essay about psychological perspective of the self

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Essay on the self: top 8 essays | self | psychology.

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After reading this essay you will learn about:- 1. Meaning of Self 2. Concept of Self 3. Need for the Concept 4. Significance 5. Development and Formation 6. Acquisition of Language 7. Self and Social Behaviour 8. Self-Related Issues.

Essay on the Self

Essay Contents:

• Essay on the Meaning of Self
• Essay on the Concept of Self
• Essay on the Need for the Concept of Self
• Essay on the Significance of the Self
• Essay on the Development and Formation of the Self
• Essay on the Acquisition of Language in the Process of Self-Development
• Essay on the Self and Social Behaviour
• Essay on the Self-Related Issues

Essay # 1. Meaning of Self:

Different psychologists and sociologists have tended to look at the self in different ways. There are some writers who look at the self as a structural part of the total system of personality and as a differentiated system indicating the characteristic of a person as perceived by him. According to this view, the self emerges and grows as a result of learning, as part of the process of socialisation and becomes a structural part of the personality.

If such a view is strictly accepted, then it may suggest that after a certain time the self stops growing. Some leading psychologists like Allport Snygg & Combs; Sheriff and Cantril. use the term self and ego synonymously. According to these writers, there is no need to make a distinction between the self and ego.

On the other hand, there are some other writers like Murphy who try to make a distinction between the self and the ego. According to him the ‘self includes individual as known to the individual and the ‘ego’ refers to a group of activities connected with the enhancement and defence of self.

In this view the ‘self is used as a structural unit consisting of many attitudes,’ perceptions and beliefs of an individual relating to himself. The ‘ego’ on the other hand is perceived as another unit primarily involving instrumental activities connected with the development of the self, its enhancement, etc.

Ausubel makes a distinction preferring to restrict the term self to a cluster of perceptual and cognitive components, whereas the ‘ego’ is considered to be more inclusive, including in addition, effectively charged variables or components like values, attitudes and sentiments. Ausubel further proceeds to indicate that the ‘self’ and the ‘ego’ together constitute the personality.

We have, in the above paragraphs, given the reader some idea of the controversy and divergence of views in studying and understanding the self. Taking into account this controversy, Allport came out with the suggestion that both the terms mentioned be discarded and instead suggested the term ‘proprium’. But it may be seen that much of this controversy is not relevant to the interests of modern social psychologists.

Social psychologists today are primarily interested in studying and understanding the concept of self in relation to the issue of how an individual develops a sense of personal and social identity and individuality which in turn results in selective, consistent, stable and continuous behaviour.

More than this, in the light of the clinical evidence available and also evidence from experiments in social psychology, the social psychologist is interested in how failure to develop a proper ‘self can result in maladjusted behaviour and dysfunctional behaviour. This is the view of leading social psychologists like Newcomb, Secord and others.

In-spite of the variations, there are some points of agreement, the most important being that the ‘self’ is not innate and that it develops and evolves as a result of social interaction with varied individuals and agencies starting from infancy.

Here, it has been found that while novel or new interactions and interactions concerned with affective process and need gratification play a more crucial role in the development of the self, repetitive interactions or passive interactions do not appear to be very crucial. In psychoanalytic terms the’ self arises and grows in the process of ‘reality distinc­tion’.

It is agreed that the formation of the self is not a case of the development of a unitary structure. It is a result of development marked by various stages characterised by different types of qualitative differences. It develops first as a distinct sense of one’s body and its parts from its surroundings.

It becomes progressively a more complex conceptual system, consisting of evaluative categories with associated traits or attributes. New acquisitions, qualities (e.g.., adolescence, old age, acquisition of new interpersonal roles and social status) continue to be incorporated in the system during the lifespan as observed by Murphy, Snugg and Combs and others.

We may now perhaps attempt an answer to the question-what is self? A review of the various studies and views on the concept of self appears to suggest that the best way of looking at the ‘self is to view it as a system of interrelated dynamic components which we may call as attitudes.

For our purpose here attitude may be satisfactorily defined as internal predisposition in an individual, acquired through experience, which makes him selectively respond to stimuli from the environment, experience certain emotional states or feelings in their presence and further be motivated or impelled by these predispositions to respond to or react in a particular manner.

In this context, some psychologists have even talked of ‘selves’ rather than a single ‘self to highlight the multi-dimensional and complex nature of the self. Among such writers was William James. More recently, certain other theorists from the angle of personality research and clinical psychology, like Murray, have also used concepts like ‘actual self, ‘ideal self, ‘moral self and so on.

But for the purpose of the discussion of the concept of ‘self in this article and also keeping in mind the more recent trends of thinking among contemporary social psychologists, we may use the term ‘self in a generic sense rather than talk of ‘selves’. In the light of the above the description of the self by Sheriff appears to be relevant.

According to Sheriff, ‘self is a developmental formulation in the psychological make-up of the individual consisting of inter-related attitudes that the individual has acquired in relation to his body and its parts, his capacities and to objects, persons, family, groups, social values, goals and institutions which define and regulate his relatedness to them in concrete situations and activities’.

The components or attitudes involved are usually strong in affective terms or intensity and are fairly specific in direction, and relate to people and issues indicating most favourable or un-favourable relations. They often reflect an individual’s deeply cherished inclinations, commitments and a high degree of involvement.

Needless to say, when such attitudes mediate or intervene in specific interactions or activities, the latter are likely to be influenced by the characteristics of these attitudes like direction and intensity, which results in consistency, stability and predictability of behaviour.

Under such conditions we may describe the behaviour as ‘involved’ behaviour. Human, social interactions show varying degrees of involvement. Tension-reduction interactions and habitual responses do not indicate much of a degree of involvement whereas unusual reactions or situations, complex situation or situations where one’s stakes are high tend to result in high degree of involvement.

The role and influence of the ‘self is directly related to the degree of involvement. Perhaps, one may describe it the other way also. When ‘self attitudes enter the picture this results in a high degree of involvement. Thus, the self attitudes provide the individualistic component in behaviour, particularly social behaviour.

The loss of individuality, loss of direction, ritualism and other forms of behaviour, is evident in certain clinical groups where it has been found that the ‘self formation has been faulty or inadequate and provides a strong evidence for understanding the importance of the self.

Essay # 2. Concept of Self:

The concept of self was also invoked to analyse and explain social behaviour. In the early days of psychology no clear-cut distinction was made between individual behaviour and social behaviour.

Dynamically oriented psychologists like Allport, Murray and Rogers who were pioneers in dealing with the concept of self did not make a distinction between individual behaviour in a non-social situation and in a social situation. In their view, every behavioural act is a total molar and meaningful act embedded in the subjective personality system or the self-system in a person.

According to the views of these psychologists, the individual was the centre of analysis. It was only subsequently with the emergence and development of the social learning theories, particularly of the stimulus response (S-R) hue, that concepts like self, personality etc. were relegated to the background in favour of concepts like drives, reinforcement, etc.

Very soon however, it was realised that terms like self, personality, ego, etc., cannot be permanently kept out in an examination and analysis of social behaviour, excepting at the cost of losing sight of obvious truth. It was against this background that the concept of self made a re-entry into social psychology, though, perhaps, in a changed form and with a changed meaning.

According to Rotter the term self has been employed in psychology with three different connotations:

(a) A wholistic gestalt view which emphasises internal and subjective expe­riences including self-evaluation. Here the term self means, an agency which is internal and which influences, mediates and moderates behaviour including social behaviour.

(b) A second view tends to hold all behaviour as a consequence of the dynamic processes and interactions among the different aspects of the self or personality. The typical example of such an approach is the classical psychoana­lytic view of behaviour as resulting from the dynamic interactions among the forces of the id, the ego and the superego.

This type of view is also reflected in the self theories of Rogers, Lecky and many others. (These views employ concepts like self-consistency, self-congruence, self-ideal discrepancy, as primary motivat­ing factors in human behaviour, social behaviour).

(c) A third view holds that the self itself is a force which motivates the organism and initiates action directed towards integration, actualization or expres­sion. Classical Jungian views and even the Maslowian concept of self-actualization belong to this category.

According to this approach, motivation and goal direction of behaviour are entirely attributed to the ‘self as an internal entity in the individual life. Such a view probably is in agreement with the concept of self found in our own traditional Upanishads.

All these different conceptualizations of the self have been used in explain­ing social behaviour. While many of these approaches which have employed the concept of the self in explaining social behaviour, have been traditional, descrip­tive, and analytical, more recent theories and approaches which are inclined towards empirical and experimental studies of social behaviour have also employed the concept of self but with different meanings.

More than the concept of self as such, they use self-derived and self-related concepts like self-esteem, self-perception and objective self-awareness and many other terms.

Thus, the self-concept continues to occupy an important place in contemporary social psychology though in a form far different from the traditional views. The ‘self’ therefore has returned to centre stage of psychology after being discarded. The return has been very grand.

Essay # 3. Need for the Concept of Self :

Terms like soul, self and spirit have occupied a prominent place in the discussions and writings of the logicians, philosophers and students of religion. Religious texts are full of discussions about the nature of ‘self and ‘soul’.

The Upanishads and the Bhagavad-Gita deal extensively with the concept of self. But, in all these discussions the concept of self was mostly employed in a metaphysical sense and in the context of understanding the essential nature of man and his relationship with the ‘cosmic self or the ‘ultimate self etc. But even here some of the discussions, particularly in the Upanishadic texts looked at the self from a functional point of view.

The self was often described in such terms as ‘seer’, ‘doer’ etc. hinting at some of the problems which have been analysed and studied in relation to the self, in contemporary psychology.

Though some of the early psychologists like William James, Baldwin and also sociologists like Coolie and Mead took a very active interest in describing and analysing the term ‘self in terms of its development and functions, scientific psychology in its initial stages out of its obsession to imitate physics, chemistry and physiology shunned the use of the term ‘self particularly because of the phobia that it may lead psychology away from the objective method and result in subjective and speculative analysis.

William James analysed the self in terms of its elements or parts including bodily features, behavioural characteristics, abilities and skills, desires and aspirations and also social affiliations and arriving at certain skills of maintaining self-esteem. He also made reference to the self being influenced by what one feels about ‘others evaluation of oneself. James interesting formula for arriving at a person’s self-esteem was

Self-esteem = Success/Pretensions

Subsequently a number of psychologists who may be identified by various terms like personal psychologists, ideographic psychologists and many others as Calkins, Stem, and Allport have tried to reintroduce the concept of self in psychology particularly in clinical psychology and social psychology and of course in studying personality.

Why do we need a concept of self? One of the characteristics of human behaviour is that it is total, meaningful, stable and consistent except in case where a person is mentally disturbed. If we analyse behaviour into various units or elements, still there remains the significant problem of explaining and understanding the integration, stability and continuity, often over years, in human behaviour.

Apart from this, it is also seen that our behaviour is very often guided by both situational conditions and basic needs. A person who is feeling hungry does not eat anything and everything because he is hungry. He may like to eat the proper food at the proper place and at the proper time.

Similarly, in most of our activities we find certain basic stabilising influences and considerations of a psychological nature emerging from within the individual and influencing our actual behaviour. Phenomena like these necessitate a concept like ‘self, otherwise human behaviour can very often be a mess.

Fortunately, it is not so in many instances. Many instances of individual differences in behaviour are also explained by a concept like self Two or three people under the same situation behave differently.

One person is ready to fall at somebody’s feet and flatter him however worthless the latter may be to attain personal ends; whereas others refuse to bow down to mediocres. The lives of Socrates, Galileo and other people who were prepared to die rather than give up their convictions are standing examples.

Many of our social restraints are sustained because of the role played by the concept of ‘self. Thus it may be seen that the ‘self concept helps us to understand many characteristics of human behaviour like ‘totality’, ‘meaningfulness’, ‘stability’, ‘continuity’ and ‘individuality’ and also the bizarre nature of behaviour of those who are severely disturbed mentally and in whom the self is disturbed.

Essay # 4. Significance of the Self:

The wide ranging and crucial role of the self in the behaviour of the individual has come to be recognised increasingly. The influence of the ‘self on behaviour operates both consciously and unconsciously and is much more noticeable where motivated and need satisfying interactions are involved, and also in situations where there is a choice.

In the words of Shoben, in any case self involved behaviour seems close to impossible to explain on the basis of a tension reduction model, and postulation of self-involvement seems necessary to account for the pursuit of long-term goals, so typical of human motivation’.

While the role of self is more prominent in goal-directed activities, its role and influence extend to many other spheres of activity like perceiving, thinking, learning and other cognitive processes and of course in many complex activities like decision-making.

Needless to say, goal setting and even task performance are known to be influenced by the self Adjustive and coping behaviour of varied kinds are also influenced by the self There is considerable evidence from the clinical side for this.

Thus, choice of behaviour, consistency, integration, continuity and a number of attributes of human actions seem to be very much influenced by the self in the words of Sheriff, “in brief, the growing interest in a self-concept reflects the search for integrating concepts, particularly motivation, where empirical work has tended to be fragmentary”.

Studying motivation in isolation from personality has lead to a very strange situation. It has fallen short in providing an adequate account of human motivation. The self enters into the operation of human motives as a regulative factor. So too the self enters into other psychological processes.

Involvement of the self in these processes is reflected in the consistency and continuity of behaviour in a person. In fact self-involvement in particular aspects of the kaleidoscopic stimulus world is the basis for the experience of continuity in personal identity.

It is evident that continuity, integration, consistency and identity are the most crucial characteristics of social behaviour. Any attempt at prediction and control of social behaviour depends on an understanding of these processes for its success. The more complex the social interaction, the greater is the relevance of the above characteristics.

It is the self which gives an individuality to a person particularly in his social behaviour. Further, the behavioural processes, like perceiving, thinking and decision making form the foundations of social behaviour. Needless to say, long-term goal-setting is the most typical hallmark of social behaviour and the role of the self here is critical.

Essay # 5. Development and Formation of the Self:

The self, is entirely a product of learning and experience. Self-formation and development go hand in hand with the general psychological development and growth, including physical growth. The development of the self is again a very integral part of the process of socialisation.

One of the pioneering attempts to deal with the process of development and formation of self was that of the distinguished sociologist G H Mead. In his classical work, ‘Mind, Self and Society’, Mead made attempts to examine the process of the development of the self. This approach may be characterised as ‘dynamic interactional’.

The self, according to Mead, arises and develops as a result of social interaction. Every individual, as he grows, enters into a greater number and variety of interactions. As a result of these interactions, two types of perceptions arise in the individual about himself.

The first set is what he calls the T perceptions and the second the ‘Me’ perceptions. The student can perhaps guess the difference between these two types of perceptions. In the course of a series of interactions with the others and also as he grows and also as the variety of interactions expand, the child learns to look at itself from two angles, one from his own angle, as he perceives himself, i.e. himself as the subject.

These perceptions are known as “I” perceptions. At the same time, he also learns to look at himself through the eyes of others and other important persons whom Sullivan would describe as ‘significant adults’ i.e., the individual learns to look at himself as he believes others are looking at him. These are called “Me” perceptions.

Over a period of time and with repeated interactions we find the emergence of a generalized and integrated ‘I’ and also a generalized and integrated ‘Me’. Further integration takes place and ultimately form the generalized ‘Me’ and the generalized ‘I’ emerges as an integrated concept of ‘self.

The effectiveness of the individual depends on whether he or she, succeeds in reaching this stage, where the discrepancies between the generalized and the ‘I’ generalized ‘Me’ are minimal. Some writers would probably refer to the former as ‘subjective self and the latter as ‘objective self.

Here it may be noticed that even the objective self evolves out of subjective perceptions and understanding. Hence our understanding of ‘others perceptions of ourselves’ is invariably influenced to some extent or other by subjective elements.

It has been shown in this context that one of the most significant factors in the development of the self is interaction with other children or peer groups, where all are equal. Peer group relations are usually based on equality and reciprocity and this helps the child to arrive at a more valid and stable picture of himself.

The studies of Piaget have produced ample evidence to this effect. Another point that may be noted here is that while the formation of the ‘self is a continuous process, at the same time, there are some critical stages in human life which are crucial. This is because during these periods the individual is subject to critical bodily changes and also consequent social expectations.

Two such periods are, the transition from childhood to adulthood, or ‘adolescence’ and old age. The former corresponds to what Freud would call the ‘latency period’ or what Sullivan would describe as the ‘juvenile era’. The interaction between the subjective self or the ‘I’ and the objective self invariably results in a continuous process of evaluation of the both.

This process of development gets facilitated by another factor. The older child by virtue of his membership in the peer group gets an opportunity to validate the ‘I’ and ‘Me’. We may here make a reference to Sullivan’s concepts of ‘reflected appraisals’ and ‘consensual validations’.

According to Sullivan these two processes are very crucial in the formation of the self. The former involves evaluation by the individual of himself in retrospect, thinking back and the latter involves evaluation against outside criteria like reactions of others.

Such processes result in greater integration, consistency and continuity of behaviour. If the environment of the child does not permit the operation of such evaluative behaviour then the result is a defective, disturbed or distorted self.

While the above account gives a general schematic idea of the process of self-development or self-formation, it should be borne in mind that the actual pace and manner of development varies from group to group and individual to individual.

The earliest awareness of self finds expression through an experienced and expressed distinction of one’s own physical body from the surroundings and what has sometimes been referred to as the ‘Me’ and ‘not Me’. This may be described as what Murphy would refer to as the ‘perceptual stage’.

Thus the initial stage in the development of the self is a sense of physical identity of one’s own body as an entity independent of and separate from the environment. Perhaps, in reaching this stage there may not be much of individual or group differences unless there are marked variations in the early socialisation processes particularly weaning behaviour.

But, once the individual crosses this stage, a number of factors like the amount of interaction with others, the variety of interactions, the reactions of others like parents in terms of acceptance, rewarding, punishing, approving, criticising of these assume importance. The impact of such social interaction and reaction is very crucial to the development of self.

Essay # 6. Acquisition of Language in the Process of Self-Development:

A real milestone in the process of self-development is the acquisition of language, particularly spoken language. This achievement is very significant from the point of view of the development of the self during the later stages. Language serves as a very powerful tool in enabling the person to arrive at primary representations and conceptualizations.

The early ‘perceptual self-identity’ based on a distinction of one’s body from external reality gradually got modified and transformed into evaluative classifications and categorisation of one’s own body and its various parts, resulting in what is known as ‘body image’.

The ‘body image’ incorporates within it a number of attitudes favourable or unfavorable towards one’s own body as a result of verbal interaction and representation. Increased ability for verbal behaviour contributes to a greater degree of consistency and also generality. Language helps in abstraction and also the ‘living’ of a particular situation in its absence both retrospectively and prospectively.

A review by Sheriff and Sheriff of a number of studies has shown that consistency in competing with others, in cooperating with others, in expressing sympathy at another’s distress, in responsibility for self and others and in setting goals for one’s own performance, appear gradually as the child participates in social and cooperative forms of play in contrast to the earlier side by side or parallel play.

The process definitely is made possible to a considerable degree by verbal interaction. Gradually, apart from consistency, one also moves towards continuity as the time perspective expands and concern with the immediate perspective gives way to an extended view involving past, present and future. Once again verbal ability and verbal interactions are very important.

As described by Kurt Lewin, the life space expands in three dimensions, space, time and reality- irreality. The points of reference cease to be confined to the immediate present or the concrete here and now. This expansion of the life space also results in gradual expansion and differentiation of the self itself.

Essay # 7. Self and Social Behaviour:

The role of the self in the context of ‘individual behaviour’, in terms of integration, consistency and continuity and that the importance of the self for social behaviour has not been made very clear as seen in the case of the manic- depressives where at one phase the individual is highly excited, feels on top of the world and resulting in ideas of grandeur.

The other phase of depression shows the opposite features of self-deprecation, blaming oneself etc. McDougall’s theory of sentiments and his explanation of manic-depressive pathology on the basis of inadequate integration of self-assertion and self-submission may not be very acceptable today.

But, certainly his concept of self-regard was the forerunner of many later concepts and research. Another leading theorist of a later date, Cattell, employing more sophisticated and complex analysis of personality also postulated a concept ‘self-sentiment’.

More recently, another term, ‘self-esteem’ has come into existence and has been studied extensively, particularly in relation to different forms of social behaviour. People who can be classified into ‘low esteem group’, ‘high esteem group’ etc., have been compared to see whether there are significant differences in their social behaviour patterns and whether one could draw the social behaviour profile of such groups differing in the level of self-esteem.

Essentially, the term self-esteem refers to the way in which an individual evaluates himself in relation to others, on a number of criteria like achievement, success, capacity, etc. In brief, self-esteem may be described as the degree to which a person likes himself and rates himself as capable, satisfactory, etc.

How does a person evaluate himself or how does self-esteem develop?

Certainly this depends on one’s experiences of success or failure. A person who has met with only failures in his various experiences perhaps will have a low degree of self-esteem. But, here again, standards of comparison are derived from cultural and social roots.

According to Festinger’s Social Comparison Theory, people in general evolve their own implicit or explicit standards of comparison based on their observation of performance and behaviour and those whom they otherwise consider their peers or equals. A number of studies have demonstrated the role of such comparisons in evaluating oneself.

The norms and values held in a particular culture or society do also influence one’s self-esteem. Certainly, in a society which lays emphasis on individualism, achievement and success, the standards of comparison are likely to be higher. Similarly, in modern societies, individuals occupying higher social positions have been found to show a higher degree of self-esteem by Himmelweit.

The earlier trends in American societies was that individuals belonging to minority groups tended to be lower in self-esteem, but such trends have been shown to be disappearing as found by Lensing & Zagorun. Some studies like those of Fey, Riese and others have shown that people who are popular and liked tend to have a higher degree of self-esteem than people who are unpopular and not liked.

In their classical investigations Sears, Maccoby and Lewin suggested that the degree of self-esteem or self-approval-disapproval, to a large extent depends on how early an individual recognises the standards employed by others for approving or disapproving one’s conduct, action, achievement, etc.

Essay # 8. Self Related Issues:

(i) self-esteem :.

Self-esteem assumes significance for understanding social behaviour in view of the fact that it has been shown to be an influential factor associated with different categories of social behaviour. A person’s willingness to interact with others, itself has been shown to be related to the degree of self-esteem.

On the other hand, sometimes individuals with low self-esteem may actually engage in compensatory arrogant and aggressive behaviour which can be obnoxious and irritating, particularly in small group situations. Apart from this, studies have also shown that the degree of ‘self-esteem’ is related to susceptibility to stress, rigidity, resistance to change, persuasion and different kinds of social behaviour.

An important characteristic of ‘self-esteem’ is that it is motivating. Very often people resort to defensive behaviour to maintain their self-esteem. This has been particularly pointed out in studies relating to behaviour where we attribute characteristics to others.

Investigations in the field of attribution behaviour, have pointed to the role of self-esteem in influencing ego defensive attribution behaviour as reported by Heider; Jones & Davis, Kelly and others. Thus we see that esteem as a characteristic process associated with self ‘formulation’ and ‘functioning’ is of significant importance in analysing and understanding social behaviour.

(ii) Reference Groups:

Our concept of self is very much related to the environment. The process of self-formation is very much influenced by the environment, events in the environment and other people. Thus an important factor here is the ‘reference group’ or groups. Reference group or groups as described by Sherif and Sherif are categories of people to whom people relate themselves psychologically.

These may be age groups, socio-economic groups, church affiliation groups, religious groups, interest groups etc. In complex differentiated societies the self concept has points of anchorage in different sub-groups.

When a person is asked to answer the question ‘who am ‘I’ the normal response starts with the name and identity in terms of social classification, identifying him and placing him in a particular category as reported by Kuhn & Mcfarland.

The psychological implications of this is that the self-image of an individual is influenced by the characteristics of the group to which he refers himself to, whether he belongs to that category or not. Thus, most people in modem society are influenced by so called middle-class values, whether they actually belong there or not.

The concept of reference groups therefore helps us to explain and account for many of the self-characteristics and identifying the people with whom an individual relates himself.

In the words of Sherif when the person locates himself within a set or group of people, the relative status of the group in the social organization and his own position within it serve as standards (anchors) for appraisals of performance by himself and others.

An effect of this anchoring on particular group standards is a resulting stabilisation of performance, self-confidence and various other behavioural characteristics. Allport, Sherif and Carter, Seigal and Seigel have reported that attitudes of a person tend to taper towards the attitudes of a group if that group also is a reference group.

Individual differences in importance or value attached to the various components of self-esteem are to a large extent traceable to reference groups. Thus in many instances attitude change or behaviour change becomes possible only if we can understand the reference groups or reference set of the individual. Reference group relations often involve high ego involvement and can result in resistance to change.

(iii) Self-Radius :

Closely related to the issue of ‘reference group’ or self-set is the ‘self- radius’. Reference groups play a central role in determining one’s behaviour and evaluation of one’s behaviour. But over and above the fact of reference, each one’s self extends a little beyond the reference group’s.

Thus, while self-esteem and also approval and disapproval of behaviour may be determined and influenced by one’s immediate reference group like family, peer groups, etc., at the same time self is also influenced by groups and issues and events a little more distant both in space and also psychologically.

Such influence, concern and involvement may be only personal and may not influence actual behaviour. Most of us are disturbed by acts of violence, discrimination and other forms of barbarity going on in different parts of the world. Thus when a large number of young people were mercilessly shot by the Chinese Communist regime, a few years ago when they were agitating for democratic rights, we were upset.

Many of us were disturbed by the famine conditions in Somalia, when we see the photographs in newspapers and magazines. Similarly, many of us feel happy and also share the sense of achievement, when somebody in a far off place achieves something great like landing on the moon or conquering the Mount Everest. This phenomenon of the extension of one’s self-involvement and concern varies from person to person in its extensity and distance.

Some people have a less extended involvement and some people a more extended involvement. Thus the psychological extent of one’s concern and sensitivity or involvement is known as ‘self-radius’. Some people are least disturbed or concerned about things and events which happen somewhere and do not have any immediate concern for them. Such people are more circumscribed in their lives.

The greater the self-radius, the more is the person’s concern and involvement with events and happenings further away. Great personalities like Buddha, Christ, and Mother Theresa were concerned about events and issues concerning entire humanity and their self-radius was very high. On the other hand people with narrow moral values and prejudices, who are dogmatic have a much shorter ‘self-radius’.

Another variation of this radius belongs to the time dimension. Some individuals are very proud of the ancient culture and heritage of the society than others whereas others are not. Some individuals are more bothered about events, things and remote happenings of both past and future, while others have more concern with things in the immediate present.

A child is more concerned and involved about events and things ‘here and now’ compared to an adult. The term self-radius then represents a person’s perspective varying from proximate to distant and also varying on the past, present, future continuum.

Thus people with global and universal outlook have a much longer self-radius than most of us. While an extended self-radius may not always influence our behaviour, it certainly has an emotional impact on us.

(iv) Self-Values :

Values are vectors or variables which influence our behaviour. Values are very close to our ‘selves’. While other variables like attitudes may not be very close to the self-concept, our values very often become part of our self-system.

Some psychologists even make a distinction between self-values and social values. Values have been shown to influence our personal behaviour, choice reactions, responses, etc. Honesty, openness, integrity, etc., are examples of personal values which become integral parts of one’s self-system.

(v) Self-Disclosure :

In recent years, psychologists who have been interested in dealing with personality problems and also concerned with bringing about changes in behaviour, values, motives and attitudes of others have found that many such changes become possible effectively only if an individual’s self-system is involved.

The concept of ‘self-disclosure’ has been brought into use in this context, by Rokeach while dealing with the problem of bringing about changes in values. Rokeach has developed a technique which uses the concept of self-disclosure.

This implies that a person who wishes to bring about value changes and attitude changes in others can achieve greater success by making himself open and disclosing himself. Such disclosure of oneself has been found to have greater impact on behaviour change, attitudes and values.

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Essay , Essay on the Self , Psychology , Self

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS article

“i” and “me”: the self in the context of consciousness.

• Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958) ] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.

Introduction

Almost 130 years ago, James (1890) introduced the distinction between “Me” and “I” (see Table 1 for illustrative quotes) to the debate about the self. The former term refers to understanding of the self as an object of experience, while the latter to the self as a subject of experience 1 . This distinction, in different forms, has recently regained popularity in cognitive science (e.g., Christoff et al., 2011 ; Liang, 2014 ; Sui and Gu, 2017 ; Truong and Todd, 2017 ) and provides a useful tool for clarifying what one means when one speaks about the self. However, its exact meaning varies in cognitive science, especially in regard to what one understands as the self as subject, or “I.”

TABLE 1. Quotes from James (1890) illustrating the distinction between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”) and a quote from Wittgenstein (1958) illustrating his distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject.

The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and take a closer look at the conceptual distinction between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. I will suggest, following James (1890) and in opposition to the tradition started by Wittgenstein (1958) , that in this context “Me” (i.e., the self as object) reflects the phenomenology of selfhood, and corresponds to what is also known as sense of self, self-consciousness, or phenomenal selfhood (e.g., Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 ; Blanke, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ). On the other hand, the ultimate meaning of “I” (i.e., the self as subject) is rooted in metaphysics of subjectivity, and refers to the question: why is all conscious experience subjective and who/what is the subject of conscious experience? I will argue that these two theoretical problems, i.e., phenomenology of selfhood and metaphysics of subjectivity, are in principle independent issues and should not be confused. However, cognitive science usually follows the Wittgensteinian tradition 2 by understanding the self-as-subject, or “I,” as a phenomenological, rather than metaphysical problem [Figure 1 illustrates the difference between James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) approach to the self]. By following Metzinger’s (2003 , 2010 ) framework of phenomenal self-models, and in agreement with a reductionist approach to the phenomenal “I” 3 ( Prinz, 2012 ), I will argue that what is typically investigated in cognitive science as the phenomenal “I” [or the Wittgenstein’s (1958) self-as-subject] can be understood as just a higher-order component of the self-model reflecting the phenomenal “Me.” Table 2 presents some of crucial claims of the theory of self-models, together with concise references to other theories of the self-as-object discussed in this paper.

FIGURE 1. An illustration of James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) distinctions between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”). In the original formulation, James’ (1890) “Me” includes also physical objects and people (material and social “Me”) – they were not included in the picture, because they are not directly related to consciousness.

TABLE 2. Examples of theories of the self-as-object (“Me”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the phenomenal self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

“Me” As An Object Of Experience: Phenomenology Of Self-Consciousness

The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain particular sort ( James, 1890 , p. 319, emphasis in original).

James (1890) chose the word “Me” to refer to self-as-object. What does it mean? In James’ (1890) view, it reflects “all the things” which have the power to produce “excitement of a certain particular sort.” This certain kind of excitement is nothing more than some form of experiential quality of me-ness, mine-ness, or similar - understood in a folk-theoretical way (this is an important point, because these terms have recently acquired technical meanings in philosophy, e.g., Zahavi, 2014 ; Guillot, 2017 ). What are “all the things”? The classic formulation suggests that James (1890) meant physical objects and cultural artifacts (material self), human beings (social self), and mental processes and content (spiritual self). These are all valid categories of self-as-object, however, for the purpose of this paper I will limit the scope of further discussion only to “objects” which are relevant when speaking about consciousness. Therefore, rather than speaking about, for example, my car or my body, I will discuss only their conscious representations. This limits the scope of self-as-object to one category of “things” – conscious mental content.

