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Gibbons v. Ogden

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Gibbons v. Ogden

Brief fact summary., synopsis of rule of law., discussion..

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Gibbons v. ogden.

22 U.S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23, 9 U.S. (Wheat.) 1, 1824 U.S. LEXIS 370 (1824)

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Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) involved a dispute over navigation rights on the waters between New York and New Jersey. Thomas Gibbons operated steamboats between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license. Aaron Ogden, who had been granted an exclusive license by New York State to operate steamboats in the same waters, filed a complaint against Gibbons for operating in violation of his state-granted monopoly. The state courts favored Ogden, enforcing the monopoly rights granted by New York, and Gibbons appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

The central issue in Gibbons v. Ogden was whether the State of New York could grant an exclusive monopoly to navigate the waters between New York and New Jersey in conflict with a federal license granted under the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

The Supreme Court held that the federal licensing act under the Constitution's Commerce Clause gave Gibbons the right to operate his steamboats in interstate waters, superseding the state monopoly granted to Ogden. Therefore, New York State's law granting exclusive navigation rights was unconstitutional as it conflicted with federal law.

The Court, led by Chief Justice John Marshall, reasoned that the power to regulate interstate commerce was granted exclusively to Congress by the Constitution and encompassed all aspects of commercial interaction, including navigation between states. The Court emphasized that commerce is not just the buying and selling of goods but includes all commercial interactions. Marshall argued that the federal government's power to regulate commerce should be understood broadly to fulfill the intent of the Constitution in creating a unified national economy. The Court also held that the federal government's power over commerce among the states was complete in itself, could be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledged no limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution. Thus, any state law that conflicted with federal commerce regulations was necessarily invalid.

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In-Depth Discussion

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Gibbons v. Ogden, as delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall, is a foundational exposition on the scope and nature of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Marshall's opinion meticulously dissects the meaning and extent of Congress's power to regulate commerce, setting a precedent for the federal government's predominant role in commercial regulation. The reasoning can be expanded into several key areas:

• Comprehensive Understanding of "Commerce"

Marshall argued for a broad interpretation of the term "commerce," stating it encompasses more than mere buying and selling of goods. He elucidated that commerce includes all aspects of commercial interaction, such as the transportation of people and goods between states. This interpretation was crucial, as it expanded the federal government's regulatory reach beyond mere trade transactions to include all forms of interstate commercial activity, including navigation.

• Federal Supremacy and the Commerce Clause

A significant portion of Marshall's reasoning centered on the supremacy of federal law in matters of interstate commerce. He underscored that the Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states." This power, according to Marshall, is not just a grant but an exclusive domain of the federal government, implying that states cannot enact legislation that interferes with or contradicts federal commerce regulations. Marshall's opinion firmly established that when state and federal laws conflict in matters of commerce, federal law prevails.

• The Nature of the Federal Union

Marshall's opinion also delved into the nature of the federal union created by the Constitution. He highlighted that the states, while sovereign in their right, surrendered certain powers to the federal government to promote the general welfare and ensure a cohesive national economy. The decision to vest the power to regulate interstate commerce exclusively in Congress was motivated by the need to avoid the discord and inefficiency of disparate state regulations. This perspective underscored the Constitution's intent to foster a unified economic space across the states.

• The Scope of Congressional Power over Commerce

Marshall addressed arguments suggesting that Congress's power to regulate commerce should be narrowly construed to prevent undue federal encroachment on states' rights. Rejecting this notion, he argued that the Constitution's grant of power to regulate commerce should be understood as broad and comprehensive, enabling Congress to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. This broad interpretation was essential to manage the complex and interwoven commercial activities that span state boundaries.

• Rejecting the Limitation of Commerce to Traffic

The Court rejected the argument that the power to regulate commerce was limited only to the regulation of traffic (the buying and selling of goods) and did not include the power to regulate navigation. Marshall pointed out that such a narrow interpretation would undermine the government's ability to effectively regulate commerce, as navigation was an integral component of commercial activity. He asserted that the historical context and the clear intent of the Constitution supported a broad understanding of commerce, which includes navigation.

