts to detect and combat sex trafficking. MOJ officials reported their concern that revising the law or issuing new regulations to specifically authorize undercover investigative authority in trafficking cases could lead to abuse of power by the police.
The government did not investigate, prosecute, or convict government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes at many levels of government remained significant concerns, hindering law enforcement action and perpetuating impunity during the year. Observers reported some local authorities, law enforcement, and security forces directly facilitated trafficking crimes by colluding with criminal networks. NGOs continued to report trafficking victims accused Cambodian officials of conspiring with labor brokers to commit trafficking crimes. NGOs also continued to allege police and other officials were complicit in online scam operations that forced thousands of PRC, Southeast Asian, and other foreign nationals to work in “call centers” in Sihanoukville and other locations. Observers reported instances of customs and immigration officials accepting bribes from traffickers to facilitate trafficking victims’ entry into Cambodia; traffickers then primarily exploited these victims in online scam operations. Observers reported prosecutors and judges accepted bribes in return for dismissal of charges, acquittals, and reduced sentencing. Corrupt officials often thwarted progress in cases where the perpetrators reportedly had political, criminal, or economic ties to senior government officials.
Institutionalized corruption and official complicity in labor trafficking and forced criminality persisted. Some high-level senior government officials, family members of senior officials, and elite business executives with close relationships with senior officials across agencies reportedly were involved with and benefitted from online scam operations or owned properties on which online scam compounds operated. Involvement of such officials and elites resulted in selective and politically motivated enforcement of laws, which inhibited effective law enforcement action against operations which remained widespread during the year. Observers reported such compounds often received advanced warning of impending law enforcement actions, were not investigated, or required local law enforcement to receive permission from high-level government officials to enter, therefore giving compound operators time to impede operations and move victims. The government carried out a pattern of intimidating victims and civil society, including intimidating local officials attempting to investigate or hold high-level government officials or individuals with close ties to high-level senior government officials criminally accountable. The government impeded civil society efforts to support trafficking victims. Government officials publicly denounced victim accounts, victim credibility, reporting by international organizations, and civil society reporting on the prevalence and severity of online scam operations and in previous reporting periods. Despite widespread reporting of forced criminality in online scam compounds in Ko Kong, Sihanoukville, O’Smach, and other locations along the Cambodia-Thailand border and along the coast, law enforcement did not charge any high-level officials, compound operators, or complicit landlords of the compound properties. Law enforcement conducted actions on online scam compounds, but often did not properly screen for trafficking indicators among potential victims; rather, officials reportedly inappropriately penalized such potential victims for crimes committed as a direct result of being trafficked by holding these victims in indefinite detention, and, in some cases, also re-trafficking them into further exploitation until they paid bribes or random to police for release, they escaped, or their foreign embassy funded their return flights home. Civil society raised alarm concerning government officials’ attempts to intimidate and penalize civil society actors working to support victims in online scam compounds and raise awareness of the issue.
The government maintained inadequate victim protection efforts. The government reported identifying 142 victims or potential victims in 2023; the government also reported identifying 214 victims of forced marriage, for whom there may have been corollary indicators of trafficking victimization. While the law specified individuals could not be confirmed as trafficking victims until a criminal trial had ended with a conviction, the government could formally designate potential victims as “suspected victims” to allow them to receive services, including legal services. The government reported screening other vulnerable groups, including workers in online scam operations, for trafficking indicators; observers reported inadequate victim screening for online scam compounds and noted the government was more likely to screen victims if the compound was not connected to a powerful government official or advisor. Foreign diplomats in the capital reported receiving hundreds of leads from potential victims trapped in online scam operations seeking assistance; Cambodian officials only acted to remove potential victims from compounds in cases when embassy officials provided details on the potential victims’ location and identity. Foreign diplomats also reported authorities did not identify other potential victims at these locations or shut down online scam compounds even after accessing them to remove named potential victims. NGOs reported the government ceased acting on civil society reports and publicly announced it would only follow up on foreign government requests to search for victims in online scam compounds. In selective cases, authorities reportedly responded when directly contacted by the victim, victims’ families, the victims’ governments, or third party private citizens. In such cases, the authorities would not remove all victims from compounds – only the victims a foreign government or family member requested support for – and did not further investigate or shut down the online scam compound. As of the end of the reporting period, the government has never arrested and prosecuted an online scam compound operator or an owner of a compound.