Let us now reformulate James’ (1890) idea in more contemporary terms and define “Me” as the totality of all content of consciousness that is experienced as self-related. Content of consciousness is meant here in a similar way to Chalmers (1996) , who begins “ The conscious mind ” by providing a list of different kinds of conscious content. He delivers an extensive (without claiming that exhaustive) collection of types of experiences, which includes the following 4 : visual; auditory; tactile; olfactory; experiences of hot and cold; pain; taste; other bodily experiences coming from proprioception, vestibular sense, and interoception (e.g., headache, hunger, orgasm); mental imagery; conscious thought; emotions. Chalmers (1996) also includes several other, which, however, reflect states of consciousness and not necessarily content per se , such as dreams, arousal, fatigue, intoxication, and altered states of consciousness induced by psychoactive substances. What is common to all of the types of experience from the first list (conscious contents) is the fact that they are all, speaking in James’ (1890) terms, “objects” in a stream of consciousness: “all these things are objects, properly so called, to the subject that does the thinking” (p. 325).

The self understood as “Me” can be understood as a subset of a set of all these possible experiences. This subset is characterized by self-relatedness (Figure 2 ). It can be illustrated with sensory experiences. For example, in the visual domain, I experience an image of my face as different from another person’s face. Hence, while the image of my face belongs to “Me,” the image of someone else does not (although it can be experimentally manipulated, Tsakiris, 2008 ; Payne et al., 2017 ; Woźniak et al., 2018 ). The same can be said about my voice and sounds caused by me (as opposed to voices of other people), and about my smell. We also experience self-touch as different from touching or being touched by a different person ( Weiskrantz et al., 1971 ; Blakemore et al., 1998 ; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2009 ). There is even evidence that we process our possessions differently ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ; Constable et al., 2018 ). This was anticipated by James’ (1890) notion of the material “Me,” and is typically regarded as reflecting one’s extended self ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ). In all of these cases, we can divide sensory experiences into the ones which do relate to the self and the ones which do not. The same can be said about the contents of thoughts and feelings, which can be either about “Me” or about something/someone else.

FIGURE 2. A simplified representation of a structure of phenomenal content including the metaphysical “I,” the phenomenal “Me,” and the phenomenal “I,” which can be understood (see in text) as a higher-level element of the phenomenal “Me.” Each pair of nodes connected with a yellow line represents one type of content of consciousness, with indigo nodes corresponding to self-related content, and black nodes corresponding to non-self-related content. In some cases (e.g., pain, emotions, interoceptive, and proprioceptive sensations), the black nodes are lighter and drawn with a dashed line (the same applies to links), to indicate that in normal circumstances one does not experiences these sensations as representing another person (although it is possible in thought experiments and pathologies). Multisensory/multimodal interactions have been omitted for the sake of clarity. All of the nodes compose the set of conscious thoughts, which can be formulated as “I experience X.” In normal circumstances, one does not deny ownership over these thoughts, however, in thought experiments, and in some cases of psychosis, one may experience that even such thoughts cease to feel as one’s own. This situation is represented by the shape with a dashed outline. Moreover, in special cases one can form meta-delusions, i.e., delusions about delusions – thoughts that my thoughts about other thoughts are not my thoughts (see text for description).

Characterizing self-as-object as a subset of conscious experiences specifies the building blocks of “Me” (which are contents of consciousness) and provides a guiding principle for distinguishing between self and non-self (self-relatedness). However, it is important to note two things. First, the distinction between self and non-self is often a matter of scale rather than a binary classification, and therefore self-relatedness may be better conceptualized as the strength of the relation with the self. It can be illustrated with an example of the “Inclusion of Other in Self” scale ( Aron et al., 1992 ). This scale asks to estimate to what extent another person feels related to one’s self, by choosing among a series of pairs of more-to-less overlapping circles representing the self and another person (e.g., a partner). The degree of overlap between the chosen pair of circles represents the degree of self-relatedness. Treating self-relatedness as a matter of scale adds an additional level of complexity to the analysis, and results in speaking about the extent to which a given content of consciousness represents self, rather than whether it simply does it or not. This does not, however, change the main point of the argument that we can classify all conscious contents according to whether (or to what extent, in that case) they are self-related. For the sake of clarity, I will continue to speak using the language of binary classification, but it should be kept in mind that it is an arbitrary simplification. The second point is that this approach to “Me” allows one to flexibly discuss subcategories of the self by imposing additional constraints on the type of conscious content that is taken into account, as well as the nature of self-relatedness (e.g., whether it is ownership of, agency over, authorship, etc.). For example, by limiting ourselves to discussing conscious content representing one’s body one can speak about the bodily self, and by imposing limits to conscious experience of one’s possessions one can speak about one’s extended self.

Keeping these reservations in mind two objections can be raised to the approach to “Me” introduced here. The first one is as follows:

(1) Speaking about the self/other distinction does not make sense in regard to experiences which are always “mine,” such as prioprioception or interoception. This special status may suggest that these modalities underpin the self as “I,” i.e., the subject of experience.

This idea is present in theoretical proposals postulating that subjectivity emerges based on (representations of) sensorimotor ( Gallagher, 2000 ; Christoff et al., 2011 ; Blanke et al., 2015 ) or interoceptive signals ( Damasio, 1999 ; Craig, 2010 ; Seth et al., 2011 ; Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 ; Salomon, 2017 ). There are two answers to this objection. First, the fact that this kind of experience (this kind of content of consciousness) is always felt as “my” experience simply means that all proprioceptive, interoceptive, pain experiences, etc., are as a matter of fact parts of “Me.” They are self-related contents of consciousness and hence naturally qualify as self-as-object. Furthermore, there is no principled reason why the fact that we normally do not experience them as belonging to someone else should transform them from objects of experience (content) into a subject of experience. Their special status may cause these experiences to be perceived as more central aspects of the self than experiences in other modalities, but there is no reason to think that it should change them from something that we experience into the self as an experiencer. Second, even the special status of these sensations can be called into question. It is possible to imagine a situation in which one experiences these kinds of sensations from an organ or a body which does not belong to her or him. We can imagine that with enough training one will learn to distinguish between proprioceptive signals coming from one’s body and those coming from another person’s (or artificial) body. If this is possible, then one may develop a phenomenal distinction between “my” versus “other’s” proprioceptive and interoceptive experiences (for example), and in this case the same rules of classification into phenomenal “Me” and phenomenal “not-Me” will apply as to other sensory modalities. This scenario is not realistic at the current point of technological development, but there are clinical examples which indirectly suggest that it may be possible. For example, people who underwent transplantation of an organ sometimes experience rejection of a transplant. Importantly, patients whose organisms reject an organ also more often experience psychological rejection of that transplant ( Látos et al., 2016 ). Moreover, there are rare cases in which patients following a successful surgery report that they perceive transplanted organs as foreign objects in themselves ( Goetzmann et al., 2009 ). In this case, affected people report experiencing a form of disownership of the implanted organ, suggesting that they may experience interoceptive signals coming from that transplant as having a phenomenal quality of being “not-mine,” leading to similar phenomenal quality as the one postulated in the before-mentioned thought experiment. Another example of a situation in which self-relatedness of interoception may be disrupted may be found in conjoint twins. In some variants of this developmental disorder (e.g., parapagus, dicephalus, thoracopagus) brains of two separate twins share some of the internal organs (and limbs), while others are duplicated and possessed by each twin individually ( Spencer, 2000 ; Kaufman, 2004 ). This provides an inverted situation to the one described in our hypothetical scenario – rather than two pieces of the same organ being “wired” to one person, the same organ (e.g., a heart, liver, stomach) is shared by two individuals. As such it may be simultaneously under control of two autonomous nervous systems. This situation raises challenging questions for theories which postulate that the root of self-as-subject lies in interoception. For example, if conjoint twins share the majority of internal organs, but possess mostly independent nervous systems, like dicephalus conjoint twins, then does it mean that they share the neural subjective frame ( Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 )? If the answer is yes, then does it mean that they share it numerically (both twins have one and the same subjective frame), or only qualitatively (their subjective frames are similar to the point of being identical, but they are distinct frames)? However, if interoception is just a part of “Me” then the answer becomes simple – the experiences can be only qualitatively identical, because they are experienced by two independent subjects.

All of these examples challenge the assumption that sensori-motor and interoceptive experiences are necessarily self-related and, as a consequence, that they can form the basis of self-as-subject. For this reason, it seems that signals coming from these modalities are more appropriate to underlie the phenomenal “Me,” for example in a form of background self-experience, or “phenomenal background” ( Dainton, 2008 , 2016 ), rather than the phenomenal “I.”

The second possible objection to the view of self-as-object described in this section is the following one:

(2) My thoughts and feelings may have different objects, but they are always my thoughts and feelings. Therefore, their object may be either “me” or “other,” but their subject is always “I.” As a consequence, even though my thoughts and feelings constitute contents of my consciousness, they underlie the phenomenal “I” and not the phenomenal “Me.”

It seems to be conceptually misguided to speak about one’s thoughts and feelings as belonging to someone else. This intuition motivated Wittgenstein (1958) to write: “there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ “would be nonsensical” ( Wittgenstein, 1958 ). In the Blue Book, he introduced the distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject (see Table 1 for a full relevant quote) and suggested that while we can be wrong about the former, making a mistake about the latter is not possible. This idea was further developed by Shoemaker (1968) who introduced an arguably conceptual truth that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, or IEM in short. For example, when I say “I see a photo of my face in front of me” I may be mistaken about the fact that it is my face (because, e.g., it is a photo of my identical twin), but I cannot be mistaken that it is me who is looking at it. One way to read IEM is that it postulates that I can be mistaken about self-as-object, but I cannot be mistaken about self-as-subject. If this is correct then there is a radical distinction between these two types of self that provides a strong argument to individuate them. From that point, one may argue that IEM provides a decisive argument to distinguish between phenomenal “I” (self-as-subject) and phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object).

Before endorsing this conclusion, let us take a small step back. It is important to note that in the famous passage from the Blue Book Wittgenstein (1958) did not write about two distinct types of self. Instead, he wrote about two ways of using the word “I” (or “my”). As such, he was more concerned with issues in philosophy of language than philosophy of mind. Therefore, a natural question arises – to what extent does this linguistic distinction map onto a substantial distinction between two different entities (types of self)? On the face of it, it seems that there is an important difference between these two uses of self-referential words, which can be mapped onto the experience of being a self-as-subject and the experience of being a self-as-object (or, for example, the distinction between bodily ownership and thought authorship, as suggested by Liang, 2014 ). However, I will argue that there are reasons to believe that the phenomenal “I,” i.e., the experience of being a self-as-subject may be better conceptualized as a higher-order phenomenal “Me” – a higher-level self-as-object.

Psychiatric practice provides cases of people, typically suffering from schizophrenia, who describe experiences of dispossession of thoughts, known as delusions of thought insertion ( Young, 2008 ; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009 ; Martin and Pacherie, 2013 ). According to the standard account, the phenomenon of thought insertion does not represent a disruption of sense of ownership over one’s thoughts, but only loss of sense of agency over them. However, the standard account has been criticized in recent years by theorists arguing that thought insertion indeed represents loss of sense of ownership ( Metzinger, 2003 ; Billon, 2013 ; Guillot, 2017 ; López-Silva, 2017 ). One of the main arguments against the standard view is that it runs into serious problems when attempting to explain obsessive intrusive thoughts in clinical population and spontaneous thoughts in healthy people. In both cases, subjects report lack of agency over thoughts, although they never claim lack of ownership over them, i.e., that these are not their thoughts. However, if the standard account is correct, obsessive thoughts should be experienced as belonging to someone else. The fact that they are not suggests that something else must be disrupted in delusions of thought insertion, i.e., sense of ownership 5 over them. If one can lose sense of ownership over one’s thoughts then it has important implications, because then one becomes capable of experiencing one’s thoughts “as someone else’s,” or at least “as not-mine.” However, when I experience my thoughts as not-mine I do it because I’ve taken a stance towards my thoughts, which treats them as an object of deliberation. In other words, I must have “objectified” them to experience that they have a quality of “feeling as if they are not mine.” Consequently, if I experience them as objects of experience, then they cannot form part of my self as subject of experience, because these two categories are mutually exclusive. Therefore, what seemed to constitute a phenomenal “I” turns out to be a part of thephenomenal “Me.”

If my thoughts do not constitute the “I” then how do they fit into the structure of “Me”? Previously, I asserted that thoughts with self-related content constitute “Me,” while thoughts with non-self related content do not. However, just now I argued in favor of the claim that all thoughts (including the ones with non-self-related content) that are experienced as “mine” belong to “Me.” How can one resolve this contradiction?

A way to address this reservation can be found in Metzinger’s (2003 ; 2010 ) self-model theory. Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ) argues that the experience of the self can be understood as underpinned by representational self-models. These self-models, however, are embedded in the hierarchical representational structure, as illustrated by an account of ego dissolution by Letheby and Gerrans (2017) :

Savage suggests that on LSD “[changes] in body ego feeling usually precede changes in mental ego feeling and sometimes are the only changes” (1955, 11), (…) This common temporal sequence, from blurring of body boundaries and loss of sense of ownership for body parts through to later loss of sense of ownership for thoughts, speaks further to the hierarchical architecture of the self-model. ( Letheby and Gerrans, 2017 , p. 8)

If self-models underlying the experience of self-as-object (“Me”) are hierarchical, then the apparent contradiction may be easily explained by the fact that when speaking about the content of thoughts and the thoughts themselves we are addressing self-models at two distinct levels. At the lower level we can distinguish between thoughts with self-related content and other-related content, while on the higher level we can distinguish between thoughts that feel “mine” as opposed to thoughts that are not experienced as “mine.” As a result, this thinking phenomenal “I” experienced in feeling of ownership over one’s thoughts may be conceived as just a higher-order level of Jamesian “Me.” As such, one may claim that there is no such thing as a phenomenal “I,” just multilevel phenomenal “Me.” However, an objection can be raised here. One may claim that even though a person with schizophrenic delusions experiences her thoughts as someone else’s (a demon’s or some malicious puppet master’s), she can still claim that:

Yes, “I” experience my thoughts as not mine, but as demon’s.” My thoughts feel as “not-mine,” however, it’s still me (or: “I”) who thinks of them as “not-mine.”

As such, one escapes “objectification” of “I” into “Me” by postulating a higher-level phenomenal-“I.” However, let us keep in mind that the thought written above constitutes a valid thought by itself. As such, this thought is vulnerable to the theoretical possibility that it turns into a delusion itself, once a psychotic person forms a meta-delusion (delusion about delusion). In this case, one may begin to experience that: “I” (I 1 ) experience that the “fake I” (I 2 ), who is a nasty pink demon, experiences my thoughts as not mine but as someone else’s (e.g., as nasty green demon’s). In this case, I may claim that the real phenomenal “I” is I 1 , since it is at the top of the hierarchy. However, one may repeat the operation of forming meta-delusions ad infinitum (as may happen in psychosis or drug-induced psychedelic states) effectively transforming each phenomenal “I” into another “fake-I” (and consequently making it a part of “Me”).

The possibility of meta-delusions illustrates that the phenomenal “I” understood as subjective thoughts is permanently vulnerable to the threat of losing the apparent subjective character and becoming an object of experience. As such it seems to be a poor choice for the locus of subjectivity, since it needs to be constantly “on the run” from becoming treated as an object of experience, not only in people with psychosis, but also in all psychologically healthy individuals if they decide to reflect on their thoughts. Therefore, it seems more likely that the thoughts themselves cannot constitute the subject of experience. However, even in case of meta-delusions there seems to be a stable deeper-level subjectivity, let us call it the deep “I,” which is preserved, at least until one loses consciousness. After all, a person who experiences meta-delusions would be constantly (painfully) aware of the process, and often would even report it afterwards. This deep “I” cannot be a special form of content in the stream of consciousness, because otherwise it would be vulnerable to becoming a part of “Me.” Therefore, it must be something different.

There seem to be two places where one can look for this deep “I”: in the domain of phenomenology or metaphysics. The first approach has been taken by ( Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016 ) who argue that “all conscious states’ phenomenal character involves for-me-ness as an experiential constituent.” It means that even if we rule out everything else (e.g., bodily experiences, conscious thoughts), we are still left with some form of irreducible phenomenal self-experience. This for-me-ness is not a specific content of consciousness, but rather “refers to the distinct manner, or how , of experiencing” ( Zahavi, 2014 ).

This approach, however, may seem inflationary and not satisfying (e.g., Dainton, 2016 ). One reason for this is that it introduces an additional phenomenal dimension, which may lead to uncomfortable consequences. For example, a question arises whether for-me-ness can ever be lost or replaced with the “ how of experiencing” of another person. For example, can I experience my sister’s for-me-ness in my stream of consciousness? If yes, then how is for-me-ness different from any other content of consciousness? And if the answer is no, then how is it possible to distil the phenomenology of for-me-ness from the metaphysical fact that a given stream of consciousness is always experienced by this and not other subject?

An alternative approach to the problem of the deep “I” is to reject that the subject of experience, the “I,” is present in phenomenology (like Hume, 1739/2000 ; Prinz, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ), and look for it somewhere else, in the domain of metaphysics. Although James (1890) did not explicitly formulate the distinction between “Me” and “I” as the distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphysical self, he hinted at it at several points, for example when he concluded the Chapter on the self with the following fragment: “(...) a postulate, an assertion that there must be a knower correlative to all this known ; and the problem who that knower is would have become a metaphysical problem” ( James, 1890 , p. 401).

“I” As A Subject Of Experience: Metaphysics Of Subjectivity

Thoughts which we actually know to exist do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to another ( James, 1890 , pp. 330–331).

Let us assume that phenomenal consciousness exists in nature, and that it is a part of the reality we live in. The problem of “I” emerges once we realize that one of the fundamental characteristics of phenomenal consciousness is that it is always subjective, that there always seems to be some subject of experience. It seems mistaken to conceive of consciousness which do “fly about loose,” devoid of subjective character, devoid of being someone’s or something’s consciousness. Moreover, it seems that subjectivity may be one of the fundamental inherent properties of conscious experience (similar notions can be found in: Berkeley, 1713/2012 ; Strawson, 2003 ; Searle, 2005 ; Dainton, 2016 ). It seems highly unlikely, if not self-contradictory, that there exists something like an objective conscious experience of “what it is like to be a bat” ( Nagel, 1974 ), which is not subjective in any way. This leads to the metaphysical problem of the self: why is all conscious experience subjective, and what or who is the subject of this experience? Let us call it the problem of the metaphysical “I,” as contrasted with the problem of the phenomenal “I” (i.e., is there a distinctive experience of being a self as a subject of experience, and if so, then what is this experience?), which we discussed so far.

The existence of the metaphysical “I” does not entail the existence of the phenomenal self. It is possible to imagine a creature that possesses a metaphysical “I,” but does not possess any sense of self. In such a case, the creature would possess consciousness, although it would not experience anything as “me,” nor entertain any thoughts/feelings, etc., as “I.” In other words, it is a possibility that one may not experience self-related content of consciousness, while being a sentient being. One example of such situation may be the experience of a dreamless sleep, which “is characterized by a dissolution of subject-object duality, or (…) by a breakdown of even the most basic form of the self-other distinction” ( Windt, 2015 ). This is a situation which can be regarded as an instance of the state of minimal phenomenal experience – the simplest form of conscious experience possible ( Windt, 2015 ; Metzinger, 2018 ), in which there is no place for even the most rudimentary form of “Me.” Another example may be the phenomenology of systems with grid-like architectures which, according to the integrated information theory (IIT, Tononi et al., 2016 ), possess conscious experience 6 . If IIT is correct, then these systems experience some form of conscious states, which most likely lack any phenomenal distinction between “Me” and “not-Me.” However, because they may possess a stream of conscious experience, and conscious experience is necessarily subjective, there remains a valid question: who or what is the subject of that experience?

The question of what exactly is the metaphysical subject of experience can have different answers. There has been a long history of theories of the self ( Barresi and Martin, 2011 ) and some of them directly address this issue. Platonic or Cartesian notions of the soul are good examples of an approach providing one answer to this question: conscious experience is subjective, because there exists a non-material being (self, soul) which is the subject of this experience (see Table 3 ). Other solutions tend to either define the self in less metaphysically expensive ways ( Johnston, 1987 ; Strawson, 2000 ; Dainton, 2008 ), define it as a formal feature of consciousness ( Searle, 2005 ), or deny the need to postulate its existence ( Metzinger, 2003 ). What is crucial here, however, is that the problem of the metaphysical self is a different issue and requires a different methodology, than the problem of the phenomenal self.

TABLE 3. Examples of theories of the self-as-subject (“I”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the metaphysical self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

What sort of methodology, then, is appropriate for investigating the metaphysical self? It seems that the most relevant methods come from the toolbox of metaphysics. This toolbox includes classical philosophical methods such as thought experiments and logical analysis. However, methodology of metaphysics is an area of open discussion, and at present there are no signs of general consensus. One of the most debated issues in this field, which is especially relevant here, is to what extent the methodology of metaphysics is continuous with the methodology of natural sciences (see Tahko, 2015 , Chapter 9 for an overview). The positions span the spectrum between the claim that science and metaphysics are fully autonomous on the one side and the claim that metaphysics can be fully naturalized on the other. Discussing this issue goes way beyond the scope of this paper. However, if these two areas are at least to some extent related (i.e., not fully autonomous), then one may argue that scientific methods can be at least of some relevance in metaphysics and consequently for investigations of the metaphysical “I.”

One example in which empirical results seem to be able to influence theoretical investigations of the metaphysical self is through imposing constraints on philosophical theories. For example, because the metaphysical self is inherently related to consciousness, we should expect that different theories of consciousness should place different constraints on what a metaphysical self can be. Then, if one theory of consciousness acquires stronger empirical support than the others, we can also treat this as evidence for the constraints on the self that this theory implies.

Let us look at an example of IIT to illustrate this point. According to IIT ( Oizumi et al., 2014 ; Tononi et al., 2016 ) the content of conscious experience is defined by the so-called informational “complex” which is characterized by maximally integrated information (which can be measured by calculating the value of Φ max ). This complex then defines the stream of conscious experience. However, what happens if there is more than one such complex in one person? In this case, as Tononi et al. (2016) wrote:

According to IIT, two or more non-overlapping complexes may coexist as discrete physical substrates of consciousness (PSCs) within a single brain, each with its own definite borders and value of Φ max . The complex that specifies a person’s day to day stream of consciousness should have the highest value of Φ max – that is, it should be the “major” complex. In some conditions, for example, after a split-brain operation, the major complex may split. In such instances, one consciousness, supported by a complex in the dominant hemisphere and with privileged access to Broca’s area, would be able to speak about the experience, but would remain unaware of the presence of another consciousness, supported by a complex in the other hemisphere, which can be revealed by carefully designed experiments. ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

This fragment suggests that in IIT the metaphysical “I” can be understood as tied to a complex of maximally integrated information. In this case, a split-brain patient would possess two metaphysical selves, because as a consequence of an operation her or his brain hosts two such complexes. On the face of it, it seems to be a plausible situation ( cf. Bayne, 2010 ). However, in the sentence which immediately follows, Tononi et al. (2016) suggest that:

An intriguing possibility is that splitting of the PSC may also occur in healthy people during long-lasting dual-task conditions – for example, when driving in an auto-pilot like manner on a familiar road while listening to an engaging conversation ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

The implications of this possibility are much more severe, because it postulates that in a matter of minutes or seconds a complex can dynamically divide into several complexes, and individual complexes can merge into one major complex. How do the complexes understood in this way then relate to the metaphysical “I”? Unfortunately, IIT is silent about this issue, but there seem to be at least two responses to this question. First, one may argue that the self does not need to be limited to one complex, but that the same metaphysical “I” can be present in all of the simultaneous streams of consciousness (complexes). However, this solution is at odds with both common-sense intuition and IIT itself. It would presuppose not only an extremely disunified view of consciousness, but even lead to self-contradictory consequences. The metaphysical “I” can be thought of as the metaphysical fact that any given stream of consciousness is subjectively experienced by some “self” (regardless of what that self might be). However, in a disunified view of an organism’s consciousness this metaphysical “I” would at the same time a) be the subject of experience of all of the complexes within this organism, and b) be the subject of experience of only one of these complexes while being blind to the others (as claimed by IIT: two complexes are not “co-conscious” with each other). It presents a contradiction and strongly suggests that the metaphysical “I” cannot be underpinned by multiple independent complexes. It leaves us with the second option, which is to bite the bullet and accept that IIT implies that the metaphysical “I” persists either as long as a given complex, or for an even shorter period of time, for example for just up to a few seconds, as suggested by Strawson (2000 , 2010 ). It means that if IIT (and the analysis outlined above) is correct then the metaphysical “I” turns out to be radically different from our intuitive understanding of subject-of-experience as persisting continuously life-long stream of consciousness. However, if empirical evidence in support of the current version of IIT becomes strong enough, it may suggest that our common-sense intuitions about self-as-subject may be mistaken. On the other hand, different theories of phenomenal consciousness (and even different versions of IIT) may imply different constraints on the metaphysical “I,” and the extent to which they are supported by empirical evidence may suggest a way to say something about what the subject of conscious experience is.

Overall, assuming that metaphysics is not fully independent from science, the relevant methodology for investigating the metaphysical “I” is a combination of toolboxes of metaphysics and empirical science. This contrasts with the phenomenal “Me,” where the relevant toolkit includes methods from phenomenology and science. The second point, which has been illustrated with an example of IIT, is that it is important to explicitly spell out the implications of different theories of consciousness in regard to what is the subject of conscious experience, as it may provide the best way forward towards solving this issue.

Understanding Predictive Coding Theories Of The Self

Recently, there has been a huge number of attempts to explain the self through the framework of predictive coding (PC) and the free energy principle (FEP). In this final section of the paper, I will use PC theories of the self as a working example demonstrating practical consequences of implementing the Jamesian distinction between “Me” and “I.” I will suggest that PC theories of the self target different dimensions of self-as-object, understood as a hierarchical structure of self-models ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2010 ), and as such provide a valuable framework to understand the self. However, I will also explain why PC and the FEP do not allow us to say much about self-as-subject (the metaphysical “I”).

According to PC, the brain can be understood as an inference machine which hosts and continuously updates a probabilistic model of the world, which it uses to infer hidden causes behind the sensory data (for a more detailed introduction see: Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 , 2010 ; Friston and Kiebel, 2009 ; Hohwy, 2013 ; Clark, 2016 ). It accomplishes this by continuously issuing predictions and comparing them with sensory data, with the discrepancy between predictions and data being propagated further up the hierarchy as prediction errors. As such, PC postulates that the brain can be seen as a hierarchical structure of generative models (which are responsible for issuing predictions). Prediction errors which arise at lower levels serve as data to be compared with predictions at the higher levels. This view of the mind inverts the classical feedforward view in which perception is a predominantly bottom-up process. In PC, instead, perception is mostly driven by top-down predictions, with bottom-up prediction errors serving the function of feedback helping to choose model with the most explanatory power. Moreover, in an extension of PC, which is known as active inference, action is also understood as a way of maximizing the fit of one’s internal models to reality. The main idea behind active inference is that rather than changing the model in order to better fit the data, one can act on the world and change it according to predictions issued by the currently dominating model. As a consequence, the whole perception-action cycle can be understood as driven by one overarching goal, i.e., long-term minimization of prediction errors.

The FEP is a further generalization of PC. It postulates that all living organisms operate under the principle to minimize the so-called “variational free energy,” which is an information theoretical measure which roughly can be understood as a measure of uncertainty ( Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 ). One of the main claims of this theory is that organisms which act according to FEP (i.e., they act in a way to minimize free energy in the long term) will, in effect, implicitly approximate Bayesian inference. It means that they will combine their prior knowledge (represented by their model of the world) with the incoming sensory input in a mathematically optimal way.

Both PC and the FEP have recently gained huge popularity and motivated a number of theories attempting to explain various aspects of cognition within this framework. It includes numerous attempts to understand different facets of the self, such as sense of bodily ownership ( Apps and Tsakiris, 2014 ), sense of self in agency and perception ( Hohwy, 2007 ), the influence of interoception on self-consciousness ( Seth et al., 2011 ; Seth, 2013 ), social aspects of the self ( Moutoussis et al., 2014 ; Friston and Frith, 2015 ), the relationship with minimal phenomenal selfhood ( Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 ), and even psychodynamical interpretations of the self ( Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010 ; Fotopoulou, 2012 ). The most comprehensive treatment of the self from the PC perspective ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 ) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following words:

We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. (…) we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 , p. 363)

The self, as seen from this perspective, is essentially a hierarchical model of endogenous hidden causes of sensory input. Or, in more classical terms, it can be said that it is a hierarchical representational structure ( cf. Clark, 2016 ; Williams, 2017 ) which allows one to distinguish between endogenous causes (what is caused by me) and exogenous causes (what is caused by something else). This distinction can be illustrated with an example of a comparison between seeing a movement of my virtual hand and of a virtual hand of someone else. If adequately prepared, in both cases the image of a hand and its movement may be identical. However, in one case I can realize that the movement of the hand is congruent with my intentions (manifested through my actions performed using a computer controller) and, as a consequence, infer that the cause of the hand’s movement is me. On the other hand, I may fail to notice any congruence between my intentions and the movement and hence infer that the hidden cause behind the movement I observe is some other person. According to Hohwy and Michael (2017) , the self is just a set of such hidden endogenous causes. Although not necessarily in full agreement with this picture in regard to the details, all other PC theories of the self listed above also speak about the self as underpinned by hierarchy of generative models, which are preoccupied with conducting probabilistic inference aimed to infer hidden causes of observed data patterns. This inference is then postulated to underlie specific types of conscious self-experience, i.e., different facets of the sense of self.

As such, one common theme among all PC theories of the self is the following: aspects of conscious experience of the self are underpinned by a representational structure in the form of hierarchical generative models. In its core, it is the same idea as the one introduced earlier by Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ), i.e., that our phenomenal experience of the self is underpinned by a representational structure of unconscious self-models (see also: Crane, 2003 ; Chalmers, 2004 , for a discussion about the relationship between representational and conscious content). Once an unconscious self-model enters conscious awareness, it generates a corresponding self-related conscious content (see: Metzinger, 2006 , 2014 , for an explicit distinction between the levels of representations and conscious content in regard to the bodily self). The same mechanism is at work in PC theories – the dynamic process of model selection leads to suppression of some models but allows other models to enter awareness in the form of conscious content. This mechanism allows PC to explain self-related content of consciousness, which is essentially nothing else than the James’ (1890) self-as-object of experience. This is how PC and the FEP help to understand the phenomenal “Me” – by describing the structure and dynamics of the underlying representational architecture.