The Supreme Court's reasoning in Gibbons v. Ogden, as articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, laid down a broad and expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. This interpretation not only resolved the immediate conflict between federal and New York State laws but also established a precedent for the federal government's dominant role in regulating interstate commerce. Marshall's reasoning emphasized the importance of a unified national market, the supremacy of federal law in commercial matters, and the broad scope of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. This case significantly influenced the development of American constitutional law, reinforcing the federal structure envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.

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We understand that the surprise of being called on in law school classes can feel daunting. Don’t worry, we've got your back! To boost your confidence and readiness, we suggest taking a little time to familiarize yourself with these typical questions and topics of discussion for the case. It's a great way to prepare and ease those nerves..

• What are the basic facts of Gibbons v. Ogden? Thomas Gibbons operated steamboats in New York waters with a federal coasting license, conflicting with Aaron Ogden's exclusive state-granted monopoly. The case questioned the validity of state laws against federally licensed commercial activity.
• What legal question did the Supreme Court need to resolve in this case? Whether the State of New York could grant an exclusive monopoly that conflicted with federal commerce regulation, specifically, if federal licenses for coastal navigation supersede state laws granting exclusive navigation rights.
• How does Chief Justice John Marshall define "commerce" in his opinion? Why is this definition significant? Marshall defined commerce broadly to include not just trade (buying and selling) but all commercial interactions, including navigation. This expansive interpretation was significant for establishing federal authority over all aspects of interstate commerce, not just trade.
• What does the Constitution say about the federal government's power to regulate commerce? Where in the Constitution can we find this authority? The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce "among the several states" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, known as the Commerce Clause. This clause serves as the basis for federal regulatory power over interstate commerce.
• How does the concept of federalism play into the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden? The decision emphasized the balance of power between state sovereignty and federal authority. Federalism plays into the Court's decision by affirming federal supremacy in matters of interstate commerce, a central aspect of the constitutional design of the United States.
• Why did the Court find New York's law granting exclusive navigation rights to Ogden unconstitutional? The Court found New York's law unconstitutional because it conflicted with the federal government's exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce. The Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2) of the Constitution makes federal law supreme over conflicting state laws.
• According to Marshall, how should conflicts between state and federal laws be resolved? What part of the Constitution supports this resolution? Marshall asserted that when state and federal laws conflict, federal law prevails due to the Supremacy Clause. This principle ensures a uniform regulatory framework for interstate commerce.
• What is the significance of the Supremacy Clause in the context of this case? The Supremacy Clause ensures that federal laws and treaties take precedence over state laws in cases of conflict. In this case, it underscored the federal government's authority over interstate commerce regulations.
• How did the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden expand the power of the federal government? The decision broadly interpreted the Commerce Clause, significantly expanding federal regulatory power over all aspects of interstate commerce, beyond mere trade to include navigation and other commercial interactions.
• Can you think of modern implications of the Gibbons v. Ogden decision in today's regulatory environment? The decision's broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause has implications for modern regulatory issues, such as environmental regulation, internet commerce, and transportation, affirming the federal government's authority to regulate these areas.
• Why might the Court have been concerned about the potential consequences of allowing states to impose their own regulations on interstate commerce? Allowing states to impose their own regulations could lead to a patchwork of conflicting laws, hindering the free flow of commerce among states and undermining the creation of a unified national market.
• What does Marshall mean by stating that the power to regulate commerce is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution"? Marshall's statement emphasizes the complete and autonomous nature of Congress's power to regulate commerce, constrained only by the Constitution itself, highlighting the intent to provide Congress with broad authority over interstate commerce.
• How does the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden illustrate the principle of checks and balances within the federal government? The case demonstrates the system of checks and balances by showing how the judiciary can review laws (state or federal) to ensure they align with the Constitution, thereby balancing powers among the branches of government and between the federal and state governments.
• In what ways does this case reflect the framers' intentions regarding the balance of power between the states and the federal government? The decision aligns with the framers' intentions to have a strong central government capable of managing commerce among states, ensuring economic unity and stability across the nation.
• How might the outcome of this case have been different if the Court had adopted a narrower interpretation of the Commerce Clause? A narrower interpretation of the Commerce Clause would have limited federal regulatory authority, potentially allowing states to enact conflicting or restrictive laws that could fragment the national economy.
• Discuss the impact of this case on the development of interstate commerce in the United States. How might commerce be different today if the decision had favored Ogden? The case set a precedent for federal supremacy in regulating interstate commerce, facilitating a cohesive national economy. Without this decision, U.S. commerce might have been stifled by restrictive state monopolies and regulations.
• What role does the concept of a unified national market play in the Court's reasoning? The concept is central to the Court's reasoning, emphasizing the need for a single, integrated market across state lines, free from state-imposed barriers to commerce, to promote economic growth and national unity.
• How does Gibbons v. Ogden relate to the broader themes of economic regulation and state sovereignty? The case underscores the tension between economic regulation (a federal prerogative in matters of interstate commerce) and state sovereignty, resolving it in favor of a unified national economy under federal oversight.
• Marshall uses the term "necessary and proper" in his opinion. How does this relate to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, and how does it apply to Congress's power to regulate commerce? Marshall's reference to necessary and proper actions connects to the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, affirming Congress's authority to enact laws essential for executing its enumerated powers, including regulating commerce.
• Finally, how does Gibbons v. Ogden illustrate the judicial philosophy of John Marshall, and what legacy did it establish for the interpretation of the Commerce Clause? The decision reflects Marshall's philosophy of a strong central government and broad interpretation of federal powers, particularly the Commerce Clause. His legacy includes establishing the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government and affirming federal supremacy in key areas of national importance.