The MOSAVY had victim identification guidelines, but law enforcement agencies’ victim identification, referral, and repatriation efforts remained disparate and underdeveloped, and the government’s procedures were inadequate for foreign victims. Observers reported officials often did not follow established victim identification procedures for foreign victims recovered from online scam operation compounds, and instead detained and deported them without screening for human trafficking indicators or providing appropriate services. The government classified many of these cases as “labor disputes” instead of human trafficking. Due to insufficient victim identification efforts, authorities penalized potential foreign victims for immigration offenses committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Some potential victims removed from online scam operations claimed police told them authorities would not allow them to return to their home countries if they officially reported their exploitation; authorities instead directed them to say they wanted to quit their jobs in the online scam operation, effectively directing them to hide their victim status.
MOSAVY officials regularly accompanied police during law enforcement activities, such as proactive law enforcement actions, to provide assistance to identified victims; if they were not present, police could screen for trafficking indicators and refer victims to a MOSAVY office. However, MOSAVY officials did not report participating in any coordinated law enforcement activities involving online scam operation compounds, including the previously mentioned large-scale, MOJ-formed special working group operation that began in August 2022. NGOs reported the Anti Commercial and Gambling Unit led most of the operation activities to remove potential victims from these compounds, rarely screened for trafficking, and did not coordinate with the MOSAVY to place victims in shelters; authorities instead treated potential victims as undocumented migrants or civil plaintiffs. Local police sometimes referred victims directly to NGOs, who reported the overall referral process was quick and victims could access NGO-run shelters within hours of being identified. Despite this process, the government continued to implement a regulation barring NGOs from representing individuals seeking formal recognition as trafficking victims. Under this arrangement, authorities required victims to seek formal identification from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to access protection services. Some NGOs reported a lack of cooperation from authorities, which hindered their operations. The government’s referral procedures were inadequate for foreign potential victims recovered from online scam operation compounds. Authorities often designated foreign victims as undocumented migrants and placed them in detention.
In December 2023, the government opened a victim support center in Banteay Meanchey province to provide services – including temporary shelter, healthcare, and vocational training – for trafficking victims; however, the government did not report whether it provided such services to any victims. Trainings for the shelter utilized NGO funding and support. MOSAVY continued to operate the migrant transit center in the border town of Poipet; the government did not report identifying any victims in this center. MOSAVY reported partnering with local law enforcement and referring 436 individuals – which included 86 victims of labor exploitation and individuals with vulnerabilities to trafficking – to NGO shelters for reintegration support services, an increase from 91 individuals in the previous reporting period. Between January and September 2023, the government also referred 356 victims and suspected trafficking victims to NGO-provided social services; however, the data includes 214 victims that offenders subjected to forced marriage – it did not report how many of these were foreign victims. The government’s trafficking victim assistance policy entitled victims to a food allowance of 150,000 riel ($37), living stipend of 120,000 riel $30) for three months, job training, and reintegration assistance, but – as in the previous reporting period – MOSAVY did not allocate sufficient funding to provide all of these supports and relied heavily on financial contributions from NGOs to cover these services. The government did not have the capacity or resources available to provide adequate protection services, including shelter, to trafficking victims; therefore, it continued to rely heavily on donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs to provide or support provision of such services to trafficking victims. MOSAVY maintained guidelines outlining minimum standards for residential care of trafficking victims. MOSAVY also managed long-term care and other assistance for child trafficking victims who could not reintegrate into their communities, but it did not operate any trafficking shelters for child victims; instead, the government relied on two NGOs to provide such shelter. The government, however, did not facilitate formal transfer of the custody of child trafficking victims to NGOs, leaving NGOs that accepted child victims into their care vulnerable to court action. Provisions allowing for financial settlements in lieu of harsher sentencing further discouraged some families from consenting to temporary guardianship at shelters; absent family consent, government officials at times returned children to high-risk environments, leaving them vulnerable to re-victimization. The government authorized public health facilities to provide free medical services to all migrant workers in Cambodia, including foreign trafficking victims; this policy relieved NGOs of the financial burden of providing medical care to this vulnerable population. The government had only limited services, including shelters, for male labor trafficking victims. However, the government continued to cooperate with an NGO to provide services to male victims exploited in the Thai commercial fishing industry. Service provider NGOs noted an acute lack of reintegration services and cultural stigma surrounding the experience of forced labor at sea catalyzed re-trafficking of fishermen returning home.
