essay on international relations of india

• IAS Preparation
• UPSC Preparation Strategy
• International Relations

India's Bilateral Relations

The knowledge about bilateral relations between India and other nations is important for the Civil Services Examination . This article will provide you with a list of countries and their bilateral relations with India.

Important Points about India’s Foreign Relations

• India has a dedicated ministry to handle foreign affairs. It is called the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
• India’s External Affairs Minister is S.Jaishankar (31st May 2019 till present).
• India is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations .
• According to MEA, 12.6 million non-resident Indians (NRIs) (Those holding an Indian passport but ordinarily residing outside the country) are spread across more than 200 nations.
• India has a dedicated examination to recruit candidates in foreign services. The examination is called Indian Foreign Service Exam .
• The Indian Foreign Services is headed by the Foreign Secretary. The Indian Foreign Secretary heads all Indian ambassadors and high commissioners.
• The Foreign Secretary of India is Harsh V Shringla (29th January 2020 till present).

India’s Foreign Relations – List of Countries

The table below gives the list of countries with whom India has bilateral ties.

Get previous years’ International Relations questions from UPSC Mains GS 2 in the linked article.

Notes on India’s Relations with Foreign Nations for UPSC

1. India-China Relations

• The diplomatic relations between India and China were established on 1st April 1950.
• China is one of the nine neighbours of India .
• In 2020, both nations completed their 70 years of diplomatic relations.
• China’s capital is Beijing.

Download the detailed notes on India-China Relations from the linked article.

2. India-Taiwan Relations

• India does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan as of now.
• Taipei is the capital of Taiwan

Download the detailed notes on India-Taiwan relations from the linked article.

3. India-Bhutan Relations

• With independent India, Bhutan signed a Treaty of Friendship on 8th August 1949.
• Bhutan’s capital is Thimphu.

Download the detailed notes on India-Bhutan relations from the linked article.

4. India-Afghanistan Relations

• The relationship shared by the two nations was strengthened with the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement in October 2011.
• Afghanistan is one of India’s neighbours. Its capital is Kabul.

Download the detailed notes on India-Afghanistan relations from the linked article.

5. India-Malaysia Relations

• The diplomatic relations between India and Malaysia were established in 1957.
• India’s Act East and Look East Policies focus on countries including Malaysia.
• The strategic partnership between the two nations was established in 2010.

Download the detailed notes on India-Malaysia relations from the linked article.

6. India-Africa Relations

• India enjoys friendly relations with Africa.
• The diplomatic relations between India and South Africa were established on 22nd November 1993; while the strategic partnership between both nations was established in March 1997.

Download the detailed notes on India-Africa relations from the linked article.

7. India-Nepal Relations

• India and Nepal signed a treaty of peace and friendship in 1950.
• Nepal is one of India’s neighbours sharing a border with 5 Indian states.

Download the detailed notes on India-Nepal relations from the linked article.

8. India-US Relations

• Logistical Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)
• Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)
• Industrial Security Annex (ISA)

Download the detailed notes on India-US relations from the linked article.

9. India-Pakistan Relations

• Pakistan is one of the neighbours of India.

Download the detailed notes on India-Pakistan relations from the linked article.

10. India-Sri Lanka Relations

• Both India and Sri Lanka share historical relations.
• India is the only neighbour of Sri Lanka.

Download the detailed notes on India-Sri Lanka relations from the linked article.

11. India-Australia Relations

• India and Australia established a strategic relationship in the year 2009.

Download the detailed notes on India-Australia relations from the linked article.

12. India-Japan Relations

• The diplomatic relations between India and Japan were established on 28th April 1952.
• In 2006, both nations established ‘Strategic and Global Partnership.’
• In 2014, the relations between India and Japan were upgraded to ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’.

Download the detailed notes on India-Japan relations from the linked article.

13. India-Maldives Relations

• India was the first country to recognize the Maldives after its independence.

Download the detailed notes on India-Maldives relations from the linked article.

14. India-Oman Relations

• The diplomatic relations between India and Oman were established in 1955.
• They became strategic partners in 2008.

Download the detailed notes on India-Oman relations from the linked article.