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Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

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The first amendment, gibbons v. ogden: defining congress’ power under the commerce clause.

March 2, 2023 | by NCC Staff

Today marks the anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Gibbons v. Ogden . Decided in 1824, Gibbons was the first major case in the still-developing jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.

The extent and nature of Congress’s power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states” has generated extensive debate among legal scholars and jurists since the early republic and is perhaps the most contentious of the explicit powers granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. A judge’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause plays an important role in his or her approach to the Constitution; indeed, one’s understanding of the clause informs how one views the power of the federal government and its relationship to state and local entities—otherwise known as federalism.

Aaron Ogden owned a steamboat company that offered commercial service between various ports in New York and New Jersey. New York state law granted a monopoly on steamboat operations within its waters to a limited number of businessmen, including Ogden, and it fined any operators who violated the restriction.

Thomas Gibbons, Ogden’s former business partner, had a steamboat business based in New Jersey that maintained commercial routes between New York and New Jersey, but he was excluded from the monopoly. A New York state court granted an injunction against Gibbons, ordering that he cease commercial operation in New York waters. Naturally, Gibbons appealed the case, which was eventually heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.

At the Court, Gibbons pointed to the fact that he obtained a license from the federal government to conduct his steamboat business between ports in New York and New Jersey in accordance with the federal Coasting Act of 1793 . He argued that the monopoly maintained by New York law and the injunction granted by the New York court seemed to conflict with this act of Congress, and should be struck down in accordance with the Supremacy Clause .

A unanimous decision from the Supreme Court did just that. Chief Justice John Marshall spent a majority of the written opinion investigating whether or not Congress had the authority to regulate and license commercial maritime activity under the Commerce Clause.

The Court held that the “power to regulate commerce extends to every species of commercial intercourse … among the several states,” and included the regulation of interstate commercial maritime routes. Marshall asserted that this kind of power is covered under the Commerce Clause because the Founders intended as much when they authored the Constitution.