To what extent PC and FEP can provide us with any help when confronted with the task to explain the metaphysical “I”? Here, I will argue that in contrast to the phenomenal “Me,” the issues pertaining to the metaphysical “I” are outside of its reach. The reason for this is a consequence of the fact that PC is in principle agnostic in regard to the issue of what brings representational content into the scope of conscious experience. In general, this can be regarded as an advantage, because this way PC accounts of self-experience can avoid the burden of being hostage to any specific theory of consciousness, and stay in principle compatible with most of them (e.g., see Hohwy, 2013 , Chapter 10 for an attempt to combine PC with ideas from Global Neuronal Workspace theory: Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 ; Dehaene, 2014 ). However, it also makes PC fundamentally underspecified when treated as a theory which is used to explain issues related to consciousness. While, as suggested before, PC is a valuable framework to describe the representational structure underlying conscious content, it runs into problems when used to explain why certain content is conscious in the first place. One way in which PC and FEP can attempt to retain relevance is by aiming to explain access consciousness ( Block, 1995 ) – a functional mechanism which allows that “some of the attended information eventually enters our awareness and becomes reportable to others” ( Dehaene, 2014 ). However, the problem of the metaphysical “I” becomes a relevant issue only when approached in the context of phenomenal consciousness – the type of consciousness which is loaded with the burden of the so-called “hard problem” ( Chalmers, 1996 ).

This is where PS and FEP encounter a dead end, as the problem enters the area which belongs more to metaphysics than empirical science (at least in the light of the current state of affairs). In order to provide an account of the metaphysical self, one needs to begin with at least some form of a theory of phenomenal consciousness and its place in physical reality. At present FEP (and PC) does not provide such a theory. Recently, Friston (2018) suggested that FEP can be used to understand consciousness, although the fact that he discusses consciousness in functionalist terms (consciousness is related to counterfactual inference 7 ) suggests that his proposal aims to explain access consciousness, making it irrelevant for the problem of metaphysical “I.”

To summarize, the fact that PC and the FEP are not theories of phenomenal consciousness, and seem not to impose any constraints on these theories, has important consequences for what type of self they can explain. As I argued, they have the potential to substantially contribute to the issue of different levels of the phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object) by describing the structure and dynamics of the level of representational content, which are reflected at the level of conscious experience. However, they are not suited to explain the metaphysical “I” (self-as-subject) because they do not address the issue of the place of consciousness in nature. Hence, the main claim is that while PC can be seen as a useful framework to investigate phenomenology of “Me,” it is in principle unsuitable to provide answers to questions about the metaphysics of “I.”

I placed the debate of the self in the domain of consciousness (as opposed to the self understood as e.g., a representational structure, a physical object, or a spiritual entity) and argued that (1) conceptually, the distinction between “Me” and “I” may reflect the distinction between theoretical problems of the phenomenal self and the metaphysical self, respectively (although the notion of for-me-ness may complicate this picture), and (2) that what is described in the literature as the phenomenal “I” can be regarded as just a higher-level part of the phenomenal “Me” [which can be understood as Metzinger’s (2018) phenomenal self-model].

The first claim draws attention to the distinction between “I” and “Me,” which suggests that these two theoretical issues should be investigated independently, using two different methodologies. While “Me” can be investigated using phenomenology and scientific methodology, “I” is typically a metaphysical problem (perhaps with the exception of non-deflationary understandings of for-me-ness) and it is arguable to what extent it can be approached using standard scientific methods. Therefore, it is important to clearly state which problem one approaches when discussing the self in the context of consciousness (see Tables 2 , 3 for some examples).

The second claim, the postulate to treat what is usually described as phenomenal “I” as just a part of the phenomenal “Me,” has two implications. The first is constructive. Investigating issues which are typically regarded in cognitive science as “I” from the perspective of “Me” may contribute towards better understanding of self-consciousness by emphasizing that these two research areas may have much more in common than it appears. Rather than using two distinct terms, which suggest that we are dealing with two fundamentally different problems, we may approach them as just two facets of the same multidimensional research problem. One such approach is to treat both of them as just different levels in the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2009 , 2010 ), an approach which can be (and implicitly is) shared by recent theories of the self, especially within the framework of PC.

The second implication is pragmatic. Refraining from using the term “I” when speaking in the context of phenomenology and using it only in the metaphysical context may reduce conceptual confusion in regard to this term. However, it will also mean forfeiting an important distinction (“Me” versus “I”) which has already gained traction in cognitive science. As such, the choice to eliminate the term “I” in the context of phenomenology is a repelling option, but may be beneficial in the long term. Alternatively, one may use more specific terms, such as “sense of ownership over an experience” to reflect what is meant by “I” in the Wittgensteinian tradition, or, e.g., “sense of ownership of interoceptive signals” when discussing the role of interoception. A second option may be to recast the distinction used in cognitive science in different terms. One proposal is to explicitly speak about it as the distinction between the experience/sense of “Me” versus the experience/sense of “I” (rather than just “Me” and “I”). The task here would be, however, to prove that there is a qualitative difference between them, and to demarcate the exact border.

Author Contributions

The article has been solely the work of MW.

This article was supported by the Australian Research Council Grant No. DP160102770.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Jakob Hohwy, Tim Bayne, Jennifer Windt, Monima Chadha, and the members of Cognition and Philosophy Lab at Monash University (especially Julian Matthews) for discussions about the issues described in the paper. The author also wants to thank the reviewers and the editor for helpful comments on how to improve the manuscript.

• ^ Therefore, whenever I use the term “I” I mean self-as-subject (of experience), and whenever I use the term “Me” I mean self-as-object (of experience). This assumption reflects James’ (1890) understanding of these terms (see Table 1 ). I also assume, following James (1890) , that these two categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., if something is an object of experience then it cannot simultaneously be a subject of experience, and vice versa.
• ^ Wittgenstein (1958) himself did not discuss the issue of phenomenology of the self. However, his approach to the distinction between the use of “I” as subject and “I” as object can be seen as a starting point for contemporary discussions of phenomenology of the self-as-subject.
• ^ Whenever I use the prefix “phenomenal” I mean “the conscious experience of.” For example, when I write phenomenal “I”, I mean: the conscious experience of self as subject of experience (“I”). In a similar fashion I use the prefix “metaphysical” when I mean “the metaphysical entity of.”
• ^ Chalmers (1996) also lists “sense of self,” although it is highly controversial whether it can be treated as a distinctive type of conscious content.
• ^ Sometimes referred to as sense of authorship.
• ^ “IIT allows for certain simple systems such as grid-like architectures, similar to topographically organized areas in the human posterior cortex, to be highly conscious even when not engaging in any intelligent behavior” ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 460).
• ^ For example, he writes: “So where does consciousness emerge? The proposal offered here is that conscious processing has a temporal thickness or depth, which underwrites inferences about the consequences of action. This necessarily lends inference a purposeful and self-evidencing aspect that has the hallmarks of consciousness” ( Friston, 2018 , p. 1).

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Keywords : self, consciousness, self-consciousness, sense of self, self-as-subject, self-as-object, predictive coding, IIT

Citation: Woźniak M (2018) “I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness. Front. Psychol. 9:1656. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01656

Received: 20 March 2018; Accepted: 17 August 2018; Published: 04 September 2018.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2018 Woźniak. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Mateusz Woźniak, [email protected] ; [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Self, From a Psychological Perspective

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Consciousness ; Identity ; Self-awareness

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The concept “self” has shifting meanings as a result of it originating in religious ideas about the soul, being heavily philosophized during the Renaissance and most recently being the topic of scientific research. The dominant contemporary definition is that self is the thoughts and images people have about themselves. Such a definition opens up the self to empirical research by asking people, in various ways, what they think about themselves. However, the self was not always conceived of as an empirical phenomenon.

The concept of the “self” grew out of religious thinking about the soul. Early thought experiments by Avicenna and Descartes tried to demonstrate that the thinking mind exists independently of all things material and thus that it belongs to the immaterial realm of the soul. Descartes was particularly influential in arguing for an ontological dualism between material and immaterial realms. In practice, this...

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Aveling, E., & Gillespie, A. (2008). Negotiating multiplicity: Adaptive asymmetries within second-generation Turks ‘society of mind’. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 21 , 200–222.

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Psychology of the Self

Introduction, general overviews.

• Instrumental Analysis
• Social Self-Analysis
• Organization of Self-Knowledge
• Self-Esteem
• Self-Efficacy
• Self-Regulation
• Self-Determination Theory
• Belief in Free Will and Personal Agency
• Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection
• Self-Affirmation Theory
• Self-Verification Theory
• Self in Social Judgment
• Self as a Behavioral Guide
• Self-Presentation
• Self-Reference Effect
• Motivated Social Perception
• Culture and Self

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Psychology of the Self by Corey L. Guenther , Mark D. Alicke LAST REVIEWED: 26 February 2013 LAST MODIFIED: 26 February 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199828340-0093

The “self” is surely one of the most heavily researched areas in social and personality psychology, even if the debate continues as to whether a self truly exists. Whatever stance one adopts regarding the self’s ontological status, there is little doubt that the many phenomena of which the self is a predicate—self-knowledge, self-awareness, self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-regulation, self-deception, self-presentation—to name just a few, are indispensable research areas. Furthermore, the study of the self extends far beyond the topics that explicitly reference the term. Social comparison theory, for example, comprises studies on how people define their characteristics by assessing where they stand relative to others. And of course, the study of the self extends beyond psychology: philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, not to mention fiction writers and other artists, have all been fascinated with the self. William James’s classic distinction between the self as knower (or pure ego) and the self as known (or the empirical self) provides a useful scheme within which to view the multitudinous aspects of self-functioning (see James 1890 , cited under Self-Awareness Theory ). Whereas prior conceptions of the self as knower tended to posit a “transcendental” capacity for the ego, James made this concept more congenial to psychologists by simply referring to it as the function that allows for continuity among thoughts and experiences. James’s distinction perseveres in the interest that self-theorists accord to how people acquire self-knowledge and how this knowledge is manifested in behavior. The major topics related to self-functioning that social and personality psychologists address concern the ways in which people understand and define their characteristics (self-knowledge), how people use task and social feedback to monitor their goal progress (self-regulation), the influence of personal standards, expectations, and values on perception of others (self in social judgment), and how people maintain desired self-images. The self has been studied as an individual difference variable (primarily by personality theorists), as a determinant of social perception, attribution, and judgment, and as an essential element in social relations. A major theme has been the interplay between motivational and nonmotivational factors in self-evaluation. Most current perspectives on the self include the motives that can potentially bias the way information regarding the self is obtained, processed, and recalled, as well as the ordinary cognitive processes that underlie self-functions. This integration has broadened theoretical explanations involving the self and bodes well for the future vigor of this research area.

Although a great deal of research on the psychology of self will be surveyed throughout this bibliographic guide, presenting an exhaustive review of the available work is beyond the scope of the current article. Discussion on the nature of selfhood dates back to pre-scientific philosophy ( Descartes 1997 ; first published 1641), a testament not only to the theoretical intrigue of the self as a construct of study but also to the difficulty (if not impossibility) of paying homage to every scholastic endeavor that has valuably contributed to our current understanding of self and identity. Thus before exploring the specific facets of selfhood as outlined in the following sections, it would be useful to direct the reader to more thoroughly comprehensive works that delve into the psychology of self at a deeper level. Leary and Tangney 2012 offers perhaps the most authoritative compilation of contemporary scholarship on selfhood on the market, while Baumeister 1999 provides a collection of some of the most influential empirical works (both historical and contemporary) to advance the scientific study of self. Brown 1998 and Sedikides and Spencer 2007 provide broad overviews of the field’s extant understanding of self, with the former aimed at undergraduate audiences and the latter toward graduate students and beyond. Baumeister 1998 is a chapter in the Handbook of Social Psychology that offers a systematic, comprehensive survey of historical and contemporary research on the self, and Fiske 2004 emphasizes the inherently social nature of the many manifestations of selfhood. Finally, Kruglanski, et al. 1996 , a special issue of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , presents a unifying collection of research that demonstrates the necessarily interdisciplinary nature of self and identity.

Baumeister, R. F. 1998. The self. In The handbook of social psychology . 4th ed. Edited by D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey, 680–740. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Comprehensive and extensive, this chapter offers a detailed and exceptionally well-organized overview of the extant literature on psychology of self. Discusses relevant research as it relates to one of three major experiences of selfhood: reflexive consciousness (capacity to be conscious of oneself), the interpersonal self, and executive functioning (control and initiation of behavior).

Baumeister, R. F., ed. 1999. The self in social psychology: Key readings . Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

A compilation of twenty-three key influential articles (both historical and contemporary) that have contributed to our current understanding of self and identity. Organized into ten thematic sections: self-knowledge, self-conceptions, motivational roots, self and information processing, self-presentation, self-esteem, self-regulation, self and culture, motivation and self-knowledge, and strategies. Excellent resource for advanced undergraduate and graduate students.

Brown, J. D. 1998. The self . New York: McGraw-Hill.

A textbook mutually suitable for upper-level undergraduate courses as well as advanced scholars seeking a broad overview of the relevant subfields in the psychology of self. Surveys both contemporary and historical views on the study of selfhood.

Descartes, Rene. 1997. Meditations on first philosophy . Translated by L. Lafleur. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Original work published 1641. A classic precursor to the scientific study of self-knowledge wherein Descartes distinguishes between the inner, immaterial substance of mind that ascertains the proceedings of the outer, material body.

Fiske, S. T. 2004. The self: Social to the core. In Social beings: A core motives approach to social psychology . Edited by S. T. Fiske, 169–214. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

A broad review of the literature on selfhood with an emphasis on how the core social motives of understanding, enhancement, and belonging underlie the cognitive, affective, and behavioral manifestations of self. Readable for an advanced undergraduate audience and useful as a summarizing work for the graduate level and beyond.

Kruglanski, A. W., N. Miller, and R. G. Geen, eds. 1996. The self and social identity [Special Issue]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71.6.

A collection of fifteen articles published to strategically highlight how the empirical study of selfhood fundamentally bridges the gap between personality and social psychology, and moreover, transcends the boundaries of the distinctive subsections of JPSP (“Attitudes and Social Cognition,” “Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes,” and “Personality Processes and Individual Differences”).

Leary, M. R., and J. P. Tangney, eds. 2012. Handbook of self and identity . 2d ed. New York: Guilford.

Now in its second edition, this edited volume comprehensively reviews the most contemporary research and theory on psychology of the self. Chapters written by the foremost experts in the field offer an up-to-date, detailed exploration of the self from multiple levels of analysis (e.g., neurological, interpersonal, cultural, developmental, etc.).

Sedikides, C., and S. J. Spencer, eds. 2007. The self . New York: Psychology Press.

A collection of chapters that offers a systematic survey of contemporary research on the psychology of self. Contributions from authoritative scholars in the area are arranged to investigate selfhood from four perspectives: brain and cognition, motivation, emotions and self-esteem, and interpersonal, intergroup, and cultural contexts. A valuable resource for the graduate level and beyond.

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Self and identity.

• Sanaz Talaifar Sanaz Talaifar Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin
•  and  William Swann William Swann Department of Psychology, University of Texas
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.242
• Published online: 28 March 2018

Active and stored mental representations of the self include both global and specific qualities as well as conscious and nonconscious qualities. Semantic and episodic memory both contribute to a self that is not a unitary construct comprising only the individual as he or she is now, but also past and possible selves. Self-knowledge may overlap more or less with others’ views of the self. Furthermore, mental representations of the self vary whether they are positive or negative, important, certain, and stable. The origins of the self are also manifold and can be considered from developmental, biological, intrapsychic, and interpersonal perspectives. The self is connected to core motives (e.g., coherence, agency, and communion) and is manifested in the form of both personal identities and social identities. Finally, just as the self is a product of proximal and distal social forces, it is also an agent that actively shapes its environment.

• self-concept
• self-representation
• self-knowledge
• self-perception
• self-esteem
• personal identity
• social identity

Introduction

The concept of the self has beguiled—and frustrated—psychologists and philosophers alike for generations. One of the greatest challenges has been coming to terms with the nature of the self. Every individual has a self, yet no two selves are the same. Some aspects of the self create a sense of commonality with others whereas other aspects of the self set it apart. The self usually provides a sense of consistency, a sense that there is some connection between who a person was yesterday and who they are today. And yet, the self is continually changing both as an individual ages and he or she traverses different social situations. A further conundrum is that the self acts as both subject and object; it does the knowing about itself. With so many complexities, coupled with the fact that people can neither see nor touch the self, the construct may take on an air of mysticism akin to the concept of the soul (Epstein, 1973 ).

Perhaps the most pressing, and basic, question psychologists must answer regarding the self is “What is it?” For the man whom many regard as the father of modern psychology, William James, the self was a source of continuity that gave individuals a sense of “connectedness” and “unbrokenness” ( 1890 , p. 335). James distinguished between two components of the self: the “I” and the “me” ( 1910 ). The “I” is the self as agent, thinker, and knower, the executive function that experiences and reacts to the world, constructing mental representations and memories as it does so (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012 ). James was skeptical that the “I” was amenable to scientific study, which has been borne out by the fact that far more attention has been accorded to the “me.” The “me” is the individual one recognizes as the self, which for James included a material, social, and spiritual self. The material self refers to one’s physical body and one’s physical possessions. The social self refers to the various selves one may express and others may recognize depending on the social setting. The spiritual self refers to the enduring core of one’s being, including one’s values, personality, beliefs about the self, etc.

This article focuses on the “me” that will be referred to interchangeably as either the “self” or “identity.” We define the self as a multifaceted, dynamic, and temporally continuous set of mental self-representations. These representations are multifaceted in the sense that different situations may evoke different aspects of the self at different times. They are dynamic in that they are subject to change in the form of elaborations, corrections, and reevaluations (Diehl, Youngblade, Hay, & Chui, 2011 ). This is true when researchers think of the self as a sort of scientific theory in which new evidence about the self from the environment leads to adjustments to one’s self-theory (Epstein, 1973 ; Gopnick, 2003 ). It is also true when researchers consider the self as a narrative that can be rewritten and revised (McAdams, 1996 ). Finally, self-representations are temporally continuous because even though they change, most people have a sense of being the same person over time. Further, these self-representations, whether conscious or not, are essential to psychological functioning, as they organize people’s perceptions of their traits, preferences, memories, experiences, and group memberships. Importantly, representations of the self also guide an individual’s behavior.

Some psychologists (e.g., behaviorists and more recently Brubaker & Cooper, 2000 ) have questioned the need to implicate a construct as nebulous as the self to explain behavior. Certainly an individual can perform many complex actions without invoking his or her self-representations. Nevertheless, psychologists increasingly regard the self as one of the most important constructs in all of psychology. For example, the percentage of self-related studies published in the field’s leading journal, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , increased fivefold between 1972 and 2002 (Swann & Seyle, 2005 ) and has continued to grow to this day. The importance of the self becomes evident when one considers the consequences of a sense of self that is interrupted, damaged, or absent. Epstein ( 1973 ) offers a case in point with an example of a schizophrenic girl meeting her psychiatrist:

Ruth, a five year old, approached the psychiatrist with “Are you the bogey man? Are you going to fight my mother? Are you the same mother? Are you the same father? Are you going to be another mother?” and finally screaming in terror, “I am afraid I am going to be someone else.” [Bender, 1950 , p. 135]

To provide a more commonplace example, children do not display several emotions we consider uniquely human, such as empathy and embarrassment, until after they have developed a sense of self-awareness (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989 ). As Darwin has argued ( 1872 / 1965 ), emotions like embarrassment exist only after one has a developed a sense of self that can be the object of others’ attention.

The self’s importance also is evident when one considers that it is a pancultural phenomenon; all individuals have a sense of self regardless of where they are born. Though the content of self-representations may vary by cultural context, the existence of the self is universal. So too is the structure of the self. One of the most basic structural dimensions of the self involves whether the knowledge is active or stored.

Forms of Self-Knowledge

Active and stored self-knowledge.

Although i ndividuals accumulate immeasurable amounts of knowledge over their lifespans, at any given moment they can access only a portion of that knowledge. The aspects of self-knowledge held in consciousness make up “active self-knowledge.” Other terms for active self-knowledge are the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986 ), the spontaneous self-concept (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978 ), and the phenomenal self (Jones & Gerard, 1967 ). On the other hand, “stored self-knowledge” is information held in memory that one can access and retrieve but is not currently held in consciousness. Because different features of the self are active versus stored at different times depending on the demands of the situation, the self can be quite malleable without eliciting feelings of inconsistency or inauthenticity (Swann, Bosson, & Pelham, 2002 ).

Semantic and Episodic Representations of Self-Knowledge

People possess both episodic and semantic representations of themselves (Klein & Loftus, 1993 ; Tulving, 1983 ). Episodic self-representations refer to “behavioral exemplars” or relatively brief “cartoons in the head” involving one’s past life and experiences. For philosopher John Locke, the self was built of episodic memory. For some researchers interested in memory and identity, episodic memory has been of particular interest because it is thought to involve re-experiencing events from one’s past, providing a person with content through which to construct a personal narrative (see, e.g., Eakin, 2008 ; Fivush & Haden, 2003 ; Klein, 2001 ; Klein & Gangi, 2010 ). Recall of these episodic instances happens together with the conscious awareness that the events actually occurred in one’s life (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 ).

Episodic self-knowledge may shed light on the individual’s traits or preferences and how he or she will or should act in the future, but some aspects of self-knowledge do not require recalling any specific experiences. Semantic self-knowledge involves memories at a higher level abstraction. These self-related memories are based on either facts (e.g., I am 39 years old) or traits and do not necessitate remembering a specific event or experience (Klein & Lax, 2010 ; Klein, Robertson, Gangi, & Loftus, 2008 ). Thus, one may consider oneself intelligent (semantic self-knowledge) without recalling that he or she achieved stellar grades the previous term (episodic self-knowledge). In fact, Tulving ( 1972 ) suggested that the two types of knowledge may be structurally and functionally independent of each other. In support of this, case studies show that damage to the episodic self-knowledge system does not necessarily result in impairment of the semantic self-knowledge system. Evaluating semantic traits for self-descriptiveness is associated with activation in brain regions implicated in semantic, but not episodic, memory. In addition, priming a trait stored in semantic memory does not facilitate recall of corresponding episodic memories that exemplify the semantic self-knowledge (Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992 ). The tenuous relationship between episodic and semantic self-knowledge suggests that only a portion of semantic self-knowledge arises inductively from episodic self-knowledge (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002 ).

Recently some researchers have questioned the importance of memory’s role in creating a sense of identity. For example, at least when it comes to perceptions of others, people perceive a person’s identity to remain more intact after a neurodegenerative disease that affects their memory than one that affects their morality (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015 ).

Conscious and Nonconscious Self-Knowledge (Sometimes Confused With Explicit Versus Implicit)

Individuals may be conscious, or aware, of aspects of the self to varying degrees in different situations. Indeed sometimes it is adaptive to have self-awareness (Mandler, 1975 ) and other times it is not (Wegner, 2009 ). Nonconscious self-representations can influence behavior in that individuals may be unaware of the ways in which their self-representations affect their behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995 ). Some researchers have even suggested that individuals can be unconscious of the contents of their self-representations (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2003 ). It is important to remember that consciousness refers primarily to the level of awareness of a self-representation, rather than the automaticity of a given representation (i.e., whether the representation is retrieved in an unaware, unintentional, efficient, and uncontrolled manner) (Bargh, 1994 ).

A key ambiguity in recent work on implicit self-esteem is defining its criterial attributes. One view contends that the nonconscious and conscious self reflect fundamentally distinct knowledge systems that arise from different learning experiences and have independent effects on thought, emotion, and behavior (Epstein, 1994 ). Another perspective views the self as a singular construct that may nevertheless show diverging responses on direct and indirect measures of self due to factors such as the opportunity and motivation to control behavioral responses (Fazio & Twoles-Schwen, 1999 ). While indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test do not require introspection and as a result may tap nonconscious representations, this is an assumption that should be supported with empirical evidence (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006 ).

Issues of direct and indirect measurement are a key consideration in research on the implicit and explicit self. Indirect measures of self allow researchers to infer an individual’s judgment about the self as a result of the speed or nature of their responses to stimuli that may be more or less self-related (De Houwer & Moors, 2010 ). Some researchers have argued that indirect measures of self-esteem are advantageous because they circumvent self-presentational issues (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999 ), but other researchers have questioned such claims (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007 ) because self-presentational strivings can be automatized (Paulhus, 1993 ).

Recent findings have raised additional questions regarding the validity of some key assumptions regarding research inspired by interest in implicit self-esteem (for a more optimistic take on implicit self-esteem, see Dehart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006 ). Although near-zero correlations between individuals’ scores on direct and indirect measures of self (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000 ) are often taken to mean that nonconscious and conscious self-representations are distinct, other factors, such as measurement error and lack of conceptual correspondence, can cause these low correlations (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Some researchers have also taken evidence of negligible associations between measures of implicit self-esteem and theoretically related outcomes to mean that such measures may not measure self-esteem at all (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011 ). A prudent strategy is thus to consider that indirect measures reflect an activation of associations between the self and other stimuli in memory and that these associations do not require conscious validation of the association as accurate or inaccurate (Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Direct measures, on the other hand, do require validation processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004 ; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ).

Global and Specific Self-Knowledge

Self-views vary in scope (Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1987 ). Global self-representations are generalized beliefs about the self (e.g., I am a worthwhile person) while specific self-representations pertain to a narrow domain (e.g., I am a nimble tennis player). Self-views can fall anywhere on a continuum between these two extremes. Generalized self-esteem may be thought of as a global self-representation at the top of a hierarchy with individual self-concepts nested underneath in specific domains such as academic, physical, and social (Marsh, 1986 ). Individual self-concepts, measured separately, combine statistically to form a superordinate global self-esteem factor (Marsh & Hattie, 1996 ). When trying to predict behavior it is important not to use a specific self-representation to predict a global behavior or a global self-representation to predict a specific behavior (e.g., Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005 ; Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007 ; Trzesniewski et al., 2006 ).

Actual, Possible, Ideal, and Ought Selves

The self does not just include who a person is in the present but also includes past and future iterations of the self. In addition, people tend to hold “ought” or “ideal” beliefs about the self. The former includes one’s beliefs about who they should be according to their own and others’ standards while the latter includes beliefs about who they would like to be (Higgins, 1987 ). In a related vein, possible selves are the future-oriented positive or negative aspects of the self-concept, selves that one hopes to become or fears becoming (Markus & Nurius, 1986 ). Some research has even shown that distance between one’s feared self and actual self is a stronger predictor of life satisfaction than proximity between one’s ideal self and actual self (Ogilvie, 1987 ). Possible selves vary in how far in the future they are, how detailed they are, and how likely they are to become an actual self (Oyserman & James, 2008 ). Many researchers have studied the content of possible selves, which can be as idiosyncratic as a person’s imagination is. The method used to measure possible selves (close-ended versus open-ended questions) will affect which possible selves are revealed (Lee & Oyserman, 2009 ). The content of possible selves is also socially and contextually grounded. For example, as a person ages, career-focused possible selves become less important while health-related possible selves become increasingly important (Cross & Markus, 1991 ; Frazier, Hooker, Johnson, & Kaus, 2000 ).

Researchers have been interested in not just the content but the function of possible selves. Thinking about successful possible selves is mood enhancing (King, 2001 ) because it is a reminder that the current self can be improved. In addition, possible selves may play a role in self-regulation. By linking present and future selves, they may promote desired possible selves and avoid feared possible selves. Possible selves may be in competition with each other and with a person’s actual self. For example, someone may envision one possible self as an artist and another possible self as an airline pilot, and each of these possible selves might require the person to take different actions in the present moment. Goal striving requires employing limited resources and attention, so working toward one possible self may require shifting attention and resources away from another possible self (Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006 ). Possible selves may have other implications as well. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara ( 2005 ) show how expected future income affects a person’s preferences for economic redistribution in the present.

Accuracy of Self-Knowledge and Feelings of Authenticity

Most individuals have had at least one encounter with an individual whose self-perception seemed at odds with “reality.” Perhaps it is a friend who believes himself to be a skilled singer but cannot understand why everyone within earshot grimaces when he starts singing. Or the boss who believes herself to be an inspiring leader but cannot motivate her workers. One potential explanation for inaccurate self-views is a disjunction between episodic and semantic memories; the image of grimacing listeners (episodic memory) may be quite independent of the conviction that one is a skilled singer (semantic memory). Of course, if self-knowledge is too disjunctive with reality it ceases to be adaptive; self-views must be moderately accurate to be useful in allowing people to predict and navigate their worlds. That said, some researchers have questioned the desirability of accurate self-views. For example, Taylor and Brown ( 1988 ) have argued that positive illusions about the self promote mental health. Similarly, Von Hippel and Trivers ( 2011 ) have argued that certain kinds of optimistic biases about the self are adaptive because they allow people to display more confidence than is warranted, consequently allowing them to reap the social rewards of that confidence.

Studying the accuracy of self-knowledge is challenging because objective criteria are often scarce. Put another way, there are only two vantage points from which to assess a person: self-perception and the other’s perception of the self. This is true even of supposedly “objective” measures of the self. An IQ test is still a measure of intelligence from the vantage point of the people who developed the test. Both vantage points can be subject to error. For example, self-perceptions may be biased to protect one’s self-image or due to self-comparison to an inappropriate referent. Others’ perceptions may be biased because of a lack of cross-situational information about the person in question or lack of insight into that person’s motives. Because of the advantages and disadvantages of each vantage point, self-reports may be better for assessing some traits (e.g., those low in observability, like neuroticism) while informant reports may be better for others (such as traits high in observability, like extraversion) (Vazire, 2010 ).

Furthermore, self-perceptions and others’ perceptions of the self may overlap to varying degrees. The “Johari window” provides a useful way of thinking about this (Luft & Ingham, 1955 ). The window’s first quadrant consists of things one knows about oneself that others also know about the self (arena). The second quadrant includes knowledge one has about the self that others do not have (façade). The third quadrant consists of knowledge one does not have about the self but others do have (blindspot). The fourth quadrant consists of information about the self that is not known to oneself or to others (unknown).

Which of these quadrants contains the “true self”? If I believe myself to be kind, but others do not, who is right? Which is a reflection of the “real me”? One set of attempts to answer this question has focused on perceptions of authenticity. The authentic self (Johnson & Boyd, 1995 ) is alternatively termed the “true self” (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014 ), “real self” (Rogers, 1961 ), “intrinsic self” (Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001 ), “essential self” (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014 ), or “deep self” (Sripada, 2010 ). Recent research has addressed both what aspects of the self other people describe as belonging to a person’s true self and how individuals judge their own authenticity.