The government continued to provide basic care to or assist in the repatriation of Cambodian victims exploited abroad, but it relied on donor organizations to finance the repatriation. The Social Affairs Ministry reported helping repatriate 90 labor trafficking victims back to Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, but did provide further detail on those cases. Cambodian diplomatic missions overseas also lacked adequate funding and capacity to provide basic assistance to or repatriate victims; some victims were reportedly unable to secure assistance from Cambodian consular services overseas because of unattended hotlines and unresponsive staff. Victims identified in countries without Cambodian diplomatic representation had access to even less support. The government signed an agreement with Thailand finalizing SOPs on the repatriation and reintegration of Cambodian trafficking victims, with support from an international organization. In 2023, the MOI did not publicly report working with PRC authorities to repatriate Cambodian women recruited through false promises of work in the PRC and forced into marriages with PRC nationals.
The government required the repatriation of foreign victims, except in rare cases, and did not have legal alternatives to removal to countries in which they would face retribution or hardship. While government policy previously ensured foreign victims awaiting repatriation could have temporary residence at NGO shelters, the government did not identify victims removed from online scam operation compounds as potential victims, precluding their access to shelters. In some cases, the government prevented civil society from providing victims services referrals for NGOs to victims held in detention centers. Media reported police demanded detained victims pay fees for basic amenities, including food, and demanded payments from victims for their release from detention; some victims claimed they paid 20,255 riel ($5) for meals and 4.05-12.15 million riel ($1,000-$3,000) for their release from detention centers. Media reported the government cooperated with foreign authorities from Indonesian, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, to repatriate victims from online scam operations.
The government reported it did not require trafficking victims to participate in trafficking investigations or prosecutions to receive protection services; however, an observer reported this occurred on a case-by-case basis. The government reported 46 survivors participated in prosecutions against alleged traffickers. NGOs reported government-appointed attorneys did not give adequate attention to trafficking cases because the government did not compensate them for their work on these cases; as previously reported, some victims only met with their assigned attorneys on trial hearing days. There were no legal provisions to offer work permits, temporary residency, or other immigration status to foreign victims wishing to remain in Cambodia to participate in civil or criminal proceedings. As in previous years, Cambodia’s weak and corrupt judicial system and the lack of any victim and witness protection, exacerbated by a lengthy trial process and fear of retaliation by traffickers, hindered victims’ willingness to cooperate in many cases. NGOs reported victims preferred out-of-court settlements over court proceedings as the fastest way to obtain monetary compensation. Restitution was difficult to obtain because of a legal requirement delaying payment until after the completion of a trafficker’s jail term; convicted traffickers frequent abscondment further complicated this arrangement. Observers noted Cambodia lacked an SOP for determining how to calculate restitution or compensation. Victims rarely received the amount promised, and many victims’ families settled out of court with traffickers or accepted bribes to drop the relevant charges. The government did not report ordering any convicted traffickers to pay restitution in 2023; the government cooperated with two NGOs to secure 37.67 million riel ($9,300) in restitution for trafficking victims in 2022. The government did not have a victim compensation fund available, and victims could only receive compensation from the trafficker through court-mandated actions. NGOs also reported judges had inadequate knowledge of victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches to engaging with victims in courtroom settings; this led to the re-traumatization of child and adult trafficking victims.