More generally, the Court articulated in Gibbons an understanding of the Commerce Clause that gave the federal government considerable regulatory power. It determined that the power to regulate commerce “is complete in itself . . . and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.” Marshall further clarified that Congress can regulate matters internal to a state that are fundamentally intertwined with interstate commerce, like the New York monopoly.

However, the Court stopped short of adopting an overly expansive reading of the clause and determined that the regulation of matters wholly confined within a state , like inspection and health laws, cannot be regulated by Congress.

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Johnson advocated for a more expansive reading of the Commerce Clause. In a foreshadowing of future constitutional debates, he rejected a “strict or literal” approach to the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, he suggested that the Commerce Clause should be interpreted expansively to ensure “the advancement of society.”

Since the 1824 decision in Gibbons v. Ogden , the Court’s understanding of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause has expanded tremendously. This evolution was particularly dramatic in the New Deal era, when the Court adopted a broader view of Congress’s interstate commerce powers and upheld many of President Roosevelt’s economic programs.

For example, the Court, in Wickard v. Filburn , that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate intra state activities if this sort of activity, in aggregate, affects inter state commerce. In that case, the Court allowed Congress to regulate the wheat production of a farmer, even though the wheat was intended strictly for personal use and would not enter the interstate market, on the basis that farming, in general, has an aggregate effect on the national economy.

A more recent case about Congress’s interstate commerce power was the 2012 challenge to the so-called “individual mandate.” In his majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts said in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate economic in activity. In light of this interpretation, penalties resulting from a failure to buy health insurance had to be justified under Congress’ taxing power, rather than its interstate commerce powers.

Given the importance of the Commerce Clause in today’s constitutional and political discourse, the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden continues to reverberate today. As a landmark ruling that precipitated and foreshadowed central debates of constitutional law, Gibbons v. Ogden was an important milestone in the development of congressional power into what we now observe.

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Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

Citation: Decree in Gibbons v. Ogden; 3/2/1824; Engrossed Minutes, 2/1790 - 6/7/1954; Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, Record Group 267; National Archives Building, Washington, DC.

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This Supreme Court decision forbade states from enacting any legislation that would interfere with Congress's right to regulate commerce among the separate states.

Robert Fulton’s 1807 invention of the steamboat was highly significant, but its application would have been severely limited had the Supreme Court not ruled against the monopoly in interstate steamboat operation in  Gibbons v. Ogden . In this decision, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Court ruled that Congress has the power to “regulate commerce” and that federal law takes precedence over state laws.

The State of New York passed a law giving Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston a monopoly on "navigating all boats that might be propelled by steam, on all waters within the territory, or jurisdiction of the State, for the term of twenty years." Fulton and Livingston issued permits and seized boats that operated without their endorsement.

Aaron Ogden had a license from the State of New York to navigate between New York City and the New Jersey coast. Ogden found himself competing with Thomas Gibbons, who had been given permission to use the waterways by the federal government. After the State of New York denied Gibbons access to the New York Bay in between New York and New Jersey, he sued Ogden.

The case went to the Supreme Court, and Chief Justice Marshall's opinion carried out the clear original intent of the Constitution to have Congress, not the states, regulate interstate commerce. Marshall’s decision sustained the nationalist definition of federal power and ruled that Congress could constitutionally regulate many activities that affected interstate commerce.

In the wake of this decision, the federal government, empowered by the Constitution’s commerce clause, increasingly exercised its authority by legislation and judicial decision over the whole range of the nation’s economic life.

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GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

[Decided March 2, 1824]

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows:

The appellant contends that this decree is erroneous because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. They are said to be repugnant: first, to that clause in the Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce; second, to that which authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts.

As preliminary to the very able discussions of the Constitution which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situation of these states, anterior to its formation. It has been said that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their congress of ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the states appear underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.

This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized  to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper  for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the Constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it.

What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they in tend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.

If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can inure solely to the benefit of the grantee, but is an investment of power for the general advantage in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred.