Though authenticity has long been the subject of philosophical thought, only recently have researchers begun addressing the topic empirically, and definitional ambiguities abound (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schroeder-Abe, 2015 ). Some studies use unidimensional measures that equate authenticity to feeling close to one’s true self (e.g., Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1997 ). A more elaborate and philosophically grounded approach proposes four necessary factors for trait authenticity: awareness (the extent of one’s self-knowledge, motivation to expand it, and ability to trust in it), unbiased processing (the relative absence of interpretative distortions in processing self-relevant information), behavior (acting consistently with one’s needs, preferences, and values), and relational orientation (valuing and achieving openness in close relationships) (Kernis, 2003 ). Authenticity is related to feelings of self-alienation (Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010 ). Being authentic is also sometimes thought to be equivalent to low self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1982 )— someone who does not alter his or her behavior to accommodate changing social situations (Grant, 2016 ). Authenticity and self-monitoring, however, are orthogonal constructs; being sensitive to environmental cues can be compatible with acting in line with one’s true self.

Although some have argued that the ability to behave in a way that contradicts one’s feelings and mental states is a developmental accomplishment (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996 ), feelings of authenticity have been associated with many positive outcomes such as positive self-esteem, positive affect, and well-being (Goldman & Kernis, 2002 ; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008 ). One interesting line of research examines the interaction of authenticity, power, and well-being. Power can increase feelings of authenticity in social interactions (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011 ), and that increased authenticity in turn can result in higher well-being (Kifer, Heller, Peruvonic, & Galinsky, 2013 ). Another line of research examines the relationship between beliefs about authenticity (at least in the West) and morality. Gino, Kouchaki, and Galinsky ( 2015 ) suggest that dishonesty and inauthenticity share a similar source: dishonesty involves being untrue to others while inauthenticity involves being untrue to the self.

Metacognitive Aspects of Self

Valence and importance of self-views.

Self-knowledge may be positively or negatively valenced. Having more positive self-views and fewer negative ones are associated with having higher self-esteem (Brown, 1986 ). Both bottom-up and top-down theories have been used to explain this association. The bottom-up approach posits that the valence of specific self-knowledge drives the valence of one’s global self-views (e.g., Marsh, 1990 ). In this view, someone who has more positive self-views in specific domains (e.g., I am intelligent and attractive) should be more likely to develop high self-esteem overall (e.g., I am worthwhile). In contrast, the top-down perspective holds that the valence of global self-views drive the valence of specific self-views such that someone who thinks they are a worthwhile person is more likely to view him or herself as attractive and intelligent (e.g., Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001 ). The reasoning is grounded in the view that global self-esteem develops quite early in life and thus determines the later development of domain-specific self-views.

A domain-specific self-view can vary not only in its valence but also in its importance. Domain-specific self-views that one believes are important are more likely to affect global self-esteem than those self-views that one considers unimportant (Pelham, 1995 ; Pelham & Swann, 1989 ). As James wrote, “I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortified if others know much more psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 310). Of course not all self-views matter to the same extent for all people. A professor of Greek studies is likely to place a great deal of importance on his knowledge of Greek. Furthermore, changes to features that are perceived to be more causally central than others are believed to be more disruptive to identity (Chen, Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016 ). Individuals try to protect their important self-views by, for example, surrounding themselves with people and environments who confirm those important self-views (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ) or distancing themselves from close friends who outperform them in these areas (Tesser, 1988 ).

Certainty and Clarity of Self-Views

Individuals may feel more or less certain about some self-views as compared to others. And just as they are motivated to protect important self-views, people are also motivated to protect the self-views of which they are certain. People are more likely to seek (Pelham, 1991 ) and receive (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ) feedback consistent with self-views that are highly certain than those about which they feel less certain. They also actively resist challenges to highly certain self-views (Swann & Ely, 1984 ).

Another construct related to certainty is self-concept clarity. Not only are people with high self-concept clarity confident and certain of their self-views, they also are clear, internally consistent, and stable in their convictions about who they are (Campbell et al., 1996 ). The causes of low self-concept clarity have been theorized to be due to a discrepancy between one’s current self-views and the social feedback one has received in childhood (Streamer & Seery, 2015 ). Both high self-concept certainty and self-concept clarity are associated with higher self-esteem (Campbell, 1990 ).

Stability of Self-Views

The self is constantly accommodating, assimilating, and immunizing itself against new self-relevant information (Diehl et al., 2011 ). In the end, the self may remain stable (i.e., spatio-temporally continuous; Parfit, 1971 ) in at least two ways. First, the self may be stable in one’s absolute position on a scale. Second, there may be stability in one’s rank ordering within a group of related others (Hampson & Goldberg, 2006 ).

The question of the self’s stability can only be answered in the context of a specified time horizon. For example, like personality traits, self-views may not be particularly good predictors of behavior at a given time slice (perhaps an indication of the self’s instability) but are good predictors of behavior over the long term (Epstein, 1979 ). Similarly, more than others, some people experience frequent, transient changes in state self-esteem (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993 ). Furthermore, there is a difference between how people perceive the stability of their self-views and the actual stability of their self-knowledge. Though previous research has explored the benefits of perceived self-esteem stability (e.g., Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000 ; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989 ), a recent program of research on fixed versus growth mindsets explores the benefits of the malleability of self-views in a variety of domains (Dweck, 1999 , 2006 ). For example, teaching adolescents to have a more malleable (i.e., incremental) theory of personality that “people change” led them to react less negatively to an immediate experience of social adversity, have lower overall stress and physical illness eight months later, and better academic performance over the school year (Yeager et al., 2014 ). Thus, believing that the self can be unstable can have positive effects in that one negative social interaction, or an instance of poor performance is not an indication that the self will always be that way, and this may, in turn, increase effort and persistence.

Organization of Self-Views

Though we have already touched on some aspects of the organization of self (e.g., specific self-views nested within global self-views), it is important to consider other aspects of organization including the fact that some self-views may be more assimilated within each other. Integration refers to the tendency to store both positive and negative self-views together, and is thought to promote resilience in the face of stress or adversity (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007 ). Compartmentalization refers to the tendency to store positive and negative self-views separately. But both integration and compartmentalization can have positive and negative consequences and can interact with other metacognitive aspects of the self, like importance. For example, compartmentalization has been associated with higher self-esteem and less depression among people for whom positive components of the self are important (Showers, 1992 ). On the other hand, for those whose negative self-views are important, compartmentalization has been associated with lower self-esteem and higher depression.

Origins and Development of the Self

Developmental approaches.

Psychologists have long been interested in when and how infants develop a sense of self. One very basic question is whether selfhood in infancy is comparable to selfhood in adulthood. The answer depends on definitions of selfhood. For example, some researchers have measured and defined selfhood in infants as the ability to self-regulate and self-organize, which even animals can do. This definition bears little resemblance to selfhood in adulthood. Nativist and constructivist debates within developmental psychology (and language development in particular) that grapple with the problem of the origins of knowledge also have implications for understanding origins of the self. A nativist account (e.g., Chomsky, 1975 ) that considers the human mind to be innately constrained to formulate a very small set of representations would suggest that the mind is designed to develop a self. Information from the environment may form specific self-representations, but a nativist account would posit that the structure of the self is intrinsic. A constructivist account would reject the notion that there are not enough environmental stimuli to explain the development of a construct like the self unless one invokes a specific innate cognitive structure. Rather, constructivists might suggest that a child develops a theory of self in the same way scientific theories are developed (Gopnik, 2003 ).

Because infants and children cannot self-report their mental states as adults can, psychologists must use other methods to study the self in childhood. One method involves studying the development of children’s use of the personal pronouns “me,” “mine,” and “I” (Harter, 1983 ; Hobson, 1990 ). Another method that is used cross-culturally, mirror self-recognition (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979 ; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004 ), has been associated with brain maturation (Lewis, 2003 ) and myelination of the left temporal region (Carmody & Lewis, 2006 , 2010 ; Lewis & Carmody, 2008 ). Pretend play, which occurs between 15 and 24 months, is an indication that the self is developing because it requires the toddler’s ability to understand its own and others’ mental states (Lewis, 2011 ). The development of self-esteem has also historically been difficult to study due to a lack of self-esteem measures that can be used across the lifespan. Recently, psychologists have developed a lifespan self-esteem scale (Harris, Donnellan, & Trzesniewski, 2017 ) suitable for measuring global self-esteem from ages 5 to 93.

The development of theory of mind, the understanding that others have minds separate from one’s own, is also closely related to the development of the self. For example, people cannot make social comparisons until they have developed the required cognitive abilities, usually by middle childhood (Harter, 1999 ; Ruble, Boggiano, Feldman, & Loebl, 1980 ). Finally, developmental psychology is also useful in understanding the self beyond childhood and into adolescence and beyond. Adolescence is a time where goals of autonomy from parents and other adults become particularly salient (Bryan et al., 2016 ), adolescents experiment with different identities to see which fit best, and many long-term goals and personal aspirations are established (Crone & Dahl, 2012 ).

Biological Approaches

Biological approaches to understanding the origins of the self consider neurological, genetic, and hormonal underpinnings. These biological underpinnings are likely evolutionarily driven (Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007 ). Neuroscientists have debated the extent to which self-knowledge is “special,” or processed differently than other kinds of knowledge. What is clear is that no brain region by itself is responsible for our sense of self, but different aspects of the self-knowledge may be associated with different brain regions. Furthermore, the same region that is implicated in self-related processing can also be implicated in other types of processing (Ochsner et al., 2005 ; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006 ). Specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) have been associated with self-related processing (Northoff Heinzel, De Greck, Bermpohl, Dobrowolny, & Panksepp, 2006 ). But meta-analyses have found that the mPFC and PCC are recruited during the processing of both self-specific and familiar stimuli more generally (e.g., familiar others) (Qin & Northoff, 2011 ).

Twin studies of personality traits can shed light on the genetic bases of self. For example, genes account for about 40% to 60% of the population variance in self-reports of the Big Five personality factors (for a review, see Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001 ). Self-esteem levels also seem to be heritable, with 30–50% of population variance accounted for by genes (Kamakura, Ando, & Ono, 2007 ; Kendler, Gardner, & Prescott, 1998 ).

Finally, hormones are unlikely to be a cause of the self but may affect the expression of the self. For example, testosterone and cortisol levels interact with personality traits to predict different levels of aggression (Tackett et al., 2015 ). Differences in levels of and in utero exposure to certain hormones also affect gender identity (Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011 ; Reiner & Gearhart, 2004 ).

Intrapsychic Approaches

Internal processes, including self-perception and introspection, also influence the development of the self. One of the most obvious ways to develop knowledge about the self (especially when existing self-knowledge is weak) is to observe one’s own behavior across different situations and then make inferences about the aspects of the self that may have caused those behaviors (Bem, 1972 ). And just as judgments about others’ attributes are less certain when multiple possible causes exist for a given behavior, the same is true of one’s own behaviors and the amount of information they yield about the self (Kelley, 1971 ).

Conversely, introspection involves understanding the self from the inside outward rather than from the outside in. Though surprisingly little thought (only 8%) is expended on self-reflection (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982 ), people buttress self-knowledge through introspection. For example, contemporary psychoanalysis can increase self-knowledge, even though an increase in self-knowledge on its own is unlikely to have therapeutic effects (Reppen, 2013 ). Writing is one form of introspection that does have psychological and physical therapeutic benefits (Pennebaker, 1997 ). Research shows that brief writing exercises can result in fewer physician visits (e.g., Francis & Pennebaker, 1992 ), and depressive episodes (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988 ), better immune function (e.g., Esterling, Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar, & Glaser, 1994 ), and higher grade point average (e.g., Cameron & Nicholls, 1998 ) and many other positive outcomes.

Experiencing the “subjective self” is yet another way that individuals gain self-knowledge. Unlike introspection, experiencing the subjective self involves outward engagement, a full engagement in the moment that draws attention away from the self (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990 ). Being attentive to one’s emotions and thoughts in the moment can reveal much about one’s preferences and values. Apparently, people rely more on their subjective experiences than on their overt behaviors when constructing self-knowledge (Andersen, 1984 ; Andersen & Ross, 1984 ).

Interpersonal Approaches

At the risk of stating the obvious, humans are social animals and thus the self is rarely cut off from others. In fact, many individuals would rather give themselves a mild electric shock than be alone with their thoughts (Wilson et al., 2014 ). The myth of finding oneself by eschewing society is dubious, and one of the most famous proponents of this tradition, transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau, actually regularly entertained visitors during his supposed seclusion at Walden (Schulz, 2015 ). As early as infancy, the reactions of others can lay the foundation for one’s self-views. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969 ; Hazan & Shaver, 1994 ) holds that children’s earliest interactions with their caregivers lead them to formulate schemas about their lovability and worth. This occurs outside of the infant’s awareness, and the schemas are based on the consistency and responsiveness of the care they receive. Highly consistent responsiveness to the infant’s needs provide the basis for the infant to develop feelings of self-worth (i.e., high global self-esteem) later in life. Though the mechanisms by which this occur are still being investigated, it may be that self-schemas developed during infancy provide the lens through which people interpret others’ reactions to them (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987 ). Note, however, that early attachment relationships are in no way deterministic: 30–45% of people change their attachment style (i.e., their pattern of relating to others) across time (e.g., Cozzarelli, Karafa, Collins, & Tagler, 2003 ).

Early attachment relationships provide a working model for how an individual expects to be treated, which is associated with perceptions of self-worth. But others’ appraisals of the self are also a more direct source of self-knowledge. An extremely influential line of thought from sociology, symbolic interactionism (Cooley, 1902 ; Mead, 1934 ), emphasized the component of the self that James referred to as the social self. He wrote, “a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind” ( 1890 / 1950 , p. 294). The symbolic interactionists proposed that people come to know themselves not through introspection but rather through others’ reactions and perceptions of them. This “looking glass self” sees itself as others do (Yeung & Martin, 2003 ). People’s inferences about how others view them become internalized and guide their behavior. Thus the self is created socially and is sustained cyclically.

Research shows, however, that reflected appraisals may not tell the whole story. While it is clear that people’s self-views correlate strongly with how they believe others see them, self-views are not necessarily perfectly correlated with how people actually view them (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979 ). Further, people’s self-views may inform how they believe others see them rather than the other way around (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993 ). Lastly, individuals are better at knowing how people see them in general rather than knowing how specific others view them (Kenny & Albright, 1987 ).

Though others’ perceptions of the self are not an individual’s only source of self-knowledge, they are an important source, and in more than one way. For example, others’ provide a reference point for “social comparison.” According to Festinger’s social comparison theory ( 1954 ), people compare their own traits, preferences, abilities, and emotions to those of similar others, making both upward and downward comparisons. These comparisons tend to happen spontaneously and effortlessly. The direction of the comparison influences how one views and feels about the self. For example, comparing the self to someone worse off boosts self-esteem (e.g., Helgeson & Mickelson, 1995 ; Marsh & Parker, 1984 ). In addition to increasing self-knowledge, social comparisons are also motivating. For instance, those undergoing difficult or painful life events can cope better when they make downward comparisons (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985 ). When motivated to improve the self in a given domain, however, people may make upward comparisons to idealized others (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999 ). Sometimes individuals make comparisons to inappropriate others, but they have the ability (with mental effort) to undo the changes made to the self-concept as a result of this comparison (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995 ).

Others can influence the self not only through interactions and comparisons but also when an individual becomes very close to a significant other. In this case, according to self-expansion theory (Aron & Aron, 1996 ), as intimacy increases, people experience cognitive overlap between the self and the significant other. People can acquire novel self-knowledge as they subsume attributes of the close other into the self.

Finally, the origins and development of the self are interpersonally influenced to the extent that our identities are dependent on the social roles we occupy (e.g., as mother, student, friend, professional, etc.). This will be covered in greater detail in the section on “The Social Self.” Here it is important simply to recognize that as the social roles of an individual inevitably change over time, so too does their identity.

Cultural Approaches

Markus and Kitayama’s seminal paper ( 1991 ) on differences in expression of the self in Eastern and Western cultures spawned an incredible amount of work investigating the importance of culture on self-construals. Building on the foundational work of Triandis ( 1989 ) and others, this work proposed that people in Western cultures see themselves as autonomous individuals who value independence and uniqueness more so than connectedness and harmony with others. In contrast to this individualism, people in the East were thought to be more collectivist, valuing interdependence and fitting in. However, the theoretical relationship between self-construals and the continuous individualism-collectivism variable have been treated in several different ways in the literature. Some have described individualism and collectivism as the origins of differences in self-construals (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996 ; Kim, Aune, Hunter, Kim, & Kim, 2001 ; Singelis & Brown, 1995 ). Others have considered self-construals as synonymous with individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002 ; Taras et al., 2014 ) or have used individualism-collectivism at the individual level as an analog of the variable at the cultural level (Smith, 2011 ).

However, in contrast to perspectives that treat individualism and collectivism as a unidimensional variable (e.g., Singelis, 1994 ), individualism and collectivism have also been theorized to be multifaceted “cultural syndromes” that include normative beliefs, values, and practices, as well as self-construals (Brewer & Chen, 2007 ; Triandis, 1993 ). In this view, there are many ways of being independent or collectivistic depending on the domain of functioning under consideration. For example, a person may be independent or interdependent when defining the self, experiencing the self, making decisions, looking after the self, moving between contexts, communicating with others, or dealing with conflicting interests (Vignoles et al., 2016 ). These domains of functioning are orthogonal such that being interdependent in one domain does not require being interdependent in another. This multidimensional picture of individual differences in individualism and collectivism is actually more similar to Markus and Kitayama’s ( 1991 ) initial treatment aiming to emphasize cultural diversity and contradicts the prevalent unidimensional approach to cultural differences that followed.

Recent research has pointed out other shortcomings of this dichotomous approach. There is a great deal of heterogeneity among the world’s cultures, so simplifying all culture to “Eastern” and “Western” or collectivistic versus individualistic types may be invalid. Vignoles and colleagues’ ( 2016 ) study of 16 nations supports this. They found that neither a contrast between Western and non-Western, nor between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, sufficiently captured the complexity of cross-cultural differences in selfhood. They conclude that “it is not useful to characterize any culture as ‘independent’ or ‘interdependent’ in a general sense” and rather advocate for research that identifies what kinds of independence and interdependence may be present in different contexts ( 2016 , p. 991). In addition, there is a great deal of within culture heterogeneity in self-construals For example, even within an individualistic, Western culture like the United States, working-class people and ethnic minorities tend to be more interdependent (Markus, 2017 ), tempering the geographically based generalizations one might draw about self-construals.

Another line of recent research on the self in cultural context that has explored self-construals beyond the East-West dichotomy is the study of multiculturalism and individuals who are a member of multiple cultural groups (Benet-Martinez & Hong, 2014 ). People may relate to each of the cultures to which they belong in different ways, and this may in turn have important effects. For example, categorization, which involves viewing one cultural identity as dominant over the others, is associated positively with well-being but negatively with personal growth (Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2013 ). Integration involves cohesively connecting multiple cultures within the self while compartmentalization requires keeping one’s various cultures isolated because they are seen to be in opposition. Each of these strategies has different consequences.

Finally, the influence of religion remains significant in many parts of the world (Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004 ; Inglehart & Baker, 2000 ), and so religion is also an important source of differences in self-construal. These religious traditions provide answers to the question of how the self should relate to others. For example, Buddhism emphasizes the interdependence of all things and thus agency does not necessarily reside in individual actors. Moreover, for Buddhists the boundaries between the self and the other are insignificant, and in fact the self is thought to be impermanent (see Garfield, Nichols, Rai, Nichols, & Strohminger, 2015 ).

Motivational Properties of the Self

Need for communion, agency, and coherence.

Understanding what motivates people is one of social psychology’s core questions, and a variety of motives have been proposed. Three motives that are particularly important to self-processes are the need for communion (belonging and interpersonal connectedness), the need for agency (autonomy and competence), and the need for coherence (patterns and regularities). The needs for communion and agency are the foundations of many aspects of social behavior (Baumeister & Leary, 1995 ; Wiggins & Broughton, 1991 ). Among attitude researchers, constructs similar to communion and agency (i.e., warmth and competence) represent the two basic dimensions of attitudes (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2007 ; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007 ; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005 ). Of even more relevance to the self, communion and agency correspond with the dual forms of self-esteem (e.g., Franks & Marolla, 1976 ; Gecas, 1971 ). That is, self-esteem can be broken down into two components: self-liking and self-competence (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001 ). Self-competence is an evaluation of one’s ability to bring about a desired outcome while the need for communion is an evaluation of one’s goodness, worth, and lovability. Each of these dimensions of self-esteem predicts unique outcomes (e.g., Bosson & Swann, 1999 ; Tafarodi & Vu, 1997 ).

Those who do not fulfill their communion needs have poorer physical outcomes such as relatively poor physical health, weakened immune functioning, and higher mortality rates (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988 ; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996 ). As far as psychological outcomes, people who lack positive connections with others also experience greater loneliness (Archibald, Bartholomew, & Marx, 1995 ; Newcomb & Bentler, 1986 ), while those with rich social networks report higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999 ). People’s sense of autonomy also contributes to psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989 ) and encourages people to strive for high performance in domains they care about. Autonomy strivings can also be beneficial in that they contribute to people’s need for self-growth (e.g., Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 2001 ; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995 ).

Finally, a great deal of support exists for the notion that people have a fundamental need for psychological coherence or the need for regularity, predictability, meaning, and control (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006 ). Coherence is a distinct from consistency because it refers specifically to the consistency between a person’s enduring self-views and the other aspects of their psychological universe (English, Chen, & Swann, 2008 ). The coherence motive may be even more basic than the needs for communion and agency (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 ; Popper, 1963 ). That is, self-views serve as the lenses through which people perceive reality, and incoherence degrades the vision of reality that these lenses offer.

When people feel that their self-knowledge base is incoherent, they may not know how to act, and guiding action is thought to be the primary purpose of thinking in the first place (James, 1890 / 1950 ).

Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification Motives

Drawing on Prescott Lecky’s ( 1945 ) proposition that chronic self-views give people a strong sense of coherence, self-verification theory posits that people desire to be seen as they see themselves, even if their self-views are negative. Self-views can guide at least three stages of information processing: attention, recall, and interpretation. In addition, people act on the preference for self-confirmatory evaluations ensuring that their experiences reinforce their self-views. For example, just as those who see themselves as likable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them positively, so too do people who see themselves as dislikable seek out and embrace others who evaluate them negatively (e.g., Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989 ). The theory suggests that people both enter and leave relationships that fail to satisfy their self-verification strivings (Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994 ), even divorcing people who they believe have overly positive appraisals of them (for a review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010 ). People may also communicate their identities visually through “identity cues” that enable others to understand and react accordingly to that identity (Gosling, 2008 ). People seek verification of their specific as well as global (self-views). They are especially inclined to seek self-verifying evaluations for self-views that are certain or important (Pelham & Swann, 1994 ; Swann & Pelham, 2002 ).

For the 70% of individuals with globally positive self-views (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995 ), self-verification may look like self-enhancement strivings (Brown, 1986 ) in that it will compel people to seek and prefer positive feedback about the self. In fact, even people with negative self-views tend to self-enhance when they do not have the cognitive resources available to reflect on their self-views and compare it to the feedback available (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990 ). In addition, people have a tendency to self-enhance before they self-verify (Swann et al., 1990 ). Other evidence for self-enhancement includes the tendency for people to view themselves as better than average, though this may be most likely for ambiguous traits that can describe a wide variety of behaviors because the evidence that people use to make self-evaluations is idiosyncratic (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989 ).

It is important to remember in discussions of self-verification and self-enhancement that people do not seek to see themselves as they actually are but rather as they see themselves . As mentioned in the section on accuracy, this self-view may overlap to varying degrees with “reality” or others’ perceptions of the self.

The Social Self

Identity negotiation.

People’s self-views influence the kinds of relationships they will engage in, and people can take on numerous identities depending on the situation and relationship. Identity negotiation theory (Swann & Bosson, 2008 ) suggests that relationship partners establish “who is who” via ongoing, mutual, and reciprocal interactions. Once people establish a “working consensus” for what roles each person will take in the relationship (e.g., Swann & Bosson, 2008 ), their agreed-upon expectations help disconnected individuals collaborate toward common obligations and goals, with some commitment to each other. Identity negotiation processes help define relationships and serve as a foundation for organized social activity. The identities that people negotiate tend to align with their chronic self-views. People follow these identity-negotiating processes, albeit largely unintentionally, during each of several successive stages of social interaction. Identities only survive to the extent that they are nourished and confirmed by the social environment, so negotiating identities in relationships is one way an individual ensures the survival of their self-views.

Personal and Social Self-Knowledge

Researchers have historically distinguished between two types of identity: personal and social. Personal identity refers to those features of the self that distinguish us from others while social identity refers to features of the self that are a source of commonality with others, such as group memberships. Once formed, social identities have a powerful influence on thought and behavior (Tajfel, 1981 ; Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ). Social category memberships can influence a person’s self-definition as much or more than idiosyncratic personal attributes (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008 ). One version of social identity theory posits that people enter groups that they view as both positive and distinctive to bolster their self-views (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988 ). Evidence shows that people display a strong ingroup bias, or tendency to favor their own group relative to outgroups (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1985 ; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971 ). This bias, along with the outgroup homogeneity effect whereby people see outgroup members as more similar than ingroup members (Linville & Jones, 1980 ) facilitates people’s ability to dehumanize members of outgroups. Dehumanization, perceiving a person as lacking in human qualities, then allows for the justification and maintenance of intergroup prejudice and conflict (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005 ; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003 ).

Self-categorization theory, in contrast to emphasizing motivation as in social identity theory, stresses the perceptual processes that lead humans to categorize the world into “us” and “them” (Turner, 1985 ; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987 ). Other approaches argue that social identities reduce uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2007 , 2012 ), make the world more coherent (e.g., Ellemers & Van Knippenberg, 1997 ), or protect people from the fear of death (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002 ). Though these approaches emphasize cognitive aspects of group membership, group-related emotions are also an important component of social identity. For instance, intergroup emotions theory proposes that a person’s emotional reactions toward other social groups can change in response to situationally induced shifts in self-categorization (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009 ).

Whatever the nature of the motive that causes people to identify with groups, although group memberships are critical for survival, they can also place people in grave danger when they motivate extreme action on behalf of the group. Research on identity fusion, which occurs when the boundaries between one’s personal and social identities become porous, shows how strong alignment with a group can lead to fighting and dying for that group at great personal cost (Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014 ). This occurs when people come to view members of their social group as family (Swann et al., 2014 ).

Some research has investigated how personal and social identities are cognitively structured (Reid & Deaux, 1996 ). The segregation model of identity assumes that social and personal attributes are distinct (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991 ) while the integration model suggests that identities and attributes coexist in a limited set of cognitive structures. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting ( 1999 ) suggest that what constitutes social versus personal identity should not be determined by the attribute itself but rather the function it is serving (i.e., connecting the self to other people or distinguishing the self from other people). Similarly, optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991 ) argues that individuals have an inherent drive to identity with groups but an equally important drive to maintain their individuality. To cope, they strive to find a balance between these opposing forces by finding an identity that supports both the individual’s need for autonomy and affiliation.

For most people, gender and ethnicity are important social identities, and there is variation in the strength of people’s identification with these groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992 ). In terms of how gender affects the expression of the self, girls are often socialized to prioritize the qualities that align them to others, while boys are taught to prioritize the qualities that distinguish and differentiate them from others (e.g., Spence, Deaux, & Helmreich, 1985 ). Moreover, women’s self-esteem tends to be connected more to their relational qualities, while men’s self-esteem is linked to their independent qualities (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992 ).

Though society has made great strides in allowing men and women to embrace identities of their own choosing (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2004 ), traditional social expectations about what it means to be a man or a women persist. For example, gender stereotypes have remained constant over the past thirty years even as women have made significant professional and political gains (Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016 ). These stereotypes remain entrenched for men as well. England ( 2010 ) argues that for the gender revolution to be complete, not only should traditionally male professions and domains be open to women but traditionally female domains should be increasingly occupied by men. This would help move society closer to attaining gender equality while signaling that traditionally female-dominated roles are equally valued.

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3 Self and Identity

For human beings, the self is what happens when “I” encounters “Me.” The central psychological question of selfhood, then, is this: How does a person apprehend and understand who he or she is? Over the past 100 years, psychologists have approached the study of self (and the related concept of identity) in many different ways, but three central metaphors for the self repeatedly emerge. First, the self may be seen as a social actor, who enacts roles and displays traits by performing behaviors in the presence of others. Second, the self is a motivated agent, who acts upon inner desires and formulates goals, values, and plans to guide behavior in the future. Third, the self eventually becomes an autobiographical author, too, who takes stock of life — past, present, and future — to create a story about who I am, how I came to be, and where my life may be going. This module briefly reviews central ideas and research findings on the self as an actor, an agent, and an author, with an emphasis on how these features of selfhood develop over the human life course.

Learning Objectives

• Explain the basic idea of reflexivity in human selfhood—how the “I” encounters and makes sense of itself (the “Me”).
• Describe fundamental distinctions between three different perspectives on the self: the self as actor, agent, and author.
• Describe how a sense of self as a social actor emerges around the age of 2 years and how it develops going forward.
• Describe the development of the self’s sense of motivated agency from the emergence of the child’s theory of mind to the articulation of life goals and values in adolescence and beyond.
• Define the term narrative identity, and explain what psychological and cultural functions narrative identity serves.

Introduction

In the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, the ancient Greeks inscribed the words: “Know thy self .” For at least 2,500 years, and probably longer, human beings have pondered the meaning of the ancient aphorism. Over the past century, psychological scientists have joined the effort. They have formulated many theories and tested countless hypotheses that speak to the central question of human selfhood: How does a person know who he or she is?

The ancient Greeks seemed to realize that the self is inherently reflexive —it reflects back on itself. In the disarmingly simple idea made famous by the great psychologist William James ( 1892/1963 ), the self is what happens when “I” reflects back upon “Me.” The self is both the I and the Me—it is the knower, and it is what the knower knows when the knower reflects upon itself. When you look back at yourself, what do you see? When you look inside, what do you find? Moreover, when you try to change your self in some way, what is it that you are trying to change? The philosopher Charles Taylor ( 1989 ) describes the self as a reflexive project . In modern life, Taylor agues, we often try to manage, discipline, refine, improve, or develop the self. We work on our selves, as we might work on any other interesting project. But what exactly is it that we work on?

Imagine for a moment that you have decided to improve your self . You might, say, go on a diet to improve your appearance. Or you might decide to be nicer to your mother, in order to improve that important social role. Or maybe the problem is at work—you need to find a better job or go back to school to prepare for a different career. Perhaps you just need to work harder. Or get organized. Or recommit yourself to religion. Or maybe the key is to begin thinking about your whole life story in a completely different way, in a way that you hope will bring you more happiness, fulfillment, peace, or excitement.

Although there are many different ways you might reflect upon and try to improve the self, it turns out that many, if not most, of them fall roughly into three broad psychological categories ( McAdams & Cox, 2010 ). The I may encounter the Me as (a) a social actor, (b) a motivated agent, or (c) an autobiographical author.