15. India-Myanmar Relations

• A treaty of friendship between both countries exists since 1951.
• Earlier known as Burma, it was separated from India in 1937.

Download the detailed notes on India-Myanmar relations from the linked article.

16. India-Bangladesh Relations

• India and Bangladesh have completed their 50 years of diplomatic relations.
• The diplomatic relations between both countries were established in the year 1971.

Download the detailed notes on India-Bangladesh relations from the linked article.

17. India-Israel Relations

• On 17th September 1950, India officially recognized Israel.
• 1992 was the year when the two nations established diplomatic relations.

Download the detailed notes on India-Israel relations from the linked article.

18. India-France Relations

• The diplomatic relations between France and India were established in 1947.
• The strategic partnership was established in 1998.
• Wassenaar Arrangement
• Missile Technology Control Regime
• Australia Group 

Download the detailed notes on India-France relations from the linked article.

19. India-Mexico Relations

• In 1950, both nations entered into a diplomatic relationship.

Download the detailed notes on India-Mexico relations from the linked article.

20. India-Vietnam Relations

• On 7th January 1992, India established full diplomatic relations with Vietnam.
• In 2007, the relationship between India and Vietnam was upgraded to a ‘Strategic Partnership.’
• The two nations, since 2016, share ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.’

Download the detailed notes on India-Vietnam relations from the linked article.

Candidates preparing for IAS Exam must go through the above-mentioned details to prepare for UPSC Mains GS 2. One can also gen an idea of important topics in international relations that are useful for the exam from the linked article.

Frequently Asked Questions on India’s Bilateral Relations

Q 1. what is meant by bilateral relations, q 2. which ministry is responsible for managing the india’s foreign ties.

International Relations Articles:

Leave a Comment Cancel reply

Your Mobile number and Email id will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Request OTP on Voice Call

Post My Comment

IAS 2024 - Your dream can come true!

Download the ultimate guide to upsc cse preparation, register with byju's & download free pdfs, register with byju's & watch live videos.

• Subject List
• Take a Tour
• For Authors
• Subscriber Services
• Publications
• African American Studies
• African Studies
• American Literature
• Anthropology
• Architecture Planning and Preservation
• Art History
• Atlantic History
• Biblical Studies
• British and Irish Literature
• Childhood Studies
• Chinese Studies
• Cinema and Media Studies
• Communication
• Criminology
• Environmental Science
• Evolutionary Biology
• International Law

International Relations

• Islamic Studies
• Jewish Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Latino Studies
• Linguistics
• Literary and Critical Theory
• Medieval Studies
• Military History
• Political Science
• Public Health
• Renaissance and Reformation
• Social Work
• Urban Studies
• Victorian Literature
• Browse All Subjects

How to Subscribe

• Free Trials

In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Indian Foreign Policy

Introduction, general overviews.

• India’s Cold War Foreign Policy
• India’s Post–Cold War Foreign Policy
• Narendra Modi and Indian Foreign Policy
• Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
• Ideology and Foreign Policy
• National Security and Strategic Culture
• Foreign Economic Policy
• Soft Power and the Diaspora
• India and Global Governance
• India and Pakistan
• India, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean
• India and the Indo-Pacific
• India and the United States
• India and China

Related Articles Expand or collapse the "related articles" section about

About related articles close popup.

Lorem Ipsum Sit Dolor Amet

Vestibulum ante ipsum primis in faucibus orci luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae; Aliquam ligula odio, euismod ut aliquam et, vestibulum nec risus. Nulla viverra, arcu et iaculis consequat, justo diam ornare tellus, semper ultrices tellus nunc eu tellus.

• Indian Perspectives on International Relations, War, and Conflict

Other Subject Areas

Forthcoming articles expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" section.