The words are:  Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.  The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our Constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration and not of definition, to as certain the extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word.

Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more - it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals in the actual employment of buying and selling or of barter. If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen.

Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and. has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word  commerce  to comprehend navigation.

The word used in the Constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word  commerce.  To what commerce does this power extend? The Constitution informs us to commerce  with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.  It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said that commerce, as the word is used in the Constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term. If this be the admitted meaning of the word in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence and remain a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which alters it.

The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce  among the several states.  The word  among  means intermingled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled with them. Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior. It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states. Such a power would be inconvenient and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the word  among  is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a state, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended would not have been made had the intention been to extend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a state.

The genius and character of the whole government seem to be that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation and to those internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself.

But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction pass through the interior of almost every state in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the states, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a state, then the power of Congress may be exercised within a state.

This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when applied to commerce  among the several states.  They either join each other, in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other states lie between them. What is commerce  among  them, and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining states commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two states remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce among the states must, of necessity, be commerce with the states. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially, when the Constitution was made, was chiefly within a state.

The power of Congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several states. The sense of the nation on this subject is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for transporting goods by land between Baltimore and Providence, between New York and Philadelphia, and between Philadelphia and Baltimore.

We are now arrived at the inquiry - What is this power? It is the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. These are expressed in plain terms and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States.

The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections are, in this as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all representative governments. The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation within the limits of every state in the Union so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with  commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.  It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdiction line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.

But it has been urged with great earnestness that, although the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states be coextensive with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the Constitution, yet the states may severally exercise the same power within their respective jurisdictions. In support of this argument, it is said that they possessed it as an inseparable attribute of sovereignty before the formation of the Constitution, and still retain it, except so far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; that this principle results from the nature of the government, and is secured by the Tenth Amendment; that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, unless in its own nature it be such that the continued exercise of it by the former possessor is inconsistent with the grant, and that this is not of that description.

The appellant, conceding these postulates except the last, contends that full power to regulate a particular subject implies the whole power .and leaves no residuum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it. Both parties have appealed to the Constitution, to legislative acts, and judicial decisions; and have drawn arguments from all these sources to support and illustrate the propositions they respectively maintain.

In discussing the question, whether this power is still in the states, in the case under consideration, we may dismiss from it the inquiry, whether it is surrendered by the mere grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We may dismiss that inquiry because it has been exercised, and the regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make are now in full operation. The sole question is - Can a state regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states while Congress is regulating it?

The counsel for the respondent answer this question in the affirmative, and rely very much on the restrictions in the 10th Section as supporting their opinion. They say, very truly, that limitations of a power furnish a strong argument in favor of the existence of that power, and that the section which prohibits the states from laying duties on imports or exports proves that this power might have been exercised had it not been expressly forbidden; and, consequently. that any other commercial regulation, not expressly forbidden, to which the original power of the state was competent, may still be made

That this restriction shows the opinion of the Convention, that a state might impose duties on exports and imports, if not expressly forbidden, will be conceded; but that it follows, as a consequence from this concession, that a state may regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states cannot be admitted.

It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant that, as the word  to regulate  implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched as that on which it has operated. There is great force in this argument, and the court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.

Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely internal affairs, whether of trading or police, the states may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, the court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that state, have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power  to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,  or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and police.

In one case and the other the acts of New York must yield to the law of Congress; and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer against a right given by a law of the Union must be erroneous. This opinion has been frequently expressed in this court, and is founded as well on the nature of the government as on the words of the Constitution. In argument, however, it has been contended that, if a law passed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty comes into conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, they affect the subject and each other like equal opposing powers.

But the framers of our Constitution foresaw this state of things and provided for it by declaring the supremacy not only of itself but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Constitution is produced by the declaration that the Constitution is supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties is to such acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but though enacted in the execution of acknowledged state powers, interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such case, the act of Congress or the treaty is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.