The Social Actor

Shakespeare tapped into a deep truth about human nature when he famously wrote, “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players.” He was wrong about the “merely,” however, for there is nothing more important for human adaptation than the manner in which we perform our roles as actors in the everyday theatre of social life. What Shakespeare may have sensed but could not have fully understood is that human beings evolved to live in social groups. Beginning with Darwin ( 1872/1965 ) and running through contemporary conceptions of human evolution, scientists have portrayed human nature as profoundly social ( Wilson, 2012 ). For a few million years, Homo sapiens and their evolutionary forerunners have survived and flourished by virtue of their ability to live and work together in complex social groups, cooperating with each other to solve problems and overcome threats and competing with each other in the face of limited resources. As social animals, human beings strive to get along and get ahead in the presence of each other ( Hogan, 1982 ). Evolution has prepared us to care deeply about social acceptance and social status, for those unfortunate individuals who do not get along well in social groups or who fail to attain a requisite status among their peers have typically been severely compromised when it comes to survival and reproduction. It makes consummate evolutionary sense, therefore, that the human “I” should apprehend the “Me” first and foremost as a social actor .

For human beings, the sense of the self as a social actor begins to emerge around the age of 18 months. Numerous studies have shown that by the time they reach their second birthday most toddlers recognize themselves in mirrors and other reflecting devices ( Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979 ; Rochat, 2003 ). What they see is an embodied actor who moves through space and time. Many children begin to use words such as “me” and “mine” in the second year of life, suggesting that the I now has linguistic labels that can be applied reflexively to itself: I call myself “me.” Around the same time, children also begin to express social emotions such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, and pride ( Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007 ). These emotions tell the social actor how well he or she is performing in the group. When I do things that win the approval of others, I feel proud of myself. When I fail in the presence of others, I may feel embarrassment or shame. When I violate a social rule, I may experience guilt, which may motivate me to make amends.

Many of the classic psychological theories of human selfhood point to the second year of life as a key developmental period. For example, Freud ( 1923/1961 ) and his followers in the psychoanalytic tradition traced the emergence of an autonomous ego back to the second year. Freud used the term “ego” (in German das Ich , which also translates into “the I”) to refer to an executive self in the personality. Erikson ( 1963 ) argued that experiences of trust and interpersonal attachment in the first year of life help to consolidate the autonomy of the ego in the second. Coming from a more sociological perspective, Mead ( 1934 ) suggested that the I comes to know the Me through reflection, which may begin quite literally with mirrors but later involves the reflected appraisals of others. I come to know who I am as a social actor, Mead argued, by noting how other people in my social world react to my performances. In the development of the self as a social actor, other people function like mirrors—they reflect who I am back to me.

Research has shown that when young children begin to make attributions about themselves, they start simple ( Harter, 2006 ). At age 4, Jessica knows that she has dark hair, knows that she lives in a white house, and describes herself to others in terms of simple behavioral traits . She may say that she is “nice,” or “helpful,” or that she is “a good girl most of the time.” By the time, she hits fifth grade (age 10), Jessica sees herself in more complex ways, attributing traits to the self such as “honest,” “moody,” “outgoing,” “shy,” “hard-working,” “smart,” “good at math but not gym class,” or “nice except when I am around my annoying brother.” By late childhood and early adolescence, the personality traits that people attribute to themselves, as well as those attributed to them by others, tend to correlate with each other in ways that conform to a well-established taxonomy of five broad trait domains, repeatedly derived in studies of adult personality and often called the Big Five : (1) extraversion, (2) neuroticism, (3) agreeableness, (4) conscientiousness, and (5) openness to experience ( Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008 ). By late childhood, moreover, self-conceptions will likely also include important social roles : “I am a good student,” “I am the oldest daughter,” or “I am a good friend to Sarah.”

Traits and roles, and variations on these notions, are the main currency of the self as social actor ( McAdams & Cox, 2010 ). Trait terms capture perceived consistencies in social performance. They convey what I reflexively perceive to be my overall acting style, based in part on how I think others see me as an actor in many different social situations. Roles capture the quality, as I perceive it, of important structured relationships in my life. Taken together, traits and roles make up the main features of my social reputation , as I apprehend it in my own mind ( Hogan, 1982 ).

If you have ever tried hard to change yourself, you may have taken aim at your social reputation, targeting your central traits or your social roles. Maybe you woke up one day and decided that you must become a more optimistic and emotionally upbeat person. Taking into consideration the reflected appraisals of others, you realized that even your friends seem to avoid you because you bring them down. In addition, it feels bad to feel so bad all the time: Wouldn’t it be better to feel good, to have more energy and hope? In the language of traits, you have decided to “work on” your “neuroticism.” Or maybe instead, your problem is the trait of “conscientiousness”: You are undisciplined and don’t work hard enough, so you resolve to make changes in that area. Self-improvement efforts such as these—aimed at changing one’s traits to become a more effective social actor—are sometimes successful, but they are very hard—kind of like dieting. Research suggests that broad traits tend to be stubborn, resistant to change, even with the aid of psychotherapy. However, people often have more success working directly on their social roles. To become a more effective social actor, you may want to take aim at the important roles you play in life. What can I do to become a better son or daughter? How can I find new and meaningful roles to perform at work, or in my family, or among my friends, or in my church and community? By doing concrete things that enrich your performances in important social roles, you may begin to see yourself in a new light, and others will notice the change, too. Social actors hold the potential to transform their performances across the human life course. Each time you walk out on stage, you have a chance to start anew.

The Motivated Agent

Whether we are talking literally about the theatrical stage or more figuratively, as I do in this module, about the everyday social environment for human behavior, observers can never fully know what is in the actor’s head, no matter how closely they watch. We can see actors act, but we cannot know for sure what they want or what they value , unless they tell us straightaway. As a social actor, a person may come across as friendly and compassionate, or cynical and mean-spirited, but in neither case can we infer their motivations from their traits or their roles. What does the friendly person want? What is the cynical father trying to achieve? Many broad psychological theories of the self prioritize the motivational qualities of human behavior—the inner needs, wants, desires, goals, values, plans, programs, fears, and aversions that seem to give behavior its direction and purpose ( Bandura, 1989 ; Deci & Ryan, 1991 ; Markus & Nurius, 1986 ). These kinds of theories explicitly conceive of the self as a motivated agent.

To be an agent is to act with direction and purpose, to move forward into the future in pursuit of self-chosen and valued goals. In a sense, human beings are agents even as infants, for babies can surely act in goal-directed ways. By age 1 year, moreover, infants show a strong preference for observing and imitating the goal-directed, intentional behavior of others, rather than random behaviors ( Woodward, 2009 ). Still, it is one thing to act in goal-directed ways; it is quite another for the I to know itself (the Me) as an intentional and purposeful force who moves forward in life in pursuit of self-chosen goals, values, and other desired end states. In order to do so, the person must first realize that people indeed have desires and goals in their minds and that these inner desires and goals motivate (initiate, energize, put into motion) their behavior. According to a strong line of research in developmental psychology, attaining this kind of understanding means acquiring a theory of mind ( Wellman, 1993 ), which occurs for most children by the age of 4. Once a child understands that other people’s behavior is often motivated by inner desires and goals, it is a small step to apprehend the self in similar terms.

Building on theory of mind and other cognitive and social developments, children begin to construct the self as a motivated agent in the elementary school years, layered over their still-developing sense of themselves as social actors. Theory and research on what developmental psychologists call the age 5-to-7 shift converge to suggest that children become more planful, intentional, and systematic in their pursuit of valued goals during this time ( Sameroff & Haith, 1996 ). Schooling reinforces the shift in that teachers and curricula place increasing demands on students to work hard, adhere to schedules, focus on goals, and achieve success in particular, well-defined task domains. Their relative success in achieving their most cherished goals, furthermore, goes a long way in determining children’s self-esteem ( Robins, Tracy, & Trzesniewski, 2008 ). Motivated agents feel good about themselves to the extent they believe that they are making good progress in achieving their goals and advancing their most important values.

Goals and values become even more important for the self in adolescence, as teenagers begin to confront what Erikson ( 1963 ) famously termed the developmental challenge of identity . For adolescents and young adults, establishing a psychologically efficacious identity involves exploring different options with respect to life goals, values, vocations, and intimate relationships and eventually committing to a motivational and ideological agenda for adult life—an integrated and realistic sense of what I want and value in life and how I plan to achieve it ( Kroger & Marcia, 2011 ). Committing oneself to an integrated suite of life goals and values is perhaps the greatest achievement for the self as motivated agent . Establishing an adult identity has implications, as well, for how a person moves through life as a social actor, entailing new role commitments and, perhaps, a changing understanding of one’s basic dispositional traits. According to Erikson, however, identity achievement is always provisional, for adults continue to work on their identities as they move into midlife and beyond, often relinquishing old goals in favor of new ones, investing themselves in new projects and making new plans, exploring new relationships, and shifting their priorities in response to changing life circumstances ( Freund & Riediger, 2006 ; Josselson, 1996 ).

There is a sense whereby any time you try to change yourself, you are assuming the role of a motivated agent. After all, to strive to change something is inherently what an agent does. However, what particular feature of selfhood you try to change may correspond to your self as actor, agent, or author, or some combination. When you try to change your traits or roles, you take aim at the social actor. By contrast, when you try to change your values or life goals, you are focusing on yourself as a motivated agent. Adolescence and young adulthood are periods in the human life course when many of us focus attention on our values and life goals. Perhaps you grew up as a traditional Catholic, but now in college you believe that the values inculcated in your childhood no longer function so well for you. You no longer believe in the central tenets of the Catholic Church, say, and are now working to replace your old values with new ones. Or maybe you still want to be Catholic, but you feel that your new take on faith requires a different kind of personal ideology. In the realm of the motivated agent, moreover, changing values can influence life goals. If your new value system prioritizes alleviating the suffering of others, you may decide to pursue a degree in social work, or to become a public interest lawyer, or to live a simpler life that prioritizes people over material wealth. A great deal of the identity work we do in adolescence and young adulthood is about values and goals, as we strive to articulate a personal vision or dream for what we hope to accomplish in the future.

The Autobiographical Author

Even as the “I” continues to develop a sense of the “Me” as both a social actor and a motivated agent, a third standpoint for selfhood gradually emerges in the adolescent and early-adult years. The third perspective is a response to Erikson’s ( 1963 ) challenge of identity. According to Erikson, developing an identity involves more than the exploration of and commitment to life goals and values (the self as motivated agent), and more than committing to new roles and re-evaluating old traits (the self as social actor). It also involves achieving a sense of temporal continuity in life—a reflexive understanding of how I have come to be the person I am becoming , or put differently, how my past self has developed into my present self, and how my present self will, in turn, develop into an envisioned future self. In his analysis of identity formation in the life of the 15th-century Protestant reformer Martin Luther, Erikson ( 1958 ) describes the culmination of a young adult’s search for identity in this way:

“To be adult means among other things to see one’s own life in continuous perspective, both in retrospect and prospect. By accepting some definition of who he is, usually on the basis of a function in an economy, a place in the sequence of generations, and a status in the structure of society, the adult is able to selectively reconstruct his past in such a way that, step for step, it seems to have planned him, or better, he seems to have planned it . In this sense, psychologically we do choose our parents, our family history, and the history of our kings, heroes, and gods. By making them our own, we maneuver ourselves into the inner position of proprietors, of creators.”

— (Erikson, 1958, pp. 111–112; emphasis added).

In this rich passage, Erikson intimates that the development of a mature identity in young adulthood involves the I’s ability to construct a retrospective and prospective story about the Me ( McAdams, 1985 ). In their efforts to find a meaningful identity for life, young men and women begin “to selectively reconstruct” their past, as Erikson wrote, and imagine their future to create an integrative life story, or what psychologists today often call a narrative identity . A narrative identity is an internalized and evolving story of the self that reconstructs the past and anticipates the future in such a way as to provide a person’s life with some degree of unity, meaning, and purpose over time ( McAdams, 2008 ; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007 ). The self typically becomes an autobiographical author in the early-adult years, a way of being that is layered over the motivated agent, which is layered over the social actor. In order to provide life with the sense of temporal continuity and deep meaning that Erikson believed identity should confer, we must author a personalized life story that integrates our understanding of who we once were, who we are today, and who we may become in the future. The story helps to explain, for the author and for the author’s world, why the social actor does what it does and why the motivated agent wants what it wants, and how the person as a whole has developed over time, from the past’s reconstructed beginning to the future’s imagined ending.

By the time they are 5 or 6 years of age, children can tell well-formed stories about personal events in their lives ( Fivush, 2011 ). By the end of childhood, they usually have a good sense of what a typical biography contains and how it is sequenced, from birth to death ( Thomsen & Bernsten, 2008 ). But it is not until adolescence, research shows, that human beings express advanced storytelling skills and what psychologists call autobiographical reasoning ( Habermas & Bluck, 2000 ; McLean & Fournier, 2008 ). In autobiographical reasoning, a narrator is able to derive substantive conclusions about the self from analyzing his or her own personal experiences. Adolescents may develop the ability to string together events into causal chains and inductively derive general themes about life from a sequence of chapters and scenes ( Habermas & de Silveira, 2008 ). For example, a 16-year-old may be able to explain to herself and to others how childhood experiences in her family have shaped her vocation in life. Her parents were divorced when she was 5 years old, the teenager recalls, and this caused a great deal of stress in her family. Her mother often seemed anxious and depressed, but she (the now-teenager when she was a little girl—the story’s protagonist) often tried to cheer her mother up, and her efforts seemed to work. In more recent years, the teenager notes that her friends often come to her with their boyfriend problems. She seems to be very adept at giving advice about love and relationships, which stems, the teenager now believes, from her early experiences with her mother. Carrying this causal narrative forward, the teenager now thinks that she would like to be a marriage counselor when she grows up.

Unlike children, then, adolescents can tell a full and convincing story about an entire human life, or at least a prominent line of causation within a full life, explaining continuity and change in the story’s protagonist over time. Once the cognitive skills are in place, young people seek interpersonal opportunities to share and refine their developing sense of themselves as storytellers (the I) who tell stories about themselves (the Me). Adolescents and young adults author a narrative sense of the self by telling stories about their experiences to other people, monitoring the feedback they receive from the tellings, editing their stories in light of the feedback, gaining new experiences and telling stories about those, and on and on, as selves create stories that, in turn, create new selves ( McLean et al., 2007 ). Gradually, in fits and starts, through conversation and introspection, the I develops a convincing and coherent narrative about the Me.

Contemporary research on the self as autobiographical author emphasizes the strong effect of culture on narrative identity ( Hammack, 2008 ). Culture provides a menu of favored plot lines, themes, and character types for the construction of self-defining life stories. Autobiographical authors sample selectively from the cultural menu, appropriating ideas that seem to resonate well with their own life experiences. As such, life stories reflect the culture, wherein they are situated as much as they reflect the authorial efforts of the autobiographical I.

As one example of the tight link between culture and narrative identity, McAdams ( 2013 ) and others (e.g., Kleinfeld, 2012 ) have highlighted the prominence of redemptive narratives in American culture. Epitomized in such iconic cultural ideals as the American dream, Horatio Alger stories, and narratives of Christian atonement, redemptive stories track the move from suffering to an enhanced status or state, while scripting the development of a chosen protagonist who journeys forth into a dangerous and unredeemed world ( McAdams, 2013 ). Hollywood movies often celebrate redemptive quests. Americans are exposed to similar narrative messages in self-help books, 12-step programs, Sunday sermons, and in the rhetoric of political campaigns. Over the past two decades, the world’s most influential spokesperson for the power of redemption in human lives may be Oprah Winfrey, who tells her own story of overcoming childhood adversity while encouraging others, through her media outlets and philanthropy, to tell similar kinds of stories for their own lives ( McAdams, 2013 ). Research has demonstrated that American adults who enjoy high levels of mental health and civic engagement tend to construct their lives as narratives of redemption, tracking the move from sin to salvation, rags to riches, oppression to liberation, or sickness/abuse to health/recovery ( McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997 ; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001 ; Walker & Frimer, 2007 ). In American society, these kinds of stories are often seen to be inspirational.

At the same time, McAdams ( 2011 , 2013 ) has pointed to shortcomings and limitations in the redemptive stories that many Americans tell, which mirror cultural biases and stereotypes in American culture and heritage. McAdams has argued that redemptive stories support happiness and societal engagement for some Americans, but the same stories can encourage moral righteousness and a naïve expectation that suffering will always be redeemed. For better and sometimes for worse, Americans seem to love stories of personal redemption and often aim to assimilate their autobiographical memories and aspirations to a redemptive form. Nonetheless, these same stories may not work so well in cultures that espouse different values and narrative ideals ( Hammack, 2008 ). It is important to remember that every culture offers its own storehouse of favored narrative forms. It is also essential to know that no single narrative form captures all that is good (or bad) about a culture. In American society, the redemptive narrative is but one of many different kinds of stories that people commonly employ to make sense of their lives.

What is your story? What kind of a narrative are you working on? As you look to the past and imagine the future, what threads of continuity, change, and meaning do you discern? For many people, the most dramatic and fulfilling efforts to change the self happen when the I works hard, as an autobiographical author, to construct and, ultimately, to tell a new story about the Me. Storytelling may be the most powerful form of self-transformation that human beings have ever invented. Changing one’s life story is at the heart of many forms of psychotherapy and counseling, as well as religious conversions, vocational epiphanies, and other dramatic transformations of the self that people often celebrate as turning points in their lives ( Adler, 2012 ). Storytelling is often at the heart of the little changes, too, minor edits in the self that we make as we move through daily life, as we live and experience life, and as we later tell it to ourselves and to others.

For human beings, selves begin as social actors, but they eventually become motivated agents and autobiographical authors, too. The I first sees itself as an embodied actor in social space; with development, however, it comes to appreciate itself also as a forward-looking source of self-determined goals and values, and later yet, as a storyteller of personal experience, oriented to the reconstructed past and the imagined future. To “know thyself” in mature adulthood, then, is to do three things: (a) to apprehend and to perform with social approval my self-ascribed traits and roles, (b) to pursue with vigor and (ideally) success my most valued goals and plans, and (c) to construct a story about life that conveys, with vividness and cultural resonance, how I became the person I am becoming, integrating my past as I remember it, my present as I am experiencing it, and my future as I hope it to be.

Text Attribution

Media attributions.

• Me in the mirror
• The Shakespeare, High Street, Lincoln

The idea that the self reflects back upon itself; that the I (the knower, the subject) encounters the Me (the known, the object). Reflexivity is a fundamental property of human selfhood.

Sigmund Freud’s conception of an executive self in the personality. Akin to this module’s notion of “the I,” Freud imagined the ego as observing outside reality, engaging in rational though, and coping with the competing demands of inner desires and moral standards.

A broad taxonomy of personality trait domains repeatedly derived from studies of trait ratings in adulthood and encompassing the categories of (1) extraversion vs. introversion, (2) neuroticism vs. emotional stability, (3) agreeable vs. disagreeableness, (4) conscientiousness vs. nonconscientiousness, and (5) openness to experience vs. conventionality. By late childhood and early adolescence, people’s self-attributions of personality traits, as well as the trait attributions made about them by others, show patterns of intercorrelations that confirm with the five-factor structure obtained in studies of adults.

The sense of the self as an embodied actor whose social performances may be construed in terms of more or less consistent self-ascribed traits and social roles.

The traits and social roles that others attribute to an actor. Actors also have their own conceptions of what they imagine their respective social reputations indeed are in the eyes of others.

Emerging around the age of 4, the child’s understanding that other people have minds in which are located desires and beliefs, and that desires and beliefs, thereby, motivate behavior.

Cognitive and social changes that occur in the early elementary school years that result in the child’s developing a more purposeful, planful, and goal-directed approach to life, setting the stage for the emergence of the self as a motivated agent.

The extent to which a person feels that he or she is worthy and good. The success or failure that the motivated agent experiences in pursuit of valued goals is a strong determinant of self-esteem.

Sometimes used synonymously with the term “self,” identity means many different things in psychological science and in other fields (e.g., sociology). In this module, I adopt Erik Erikson’s conception of identity as a developmental task for late adolescence and young adulthood. Forming an identity in adolescence and young adulthood involves exploring alternative roles, values, goals, and relationships and eventually committing to a realistic agenda for life that productively situates a person in the adult world of work and love. In addition, identity formation entails commitments to new social roles and reevaluation of old traits, and importantly, it brings with it a sense of temporal continuity in life, achieved though the construction of an integrative life story.

The sense of the self as an intentional force that strives to achieve goals, plans, values, projects, and the like.

The self as knower, the sense of the self as a subject who encounters (knows, works on) itself (the Me).

The self as known, the sense of the self as the object or target of the I’s knowledge and work.

An internalized and evolving story of the self designed to provide life with some measure of temporal unity and purpose. Beginning in late adolescence, people craft self-defining stories that reconstruct the past and imagine the future to explain how the person came to be the person that he or she is becoming.

The ability, typically developed in adolescence, to derive substantive conclusions about the self from analyzing one’s own personal experiences.

The sense of the self as a storyteller who reconstructs the past and imagines the future in order to articulate an integrative narrative that provides life with some measure of temporal continuity and purpose.

Life stories that affirm the transformation from suffering to an enhanced status or state. In American culture, redemptive life stories are highly prized as models for the good self, as in classic narratives of atonement, upward mobility, liberation, and recovery.

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Psychological View of the Self Essay

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The significant distinction between these two philosophers is that, although Socrates seldom spoke about the soul of the human being, Plato emphasized the soul of the human being more than the body. Plato perceives the self as a knower, and the notions of self and learning are closely intertwined (“Plato’s concept of the self,” 2022). His practical understanding relies on his reflections on the essence of the rational soul as the ultimate kind of cognition. Plato defines a human being as having a body and a soul (“Plato’s concept of the self,” 2022). The body is the physical and destructible component of the human being, but the soul is ethereal and unbreakable. The philosopher contends that the soul is separate from the body; hence, the soul is the self.

On the other hand, Socrates considered the soul a human’s intellectual and ethical identity. According to the philosopher, the soul is the essence of the person’s ability to think and will (“Socrates’ concept of the self,” 2022). As a result, for Socrates, the soul or self is the responsible agent in comprehending and behaving correctly or incorrectly (“Socrates’ concept of the self,” 2022). The self is founded on understanding and ignorance, goodness, and badness, and as individuals seek self-knowledge, they finally realize their genuine selves.

To conclude, Plato claimed that the actual self of individuals is the reasoning or cognition that comprises their soul and is apart from their body. On the contrary, Socrates believed that the sense of the self reveals the essence of a person. The philosopher questioned how people value what others say without comprehending the idea of separate thoughts. Hence, his argument was based on the fact that an individual’s potential is a product of the self. Finally, Socrates highlighted that people must trust their ideals and not be influenced by society.

Plato’s concept of the self . (2022). Philo-notes. Web.

Socrates’ concept of the self . (2022). Philo-notes. Web.

• Louis Pojman's Ethical Theory
• Utilitarianism vs. Moral Relativism
• Concept of Utilitarianism Theory
• Affinities of Mind and Spirit between the Characters
• "The Allegory of the Cave" by Platon: Perception, Reality, and Making Connections
• Human Excellence From Nietzsche's and Plato's Perspectives
• Plato's "Republic": Moderation and Justice
• Sound Reasoning and Arguments as Concepts
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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1. IvyPanda . "Psychological View of the Self." February 23, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/psychological-view-of-the-self/.

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What Is Self-Concept?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Rachel Goldman, PhD FTOS, is a licensed psychologist, clinical assistant professor, speaker, wellness expert specializing in eating behaviors, stress management, and health behavior change.

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• Development
• Can It Be Changed?
• Self-Concept Theories

Frequently Asked Questions

Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves. It is influenced by many forces, including our interaction with important people in our lives. It is how we perceive our behaviors, abilities, and unique characteristics. For example, beliefs such as "I am a good friend" or "I am a kind person" are part of an overall self-concept.

Other examples of self-concept include:

• How you view your personality traits, such as whether you are an extrovert or introvert
• How you see your roles in life, such as whether you feel that being a parent, sibling, friend, and partner are important parts of your identity
• The hobbies or passions that are important to your sense of identity, such as being a sports enthusiast or belonging to a certain political party
• How you feel about your interactions with the world, such as whether you feel that you are contributing to society

Our self-perception is important because it affects our motivations , attitudes, and behaviors . It also affects how we feel about the person we think we are, including whether we are competent or have self-worth.

Self-concept tends to be more malleable when we're younger and still going through self-discovery and identity formation . As we age and learn who we are and what's important to us, these self-perceptions become much more detailed and organized.

At its most basic, self-concept is a collection of beliefs one holds about oneself and the responses of others. It embodies the answer to the question: " Who am I? " If you want to find your self-concept, list things that describe you as an individual. What are your traits? What do you like? How do you feel about yourself?

Rogers' Three Parts of Self-Concept

Humanist psychologist  Carl Rogers believed that self-concept is made up of three different parts:

• Ideal self : The ideal self is the person you want to be. This person has the attributes or qualities you are either working toward or want to possess. It's who you envision yourself to be if you were exactly as you wanted.
• Self-image : Self-image refers to how you see yourself at this moment in time. Attributes like physical characteristics, personality traits , and social roles all play a role in your self-image.
• Self-esteem : How much you like, accept, and value yourself all contribute to your self-concept. Self-esteem can be affected by a number of factors—including how others see you, how you think you compare to others, and your role in society.

Incongruence and Congruence

Self-concept is not always aligned with reality. When it is aligned, your self-concept is said to be congruent . If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (your self-image) and who you wish you were (your ideal self), your self-concept is incongruent . This incongruence can negatively affect self-esteem .

Rogers believed that incongruence has its earliest roots in childhood. When parents place conditions on their affection for their children (only expressing love if children "earn it" through certain behaviors and living up to the parents' expectations), children begin to distort the memories of experiences that leave them feeling unworthy of their parents' love.

Unconditional love, on the other hand, helps to foster congruence. Children who experience such love—also referred to as family love —feel no need to continually distort their memories in order to believe that other people will love and accept them as they are.

How Self-Concept Develops

Self-concept develops, in part, through our interaction with others. In addition to family members and close friends, other people in our lives can contribute to our self-identity.

For instance, one study found that the more a teacher believes in a high-performing student's abilities, the higher that student's self-concept. (Interestingly, no such association was found with lower-performing students.)

Self-concept can also be developed through the stories we hear. As an example, one study found that female readers who were "deeply transported" into a story about a leading character with a traditional gender role had a more feminist self-concept than those who weren't as moved by the story.

The media plays a role in self-concept development as well—both mass media and social media . When these media promote certain ideals, we're more likely to make those ideals our own. And the more often these ideals are presented, the more they affect our self-identity and self-perception.

Can Self-Concept Be Changed?

Self-concept is not static, meaning that it can change. Our environment plays a role in this process. Places that hold a lot of meaning to us actively contribute to our future self-concept through both the way we relate these environments to ourselves and how society relates to them.

Self-concept can also change based on the people with whom we interact. This is particularly true with regard to individuals in our lives who are in leadership roles. They can impact the collective self (the self in social groups) and the relational self (the self in relationships).

In some cases, a medical diagnosis can change self-concept by helping people understand why they feel the way they do—such as someone receiving an autism diagnosis later in life, finally providing clarity as to why they feel different.

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Other Self-Concept Theories

As with many topics within psychology , a number of other theorists have proposed different ways of thinking about self-concept.

Social Identity

Social psychologist Henri Tajfel developed social identity theory, which states that self-concept is composed of two key parts:

• Personal identity : The traits and other characteristics that make you unique
• Social identity : Who you are based on your membership in social groups, such as sports teams, religions, political parties, or social class

This theory states that our social identity influences our self-concept, thus affecting our emotions and behaviors. If we're playing sports, for instance, and our team loses a game, we might feel sad for the team (emotion) or act out against the winning team (behavior).

Multiple Dimensions

Psychologist Bruce A. Bracken had a slightly different theory and believed that self-concept was multidimensional, consisting of six independent traits:

• Academic : Success or failure in school
• Affect : Awareness of emotional states
• Competence : Ability to meet basic needs
• Family : How well you work in your family unit
• Physical : How you feel about your looks, health, physical condition, and overall appearance
• Social : Ability to interact with others

In 1992, Bracken developed the Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale, a comprehensive assessment that evaluates each of these six elements of self-concept in children and adolescents.

Self-concept development is never finished. Though one's self-identity is thought to be primarily formed in childhood, your experiences as an adult can also change how you feel about yourself. If your self-esteem increases later in life, for instance, it can improve your self-concept.

Our self-concept can affect the method by which we communicate. If you feel you are a good writer, for instance, you may prefer to communicate in writing versus speaking with others.

It can also affect the way we communicate. If your social group communicates a certain way, you would likely choose to communicate that way as well. Studies on teens have connected high self-concept clarity with more open communication with parents.

Self-concept refers to a broad description of ourselves ("I am a good writer") while self-esteem includes any judgments or opinions we have of ourselves ("I feel proud to be a good writer"). Put another way, self-concept answers the question: Who am I? Self-esteem answers the question: How do I feel about who I am?

Our self-concept impacts how we respond to life, so a well-developed self-concept helps us respond in ways that are more positive and beneficial for us. One of the ways it does this is by enabling us to recognize our worth. A well-developed self-concept also helps keep us from internalizing negative feedback from others.

Different cultures have different beliefs. They have different ideas of how dependent or independent one should be, different religious beliefs, and differing views of socioeconomic development.

All of these cultural norms influence self-concept by providing the structure of what is expected within that society and how one sees oneself in relation to others.

Bailey JA 2nd. Self-image, self-concept, and self-identity revisited . J Natl Med Assoc . 2003;95(5):383-386.

Mercer S. Self-concept: Situating the self . In: Mercer S, Ryan S, Williams M, eds. Psychology for Language Learning . Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9781137032829_2

Argyle M. Social encounters: Contributions to Social Interaction . 1st ed . Routledge.

Koch S. Formulations of the person and the social context . In: Psychology: A study of a science. Vol. III. McGraw-Hill:184-256.

Pesu L, Viljaranta J, Aunola K. The role of parents' and teachers' beliefs in children's self-concept development . J App Develop Psychol . 2016;44:63-71. doi:10.1016/j.appdev.2016.03.001

Richter T, Appel M, Calio F. Stories can influence the self-concept . Social Influence . 2014;9(3):172-88. doi:10.1080/15534510.2013.799099

Vandenbosch L, Eggermont S. The interrelated roles of mass media and social media in adolescents' development of an objectified self-concept: A longitudinal study . Communc Res . 2015. doi:10.1177/0093650215600488

Prince D. What about place? Considering the role of physical environment on youth imagining of future possible selves . J Youth Stud . 2014;17(6):697-716. doi:10.1080/13676261.2013.836591

Kark R, Shamir B. The dual effect of transformational leadership: priming relational and collective selves and further effects on followers . In: Avolio BJ, Yammarino FJ, eds.  Monographs in Leadership and Management . Vol 5. Emerald Group Publishing Limited; 2013:77-101. doi:10.1108/S1479-357120130000005010

Stagg SD, Belcher H. Living with autism without knowing: receiving a diagnosis in later life . Health Psychol Behav Med . 2019;7(1):348-361. doi:10.1080/21642850.2019.1684920

Tajfel H, Turner J. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict . In: Hogg MA, Abrams D, eds.  Intergroup Relations: Essential Readings. Psychology Press:94–109.