The government maintained prevention efforts. The National Committee for Counter Trafficking (NCCT) and its secretariat coordinated anti-trafficking activities and began drafting a 2024-2028 anti-trafficking NAP. The NCCT produced an annual report documenting the government’s anti-trafficking efforts; the NCCT made the report available to the public. The NCCT chaired 295 meetings in 2023 with various ministries to elevate the importance of human trafficking in the government, compared with 344 in 2022. The NCCT reported invited trafficking survivors to attend meetings and workshops to improve policies through survivors’ expertise and recommendations. The secretariat of the NCCT maintained six working groups to monitor the efforts of the interagency committee, as well as those of its provincial subcommittees. Subsidiary provincial committees to counter trafficking (PCCT), four of which continued to receive modest central government funds, coordinated efforts at the local level to mirror the activities of the NAP. Each PCCT maintained customized provincial-level action plans outlining how to report cases of trafficking to police, victim protection efforts, and prevention activities. The NCCT and various PCCTs – in cooperation with relevant ministries and international organization and NGO partners – trained government officials on anti-trafficking laws, investigation techniques, evidence collection, strategies to combat human trafficking, victim identification, protection of rights for trafficking victims, child protection, safe migration, and repatriation of suspected trafficking victims. A Monitoring Working Group continued to strengthen the work of the NCCT at the provincial level by meeting with provincial officials and assessing areas of improvement. The government trained Cambodian diplomatic personnel on trafficking as a part of their orientation prior to deploying abroad, and raised awareness for diplomats abroad to assess suspicious marriage certificates. The government did not report its anti-trafficking budget in 2023; the budget was approximately 2.2 billion riels ($543,080) in 2020, the last year for which data was available. As in the previous year, NGOs reported the government’s inadequate funding for anti-trafficking activities led some NGOs to cover the expenses of government activities.
The government – in collaboration with various donors and civil society, including NGOs – disseminated information about trafficking laws, safe migration, child labor, and strategies to combat trafficking to law enforcement, other government personnel, and the general population. In partnership with NGOs, the NCCT reported propagating 167,207 anti-trafficking awareness messages across the country, including radio broadcasts and incorporated into thousands of public events (such as town halls and community council meetings and including National Human Trafficking Day television and radio broadcasts and public school events), and senior officials spoke publicly about human trafficking in general terms. The government used local press outlets to share public statements from senior public officials’ commitment to addressing human trafficking; however, no state-sponsored outlets covered human trafficking issues directly. Senior officials acknowledged online scam operations existed in the country and remained a problem but made public statements dismissing the large scale and prevalence of such operations.
The AHTJP and MOI continued to operate a hotline and a social media page to report human trafficking crimes. The government reported 26 foreign nationals contacted the hotlines and social media pages, “suspected to be victims of human trafficking,” but did not report whether hotline or social media communications resulted in any victim identifications or investigations as a result of preliminary reporting; no data was provided in 2022. The government reported an increase in engagement via social media platforms and the Cambodian National Police (CNP) website, which received more than 1,300 complaints of suspected human trafficking, and reported they did not receive any complaints from scam victims. The government did not report if these complaints resulted in trafficking investigations, victim identifications, or referrals to service. The Ministries of Labor and Foreign Affairs operated hotlines for Cambodians working abroad to seek assistance and report cases of human trafficking, but it did not report how many calls Cambodian embassies received during 2023. Observers reported officials pressured NGOs and independent public media outlets to not discuss or report on human trafficking crimes, including on forced criminality in online scam operations.
The government did not prohibit the imposition of worker-paid recruitment or placement fees. Observers noted the high costs, complex administrative requirements, and restrictive provisions inherent to formal migration paths drove most Cambodian labor migrants to pursue informal pathways to working abroad. The Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) trained recruitment agencies and labor brokers on ethical recruitment practices to protect the rights of migrant workers. The government reported conducting labor inspections but did not report screening for or identifying any labor trafficking victims through these efforts. The MOLVT maintained offices at the provincial level to monitor recruitment agencies and address complaints from workers, including potential incidents of trafficking; however, it did not report how many complaints these offices received in 2023. The government also did not conduct inspections of recruitment agencies allegedly involved in trafficking crimes.