Decree This court is of opinion that so much of the several laws of the state of New York as prohibits vessels, licensed according to the laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of the state of New York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said Constitution and void. This court is, therefore, of opinion that the decree of the court of New York for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors, affirming the decree of the chancellor of that state is erroneous and ought to be reversed, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled. And this court doth further direct, order, and decree that the bill of the said Aaron Ogden be dismissed, and the same is hereby dismissed accordingly.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

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Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) was a Supreme Court case that famously expounded upon the powers of the commerce clause , setting the precedent of Congress’s broad ability to regulate interstate and some intrastate commerce. 

The case originated in a dispute over shipping monopolies in New York. Ogden and Gibbons both were in the business of steamboat operations between New York and New Jersey. Ogden had a monopoly from the state of New York over steamboat operations in state waters, but Gibbons had a federal license to operate within New York. After a New York court granted an injunction against Gibbons, Gibbons appealed up to the Supreme Court which found that Congress had the ability to regulate the shipping under the commerce clause and therefore superior to the state’s regulations. The case involved many historical figures of business and law including Cornelius Vanderbilt and Daniel Webster. 

The court decided in this case that the commerce clause allows Congress to regulate not only interstate commerce but also intrastate commerce (commerce within a state) that substantially impacts interstate commerce. This decision in Gibbons v. Ogden set the foundation for later cases such as Wickard v. Filburn that greatly expanded the ability of Congress to regulate commerce within a state itself. 

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Gibbons v. Ogden

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• National Constitution Center - Gibbons v. Ogden: Defining Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause
• Gibbons v. Ogden - Children's Encyclopedia (Ages 8-11)
• Gibbons v. Ogden - Student Encyclopedia (Ages 11 and up)

Gibbons v. Ogden , (1824), U.S. Supreme Court case establishing the principle that states cannot, by legislative enactment, interfere with the power of Congress to regulate commerce. The state of New York agreed in 1798 to grant Robert Fulton and his backer, Robert R. Livingston , a monopoly on steamboat navigation in state waters if they developed a steamboat capable of traveling 4 miles (6.4 km) per hour upstream on the Hudson River . Fulton and Livingston satisfied the condition of the grant in 1807. Subsequently, Aaron Ogden purchased from Fulton and Livingston rights to operate steamboats between New York City and New Jersey . In 1819 Ogden sued Thomas Gibbons, who was operating steamboats in the same waters without the authority of Fulton and Livingston. Ogden won in 1820 in the New York Court of Chancery.

Gibbons appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that he was protected by terms of a federal license to engage in coasting trade. His case was argued before the Supreme Court by Daniel Webster , the leading lawyer of the era, and in an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall , the Supreme Court ruled in favour of Gibbons. The decision was an important development in interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution, and it freed all navigation of monopoly control. The dismantling of navigational monopolies in New York and Louisiana, in particular, facilitated the settlement of the American West.

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The Supreme Court Case of Gibbons v. Ogden

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The case of Gibbons v. Ogden , decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1824, was a major step in the expansion of the power of the federal government to deal with challenges to U.S. domestic policy . The decision confirmed that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, including the commercial use of navigable waterways. 

Fast Facts: Gibbons v. Ogden

• Case Argued : February 5—February 9, 1824
• Decision Issued:  March 2, 1824
• Petitioner:  Thomas Gibbons (appellant)
• Respondent:  Aaron Ogden (appellee)
• Key Questions: Was it within New York State’s rights to issue laws regarding navigation within its jurisdiction, or does the Commerce Clause give Congress authority over interstate navigation?
• Unanimous Decision: Justices Marshall, Washington, Todd, Duvall, and Story (Justice Thompson abstained)
• Ruling:  As interstate navigation fell under interstate commerce, New York could not interfere with it, and the law was therefore invalid.

Circumstances of Gibbons v. Ogden

In 1808, the state government of New York awarded a private transport company a virtual monopoly to operate its steamboats on the state’s rivers and lakes, including rivers that ran between New York and adjoining states.