Scheepers D. Social identity theory . Social Psychol Act . 2019. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-13788-5_9

Bracken BA. Multidimensional Self Concept Scale . American Psychological Association. doi:10.1037/t01247-000

Sampthirao P. Self-concept and interpersonal communication . Int J Indian Psychol . 2016;3(3):6. dip:18.01.115/20160303

Van Dijk M, Branje S, Keijsers L, Hawk S, Hale !, Meeus W. Self-concept clarity across adolescence: Longitudinal associations with open communication with parents and internalizing symptoms . J Youth Adolesc . 2013;43:1861-76. doi:10.1007/s10964-013-0055-x

Vignoles V, Owe E, Becker M, et al. Beyond the 'east-west' dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of selfhood . J Exp Psychol Gen . 2016;145(8):966-1000. doi:10.1037/xge0000175

Weiten W, Dunn DS, Hammer EY. Psychology Applied to Modern Life: Adjustment in the 21st Century . Cengage Learning.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

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“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness

James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the self as an object of experience (self as object), while the latter (“I”) reflects the self as a subject of experience (self as subject). I will argue that in most of the cases (arguably all) this distinction maps onto the distinction between the phenomenal self (reflecting self-related content of consciousness) and the metaphysical self (representing the problem of subjectivity of all conscious experience), and as such these two issues should be investigated separately using fundamentally different methodologies. Moreover, by referring to Metzinger’s (2018) theory of phenomenal self-models, I will argue that what is usually investigated as the phenomenal-“I” [following understanding of self-as-subject introduced by Wittgenstein (1958) ] can be interpreted as object, rather than subject of experience, and as such can be understood as an element of the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model. This understanding relates to recent predictive coding and free energy theories of the self and bodily self discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.

Introduction

Almost 130 years ago, James (1890) introduced the distinction between “Me” and “I” (see Table ​ Table1 1 for illustrative quotes) to the debate about the self. The former term refers to understanding of the self as an object of experience, while the latter to the self as a subject of experience 1 . This distinction, in different forms, has recently regained popularity in cognitive science (e.g., Christoff et al., 2011 ; Liang, 2014 ; Sui and Gu, 2017 ; Truong and Todd, 2017 ) and provides a useful tool for clarifying what one means when one speaks about the self. However, its exact meaning varies in cognitive science, especially in regard to what one understands as the self as subject, or “I.”

Quotes from James (1890) illustrating the distinction between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”) and a quote from Wittgenstein (1958) illustrating his distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject.

The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and take a closer look at the conceptual distinction between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. I will suggest, following James (1890) and in opposition to the tradition started by Wittgenstein (1958) , that in this context “Me” (i.e., the self as object) reflects the phenomenology of selfhood, and corresponds to what is also known as sense of self, self-consciousness, or phenomenal selfhood (e.g., Blanke and Metzinger, 2009 ; Blanke, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ). On the other hand, the ultimate meaning of “I” (i.e., the self as subject) is rooted in metaphysics of subjectivity, and refers to the question: why is all conscious experience subjective and who/what is the subject of conscious experience? I will argue that these two theoretical problems, i.e., phenomenology of selfhood and metaphysics of subjectivity, are in principle independent issues and should not be confused. However, cognitive science usually follows the Wittgensteinian tradition 2 by understanding the self-as-subject, or “I,” as a phenomenological, rather than metaphysical problem [ Figure ​ Figure1 1 illustrates the difference between James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) approach to the self]. By following Metzinger’s (2003 , 2010 ) framework of phenomenal self-models, and in agreement with a reductionist approach to the phenomenal “I” 3 ( Prinz, 2012 ), I will argue that what is typically investigated in cognitive science as the phenomenal “I” [or the Wittgenstein’s (1958) self-as-subject] can be understood as just a higher-order component of the self-model reflecting the phenomenal “Me.” Table ​ Table2 2 presents some of crucial claims of the theory of self-models, together with concise references to other theories of the self-as-object discussed in this paper.

An illustration of James (1890) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) distinctions between self-as-object (“Me”) and self-as-subject (“I”). In the original formulation, James’ (1890) “Me” includes also physical objects and people (material and social “Me”) – they were not included in the picture, because they are not directly related to consciousness.

Examples of theories of the self-as-object (“Me”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the phenomenal self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

“Me” As An Object Of Experience: Phenomenology Of Self-Consciousness

The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain particular sort ( James, 1890 , p. 319, emphasis in original).

James (1890) chose the word “Me” to refer to self-as-object. What does it mean? In James’ (1890) view, it reflects “all the things” which have the power to produce “excitement of a certain particular sort.” This certain kind of excitement is nothing more than some form of experiential quality of me-ness, mine-ness, or similar - understood in a folk-theoretical way (this is an important point, because these terms have recently acquired technical meanings in philosophy, e.g., Zahavi, 2014 ; Guillot, 2017 ). What are “all the things”? The classic formulation suggests that James (1890) meant physical objects and cultural artifacts (material self), human beings (social self), and mental processes and content (spiritual self). These are all valid categories of self-as-object, however, for the purpose of this paper I will limit the scope of further discussion only to “objects” which are relevant when speaking about consciousness. Therefore, rather than speaking about, for example, my car or my body, I will discuss only their conscious representations. This limits the scope of self-as-object to one category of “things” – conscious mental content.

Let us now reformulate James’ (1890) idea in more contemporary terms and define “Me” as the totality of all content of consciousness that is experienced as self-related. Content of consciousness is meant here in a similar way to Chalmers (1996) , who begins “ The conscious mind ” by providing a list of different kinds of conscious content. He delivers an extensive (without claiming that exhaustive) collection of types of experiences, which includes the following 4 : visual; auditory; tactile; olfactory; experiences of hot and cold; pain; taste; other bodily experiences coming from proprioception, vestibular sense, and interoception (e.g., headache, hunger, orgasm); mental imagery; conscious thought; emotions. Chalmers (1996) also includes several other, which, however, reflect states of consciousness and not necessarily content per se , such as dreams, arousal, fatigue, intoxication, and altered states of consciousness induced by psychoactive substances. What is common to all of the types of experience from the first list (conscious contents) is the fact that they are all, speaking in James’ (1890) terms, “objects” in a stream of consciousness: “all these things are objects, properly so called, to the subject that does the thinking” (p. 325).

The self understood as “Me” can be understood as a subset of a set of all these possible experiences. This subset is characterized by self-relatedness ( Figure ​ Figure2 2 ). It can be illustrated with sensory experiences. For example, in the visual domain, I experience an image of my face as different from another person’s face. Hence, while the image of my face belongs to “Me,” the image of someone else does not (although it can be experimentally manipulated, Tsakiris, 2008 ; Payne et al., 2017 ; Woźniak et al., 2018 ). The same can be said about my voice and sounds caused by me (as opposed to voices of other people), and about my smell. We also experience self-touch as different from touching or being touched by a different person ( Weiskrantz et al., 1971 ; Blakemore et al., 1998 ; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2009 ). There is even evidence that we process our possessions differently ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ; Constable et al., 2018 ). This was anticipated by James’ (1890) notion of the material “Me,” and is typically regarded as reflecting one’s extended self ( Kim and Johnson, 2014 ). In all of these cases, we can divide sensory experiences into the ones which do relate to the self and the ones which do not. The same can be said about the contents of thoughts and feelings, which can be either about “Me” or about something/someone else.

A simplified representation of a structure of phenomenal content including the metaphysical “I,” the phenomenal “Me,” and the phenomenal “I,” which can be understood (see in text) as a higher-level element of the phenomenal “Me.” Each pair of nodes connected with a yellow line represents one type of content of consciousness, with indigo nodes corresponding to self-related content, and black nodes corresponding to non-self-related content. In some cases (e.g., pain, emotions, interoceptive, and proprioceptive sensations), the black nodes are lighter and drawn with a dashed line (the same applies to links), to indicate that in normal circumstances one does not experiences these sensations as representing another person (although it is possible in thought experiments and pathologies). Multisensory/multimodal interactions have been omitted for the sake of clarity. All of the nodes compose the set of conscious thoughts, which can be formulated as “I experience X.” In normal circumstances, one does not deny ownership over these thoughts, however, in thought experiments, and in some cases of psychosis, one may experience that even such thoughts cease to feel as one’s own. This situation is represented by the shape with a dashed outline. Moreover, in special cases one can form meta-delusions, i.e., delusions about delusions – thoughts that my thoughts about other thoughts are not my thoughts (see text for description).

Characterizing self-as-object as a subset of conscious experiences specifies the building blocks of “Me” (which are contents of consciousness) and provides a guiding principle for distinguishing between self and non-self (self-relatedness). However, it is important to note two things. First, the distinction between self and non-self is often a matter of scale rather than a binary classification, and therefore self-relatedness may be better conceptualized as the strength of the relation with the self. It can be illustrated with an example of the “Inclusion of Other in Self” scale ( Aron et al., 1992 ). This scale asks to estimate to what extent another person feels related to one’s self, by choosing among a series of pairs of more-to-less overlapping circles representing the self and another person (e.g., a partner). The degree of overlap between the chosen pair of circles represents the degree of self-relatedness. Treating self-relatedness as a matter of scale adds an additional level of complexity to the analysis, and results in speaking about the extent to which a given content of consciousness represents self, rather than whether it simply does it or not. This does not, however, change the main point of the argument that we can classify all conscious contents according to whether (or to what extent, in that case) they are self-related. For the sake of clarity, I will continue to speak using the language of binary classification, but it should be kept in mind that it is an arbitrary simplification. The second point is that this approach to “Me” allows one to flexibly discuss subcategories of the self by imposing additional constraints on the type of conscious content that is taken into account, as well as the nature of self-relatedness (e.g., whether it is ownership of, agency over, authorship, etc.). For example, by limiting ourselves to discussing conscious content representing one’s body one can speak about the bodily self, and by imposing limits to conscious experience of one’s possessions one can speak about one’s extended self.

Keeping these reservations in mind two objections can be raised to the approach to “Me” introduced here. The first one is as follows:

• simple (1) Speaking about the self/other distinction does not make sense in regard to experiences which are always “mine,” such as prioprioception or interoception. This special status may suggest that these modalities underpin the self as “I,” i.e., the subject of experience.

This idea is present in theoretical proposals postulating that subjectivity emerges based on (representations of) sensorimotor ( Gallagher, 2000 ; Christoff et al., 2011 ; Blanke et al., 2015 ) or interoceptive signals ( Damasio, 1999 ; Craig, 2010 ; Seth et al., 2011 ; Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 ; Salomon, 2017 ). There are two answers to this objection. First, the fact that this kind of experience (this kind of content of consciousness) is always felt as “my” experience simply means that all proprioceptive, interoceptive, pain experiences, etc., are as a matter of fact parts of “Me.” They are self-related contents of consciousness and hence naturally qualify as self-as-object. Furthermore, there is no principled reason why the fact that we normally do not experience them as belonging to someone else should transform them from objects of experience (content) into a subject of experience. Their special status may cause these experiences to be perceived as more central aspects of the self than experiences in other modalities, but there is no reason to think that it should change them from something that we experience into the self as an experiencer. Second, even the special status of these sensations can be called into question. It is possible to imagine a situation in which one experiences these kinds of sensations from an organ or a body which does not belong to her or him. We can imagine that with enough training one will learn to distinguish between proprioceptive signals coming from one’s body and those coming from another person’s (or artificial) body. If this is possible, then one may develop a phenomenal distinction between “my” versus “other’s” proprioceptive and interoceptive experiences (for example), and in this case the same rules of classification into phenomenal “Me” and phenomenal “not-Me” will apply as to other sensory modalities. This scenario is not realistic at the current point of technological development, but there are clinical examples which indirectly suggest that it may be possible. For example, people who underwent transplantation of an organ sometimes experience rejection of a transplant. Importantly, patients whose organisms reject an organ also more often experience psychological rejection of that transplant ( Látos et al., 2016 ). Moreover, there are rare cases in which patients following a successful surgery report that they perceive transplanted organs as foreign objects in themselves ( Goetzmann et al., 2009 ). In this case, affected people report experiencing a form of disownership of the implanted organ, suggesting that they may experience interoceptive signals coming from that transplant as having a phenomenal quality of being “not-mine,” leading to similar phenomenal quality as the one postulated in the before-mentioned thought experiment. Another example of a situation in which self-relatedness of interoception may be disrupted may be found in conjoint twins. In some variants of this developmental disorder (e.g., parapagus, dicephalus, thoracopagus) brains of two separate twins share some of the internal organs (and limbs), while others are duplicated and possessed by each twin individually ( Spencer, 2000 ; Kaufman, 2004 ). This provides an inverted situation to the one described in our hypothetical scenario – rather than two pieces of the same organ being “wired” to one person, the same organ (e.g., a heart, liver, stomach) is shared by two individuals. As such it may be simultaneously under control of two autonomous nervous systems. This situation raises challenging questions for theories which postulate that the root of self-as-subject lies in interoception. For example, if conjoint twins share the majority of internal organs, but possess mostly independent nervous systems, like dicephalus conjoint twins, then does it mean that they share the neural subjective frame ( Park and Tallon-Baudry, 2014 )? If the answer is yes, then does it mean that they share it numerically (both twins have one and the same subjective frame), or only qualitatively (their subjective frames are similar to the point of being identical, but they are distinct frames)? However, if interoception is just a part of “Me” then the answer becomes simple – the experiences can be only qualitatively identical, because they are experienced by two independent subjects.

All of these examples challenge the assumption that sensori-motor and interoceptive experiences are necessarily self-related and, as a consequence, that they can form the basis of self-as-subject. For this reason, it seems that signals coming from these modalities are more appropriate to underlie the phenomenal “Me,” for example in a form of background self-experience, or “phenomenal background” ( Dainton, 2008 , 2016 ), rather than the phenomenal “I.”

The second possible objection to the view of self-as-object described in this section is the following one:

• simple (2) My thoughts and feelings may have different objects, but they are always my thoughts and feelings. Therefore, their object may be either “me” or “other,” but their subject is always “I.” As a consequence, even though my thoughts and feelings constitute contents of my consciousness, they underlie the phenomenal “I” and not the phenomenal “Me.”

It seems to be conceptually misguided to speak about one’s thoughts and feelings as belonging to someone else. This intuition motivated Wittgenstein (1958) to write: “there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ “would be nonsensical” ( Wittgenstein, 1958 ). In the Blue Book, he introduced the distinction between the use of “I” as object and as subject (see Table ​ Table1 1 for a full relevant quote) and suggested that while we can be wrong about the former, making a mistake about the latter is not possible. This idea was further developed by Shoemaker (1968) who introduced an arguably conceptual truth that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, or IEM in short. For example, when I say “I see a photo of my face in front of me” I may be mistaken about the fact that it is my face (because, e.g., it is a photo of my identical twin), but I cannot be mistaken that it is me who is looking at it. One way to read IEM is that it postulates that I can be mistaken about self-as-object, but I cannot be mistaken about self-as-subject. If this is correct then there is a radical distinction between these two types of self that provides a strong argument to individuate them. From that point, one may argue that IEM provides a decisive argument to distinguish between phenomenal “I” (self-as-subject) and phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object).

Before endorsing this conclusion, let us take a small step back. It is important to note that in the famous passage from the Blue Book Wittgenstein (1958) did not write about two distinct types of self. Instead, he wrote about two ways of using the word “I” (or “my”). As such, he was more concerned with issues in philosophy of language than philosophy of mind. Therefore, a natural question arises – to what extent does this linguistic distinction map onto a substantial distinction between two different entities (types of self)? On the face of it, it seems that there is an important difference between these two uses of self-referential words, which can be mapped onto the experience of being a self-as-subject and the experience of being a self-as-object (or, for example, the distinction between bodily ownership and thought authorship, as suggested by Liang, 2014 ). However, I will argue that there are reasons to believe that the phenomenal “I,” i.e., the experience of being a self-as-subject may be better conceptualized as a higher-order phenomenal “Me” – a higher-level self-as-object.

Psychiatric practice provides cases of people, typically suffering from schizophrenia, who describe experiences of dispossession of thoughts, known as delusions of thought insertion ( Young, 2008 ; Bortolotti and Broome, 2009 ; Martin and Pacherie, 2013 ). According to the standard account, the phenomenon of thought insertion does not represent a disruption of sense of ownership over one’s thoughts, but only loss of sense of agency over them. However, the standard account has been criticized in recent years by theorists arguing that thought insertion indeed represents loss of sense of ownership ( Metzinger, 2003 ; Billon, 2013 ; Guillot, 2017 ; López-Silva, 2017 ). One of the main arguments against the standard view is that it runs into serious problems when attempting to explain obsessive intrusive thoughts in clinical population and spontaneous thoughts in healthy people. In both cases, subjects report lack of agency over thoughts, although they never claim lack of ownership over them, i.e., that these are not their thoughts. However, if the standard account is correct, obsessive thoughts should be experienced as belonging to someone else. The fact that they are not suggests that something else must be disrupted in delusions of thought insertion, i.e., sense of ownership 5 over them. If one can lose sense of ownership over one’s thoughts then it has important implications, because then one becomes capable of experiencing one’s thoughts “as someone else’s,” or at least “as not-mine.” However, when I experience my thoughts as not-mine I do it because I’ve taken a stance towards my thoughts, which treats them as an object of deliberation. In other words, I must have “objectified” them to experience that they have a quality of “feeling as if they are not mine.” Consequently, if I experience them as objects of experience, then they cannot form part of my self as subject of experience, because these two categories are mutually exclusive. Therefore, what seemed to constitute a phenomenal “I” turns out to be a part of thephenomenal “Me.”

If my thoughts do not constitute the “I” then how do they fit into the structure of “Me”? Previously, I asserted that thoughts with self-related content constitute “Me,” while thoughts with non-self related content do not. However, just now I argued in favor of the claim that all thoughts (including the ones with non-self-related content) that are experienced as “mine” belong to “Me.” How can one resolve this contradiction?

A way to address this reservation can be found in Metzinger’s (2003 ; 2010 ) self-model theory. Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ) argues that the experience of the self can be understood as underpinned by representational self-models. These self-models, however, are embedded in the hierarchical representational structure, as illustrated by an account of ego dissolution by Letheby and Gerrans (2017) :

• simple  Savage suggests that on LSD “[changes] in body ego feeling usually precede changes in mental ego feeling and sometimes are the only changes” (1955, 11), (…) This common temporal sequence, from blurring of body boundaries and loss of sense of ownership for body parts through to later loss of sense of ownership for thoughts, speaks further to the hierarchical architecture of the self-model. ( Letheby and Gerrans, 2017 , p. 8)

If self-models underlying the experience of self-as-object (“Me”) are hierarchical, then the apparent contradiction may be easily explained by the fact that when speaking about the content of thoughts and the thoughts themselves we are addressing self-models at two distinct levels. At the lower level we can distinguish between thoughts with self-related content and other-related content, while on the higher level we can distinguish between thoughts that feel “mine” as opposed to thoughts that are not experienced as “mine.” As a result, this thinking phenomenal “I” experienced in feeling of ownership over one’s thoughts may be conceived as just a higher-order level of Jamesian “Me.” As such, one may claim that there is no such thing as a phenomenal “I,” just multilevel phenomenal “Me.” However, an objection can be raised here. One may claim that even though a person with schizophrenic delusions experiences her thoughts as someone else’s (a demon’s or some malicious puppet master’s), she can still claim that:

Yes, “I” experience my thoughts as not mine, but as demon’s.” My thoughts feel as “not-mine,” however, it’s still me (or: “I”) who thinks of them as “not-mine.”

As such, one escapes “objectification” of “I” into “Me” by postulating a higher-level phenomenal-“I.” However, let us keep in mind that the thought written above constitutes a valid thought by itself. As such, this thought is vulnerable to the theoretical possibility that it turns into a delusion itself, once a psychotic person forms a meta-delusion (delusion about delusion). In this case, one may begin to experience that: “I” (I 1 ) experience that the “fake I” (I 2 ), who is a nasty pink demon, experiences my thoughts as not mine but as someone else’s (e.g., as nasty green demon’s). In this case, I may claim that the real phenomenal “I” is I 1 , since it is at the top of the hierarchy. However, one may repeat the operation of forming meta-delusions ad infinitum (as may happen in psychosis or drug-induced psychedelic states) effectively transforming each phenomenal “I” into another “fake-I” (and consequently making it a part of “Me”).

The possibility of meta-delusions illustrates that the phenomenal “I” understood as subjective thoughts is permanently vulnerable to the threat of losing the apparent subjective character and becoming an object of experience. As such it seems to be a poor choice for the locus of subjectivity, since it needs to be constantly “on the run” from becoming treated as an object of experience, not only in people with psychosis, but also in all psychologically healthy individuals if they decide to reflect on their thoughts. Therefore, it seems more likely that the thoughts themselves cannot constitute the subject of experience. However, even in case of meta-delusions there seems to be a stable deeper-level subjectivity, let us call it the deep “I,” which is preserved, at least until one loses consciousness. After all, a person who experiences meta-delusions would be constantly (painfully) aware of the process, and often would even report it afterwards. This deep “I” cannot be a special form of content in the stream of consciousness, because otherwise it would be vulnerable to becoming a part of “Me.” Therefore, it must be something different.

There seem to be two places where one can look for this deep “I”: in the domain of phenomenology or metaphysics. The first approach has been taken by ( Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016 ) who argue that “all conscious states’ phenomenal character involves for-me-ness as an experiential constituent.” It means that even if we rule out everything else (e.g., bodily experiences, conscious thoughts), we are still left with some form of irreducible phenomenal self-experience. This for-me-ness is not a specific content of consciousness, but rather “refers to the distinct manner, or how , of experiencing” ( Zahavi, 2014 ).

This approach, however, may seem inflationary and not satisfying (e.g., Dainton, 2016 ). One reason for this is that it introduces an additional phenomenal dimension, which may lead to uncomfortable consequences. For example, a question arises whether for-me-ness can ever be lost or replaced with the “ how of experiencing” of another person. For example, can I experience my sister’s for-me-ness in my stream of consciousness? If yes, then how is for-me-ness different from any other content of consciousness? And if the answer is no, then how is it possible to distil the phenomenology of for-me-ness from the metaphysical fact that a given stream of consciousness is always experienced by this and not other subject?

An alternative approach to the problem of the deep “I” is to reject that the subject of experience, the “I,” is present in phenomenology (like Hume, 1739/2000 ; Prinz, 2012 ; Dainton, 2016 ), and look for it somewhere else, in the domain of metaphysics. Although James (1890) did not explicitly formulate the distinction between “Me” and “I” as the distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphysical self, he hinted at it at several points, for example when he concluded the Chapter on the self with the following fragment: “(...) a postulate, an assertion that there must be a knower correlative to all this known ; and the problem who that knower is would have become a metaphysical problem” ( James, 1890 , p. 401).

“I” As A Subject Of Experience: Metaphysics Of Subjectivity

Thoughts which we actually know to exist do not fly about loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker and not to another ( James, 1890 , pp. 330–331).

Let us assume that phenomenal consciousness exists in nature, and that it is a part of the reality we live in. The problem of “I” emerges once we realize that one of the fundamental characteristics of phenomenal consciousness is that it is always subjective, that there always seems to be some subject of experience. It seems mistaken to conceive of consciousness which do “fly about loose,” devoid of subjective character, devoid of being someone’s or something’s consciousness. Moreover, it seems that subjectivity may be one of the fundamental inherent properties of conscious experience (similar notions can be found in: Berkeley, 1713/2012 ; Strawson, 2003 ; Searle, 2005 ; Dainton, 2016 ). It seems highly unlikely, if not self-contradictory, that there exists something like an objective conscious experience of “what it is like to be a bat” ( Nagel, 1974 ), which is not subjective in any way. This leads to the metaphysical problem of the self: why is all conscious experience subjective, and what or who is the subject of this experience? Let us call it the problem of the metaphysical “I,” as contrasted with the problem of the phenomenal “I” (i.e., is there a distinctive experience of being a self as a subject of experience, and if so, then what is this experience?), which we discussed so far.

The existence of the metaphysical “I” does not entail the existence of the phenomenal self. It is possible to imagine a creature that possesses a metaphysical “I,” but does not possess any sense of self. In such a case, the creature would possess consciousness, although it would not experience anything as “me,” nor entertain any thoughts/feelings, etc., as “I.” In other words, it is a possibility that one may not experience self-related content of consciousness, while being a sentient being. One example of such situation may be the experience of a dreamless sleep, which “is characterized by a dissolution of subject-object duality, or (…) by a breakdown of even the most basic form of the self-other distinction” ( Windt, 2015 ). This is a situation which can be regarded as an instance of the state of minimal phenomenal experience – the simplest form of conscious experience possible ( Windt, 2015 ; Metzinger, 2018 ), in which there is no place for even the most rudimentary form of “Me.” Another example may be the phenomenology of systems with grid-like architectures which, according to the integrated information theory (IIT, Tononi et al., 2016 ), possess conscious experience 6 . If IIT is correct, then these systems experience some form of conscious states, which most likely lack any phenomenal distinction between “Me” and “not-Me.” However, because they may possess a stream of conscious experience, and conscious experience is necessarily subjective, there remains a valid question: who or what is the subject of that experience?

The question of what exactly is the metaphysical subject of experience can have different answers. There has been a long history of theories of the self ( Barresi and Martin, 2011 ) and some of them directly address this issue. Platonic or Cartesian notions of the soul are good examples of an approach providing one answer to this question: conscious experience is subjective, because there exists a non-material being (self, soul) which is the subject of this experience (see Table ​ Table3 3 ). Other solutions tend to either define the self in less metaphysically expensive ways ( Johnston, 1987 ; Strawson, 2000 ; Dainton, 2008 ), define it as a formal feature of consciousness ( Searle, 2005 ), or deny the need to postulate its existence ( Metzinger, 2003 ). What is crucial here, however, is that the problem of the metaphysical self is a different issue and requires a different methodology, than the problem of the phenomenal self.

Examples of theories of the self-as-subject (“I”) in the context of consciousness, as theories of the metaphysical self, with representative quotes illustrating each position.

What sort of methodology, then, is appropriate for investigating the metaphysical self? It seems that the most relevant methods come from the toolbox of metaphysics. This toolbox includes classical philosophical methods such as thought experiments and logical analysis. However, methodology of metaphysics is an area of open discussion, and at present there are no signs of general consensus. One of the most debated issues in this field, which is especially relevant here, is to what extent the methodology of metaphysics is continuous with the methodology of natural sciences (see Tahko, 2015 , Chapter 9 for an overview). The positions span the spectrum between the claim that science and metaphysics are fully autonomous on the one side and the claim that metaphysics can be fully naturalized on the other. Discussing this issue goes way beyond the scope of this paper. However, if these two areas are at least to some extent related (i.e., not fully autonomous), then one may argue that scientific methods can be at least of some relevance in metaphysics and consequently for investigations of the metaphysical “I.”

One example in which empirical results seem to be able to influence theoretical investigations of the metaphysical self is through imposing constraints on philosophical theories. For example, because the metaphysical self is inherently related to consciousness, we should expect that different theories of consciousness should place different constraints on what a metaphysical self can be. Then, if one theory of consciousness acquires stronger empirical support than the others, we can also treat this as evidence for the constraints on the self that this theory implies.

Let us look at an example of IIT to illustrate this point. According to IIT ( Oizumi et al., 2014 ; Tononi et al., 2016 ) the content of conscious experience is defined by the so-called informational “complex” which is characterized by maximally integrated information (which can be measured by calculating the value of Φ max ). This complex then defines the stream of conscious experience. However, what happens if there is more than one such complex in one person? In this case, as Tononi et al. (2016) wrote:

According to IIT, two or more non-overlapping complexes may coexist as discrete physical substrates of consciousness (PSCs) within a single brain, each with its own definite borders and value of Φ max . The complex that specifies a person’s day to day stream of consciousness should have the highest value of Φ max – that is, it should be the “major” complex. In some conditions, for example, after a split-brain operation, the major complex may split. In such instances, one consciousness, supported by a complex in the dominant hemisphere and with privileged access to Broca’s area, would be able to speak about the experience, but would remain unaware of the presence of another consciousness, supported by a complex in the other hemisphere, which can be revealed by carefully designed experiments. ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

This fragment suggests that in IIT the metaphysical “I” can be understood as tied to a complex of maximally integrated information. In this case, a split-brain patient would possess two metaphysical selves, because as a consequence of an operation her or his brain hosts two such complexes. On the face of it, it seems to be a plausible situation ( cf. Bayne, 2010 ). However, in the sentence which immediately follows, Tononi et al. (2016) suggest that:

• simple  An intriguing possibility is that splitting of the PSC may also occur in healthy people during long-lasting dual-task conditions – for example, when driving in an auto-pilot like manner on a familiar road while listening to an engaging conversation ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 455)

The implications of this possibility are much more severe, because it postulates that in a matter of minutes or seconds a complex can dynamically divide into several complexes, and individual complexes can merge into one major complex. How do the complexes understood in this way then relate to the metaphysical “I”? Unfortunately, IIT is silent about this issue, but there seem to be at least two responses to this question. First, one may argue that the self does not need to be limited to one complex, but that the same metaphysical “I” can be present in all of the simultaneous streams of consciousness (complexes). However, this solution is at odds with both common-sense intuition and IIT itself. It would presuppose not only an extremely disunified view of consciousness, but even lead to self-contradictory consequences. The metaphysical “I” can be thought of as the metaphysical fact that any given stream of consciousness is subjectively experienced by some “self” (regardless of what that self might be). However, in a disunified view of an organism’s consciousness this metaphysical “I” would at the same time a) be the subject of experience of all of the complexes within this organism, and b) be the subject of experience of only one of these complexes while being blind to the others (as claimed by IIT: two complexes are not “co-conscious” with each other). It presents a contradiction and strongly suggests that the metaphysical “I” cannot be underpinned by multiple independent complexes. It leaves us with the second option, which is to bite the bullet and accept that IIT implies that the metaphysical “I” persists either as long as a given complex, or for an even shorter period of time, for example for just up to a few seconds, as suggested by Strawson (2000 , 2010 ). It means that if IIT (and the analysis outlined above) is correct then the metaphysical “I” turns out to be radically different from our intuitive understanding of subject-of-experience as persisting continuously life-long stream of consciousness. However, if empirical evidence in support of the current version of IIT becomes strong enough, it may suggest that our common-sense intuitions about self-as-subject may be mistaken. On the other hand, different theories of phenomenal consciousness (and even different versions of IIT) may imply different constraints on the metaphysical “I,” and the extent to which they are supported by empirical evidence may suggest a way to say something about what the subject of conscious experience is.

Overall, assuming that metaphysics is not fully independent from science, the relevant methodology for investigating the metaphysical “I” is a combination of toolboxes of metaphysics and empirical science. This contrasts with the phenomenal “Me,” where the relevant toolkit includes methods from phenomenology and science. The second point, which has been illustrated with an example of IIT, is that it is important to explicitly spell out the implications of different theories of consciousness in regard to what is the subject of conscious experience, as it may provide the best way forward towards solving this issue.