The MOLVT reported that it had conducted 1,328 pre-departure orientation briefings to 52,184 Cambodians migrating abroad for work, including 21,978 women, between January and December 2023, more than doubling the number of briefings and participants from 2022. According to some NGOs working on human trafficking, many Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand were reportedly unaware of how to apply for travel documentation or how much it should cost – leaving them at higher risk of travel through informal, more vulnerable means – and the government did not take sufficient steps to publicize that information. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) continued to implement consular screening measures to reduce the sex and labor trafficking of Cambodian women via forced and fraudulent marriages, including by assessing applicants against trafficking victim profiles jointly developed with the PRC in 2016. However, the MFAIC did not report identifying potential victims during these screenings. The government also continued implementing a regulation passed in 2018 requiring foreign men to pay a fee if intending to return to their home countries with a Cambodian spouse; as previously reported and because this regulation only applied to air travel, observers reported an increase in the number of Cambodian women traveling through unsafe overland channels for marriage migration to the PRC.
The MOLVT maintained an action plan aimed at reducing child labor and debt bondage in the service, agricultural, mining, and energy sectors by 2025 through awareness raising, legal action, and collaboration with civil society funded in part through the national budget. MOLVT officials continued to deny the existence of child labor – including forced child labor – and debt-based coercion in the brick industry. The MOLVT reported conducting 400 inspections in 2023 of brick kilns, but for the second consecutive year did not report identifying any trafficking victims or cases of vulnerable children living on the kilns. Observers stated police were often unaware that detection of crimes at brick kilns fell under their investigative purview or feared reprisals for conducting investigations or making any arrests; the AHTJP viewed brick kiln inspections as under the MOLVT’s purview and would only investigate kilns if the MOLVT referred a case to them. The AHTJP did not report any such referrals. Authorities often conducted inspections with advance notification to the kiln owners, enabling them to avoid fines or conceal abuses by removing children from the kilns before an inspection. The government continued to produce public-facing materials targeting potential consumers of commercial sex with children. The CNP maintained teams of anti-trafficking and cybercrime specialists in each province to investigate cases involving online child sexual exploitation (OCSE). The government – in coordination with an NGO – also worked with local tuk tuk and taxi drivers to receive reports of suspected human trafficking and child exploitation at hotels and guesthouses. However, as in prior years, the government generally focused on deterring foreign perpetrators of extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse, rather than targeting the local population that constituted the main source of demand for commercial sex with children in Cambodia. The government did not report denying entry to any foreign convicted sex offenders, compared with denial of entry to four the previous reporting period.
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cambodia, and traffickers exploit victims from Cambodia abroad. NGOs and labor unions reported in 2020 that foreign labor brokers fraudulently recruit foreign migrants, including from Bangladesh, the PRC, and Nepal, to work in PRC-invested and other construction sites in Cambodia, where some are indebted to recruitment firms and experience passport confiscation. Traffickers also exploit Cambodians and foreign nationals in forced criminality in online scam operations run by locally operated PRC national organized crime syndicates in call centers located in Cambodia. Increasingly, these traffickers use the Internet and social media to fraudulently recruit adults and children from Cambodia, the PRC, and other countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere, for high-paying technical jobs abroad and subsequently force them to engage in online gambling, cryptocurrency, Internet romance, and telephone scams, primarily in large commercial compounds in Cambodia. Traffickers often lure foreign victims to Cambodia with false job offers, only to subject them to forced detention and criminality. Brokers move victims through airports, overland, or by sea into Cambodia. Traffickers subject these workers to punishment for poor performance and disobedience, including, but not limited to, physical abuse and torture, sexual abuse, pay docking, and debt bondage, and may “resell” those who cannot meet sales quotas or repay recruitment debts to other criminal networks for forced labor in similar fraud schemes, domestic servitude, or sex trafficking. NGOs estimate as many as 100,000 workers are exploited in forced labor in these compounds in Cambodia, noting the number is likely conservative. These compounds are largely clustered in the port city of Sihanoukville, an SEZ under a Belt and Road Initiative agreement between Cambodia and the PRC, but there are dozens of additional compounds throughout Cambodia, primarily along the borders with Thailand and Laos. In response to the Cambodian government’s August 2022 operation to target and investigate these online scam operation compounds, traffickers moved from Sihanoukville to more rural areas, including to other PRC-invested SEZs, where they encountered less scrutiny by the government and NGOs and victims have less chance of escape. Media and civil society reporting indicates compounds have consolidated and returned in full force to Sihanoukville and other locations along the Cambodia-Thailand border by the end of 2023.