This state-sanctioned steamboat company granted Aaron Ogden a license to operate steamboats between Elizabethtown Point in New Jersey and New York City. As one of Ogden’s business partners, Thomas Gibbons, operated his steamboats along the same route under a federal coasting license issued to him by an act of Congress.

The Gibbons-Ogden partnership ended in dispute when Ogden claimed that Gibbons was undercutting their business by unfairly competing with him.

Ogden filed a complaint in the New York Court of Errors seeking to stop Gibbons from operating his boats. Ogden argued that the license granted to him by the New York monopoly was valid and enforceable even though he operated his boats on shared, interstate waters. Gibbons disagreed arguing that the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the sole power over interstate commerce.

The Court of Errors sided with Ogden. After losing his case in another New York court, Gibbons appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Constitution grants the federal government the overriding power to regulate how interstate commerce is conducted.

Some of the Parties Involved

The case of Gibbons v. Ogden was argued and decided by some of the most iconic lawyers and jurists in U.S. history. Exiled Irish patriot Thomas Addis Emmet and Thomas J. Oakley represented Ogden, while U.S. Attorney General William Wirt and Daniel Webster argued for Gibbons.

The decision of the Supreme Court was written and delivered by America’s fourth Chief Justice John Marshall.

“. . . Rivers and bays, in many cases, form the divisions between States; and thence it was obvious, that if the States should make regulations for the navigation of these waters, and such regulations should be repugnant and hostile, embarrassment would necessarily happen to the general intercourse of the community. Such events had actually occurred, and had created the existing state of things.” — John Marshall — Gibbons v. Ogden , 1824

The Decision

In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress alone had the power to regulate interstate and coastal trade.

The decision answered two pivotal questions about the Constitution’s Commerce Clause: First, exactly what constituted “commerce?” And, what did the term “among the several states” mean?

The Court held that “commerce” is the actual trade of commodities, including the commercial transportation of commodities using navigation. Also, the word “among” meant "intermingled with” or cases in which one or more states had an active interest in the commerce involved.

Siding with Gibbons, the decision read, in part: 

"If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States."

The Significance of Gibbons v. Ogden 

Decided 35 years after the ratification of the Constitution , the case of Gibbons v. Ogden represented a significant expansion of the power of the federal government to address issues involving U.S. domestic policy and the rights of the states.

The Articles of Confederation had left the national government virtually powerless to enact policies or regulations dealing with the actions of the states. In the Constitution, the framers included the Commerce Clause in the Constitution to address this problem.

Though the Commerce Clause gave Congress some power over commerce, it was unclear just how much. The Gibbons decision clarified some of these issues.

In the long run, Gibbons v. Ogden would be used to justify the future expansion of congressional power to control not only commercial activity but a vast range of activities previously thought to be under the exclusive control of the states. Gibbons v. Ogden gave Congress the preemptive power over the states to regulate any aspect of commerce involving the crossing of state lines. As a result of Gibbons , any state law regulating in-state commercial activities—such as the minimum wage paid to workers in an in-state factory—can be overturned by Congress if, for example, the factory’s products are also sold in other states. In this manner, Gibbons is often cited as justification for the enactment and enforcement of federal laws regulating the sale of firearms and ammunition.

Perhaps more than any case in the history of the Supreme Court, Gibbons v. Ogden set the stage for massive growth in the power of the federal government during the 20th century.

John Marshall’s Role

In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall provided a clear definition of the word “commerce” and the meaning of the term, “among the several states” in the Commerce Clause. Today, Marshall’s is regarded as the most influential opinions concerning this key clause.​

"... Few things were better known, than the immediate causes which led to the adoption of the present constitution ... that the prevailing motive was to regulate commerce; to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the legislation of so many different States, and to place it under the protection of a uniform law.”—John Marshall— Gibbons v. Ogden , 1824

Updated by Robert Longley

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