Understanding Predictive Coding Theories Of The Self

Recently, there has been a huge number of attempts to explain the self through the framework of predictive coding (PC) and the free energy principle (FEP). In this final section of the paper, I will use PC theories of the self as a working example demonstrating practical consequences of implementing the Jamesian distinction between “Me” and “I.” I will suggest that PC theories of the self target different dimensions of self-as-object, understood as a hierarchical structure of self-models ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2010 ), and as such provide a valuable framework to understand the self. However, I will also explain why PC and the FEP do not allow us to say much about self-as-subject (the metaphysical “I”).

According to PC, the brain can be understood as an inference machine which hosts and continuously updates a probabilistic model of the world, which it uses to infer hidden causes behind the sensory data (for a more detailed introduction see: Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 , 2010 ; Friston and Kiebel, 2009 ; Hohwy, 2013 ; Clark, 2016 ). It accomplishes this by continuously issuing predictions and comparing them with sensory data, with the discrepancy between predictions and data being propagated further up the hierarchy as prediction errors. As such, PC postulates that the brain can be seen as a hierarchical structure of generative models (which are responsible for issuing predictions). Prediction errors which arise at lower levels serve as data to be compared with predictions at the higher levels. This view of the mind inverts the classical feedforward view in which perception is a predominantly bottom-up process. In PC, instead, perception is mostly driven by top-down predictions, with bottom-up prediction errors serving the function of feedback helping to choose model with the most explanatory power. Moreover, in an extension of PC, which is known as active inference, action is also understood as a way of maximizing the fit of one’s internal models to reality. The main idea behind active inference is that rather than changing the model in order to better fit the data, one can act on the world and change it according to predictions issued by the currently dominating model. As a consequence, the whole perception-action cycle can be understood as driven by one overarching goal, i.e., long-term minimization of prediction errors.

The FEP is a further generalization of PC. It postulates that all living organisms operate under the principle to minimize the so-called “variational free energy,” which is an information theoretical measure which roughly can be understood as a measure of uncertainty ( Friston et al., 2006 ; Friston, 2009 ). One of the main claims of this theory is that organisms which act according to FEP (i.e., they act in a way to minimize free energy in the long term) will, in effect, implicitly approximate Bayesian inference. It means that they will combine their prior knowledge (represented by their model of the world) with the incoming sensory input in a mathematically optimal way.

Both PC and the FEP have recently gained huge popularity and motivated a number of theories attempting to explain various aspects of cognition within this framework. It includes numerous attempts to understand different facets of the self, such as sense of bodily ownership ( Apps and Tsakiris, 2014 ), sense of self in agency and perception ( Hohwy, 2007 ), the influence of interoception on self-consciousness ( Seth et al., 2011 ; Seth, 2013 ), social aspects of the self ( Moutoussis et al., 2014 ; Friston and Frith, 2015 ), the relationship with minimal phenomenal selfhood ( Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013 ), and even psychodynamical interpretations of the self ( Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010 ; Fotopoulou, 2012 ). The most comprehensive treatment of the self from the PC perspective ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 ) also exemplifies most of the crucial points made by other PC theories of the self. At the beginning of their paper Hohwy and Michael (2017) describe the self in the following words:

• simple  We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden causes of behavior. (…) we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous causes should qualify as a self. ( Hohwy and Michael, 2017 , p. 363)

The self, as seen from this perspective, is essentially a hierarchical model of endogenous hidden causes of sensory input. Or, in more classical terms, it can be said that it is a hierarchical representational structure ( cf. Clark, 2016 ; Williams, 2017 ) which allows one to distinguish between endogenous causes (what is caused by me) and exogenous causes (what is caused by something else). This distinction can be illustrated with an example of a comparison between seeing a movement of my virtual hand and of a virtual hand of someone else. If adequately prepared, in both cases the image of a hand and its movement may be identical. However, in one case I can realize that the movement of the hand is congruent with my intentions (manifested through my actions performed using a computer controller) and, as a consequence, infer that the cause of the hand’s movement is me. On the other hand, I may fail to notice any congruence between my intentions and the movement and hence infer that the hidden cause behind the movement I observe is some other person. According to Hohwy and Michael (2017) , the self is just a set of such hidden endogenous causes. Although not necessarily in full agreement with this picture in regard to the details, all other PC theories of the self listed above also speak about the self as underpinned by hierarchy of generative models, which are preoccupied with conducting probabilistic inference aimed to infer hidden causes of observed data patterns. This inference is then postulated to underlie specific types of conscious self-experience, i.e., different facets of the sense of self.

As such, one common theme among all PC theories of the self is the following: aspects of conscious experience of the self are underpinned by a representational structure in the form of hierarchical generative models. In its core, it is the same idea as the one introduced earlier by Metzinger (2003 , 2010 ), i.e., that our phenomenal experience of the self is underpinned by a representational structure of unconscious self-models (see also: Crane, 2003 ; Chalmers, 2004 , for a discussion about the relationship between representational and conscious content). Once an unconscious self-model enters conscious awareness, it generates a corresponding self-related conscious content (see: Metzinger, 2006 , 2014 , for an explicit distinction between the levels of representations and conscious content in regard to the bodily self). The same mechanism is at work in PC theories – the dynamic process of model selection leads to suppression of some models but allows other models to enter awareness in the form of conscious content. This mechanism allows PC to explain self-related content of consciousness, which is essentially nothing else than the James’ (1890) self-as-object of experience. This is how PC and the FEP help to understand the phenomenal “Me” – by describing the structure and dynamics of the underlying representational architecture.

To what extent PC and FEP can provide us with any help when confronted with the task to explain the metaphysical “I”? Here, I will argue that in contrast to the phenomenal “Me,” the issues pertaining to the metaphysical “I” are outside of its reach. The reason for this is a consequence of the fact that PC is in principle agnostic in regard to the issue of what brings representational content into the scope of conscious experience. In general, this can be regarded as an advantage, because this way PC accounts of self-experience can avoid the burden of being hostage to any specific theory of consciousness, and stay in principle compatible with most of them (e.g., see Hohwy, 2013 , Chapter 10 for an attempt to combine PC with ideas from Global Neuronal Workspace theory: Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 ; Dehaene, 2014 ). However, it also makes PC fundamentally underspecified when treated as a theory which is used to explain issues related to consciousness. While, as suggested before, PC is a valuable framework to describe the representational structure underlying conscious content, it runs into problems when used to explain why certain content is conscious in the first place. One way in which PC and FEP can attempt to retain relevance is by aiming to explain access consciousness ( Block, 1995 ) – a functional mechanism which allows that “some of the attended information eventually enters our awareness and becomes reportable to others” ( Dehaene, 2014 ). However, the problem of the metaphysical “I” becomes a relevant issue only when approached in the context of phenomenal consciousness – the type of consciousness which is loaded with the burden of the so-called “hard problem” ( Chalmers, 1996 ).

This is where PS and FEP encounter a dead end, as the problem enters the area which belongs more to metaphysics than empirical science (at least in the light of the current state of affairs). In order to provide an account of the metaphysical self, one needs to begin with at least some form of a theory of phenomenal consciousness and its place in physical reality. At present FEP (and PC) does not provide such a theory. Recently, Friston (2018) suggested that FEP can be used to understand consciousness, although the fact that he discusses consciousness in functionalist terms (consciousness is related to counterfactual inference 7 ) suggests that his proposal aims to explain access consciousness, making it irrelevant for the problem of metaphysical “I.”

To summarize, the fact that PC and the FEP are not theories of phenomenal consciousness, and seem not to impose any constraints on these theories, has important consequences for what type of self they can explain. As I argued, they have the potential to substantially contribute to the issue of different levels of the phenomenal “Me” (self-as-object) by describing the structure and dynamics of the level of representational content, which are reflected at the level of conscious experience. However, they are not suited to explain the metaphysical “I” (self-as-subject) because they do not address the issue of the place of consciousness in nature. Hence, the main claim is that while PC can be seen as a useful framework to investigate phenomenology of “Me,” it is in principle unsuitable to provide answers to questions about the metaphysics of “I.”

I placed the debate of the self in the domain of consciousness (as opposed to the self understood as e.g., a representational structure, a physical object, or a spiritual entity) and argued that (1) conceptually, the distinction between “Me” and “I” may reflect the distinction between theoretical problems of the phenomenal self and the metaphysical self, respectively (although the notion of for-me-ness may complicate this picture), and (2) that what is described in the literature as the phenomenal “I” can be regarded as just a higher-level part of the phenomenal “Me” [which can be understood as Metzinger’s (2018) phenomenal self-model].

The first claim draws attention to the distinction between “I” and “Me,” which suggests that these two theoretical issues should be investigated independently, using two different methodologies. While “Me” can be investigated using phenomenology and scientific methodology, “I” is typically a metaphysical problem (perhaps with the exception of non-deflationary understandings of for-me-ness) and it is arguable to what extent it can be approached using standard scientific methods. Therefore, it is important to clearly state which problem one approaches when discussing the self in the context of consciousness (see Tables ​ Tables2 2 , ​ 3 3 for some examples).

The second claim, the postulate to treat what is usually described as phenomenal “I” as just a part of the phenomenal “Me,” has two implications. The first is constructive. Investigating issues which are typically regarded in cognitive science as “I” from the perspective of “Me” may contribute towards better understanding of self-consciousness by emphasizing that these two research areas may have much more in common than it appears. Rather than using two distinct terms, which suggest that we are dealing with two fundamentally different problems, we may approach them as just two facets of the same multidimensional research problem. One such approach is to treat both of them as just different levels in the hierarchical structure of the phenomenal self-model ( Metzinger, 2003 , 2009 , 2010 ), an approach which can be (and implicitly is) shared by recent theories of the self, especially within the framework of PC.

The second implication is pragmatic. Refraining from using the term “I” when speaking in the context of phenomenology and using it only in the metaphysical context may reduce conceptual confusion in regard to this term. However, it will also mean forfeiting an important distinction (“Me” versus “I”) which has already gained traction in cognitive science. As such, the choice to eliminate the term “I” in the context of phenomenology is a repelling option, but may be beneficial in the long term. Alternatively, one may use more specific terms, such as “sense of ownership over an experience” to reflect what is meant by “I” in the Wittgensteinian tradition, or, e.g., “sense of ownership of interoceptive signals” when discussing the role of interoception. A second option may be to recast the distinction used in cognitive science in different terms. One proposal is to explicitly speak about it as the distinction between the experience/sense of “Me” versus the experience/sense of “I” (rather than just “Me” and “I”). The task here would be, however, to prove that there is a qualitative difference between them, and to demarcate the exact border.

Author Contributions

The article has been solely the work of MW.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Jakob Hohwy, Tim Bayne, Jennifer Windt, Monima Chadha, and the members of Cognition and Philosophy Lab at Monash University (especially Julian Matthews) for discussions about the issues described in the paper. The author also wants to thank the reviewers and the editor for helpful comments on how to improve the manuscript.

Funding. This article was supported by the Australian Research Council Grant No. DP160102770.

1 Therefore, whenever I use the term “I" I mean self-as-subject (of experience), and whenever I use the term “Me" I mean self-as-object (of experience). This assumption reflects James’ (1890) understanding of these terms (see Table ​ Table1 1 ). I also assume, following James (1890) , that these two categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., if something is an object of experience then it cannot simultaneously be a subject of experience, and vice versa.

2 Wittgenstein (1958) himself did not discuss the issue of phenomenology of the self. However, his approach to the distinction between the use of “I” as subject and “I” as object can be seen as a starting point for contemporary discussions of phenomenology of the self-as-subject.

3 Whenever I use the prefix “phenomenal” I mean “the conscious experience of.” For example, when I write phenomenal “I”, I mean: the conscious experience of self as subject of experience (“I”). In a similar fashion I use the prefix “metaphysical” when I mean “the metaphysical entity of.”

4 Chalmers (1996) also lists “sense of self,” although it is highly controversial whether it can be treated as a distinctive type of conscious content.

5 Sometimes referred to as sense of authorship.

6 “IIT allows for certain simple systems such as grid-like architectures, similar to topographically organized areas in the human posterior cortex, to be highly conscious even when not engaging in any intelligent behavior” ( Tononi et al., 2016 , p. 460).

7 For example, he writes: “So where does consciousness emerge? The proposal offered here is that conscious processing has a temporal thickness or depth, which underwrites inferences about the consequences of action. This necessarily lends inference a purposeful and self-evidencing aspect that has the hallmarks of consciousness” ( Friston, 2018 , p. 1).

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What Is Self-Concept and Why Does It Matter?

Learn about your self-concept and how it affects well-being..

Posted September 1, 2021 | Reviewed by Gary Drevitch

Our self-concept is the image we have of our bodies, capabilities, impressions, etc. (Bailey, 2003). It includes:

• The material self. Our body, possessions, and other things in our lives.
• The interpersonal self. The views others hold about us.
• The intrapersonal self. Our emotions, desires, needs, values, etc. (Epstein, 1973)

Research psychologists noticed that the way we see ourselves is often similar to the way others see us. This finding is referred to as the looking-glass self (Epstein, 1973). This research taught us that much of our self-concept emerges from the social interactions we have with others. Our 'self' emerges based on the information others tell us about who we are.

Our self-concept also includes the self-awareness that we are part of categories based on our age, gender , race, etc. Some people theorize that self-concept is like the glue that holds all the pieces of our personality together. And, at its most basic, self-concept is the answer we give when asked the question "Who am I?"

Why Does the Self-Concept Matter?

Each of us has parts of ourselves that we believe are the most important (Epstein, 1973). For example, an athlete might view their athleticism to be of central importance to their self-concept, even though they also enjoy cooking and are part of a big family. Some have even suggested that the self is arranged hierarchically, with relatively important parts above less important parts. But each of us decides which parts are important to us.

​As we experience new things and gain additional information from others, the self-concept may determine which new aspects of personality are acceptable. If new parts don't jibe with the old parts, they may not be allowed, thus ensuring that our sense of self remains reliable and intact (Epstein, 1973). As we grow older, contradictory evidence may have less impact on our self-concept. So it can become harder to integrate external information, particularly if it disrupts important aspects of the self-concept.

How Does Self-Concept Relate to Well-Being?

Several aspects of the self-concept also play a role in well-being . These include:

• Self-image: The way you see yourself.
• Self-esteem (or self-worth): The extent to which you value yourself or believe you have worth.
• Ideal self: The vision you have of your best self.

Self-image ​

The terms self-image and self-concept are sometimes used interchangeably, but more often, self-image is defined as how you see yourself. This may be literal, like when looking in the mirror. But it can also involve mental representations of yourself. These may or may not be consistent with what one actually sees in the mirror.

Self-esteem (or self-worth)

Self-esteem is broadly defined as the extent to which we like or value ourselves. This generally includes evaluating two parts of ourselves (Tafarodi & Swann Jr, 2001):

• Intrinsic value. This refers to our belief that we are a good (or not-so-good) person. If we have intrinsic value, then we value ourselves just for being who we are. This is also sometimes thought of as the extent to which we like ourselves.
• Instrumental value. This refers to our belief that we can do good things. If we have instrumental value, then we value ourselves because of the things we do. This is also sometimes thought of as the extent to which we respect ourselves.

The ideal self is defined as the self we would like to be—our best self. It appears to originate from the ideal selves that our parents hold for us and communicate to us through childhood (Zentner & Renaud, 2007).

​In positive psychology, the ideal self is thought to include three parts (Boyatzis, & Akrivou, 2006):

• The image of our desired future. This may include dreams , aspirations, and goals .
• Hope. This includes self-efficacy and optimism (beliefs that we can indeed achieve our goals).
• A clear self-concept. This includes an understanding of our core identity and enduring traits. Our ideal self needs to fit with our values, beliefs, and who we are.

Our ideal self is a vision of what we could be or do. That's why the ideal self is thought to be a helpful motivator—it inspires us to progress toward goals and improve our lives in beneficial ways. It may also include aspirations, passions, dreams, and purpose—all things that tend to be good for our well-being.

Our self-concept is an important guiding principle that helps us navigate the world and understand our role in it. Parts of our self-concept may be good or not-so-good for our well-being. That's why learning more about our own self-concept can be beneficial.

Adapted from an article published by The Berkeley Well-Being Institute .

​Bailey 2nd, J. A. (2003). Self-image, self-concept, and self-identity revisited. Journal of the National Medical Association, 95(5), 383.

​Boyatzis, R. E., & Akrivou, K. (2006). The ideal self as the driver of intentional change. Journal of management development.

Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited: Or a theory of a theory. American psychologist, 28(5), 404.

​Tafarodi, R. W., & Swann Jr, W. B. (2001). Two-dimensional self-esteem: Theory and measurement. Personality and individual Differences, 31(5), 653-673.

​Zentner, M., & Renaud, O. (2007). Origins of adolescents' ideal self: An intergenerational perspective. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(3), 557​

Tchiki Davis, Ph.D. , is a consultant, writer, and expert on well-being technology.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE THE SELF ACCORDING TO

"The purpose of psychology is to give us a completely different idea of the things we know best". Paul Valery "Be that self which one truly is." Soren Kierkegaard Prepared by: Paul Vincent B. Galgo LPT

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VIEWS OF THE SELF AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS SEPTEMBER 1990 THOMAS M. RAVENS, B. A. , DARTMOUTH COLLEGE M.E., THAYER SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING M. A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews This thesis examines some views of the self and investigates the ethical implications of these views. The working hypothesis is that our ethical principles are conditioned by what we hold to be the nature of the self. My investigation of the self concerns the question of whether there is a metaphysical self which functions as the subject of human experience, that is, which thinks, feels and acts. I conclude that there is no such self. Next, I investigate how our thinking about persons and our moral principles are affected by the denial of the self. I conclude that some principles of moral responsibility such as promise keeping are unaffected for they only presuppose psychological continuity. However, principles of distributive justice may be affected in scope and

T.L. Holdstock

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• Published: 26 June 2024

DE-PASS best evidence statement (BESt): determinants of adolescents’ device-based physical activity and sedentary behaviour in settings: a systematic review and meta-analysis

• Athanasios Kolovelonis 1 ,
• Ioannis Syrmpas 1 ,
• Anna Marcuzzi 2 ,
• Mohammed Khudair 3 ,
• Kwok Ng 4 , 5 , 6 ,
• Gavin Daniel Tempest 3 ,
• Ratko Peric 7 ,
• František Bartoš 8 ,
• Maximilian Maier 9 ,
• Mirko Brandes 10 ,
• Angela Carlin 11 ,
• Simone Ciaccioni 12 ,
• Cristina Cortis 13 ,
• Chiara Corvino 14 ,
• Andrea Di Credico 15 ,
• Patrik Drid 16 ,
• Francesca Gallè 17 ,
• Pascal Izzicupo 15 ,
• Henriette Jahre 18 ,
• Atle Kongsvold 2 ,
• Evangelia Kouidi 19 ,
• Paul Jarle Mork 2 ,
• Federico Palumbo 12 ,
• Penny Louise Sheena Rumbold 3 ,
• Petru Sandu 20 ,
• Mette Stavnsbo 21 ,
• Sofia Vilela 22 ,
• Catherine Woods 23 ,
• Kathrin Wunsch 24 ,
• Laura Capranica 12 ,
• Ciaran MacDonncha 23 &
• Fiona Chun Man Ling 3

on behalf of DE-PASS

BMC Public Health volume  24 , Article number:  1706 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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Although physical activity (PA) is associated with significant health benefits, only a small percentage of adolescents meet recommended PA levels. This systematic review with meta-analysis explored the modifiable determinants of adolescents’ device-based PA and/or sedentary behaviour (SB), evaluated in previous interventions and examined the associations between PA/SB and these determinants in settings.

A search was conducted on five electronic databases, including papers published from January 2010 to July 2023. Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) or Controlled Trials (CTs) measuring adolescents’ device-based PA/SB and their modifiable determinants at least at two time points: pre- and post-intervention were considered eligible. PA/SB and determinants were the main outcomes. Modifiable determinants were classified after data extraction adopting the social-ecological perspective. Robust Bayesian meta-analyses (RoBMA) were performed per each study setting. Outcomes identified in only one study were presented narratively. The risk of bias for each study and the certainty of the evidence for each meta-analysis were evaluated. The publication bias was also checked. PROSPERO ID: CRD42021282874.

Fourteen RCTs (eight in school, three in school and family, and one in the family setting) and one CT (in the school setting) were included. Fifty-four modifiable determinants were identified and were combined into 33 broader determinants (21 individual–psychological, four individual–behavioural, seven interpersonal, and one institutional). RoBMAs revealed none or negligible pooled intervention effects on PA/SB or determinants in all settings. The certainty of the evidence of the impact of interventions on outcomes ranged from very low to low. Narratively, intervention effects in favour of the experimental group were detected in school setting for the determinants: knowledge of the environment for practicing PA, d  = 1.84, 95%CI (1.48, 2.20), behaviour change techniques, d  = 0.90, 95%CI (0.09, 1.70), choice provided, d  = 0.70, 95%CI (0.36, 1.03), but no corresponding effects on PA or SB were found.

Conclusions

Weak to minimal evidence regarding the associations between the identified modifiable determinants and adolescents’ device-based PA/SB in settings were found, probably due to intervention ineffectiveness. Well-designed and well-implemented multicomponent interventions should further explore the variety of modifiable determinants of adolescents’ PA/SB, including policy and environmental variables.

Peer Review reports

Regular physical activity (PA) is associated with significant health-related benefits [ 1 ], effective cognitive functioning [ 2 ], and higher academic performance [ 3 ]. Conversely, physical inactivity is associated with an increased prevalence of obesity and cardiovascular diseases [ 1 , 4 ]. Thus, increasing PA levels can be considered a cost-effective strategy for improving people’s health and reducing the burden on health-care systems [ 5 ]. Considering this evidence, the World Health Organization (WHO) [ 6 ] recommends that children and adolescents should partake in at least 60 min of moderate to vigorous PA (MVPA) every day. However, globally, only one out of five adolescents meet WHO’s recommended levels of PA [ 4 , 7 , 8 ]. Moreover, the WHO has suggested that adolescents should reduce sedentary behaviours (SB), especially recreational screen time [ 4 , 6 ]. However, adolescents spend a lot of their leisure time in SB (e.g., screen-viewing) which has been associated with unfavourable body composition, lower fitness, and lower self-esteem [ 9 ]. The SB prevalence in European adolescents (boys and girls) seems to be extremely high (e.g., 76.8% in 2017) [ 10 ]. Other evidence has suggested that the average screen time for children and adolescents was 2.9 h/day while the total SB was 8.1 h/day and increased from early childhood through adolescence [ 11 ].

To reverse this alarming trend, the WHO has set a goal of reducing the incidence of worldwide physical inactivity by 15% by 2030 [ 12 ]. This goal can only be achieved if effective policies aimed at promoting PA and reducing SB are implemented [ 12 , 13 ]. The European Union has also emphasized the need to implement effective policies to promote health-enhancing PA [ 14 ]. Policies provide the framework within which programmes and environmental interventions can operate [ 15 ] and as such they should be based on high-quality research evidence regarding the factors associated with adolescents’ PA in different settings. Understanding which drivers (i.e., modifiable determinants) of PA work effectively in the various social or environmental contexts (i.e., settings), how these determinants interact with each other, and how to incorporate them in well-organized systems is critical for designing effective PA interventions [ 13 , 16 ].

In this context, research should focus on understanding the determinants of PA/SB in different settings. Determinants can be viewed as causal factors and mechanisms that include personal, social, economic, and environmental factors that drive and explain adaptations of behaviour in specific contexts [ 17 ]. From a social-ecological perspective, determinants can be individual (e.g., psychological, behavioural), interpersonal (e.g., relationships with parents or peers), but also institutional, environmental (e.g., organization or neighborhood characteristics), community, or policy-related (e.g., laws, policies) [ 18 ]. Determinants can be non-modifiable (e.g., age, gender) or modifiable (e.g., motivation, self-efficacy, family support, or transport infrastructure) meaning that they could be altered through an intervention [ 17 ]. Moreover, adolescents face rapid psychological and biological changes while being influenced by various determinants in different settings (e.g., school, family, neighborhood, and social networks). Hence, it is useful for researchers to identify which of these determinants have a positive impact on adolescents’ PA to design and implement effective interventions and policies to promote PA and to reduce SB [ 19 , 20 , 21 ].

The present study is part of the COST Action CA19101 DEterminants of Physical Activities in SettingS (DE-PASS) [ https://depass.eu/ ] that aims to generate a best-evidence statement derived from high-quality research, to inform future interventions and policies targeting PA and SB. To achieve this objective, a series of systematic reviews and meta-analyses (SRMA) were conducted within DE-PASS, to examine the effects of modifiable determinants in promoting PA and/or reducing SB in children and adolescents, in different settings. The present study focused on adolescents’ device-based PA/SB and modifiable determinants in different settings. Device-based measurement methods of PA/SB are considered more sensitive to behaviour change (i.e., alteration in adolescents’ PA/SB) and less susceptible to recall errors [ 22 , 23 ]. Moreover, by focusing only in device-based measurement methods of PA/SB the results across studies are more comparable and interpretable.

Previous evidence from systematic reviews regarding the effectiveness of determinants on PA/SB [ 21 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 ] is mixed and/or inconclusive primarily due to the moderate methodological quality (e.g., lack of assessment for publication bias) and the variety in the research designs and methodologies used (e.g., for measuring PA) in the included studies. In particular, most of the included studies involved a cross-sectional design [ 26 , 27 , 28 ] making it difficult to infer causal relationships between determinants and PA/SB. For detecting potential causality between determinants and PA/SB appropriate research designs are needed such as randomized controlled trial (RCT) or controlled trial (CT) [ 17 ]. Moreover, some previous reviews focused on mixed populations including both children and adolescents or adults [ 28 , 31 , 32 ] and did not consider the setting of the interventions. Finally, most of the included studies used non-objective measurement methods of PA/SB [ 25 , 27 ] while some others a combination of self-report and device-based methods [ 28 , 31 , 32 ]. Using different methods for measuring PA/SB may increase methodological variability making the comparison of the results more difficult.

Therefore, the present SRMA expanded previous research efforts by focusing on high-level evidence derived from RCTs or CTs and device-based methods for measuring adolescents’ PA/SB in different settings. Actually, to our knowledge, this is the first SRMA of RCTs and CTs that examined concurrently intervention effects both on modifiable determinants and adolescents’ device-based PA/SB in different settings in order to infer, if possible, potential associations between determinants and PA/SB.

Despite the increasing research interest on adolescents’ PA, further research is needed to enrich our knowledge regarding adolescents’ PA, including intervention implementation and policy development [ 8 ]. Such evidence is considered critical for understanding the reasons for PA decline during adolescence [ 7 , 33 ] and identifying potential barriers and facilitators of PA/SB [ 34 ] to develop and implement effective interventions for promoting adolescents’ PA in different settings and informing related public health policies [ 8 , 21 ]. Consequently, the results of this study can provide valuable information regarding the modifiable determinants that can increase adolescents’ PA or reduce SB more effectively in different settings.

The aims of this SRMA were a) to identify modifiable determinants of adolescents’ device-based PA/SB that were targeted in RCTs and CTs in different settings, b) to examine the effects of these interventions on PA/SB and modifiable determinants and c) to explore the potential associations of these determinants with adolescents’ PA/SB in different settings.

Protocol and registration

A common protocol for all SRMAs for children and adolescents conducted under the DE-PASS consortium has been registered in the international prospective register of systematic reviews (PROSPERO) on October 12, 2021 with the registration number: CRD42021282874 and subsequently published [ 35 ]. The present study was reported according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement [ 36 ].

Eligibility criteria

Eligible studies had to meet the following inclusion criteria: a) adolescents (13–19 years) with no reported medical conditions that would hinder habitual PA, b) adopt a RCT/CT design with an intervention for promoting PA and/or reducing SB and a control or other comparison group, c) report PA/SB as an outcome measure using device-based methods, d) examine modifiable determinants of PA/SB, e) measure both PA/SB and determinants at least at two-time points: pre- and post-intervention, and g) be published in a peer-reviewed journal after 2010 (following the first publication of PA guidelines by the WHO) [ 37 ]. High-quality evidence can be derived from RCTs and CTs that can detect potential causality between modifiable determinants and adolescents’ PA/SB [ 14 ]. Device-based measurement methods of PA/SB are considered more sensitive to behaviour change (i.e., alteration in adolescents’ PA/SB) compared to self-report methods, which are susceptible to recall errors and bias [ 22 , 23 ]. All forms of PA were eligible, including structured PA (e.g., PA in physical education), exercise (e.g., gym), leisure-time PA, competitive sport (e.g., football training), active transport PA, or other PA types (e.g., habitual PA). Similarly, various SB activities were included such as screen-based activities (e.g., TV viewing time, homework on computers), transport-related SB (e.g., sitting in a bus) or leisure-time SB (e.g., reading). Νo specific criterion was set regarding the length of the intervention. Studies involving participants outside of the age range (13–19 years) were excluded unless they reported data for a subgroup with a mean age within the eligible range. Grey literature (e.g., research reports, conference proceedings, and theses) was excluded. Studies published in languages other than English were included only if a translation could be provided by a member of the research team.

Search strategy

A search was conducted in the following electronic databases: PsycINFO (EBSCO), MEDLINE (Ovid), Web of Science, Sport Discus, and Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) from January 2010 (following the first publication of PA guidelines by the WHO [ 37 ]) to September 2021. This search was updated in July 2023 [ 38 ]. A detailed description of the search terms, Boolean commands, and field indicators are detailed in the protocol paper [ 35 ]. The following search terms were relevant and used for this systematic review (SR): a) PA, b) SB, c) RCT, d) CT, e) determinants commonly used in PA research, f) adolescents, and g) device-based PA/SB measurement methods (e.g., accelerometer, pedometer). Synonyms and related terms that are commonly used in PA/SB research for all these search terms were also used.

Screening process

Members of the review team performed an initial screening using reference management software (EndNote × 9) [ 39 ] to exclude records of grey literature and duplicates. The resulting list of studies was uploaded to Covidence [ 40 ], an online tool for SRs, which was used by a group of reviewers to review the studies [ 36 ]. After this initial phase, the blinded screening process was completed in two consecutive stages, including title and abstract screening and full-text screening. In both stages, each study was screened by two blinded independent reviewers, randomly selected by Covidence. A third reviewer resolved conflicts, if necessary. The evaluation of studies in the title/abstract and full-text screening was based on a decision tree illustrating the criteria for inclusion/exclusion. Reasons for excluding a study at the full-text stage were recorded. The included studies were then checked for duplicate reporting [ 41 ].

Data extraction

Two independent reviewers extracted data from each study using a form created in Covidence. Missing data or clarifications were requested from the corresponding authors, where necessary. Studies with incomplete data were excluded. Conflicts between reviewers regarding the correctness of the extracted data were resolved through online bilateral consensus meetings. The data extracted included the description of the study and the respective intervention, participants’ characteristics, the measures of PA/SB and modifiable determinants, the study time frames, and results [ 35 ].