Cambodian adults and children migrate to other countries in the region and increasingly to the Middle East for work; traffickers force many – often through debt-based coercion – to work on fishing vessels, in agriculture, in construction, in factories, and in domestic service, or exploit them in sex trafficking. Migrants moving outside of regular migration channels, predominantly with the assistance of unlicensed brokers, are at an increased risk of trafficking, although those using licensed recruiting agents also become victims of forced labor or sex trafficking. Companies operating under the auspices of the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” exploit Cambodian nationals in forced labor in food processing, manufacturing, construction, and fishing. Children from impoverished families are vulnerable to forced labor, often with the complicity of their families, including in domestic service and forced begging or street vending in Thailand and Vietnam. Undocumented Cambodian labor migrants working in Thailand – who constituted an estimated 30-40 percent of the 1.5 to two million Cambodians there before the COVID-19 pandemic – are at a high risk of trafficking because of their immigration status, as are undocumented Cambodians working in Vietnam.
Traffickers continue to recruit significant numbers of Cambodian men and boys in Thailand to work on fishing boats and exploit them in forced labor on Thai-owned and -operated vessels in international waters. Cambodian victims escaping from traffickers have been identified in Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, and South Africa. Cambodian men working on Thai-owned and -operated fishing vessels report deceptive recruitment tactics, severe physical abuse, underpayment or nonpayment of wages, restricted access to medical care, and confinement at sea for years at a time without permission to come ashore. Traffickers recruit women and some girls from rural areas under false pretenses to travel to the PRC to enter into marriages with PRC-national men. These women incur thousands of dollars of debt to brokers facilitating the transaction; the men force some of these women to work in factories or exploit them in sex trafficking to repay this debt. Some parents reportedly receive between 6.08-12.15 million riel ($1,500 and $3,000) from marriage brokers to send their daughters to the PRC for marriage. Cambodian women serving willingly as illegal surrogates for PRC families are vulnerable to confinement and domestic servitude. Stateless persons, namely in ethnic Vietnamese communities, are at a higher risk of trafficking because of a lack of identity documentation necessary for access to formal employment, education, marriage registration, the court system, or the right to own land.
The proprietors of brick kilns subject many of the more than 10,000 Cambodians living at such kilns, including nearly 4,000 children, to multigenerational debt-based coercion, either by buying off their pre-existing loans, or by requiring them to take out new loans as a condition of employment or to cover medical expenses resulting from injuries incurred while working. NGO reports in 2019 and 2021 have confirmed cases of child labor – including forced child labor – in brick kilns, as children are forced to work alongside their parents through debt-based coercion. An extensive, largely unregulated network of predatory micro-finance organizations and private creditors contributes to this arrangement by proactively advertising loans to families in vulnerable communities and connecting them with the kilns. Rural farming families are at a higher risk of this form of forced labor because of economic hardships ensuing from climate change. Unseasonal rain patterns and the subsequent loss of crops push many farmers to take out large loans for new irrigation or pesticide systems, and brick kiln owners often purchase these loans as a means of securing and retaining their labor. Extended rainy seasons also delay the brick-drying process, reducing these bonded kiln workers’ pay and forcing many to become further indebted to the kiln owners. To dissuade workers from fleeing abusive conditions, some kiln owners reportedly allow only select members of family units to be absent for public holidays or to seek medical care at any given time. Some workers report continued confinement and forced labor in the kilns long after they repaid their debts. Cambodian families may also experience conditions indicative of forced labor in the clay extraction process required for brick making. Traffickers exploit children as young as 13 in domestic servitude and in brothels to pay off family debts accrued through this system. Communities displaced by illegal logging operations supplying the brick kilns with timber for fuel may be at elevated risk of trafficking, including in logging itself and elsewhere as a result of ensuing economic hardships.
Traffickers may exploit victims from all of Cambodia’s 25 provinces in human trafficking. Sex trafficking is largely clandestine; Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese women and girls move from rural areas to cities and tourist destinations, where criminals exploit them in sex trafficking in brothels and, more frequently, clandestine sex establishments at beer gardens, massage parlors, salons, karaoke bars, retail spaces, and non-commercial sites. In recent years, the rapidly growing and largely unregulated presence of PRC national-owned casinos, entertainment establishments, and other commercial enterprises in Preah Sihanouk Province led to an increase of local sex trafficking and forced labor among Cambodian women and girls, although Cambodia’s 2020 ban on online gambling and the subsequent shuttering of many PRC national-owned casinos and other entertainment establishments has reduced such trafficking. Cambodian men form the largest source of demand for children exploited in sex trafficking; however, men from elsewhere in Asia, Australia, Europe, South Africa, and the United States travel to Cambodia to engage in extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse, increasingly facilitated through social media contact. Thousands of urban children left behind by families migrating abroad for work are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor. The prevalence of child sex trafficking and extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse reportedly declined in 2020 because of reduced international travel and pandemic-related quarantine requirements. However, NGOs and law enforcement officials reported the pandemic increased incidents of online child sexual exploitation in 2020, and incidents continued to increase through 2022. In 2022, the Cambodian National Council for Children released a report that found 11 percent of Internet-using children in Cambodia between the ages of 12 and 17 had experienced abuse and OCSE. Vietnamese women and children, many of whom are victims of debt-based coercion, travel to Cambodia and are exploited in sex trafficking. NGOs report criminal gangs transport some Vietnamese victims through Cambodia before they are exploited in Thailand and Malaysia. Traffickers in Cambodia are most commonly family or community members or small networks of independent brokers. Some Cambodian orphanages purchase local children from economically disadvantaged families and subject them to malnutrition and unclean living conditions in their facilities for the purpose of attracting and profiting from charitable donations; some of these children are at further risk of sex trafficking and domestic servitude as a result of poor government oversight of adoption processes.
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This microfinance business plan template is about a sample microfinance bank that operates in the USA. It will provide an overview of a microfinance bank's business models, services, customer focus, management team, success factors, financial highlights, and plans.
A Sample Microfinance Bank Business Plan Template. 1. Industry Overview. Microfinance banks provide microloans to individuals and small businesses. These individuals and small businesses tend to go for loans to be able to pay for the purchase of real estate and other transactions. This demand in turn makes the microfinance bank business a ...
Here is a free business plan sample for a microlending organization. January 29, 2024. If the idea of empowering individuals and small businesses through financial support sparks your interest, then launching a microlending company might be your calling. In the following paragraphs, we will guide you through a comprehensive business plan ...
The microfinance institution (MFI) and its founders. Indicate the core strengths or uniqueness of the institu-tion or its founders. Include a short summary of previ-ous history, including financial data. Market opportunity. Summarize the opportunity that the MFI will exploit. Products and technology. Identify what gives the insti-tution a ...
Chapter 9 Using Business Planning as an Ongoing Management Tool 151. 9.1 Variance analysis 151 9.2 Annual planning 152. Annexes. 1 Installing and Starting Microfin 153 2 Printouts from Microfin 157 3 Data Requirements for Completing Microfin 217 4 Program or Branch Modeling Exercise 221 5 Analysis of Effective Interest Rates and Costs to ...
Depending on the scale at which you want to start from, you might require as much as multiple thousands of dollars to take off. If you get your economic and cost analysis right before launching the business, you may not have to stay long before you break even. 5. Decide Whether to Buy a Franchise or Start from Scratch.
ClickUp's Microfinance Business Strategic Plan Template is designed to assist microfinance institutions in developing a comprehensive plan that covers all aspects of their operations. With this template, you can: Set clear goals and objectives to drive your business forward. Identify and capitalize on growth opportunities within the industry.
As such, strategic planning for a microfinance business requires a deep understanding of the target market, socio-economic factors, and the regulatory environment. A robust strategic plan should address the following key aspects: Mission and Vision Statement: Clearly articulate your organization's purpose and long-term aspirations.