• Risk of bias

Risk of bias was assessed with a modified version of the Cochrane risk of bias tool for randomized trials (RoB V.2.0) and non-randomized studies of intervention (ROBINS-I) [ 42 ], whereby the domain concerning the bias in the measurement of the outcome was duplicated to assess both PA/SB and determinant outcomes. Risk of bias assessment was conducted by the same two independent reviewers who extracted the data from the respective studies. A separate, dedicated form was created in Covidence to facilitate this process. Discrepancies between reviewers were resolved by reaching a consensus on the correctness of the assessment with the contribution of a third reviewer, if necessary.

Data synthesis and statistical analysis

The main outcomes in the present SRMA were adolescents’ PA and/or SB measured with device-based methods (i.e., accelerometers, pedometers, and phone-based pedometer apps) and the modifiable determinants of PA/SB. The total PA/SB throughout the day was used as an outcome. In cases where total PA/SB was not measured in a study, or if multiple PA/SB outcomes were reported, the outcome most representative of habitual PA/SB (e.g., MVPA/day) was used. Modifiable determinants were classified after data extraction by adopting the social-ecological perspective [ 18 ]. In cases where similarities among determinants were identified, conceptually-related determinants were combined into broader determinants. For example, the self-determined motivational regulations (i.e., intrinsic motivation and identified regulation) were merged into the determinant of autonomous motivation, while the non-self-determined motivational regulations (i.e., introjected regulation and external motivation) were merged into the determinant of controlled motivation. Moreover, the psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness were merged into the determinant of basic psychological needs [ 43 ]. By the same token, conceptually similar determinants were analyzed together. For example, determinants related to self-efficacy and confidence regarding PA/SB were all considered under the label of the determinant of self-efficacy. For all these cases, composite scores of multiple outcomes were calculated using respective formulas (Additional file 1) suggested by Borenstein et al. [ 44 ]. The robustness of the composite scores and the effect sizes, when different correlation coefficients were applied to the calculation, were tested through a sensitivity analysis [ 44 ].

Outcomes (i.e., PA/SB and determinants) were included in meta-analysis (MA) by study setting providing that at least two studies reported the same outcome in a specific setting. Intervention effects on determinants were analyzed regardless of their PA/SB outcomes. The results of the outcomes identified in only one study were presented narratively. Studies including habitual and non-habitual PA (e.g., PA during physical education) were analyzed separately. Short-term (up to 6 months) and long-term (over 6 months) follow-up measurements were analyzed separately.

The effect size metric of the “standardised mean difference” and the standard error were calculated for all outcomes of studies included in this SR and meta-analyzed or presented narratively. MAs were performed in JASP 0.17.1 statistics software [ 45 ] adopting the robust Bayesian meta-analysis (RoBMA) [ 46 ] which uses the RoBMA R package [ 47 ] and Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms via JAGS [ 48 ]. We used only random-effects part of the RoBMA model ensemble with the default prior distributions resulting in 18 included models (detailed RoBMA specification can be found in [ 49 ]). We used Bayes factor (BF 10 ) to measure evidence of the presence of an effect (alternative hypothesis) over the absence of an effect (null hypothesis). The same criteria were also applied to publication bias assessment. BF 10 were interpreted using the Lee and Wagenmakers’ thresholds [ 50 ]. BF 10 values between 1 and 0.33 represent anecdotal evidence (i.e., presence or absence of an effect cannot be ascertained), BF 10 values between 0.33 and 0.1 represent moderate evidence, and BF 10 values below 0.1 represent strong evidence for the null hypothesis. A detailed presentation of the cut-off criteria for the interpretation of BF 10 is included in Additional file 2. The effect sizes of Cohen’s d with a 95% credible interval (CI) were also reported. For interpreting these results, effect size values above 0.20 were considered a small effect, values above 0.50 a moderate effect and values above 0.80 a large effect [ 51 ]. The degree of heterogeneity was assessed by the between-study standard deviation τ. For readers unfamiliar with RoBMA, classical frequentist MAs with random effects were additionally performed and the results including effect size (95% CI) and heterogeneity are presented in Additional file 3.

Certainty of evidence

The certainty of the evidence for each outcome was evaluated with the Grading Recommendations to Assess Development and Evaluation system (GRADE) [ 52 ]. The GRADE classification includes four possible levels: Very low (the true effect is probably markedly different from the estimated effect); Low (the true effect might be markedly different from the estimated effect); Moderate (the true effect is probably close to the estimated effect); High (the true effect is similar to the estimated effect). Five factors, namely the risk of bias, imprecision, inconsistency, indirectness, and publication bias can be considered relevant for downgrading the certainty of the evidence. Two independent reviewers evaluated the certainty of the evidence using GRADE. Discrepancies between reviewers were resolved by achieving a consensus, while a third reviewer was consulted, if necessary.

Training process

All reviewers involved in the screening process, data extraction, assessment of the risk of bias and certainty of evidence attended online workshops, to perform the above-described steps efficiently and to ensure mutual understanding and consistent practice. A constant communication process among reviewers and with the study leaders was also maintained during all stages of the SRMA research process.

Study selection

In total, 102,560 records were identified through the search of electronic databases. After removing duplicate results, 27,587 records were included in the screening process. Title and abstract screening resulted in 1,758 full-text articles. Full-text screening resulted in 177 eligible studies for all DE-PASS reviews, focusing on children and adolescents and involving RCT, CT and longitudinal studies. The present review included the 15 studies (14 RCTs, one CT) measuring adolescents’ device-based PA/SB measurement and modifiable determinants (PRISMA flow diagram Fig.  1 [ 36 ]).

PRISMA flowchart of included studies, eligibility, inclusion, and exclusion criteria

Study characteristics

The characteristics of the included studies are summarized in Table  1 . A total number of 8531 adolescents (5310 girls) participated in the included studies ranging from 40 to 2862 participants in each of the individual studies.

The 14 RCTs [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 ] and the one CT [ 67 ] included were conducted in three settings, namely school (11 studies), school and family (three studies), and family (one study).

Determinants

In total, 54 modifiable determinants were identified in the 15 studies. These modifiable determinants were classified following the social-ecological perspective [ 18 ]. Most of them were individual–psychological ( n  = 37), some were interpersonal ( n  = 11) and a few were individual–behavioural ( n  = 4) or institutional ( n  = 2). After combining conceptually-related determinants into broader determinants, 33 determinants were introduced in the analyses (21 individual–psychological, four individual–behavioural, seven interpersonal and one institutional). Twelve determinants were identified in two or more studies conducted in a specific setting and were, as mentioned in the methods section, included in the meta-analysis, while the rest, identified in only one study, are presented narratively.

PA and SB outcomes

Thirteen RCTs [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 ] measured habitual PA/SB, one RCT [ 57 ] non-habitual/structured PA/SB (i.e., during physical education), while one CT [ 67 ] measured SB in the classroom. Thirteen studies used accelerometers [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 65 , 66 ], one study used pedometers [ 63 ] and one used a mobile phone-based pedometer app [ 64 ].

School setting

Ten RCTs [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 65 , 66 ] and one CT [ 67 ] published from 2013 to 2023 were included. Nine RCTs [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 65 , 66 ] measured habitual PA/SB, one [ 57 ] measured structured PA/SB (i.e., during physical education), and one CT [ 67 ] measured SB in the classroom, all using accelerometers. The number of participants in these studies ranged from 40 to 1558 and the intervention duration ranged from four weeks to six months, except for one study including a single physical education session [ 57 ]. Three studies [ 54 , 58 , 66 ] included post-intervention follow-up measures (10-, three-, and six-months post-intervention, respectively). All studies based the design of their interventions on one or more theories and all focused on increasing adolescents’ PA and/or decreasing SB and enhancing related psychosocial variables. These studies were implemented during the school schedule either during physical education or in sport-related school programs [ 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 ], while some others [ 59 , 60 , 65 , 66 ] involved additional extra-curricular activities (e.g., asking students to participate in after school PAs) (Table  1 ).

In total, 36 modifiable determinants were identified in the school setting (25 individual–psychological, three individual–behavioural and eight interpersonal). After merging conceptually-related determinants into broader categories, 25 determinants were included in the analyses (16 individual–psychological, three individual–behavioural, and six interpersonal). Ten of these determinants were included in more than two studies and were meta-analyzed (Table  2 ; Fig.  2 a to k). We found strong evidence for the absence of an effect on autonomous motivation, basic psychological needs and self-efficacy, moderate evidence for the absence of an effect on friendship quality, intentions, controlled motivation, social support by peers, perceived barriers to PA and enjoyment, and anecdotal evidence for the absence of an effect on perceived autonomy support.

Forest plots of effects of interventions on determinants in the school setting

Fifteen different determinants were identified in only one of the studies conducted in the school setting and are presented narratively. Large standardized mean differences in favour of the experimental group were found in knowledge of the environment for practicing PA, d  = 1.84, 95%CI (1.48, 2.20) [ 65 ], in behaviour change techniques (BCTs), d  = 0.90, 95%CI (0.09, 1.70) [ 60 ] and medium differences in choice provided by teachers, d  = 0.70, 95%CI (0.36, 1.03) [ 57 ]. For other determinants nonsignificant intervention effects ( d s ranging from -0.41 to 0.71) were found. Notably, there were medium differences in fundamental movement skills, d  = 0.71, 95%CI (-0.19, 1.61) [ 59 ], and low differences in coping planning at post-intervention, d  = 0.30, 95%CI (-0.05, 0.65) and 3-months follow-up, d  = 0.31, 95%CI (-0.07, 0.69) [ 58 ]. However, in these cases, the 95%CIs crossed the threshold.

One RoBMA was conducted for PA (Fig.  3 a), one for SB (Fig.  3 b) and one for short-term (up to six months) post-intervention follow-up PA (Fig.  3 c). Strong evidence for the absence of an effect on PA, moderate evidence for the absence of an effect on SB, and anecdotal evidence for the absence of an effect on follow-up PA were found. One study, included a long-term (over six months) follow-up measure [ 54 ] and showed small negative and nonsignificant effects on PA and SB ( d s = -0.10 and -0.11, respectively). One study [ 57 ] measuring non-habitual PA (i.e., MVPA and percentage of SB in a single 20-min physical education session) reported no intervention effects.

Forest plots of effects of interventions on ( a ) PA, ( b ) SB, and ( c ) on PA-follow-up in the school setting

All MAs show small heterogeneity accompanied, however, by a large degree of uncertainty due to limited number of studies in each MA. There is also insufficient evidence for publication bias (Table  2 ).

The only CT [ 67 ] included in our study, delivered in the school setting, revealed moderate intervention effects, with the 95%CIs crossing the threshold, for habit strength, d  = 0.44, 95%CI (-0.02, 0.90) and self-efficacy, d  = 0.39, 95%CI (-0.07, 0.85) for replacing classroom sitting with standing, accompanied with large effects in reducing SB (sitting), d  = 0.92, 95%CI (0.43, 1.41).

Risk of bias assessment

The results of the risk of bias assessment are presented in the traffic light plot [ 68 ] in Fig.  4 . An overall high-risk of bias evaluation was determined for the 10 RCTs in the school setting. Domain 5 (bias due to measurement of determinants) and domain 2 (bias due to deviations from the intended interventions) mainly contributed to these evaluations. Regarding domain 5, participants were unlikely to be blinded in most interventions involving self-report measurements of the determinants. For domain 2, the lack of an appropriate analysis used to estimate the effect of assignment to intervention and the potential impact of this failure on the result contributed to these evaluations. An overall high-risk was assessed for the one CT in the school setting mainly due to the judgement in domain 7 (bias due to measurement of determinants), domain 5 (bias due to missing data) and domain 8 (bias in selection of reported results) (Fig.  5 ).

Risk of bias assessments of RCTs in the school setting

Risk of bias assessments of CT in the school setting

Certainty of the evidence

The certainty of the evidence for PA, SB, PA (follow-up), friendship quality, basic psychological needs, self-efficacy, social support by peers, perceived barriers to PA, and enjoyment was rated as low and for intentions, autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, and perceived autonomy support as very low, largely due to imprecision (Table  3 ).

School and family setting

Three RCTs [ 61 , 62 , 63 ], all theory-based, measuring habitual PA using accelerometers [ 61 , 62 ] or pedometers [ 63 ], published from 2010 to 2019 were included. These studies included a school-based intervention with additional intervention components involving parents and PA related activities at home. The number of the participants ranged from 124 to 1550 and the intervention duration ranged from four weeks to one year. Lubans et al. [ 63 ] analyzed data separately for boys and girls and thus this study was introduced in the MA twice, once for boys and once for girls. No study included a post-intervention follow-up measure. Interventions focused mainly on increasing adolescents’ PA and/or decreasing SB and enhancing related psychosocial variables (Table  1 ).

In total, 18 modifiable determinants were identified in the school and family setting (10 individual–psychological, one individual–behavioural, five interpersonal, and two institutional). Merging conceptually-related determinants into broader categories resulted in a final number of 10 determinants (five individual–psychological, one individual–behavioural, three interpersonal, and one institutional). Two of these determinants (i.e., self-efficacy and social support by family; Fig.  6 a,b respectively) were measured in more than two studies and meta-analyzed. Moderate evidence to suggest the absence of an effect on self-efficacy and social support by family were found. The evidence to suggest the presence or absence of publication bias was insufficient (Table  4 ).

Forest plots of effects of interventions on ( a ) self-efficacy, ( b ) social support by family ( c ) PA in the school and family setting

Regarding determinants measured in only one study, nonsignificant intervention effects ( d s ranged from -0.04 to 0.15) were found.

One RoBMA was conducted for PA (Fig.  6 c) showing insufficient evidence to suggest the presence or absence of an effect on PA, publication bias and heterogeneity. (Table  4 ). Only one study [ 62 ] measured SB and reported negligible intervention effects ( d  = -0.08).

An overall high-risk of bias evaluation was determined for the three RCTs in the school and family setting. Domain 1 (bias arising from the randomization process), domain 5 (bias due to the measurement of determinants) and domain 2 (bias due to deviations from the intended interventions) primarily contributed to these evaluations (Fig.  7 ).

Risk of bias assessments of RCTs in the school and family setting

The certainty of the evidence for PA and self-efficacy was rated as very low and for social support by family as low, largely due to imprecision (Table  3 ).

Family setting

One RCT [ 64 ] measuring habitual PA using a mobile phone-based pedometer app in the family setting was identified. Forty-two adolescent girls participated in this six-week multi-component intervention based on the self-determination theory. No follow-up measures were included (Table  1 ). The nine determinants (all individual–psychological) identified were merged into six broader determinants. Nonsignificant intervention effects on the determinants were found ( d s ranged from -0.23 to 0.59). Notably, medium standardized mean differences in favour of the experimental group were found for body appreciation, d  = 0.59, 95%CI (-0.03, 1.21), and small differences for perceived competence, d  = 0.37, 95%CI (-0.24, 0.98), autonomous motivation, d  = 0.33, 95%CI (-0.08, 0.73), and amotivation, d  = 0.27, 95%CI (-0.34, 0.88). However, for all these determinants the 95%CIs crossed the threshold. No intervention effect on PA ( d  = 0.00) was found.

An overall high-risk of bias evaluation was determined for this study [ 64 ] mainly due to domain 1 (bias arising from the randomization process) and domain 5 (bias due to the measurement of determinants) (Fig.  8 ).

Risk of bias assessments of RCT in the family setting

Sensitivity analysis

For outcomes requiring estimations of composite scores, sensitivity analyses were performed showing no difference in the effect sizes when r was set at 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8.

The aim of this SRMA was threefold: (a) to identify modifiable determinants of adolescents’ device-based PA/SB that were targeted in RCTs and CTs in different settings, (b) to examine the intervention effects on PA/SB and modifiable determinants and (c) to investigate the potential associations of modifiable determinants with adolescents’ PA/SB. A wide range of modifiable determinants were identified. Generally, none or negligible evidence for intervention effect on adolescents’ device-based PA/SB and modifiable determinants were found, while the certainty of this evidence ranged from very low to low. Moreover, this review provided weak evidence regarding how modifiable the identified determinants are and the corresponding changes of these determinants with adolescents’ device-based PA/SB in three different settings (i.e., school, family, school and family). Methodological issues in the implementation and evaluation of the interventions were identified and the characteristics of the effective PA interventions were highlighted.

In particular, 54 determinants merged into 33 broader determinants were identified in the 14 RCTs and one CT included in this SRMA. Similar to previous reports [ 27 ], most of these determinants were individual–psychological, some interpersonal, and very few individual–behavioural or institutional [ 18 ]. None or negligible pooled intervention effects on the determinants were found. In many cases, RoBMAs provided insufficient evidence for the presence or the absence of an effect. Regarding the determinants identified in only one study, moderate to large differences in favour of the experimental group were found in knowledge of the environment for practicing PA, BCTs, and choice provided (school setting). However, in almost all cases, these differences did not correspond to respective improvements in PA. Moreover, none or negligible pooled intervention effects on adolescents’ device-based PA or SB in settings were found. Intervention effects on reducing SB were found only in the CT [ 67 ] examining sitting in the classroom. Post intervention short-term and long-term follow-up effects on PA/SB were also negative. The lack of changes in the identified determinants and the corresponding PA/SB may be due to ineffectiveness of the interventions. This, however, does not imply the lack of relationships between determinants and PA/SB. Actually, considering that determinants have been viewed as “causal factors, and variations in these factors are followed systematically by variations in PA” ([ 17 ], p. 6), the lack of change in determinants found in the present review was rather expected to lead to lack of change in PA/SB.

Previous studies have also reported minimal effects of interventions on adolescents’ device-based PA [ 8 ]. Indeed, a SRMA of RCTs in school settings found small and nonsignificant pooled effects on device-based measured total PA and MVPA [ 69 , 70 ]. Similarly, small to negligible pooled intervention effects on device-based PA and a small effect on MVPA in RCTs or CTs with participants younger than 16 years old were found [ 71 , 72 ]. Other reviews including studies measuring both self-report and device-based PA found a very small positive effect of school-based PA intervention on adolescent girls’ PA [ 73 ], negligible effects on MVPA and no effects on total PA in children aged 5 to 18 years [ 74 ].

Within the school setting, evidence for the absence of an effect was found on both determinants (i.e., basic psychological needs, self-efficacy, friendship quality, intentions, autonomous and controlled motivation, social support by peers, and perceived autonomy support) and PA/SB. Available evidence regarding these determinants is mixed, whereas for some determinants only evidence from studies with adults were available. For example, a recent SRMA [ 75 ] has suggested, with low certainty of evidence, that school-based PA interventions may be effective in increasing some motivational outcomes (i.e., autonomous forms of motivation and task orientation) but less so for others (i.e., basic psychological needs). A MA of cross-sectional or longitudinal studies suggested that social support was not a strong predictor of adolescent girls’ PA [ 76 ], while SRMAs of longitudinal and experimental [ 77 ] and RCT studies [ 78 ] in adults reported positive associations between intentions and PA levels.

Narratively, large differences in favour of the experimental group were found for knowledge of the environment for practicing PA [ 65 ] without, however, corresponding effects on PA or SB. Knowledge about practicing PA may be a facilitator of adolescents’ PA [ 34 ]. Similarly, large effects were also found for BCTs (e.g., goal setting and self-monitoring) [ 60 ] without corresponding effect on PA. The evidence on the BCTs like goal setting, and self-monitoring is limited, and although there is evidence of promise, as highlighted from the feasibility study [ 60 ], the evidence is not sufficiently robust, and should be treated with caution. Following some positive associations between PA and self-monitoring, goal setting, and other self-regulatory BCTs reported in various settings among adults [ 79 ], the effects of these determinants on adolescents’ PA may be further explored. Moderate intervention effects on students’ perceptions of choice provided by their teacher but not on MVPA and SB after a single 20-min physical education session were found [ 57 ]. This finding was aligned with previous evidence where teachers’ perceived autonomy support did not increase students’ PA [ 80 ]. Generally, interventions can increase students’ MVPA during physical education classes [ 81 ], although, considering the results of the present and previous studies [ 73 ], the effects of school-based interventions on increasing students’ total PA cannot be ascertained.

In the school and family setting, RobMAs revealed insufficient evidence to suggest the presence or absence of an effect on PA and moderate evidence to suggest absence of an effect on self-efficacy and social support by family. Negligible, pooled intervention effects were found for self-efficacy and PA with evidence for heterogeneity. Yet, through a mediation study [ 63 ] the positive intervention effects on self-efficacy were not associated with changes in PA. Convincing evidence regarding the positive associations between self-efficacy and overall PA in adolescents [ 27 ] and the reduction of SB in both children/adolescents and adults [ 82 ] have been previously reported. Regarding social support, previous evidence suggests that it is not a strong predictor of PA in adolescent girls [ 76 ]. Narratively, positive intervention effects on family norm of setting limitations for screen time were detected but no corresponding effects on the device-based PA were found [ 61 ]. Aittasalo et al. [ 61 ], however, used non-validated questionnaires for measuring parental indicators and faced a high dropout rate from the accelerometer both pre- and post-intervention.

Only one RCT [ 64 ] identified in the family setting showing nonsignificant intervention effects on the determinants (all individual–psychological) and PA. Previous evidence has suggested that perceived competence was positively associated with PA when mainly measured through self-report methods among children and adolescents [ 83 ]. Regarding motivation, although weak to moderate positive associations of PA with autonomous forms of motivation in children and adolescents have been reported [ 84 ], a more recent SRMA using a meta-regression analysis showed that increases in autonomous motivation were not significantly related to increases in PA [ 79 ]. Thus, further research should explore the effects of the determinants on adolescents’ PA/SB in family setting, including determinants related to parents and family environment.

The certainty of evidence found ranged from very low to low mainly due to the high risk of bias and imprecision (i.e., relatively wide 95%CI on the overall estimate including the potential for both positive and negative effects). Possible explanations for the lack of intervention effects on PA/SB and determinants may include poor implementation of the interventions [ 54 , 63 ], use of non-validated questionnaires for measuring the determinants [ 60 , 61 ], use of scales with low measurement sensitivity or cultural appropriateness [ 63 ], and with dropout rates ranging from 22 to 83% [ 56 , 58 , 61 , 65 ]. Some interventions included samples of 20 to 42 participants [ 59 , 60 , 64 ] or a small number of sessions ranging from 1 to 8 [ 55 , 57 , 58 , 61 ], during which effects on determinants and consequently on PA/SB might not be feasible. Changing determinants may require longer time to occur. Some studies [ 53 , 54 , 56 , 62 ] failed to comply with the suggested minimum period of four to five days of monitoring for capturing valid and reliable habitual PA [ 85 ], while others did not report the minimum accelerometer wear-time [ 59 , 63 ]. Similar interpretations have been previously reported including issues related to the duration or the intensity of interventions, the quality of implementation, or the lack of checking implementation fidelity including the sound translation of theory-based principles into practical tasks and activities involved in interventions components [ 71 , 73 , 74 ]. Undoubtedly, all these issues represent challenges to be overcome in future research focusing on implementing well-designed interventions for examining which determinants are modifiable in settings and their levels of association with PA/SB.

Thus, the questions about the characteristics of the effective PA interventions and which of the determinants of adolescents’ PA/SB are modifiable are still open. Current interventions to promote adolescents’ PA are mostly ineffective [ 8 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 ]. Considering the low levels of PA among adolescents [ 7 ] that reduced even more during COVID-19 lockdown [ 86 ], and the increased levels of SB which has been characterized as a global pandemic [ 87 ], the design and implementation of the most effective interventions is urgently needed. However, increasing PA is not an easy goal to reach by just focusing on simple, often short-term, individual health outcomes, or by involving isolated interventions but rather requires complex, multiple, innovative actions for creating active societies, environments, people, and systems [ 16 ]. In line with this, the International Society for Physical Activity and Health [ 16 ] has suggested that increasing PA and reducing SB requires multiple policies and actions across different settings including school, active transport, sport and recreation, and community. Considering that most adolescents spend a lot of their day-time in the school setting, a whole-of-school approach to PA should be a priority [ 13 ]. This involves the design of multicomponent interventions including as a cornerstone regular and high-quality physical education classes for all, suitable physical and social environments and resources, and policy actions to promote PA before, during, and after school hours (e.g., active recess breaks, active school transportation, extracurricular PA and sport, use of technology). For example, walking to and from school can have a meaningful contribution to adolescents’ PA [ 88 ], while using activity trackers may increase PA [ 89 ]. Thus, such approaches should be incorporated into respective interventions that may also be context-specific adopting a flexible approach that enables schools to tailor content to their specific context [ 90 ]. The involvement of staff, family and the wider community may also be necessary components of such interventions [ 8 , 16 ]. Although, some evidence regarding the effectiveness of the multicomponent interventions has been reported [ 73 , 91 ], further research is warranted to identify the most effective modifiable determinants of adolescents’ PA/SB, that these interventions should focus on in each setting [ 16 ]. Finally, close collaboration and establishment of a clear communication process between researchers, practitioners and policy and decision makers regarding the design, implementation, and evaluation of PA/SB interventions are also welcomed, as this would lead to increased effectiveness of PA/SB interventions in real-life contexts [ 92 ].

Strengths and limitations

This study identified the modifiable determinants of adolescents’ PA/SB in settings and explored their associations with PA/SB. Including studies measuring concurrently PA/SB and modifiable determinants in specific settings provided the advantage of placing the factors (i.e., modifiable determinants) associated with adolescents’ PA in their social and environmental context [ 18 ]. Moreover, by focusing on high-quality studies (i.e., RCTs and CTs) potential causality between modifiable determinants and adolescents’ PA/SB could be detected [ 17 ]. Furthermore, to strengthen the quality of the evidence, RoBMA was the method of analysis allowing us to adjust for publication bias and enhance our understanding of the data by quantifying evidence on a continuous scale and assessing potential evidence for the null or the alternative hypothesis or whether results were inconclusive [ 46 ].

The relatively small number of studies included in MAs may be considered a limitation. This may be reflected in the results of some RoBMAs showing insufficient evidence to suggest the presence or the absence of an effect that may contribute to imprecision in the GRADE process. Moreover, the risk of bias assessment in the GRADE process was based on the evaluation of all domains and not only on the overall evaluation which was deemed high for all studies, because the lack of blinding of participants might have affected the measurement of determinants. Effective blinding of participants assigned to the intervention groups is a real challenge for future interventions. Heterogeneity was present in some MAs, while the evidence to suggest the presence or absence of publication bias was insufficient. Associations between PA/SB and modifiable determinants could only be inferred as almost all included studies did not conduct mediation analyses to test causal relationships. The use of different forms of PA/SB analyzed in MAs or the merge of conceptually-related determinants into broader determinants (e.g., autonomy, competence, and relatedness were merged into the broader determinant of basic psychological needs) may also be considered as limitations. However, we adopted this approach to avoid conducting a larger number of MAs with small number of studies for different forms of PA/SB or for every single determinant that may make the interpretation of the results more difficult.

Future research

Considering that research up to date has primarily adopted an individual approach to behavioural change focusing mainly on individual–psychological determinants, future research may prioritize environmental over individual approaches for promoting PA [ 93 ] focusing on determinants related to physical environments, institutional, community, or policy factors [ 8 , 18 ]. It is also critical for future studies to examine the mechanisms underlying behavioural changes related to adolescents’ PA/SB and conduct mediation analyses to explore these mechanisms [ 93 ]. In this direction, realist synthesis may enhance our understanding of what determinants of PA/SB might work, how they work, for who, and in what settings [ 94 ]. Further research should examine the effects of interventions in other settings in which adolescents are involved except that of family and school (e.g., sport and recreation, transportation, and community). For example, after school PA and sport programs can contribute to adolescents’ daily PA and reduced SB [ 95 ]. Most importantly, interventions involving more than one setting [ 16 ] adopting a transdisciplinary collaboration and targeting modifiable determinants from different categories [ 18 ] should further highlight the dynamic associations between determinants and settings and provide insightful information to guide related policies and practices. Considering that in the present study only three interventions involved follow-up measures, future research should explore the long-lasting intervention effects on adolescents’ PA/SB and modifiable determinants.

This study found none or negligible evidence for intervention effects on adolescents’ device-based PA/SB and modifiable determinants in different settings. Some intervention effects in favour of the experimental group were found in single studies, for few determinants (i.e., knowledge for practicing PA, BCTs, choice provided). This evidence was rather limited and, in some cases, insufficient to draw a definite conclusion. Thus, the modifiable determinants of adolescents’ PA/SB should be further targeted in holistic multicomponent interventions in different settings and tested by well-designed, well-implemented and well-evaluated research.

Availability of data and materials

The data underlying the results presented in this review are available on request from the first author ([email protected]).

Abbreviations

Behaviour Change Techniques

Credible Interval

Controlled Trials

DEterminants of Physical Activities in SettingS

Grading Recommendations to Assess Development and Evaluation system

Meta-Analysis

Moderate to Vigorous PA

Physical Activity

Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses

Randomized Control Trial

Robust Bayesian Meta-Analyses

Sedentary Behaviour

Systematic Review

Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

World Health Organization

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Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge contributions from Dr Grainne Hayes (Department of Physical Education and Sport Sciences), Associate Professor Ayşe Özbil Torun (Department of Architecture and Built Environment, Northumbria University), Dr Teferi Mekonnen Yitayew (Department of Nutrition, Institute of Basic Medical Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo), Professor Angela Di Baldassarre and Professor Barbara Ghinassi (Department of Medicine and Aging Sciences, University “G. d’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara) to the early stage of the systematic review screening process.

This article is based on work from COST Action CA19101 Determinants of Physical Activities in Settings (DE-PASS), supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology). The content of this article reflects only the authors’ views and the European Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) is a funding agency for research and innovation networks. Our Actions help connect research initiatives across Europe and enable scientists to grow their ideas by sharing them with their peers. This boosts their research, career and innovation. www.cost.eu .

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The current systematic review protocol was produced by members of the COST Action CA19101 Determinants of Physical Activities in Settings (DE-PASS). The protocol was conceived and designed by CMD, LC, FCML, MK, AM, GDT and KN. The methodology was planned and outlined by CMD, FCML, MK, AM, GDT, KN, FB, RP and MM. The review was initially drafted by AthanasiosK. Subsequent drafts were reviewed by all co-authors: IS, AM, MK, KN, GDT, RP, FB, MM, MB, AC, SC, CristinaC, ChiaraC, ADC, PD, FG, PI, HJ, AtleK, EK, PJM, FP, PLSR, PS, MS, SV, CW, KW, LC, CMD, FCML. Revisions were made by AthanasiosK. All authors have read and agreed to the submitted version of the manuscript.

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Kolovelonis, A., Syrmpas, I., Marcuzzi, A. et al. DE-PASS best evidence statement (BESt): determinants of adolescents’ device-based physical activity and sedentary behaviour in settings: a systematic review and meta-analysis. BMC Public Health 24 , 1706 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-024-19136-y

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By Maya Phillips

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