Contact us today to avail the best business plan writing services. We are Experienced in a number of Industries. Talk to us at 01 442 8230 or Text/Phone/Whatsapp 0851477625 or complete one of the forms below. Discover the key to success with our comprehensive business plan for microfinance institutions.Unlock the potential of microfinance ...
Below is a sample business plan for a microfinance business in Tanzania. Sample Microfinance Business Plan Download. F: Sample Credit Policy of a Microfinance Company. Credit policies are set of objectives, standards and parameters to guide bank officers who grant loans and manage the loan portfolio. Thus, they are procedures, guidelines and ...
The "Business Planning for Microfinance Institutions" course was originally entitled "Business Planning with Microfin" and is one of the four courses in the Operational Management Curriculum, along with "Product Development," "Information Systems," and "Operational Risk Management.".
Daily Updates of the Latest Projects & Documents. Business planning for microfinance institutions can be understood as two closely related processes: strategic planning and operational planning. Strategic planning .
Pro Business Plans is a team of professional researchers, writers, designers, and financial. analysts. Speak with an advisor today. GET QUOTE. Speak with Sales (646) 866-7619. This article provides information on what is included in a Microfinance business plan and how it is typically structured.
The document summarizes a handbook for business planning and financial modeling for microfinance institutions. The handbook guides readers through developing a business plan, including articulating goals and missions, defining markets and clients, and strategic planning. It also covers operational planning and creating detailed financial projections using a modeling tool. The financial ...
This document provides a business plan for starting a microfinance institution in Tanzania called Empowerment Enterprises of Africa (EEA). EEA was founded in 2008 to provide social and financial solutions to the poor. The business plan outlines EEA's mission to empower 1 million Tanzanians to move out of poverty through microfinance lending, community investment programs, entrepreneurship ...
Making Microfinance More Effective. For the 2.5 billion people who live on less than $2 per day, shocks such as illness, crop failures, livestock deaths, farming-equipment breakdowns and even ...
Preparing business plans in microfinance. This document sets out guidelines for MFIs on developing their business plan. The business plan should contain an executive summary that should be restricted to two pages. It should also contain necessary information about: Financial plan. The business plan should also contain details about the proposed ...
1,335 microfinance institutions between 2005 and 2009, jointly serving 80.1 million borrowers, to calculate the costs of microfinance and other elements of the microfinance business model. It calculates that on average, subsidies amounted to $132 per borrower, but the distribution is highly skewed. The median microfinance institution used
Step 3. Determme the actIOns the MFI should take to fill current gaps and to create and sustam the capacIty reqUIred for the planned growth Develop a new organIzatIOnal structure IncludIng pOSItIOns that Will need to be filled m future (durmg the term of the plan) The Center for Microenterpnse Fmance, Kampala, Uganda.
Financial Services Company. BUSINESS PLAN PRISMA MICROFINANCE, INC. 2 Claremont Street Boston, Massachusetts 02118. Prisma MicroFinance, Inc., is a private, mission-driven company with operating subsidiaries in Central America that provide "microcredit" to entrepreneurs. Since 1995, Prisma has provided lending and savings services to people in ...
The website provides statistics shows that the number of total micro finance institutions in Egypt is "13 reported in year 2009", with "1.1 million active borrowers" (mixmarket.org). Although the number of MFI's is limited, by time micro-financing is becoming a more widespread practiced business.
The handbook's last chapter discusses how to use the business plan and financial projections as ongoing management tools. Once readers have practiced with the Microfin model using the data provided in the case study, they can use the model to develop detailed financial projections for their own institution.
A one-page business plan is a simplified version of the larger business plan, and it focuses on the problem your product or service is solving, the solution (your product), and your business model (how you'll make money). A one-page plan is hyper-direct and easy to read, making it an effective tool for businesses of all sizes, at any stage ...
Planning for growth means creating a successful small business financial plan, one which considers business goals, financial goals, and risk management. Working with a financial advisor is the best way to create a plan that includes retirement planning, funding options, and preparing for worst case scenarios. This article gives you financial ...
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts; official complicity remained a significant concern. The 2008 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years' imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 15 to 20 years' imprisonment for ...