• Crisis Bargaining
• History of Brazilian Foreign Policy (1808 to 1945)
• Indian Foreign Policy
• Find more forthcoming articles...
• Export Citations
• Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Indian Foreign Policy by Ian Hall LAST REVIEWED: 26 September 2022 LAST MODIFIED: 26 September 2022 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0312

After India gained independence in 1947, New Delhi pursued an active foreign policy, seeking status and respect, trying to reform aspects of a Western-dominated international order, and aiming to safeguard its interests. Over time, the means used to achieve these ends have changed, as both the context with which India’s leaders have had to contend and its relative power and influence have shifted. In parallel, the actors involved in foreign policy inside and outside government and the policymaking processes have also changed. Today, New Delhi has four priorities: ensuring that India’s status as a major emerging power is respected by others; supporting the country’s economic and social development; enhancing national security, especially concerning China, Pakistan, and India’s immediate neighborhood; and acquiring the instruments of influence, including “soft power,” necessary to defend its interests and realize its aspirations. To pursue them, successive Indian leaders have engaged in extensive bilateral, mini-lateral, and multilateral summitry, pressing for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, and a greater say in global governance, from trade to climate change. Seeking to boost growth but protect key sectors of the economy and avoid dependence, successive governments have implemented various trade and investment policies, ranging from the restrictive to the more open. At the same time, they have tried to forge close relationships with states rich in the capital or resources India requires. Indian governments have tried to manage security challenges in similar ways: by pushing for action in multilateral settings, especially in the United Nations, to address terrorism, in particular; and by forging strategic partnerships with powerful states capable of supplying diplomatic support and defense technology. Finally, New Delhi has shown particular concern for leveraging India’s extraordinary cultural and religious inheritance, as well as past and present links with communities across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The literature on all these topics is large. Much of it concentrates on the management of key bilateral relationships, especially with China, Pakistan, and the United States; tends to be historical in approach; focuses on the ideas and actions of leaders; and draws on the recollections of former politicians and officials. A growing body of work explores Indian foreign policy from different perspectives, using new theories and approaches; looks a broader range of policy areas and actors; and draws on new data from various sources.

There are many general overviews of aspects of India’s foreign policy. Some are more comprehensive than others, and they use a range of different perspectives to explain how foreign policy is made; to explore what shapes India’s approaches to different states, institutions, and issues; and to understand the evolution of key bilateral relationships. The most substantial and broad ranging recent general overview is Malone, et al. 2015 . That volume includes sections on relevant theory, the history of India’s foreign policy, actors and institutions, important bilateral and regional relations, and India’s engagement with multilateral institutions. Beyond it, there are several other useful texts, including classic studies such as Bandyopadhyaya 2003 , a sharp analysis by an Indian diplomat-turned-scholar first published in 1970, and Cohen 2001 , a tour de force by a preeminent American analyst of South Asia’s international relations. Those two books, as well as Chacko 2013 , look in depth at the worldviews of India’s elite and the ways in which ideas have shaped the ends and means of Indian foreign policy. Others, including Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada 2017 and Schaffer and Schaffer 2016 , concentrate especially on India’s distinctive and long-standing preoccupation with status, as well as persistent insecurities, especially concerning the various threats to security and prosperity that lurk in India’s immediate region. Several edited collections provide helpful discussions of India’s dealings with the major powers, other South Asian states, and other parts of the world, including East Asia and the Middle East, with which it has increasingly important relationships. These include Bajpai and Pant 2013 ; Ganguly 2016 ; and Malone, et al. 2015 —among many others. Finally, there are some general overviews of Indian foreign policy that focus especially on the ways in which established and new theories in international relations are opening up new ways of explaining New Delhi’s behavior. The edited volume Hansel, et al. 2017 is a landmark in this area, alongside Pant 2019 . Both books also explore the emergence of new agendas in the practice of Indian foreign policy, including the growing concerns with development assistance and support for democratic governance, and with India’s widely spread and notably diverse diaspora.

Bajpai, Kanti, and Harsh V. Pant, eds. India’s Foreign Policy: A Reader . London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

An invaluable collection of essays on Indian thinking about international relations, foreign policymaking, and a series of key relationships and issues.

Bandyopadhyaya, Jayantanuja. The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities . New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2003.

A pioneering and still helpful study of how India’s foreign policy is made that explores both the ideological and institutional dimensions of policymaking.

Basrur, Rajesh, and Kate Sullivan de Estrada. Rising India: Status and Power . London and New York: Routledge, 2017.

DOI: 10.4324/9781315227825

A short and sharp look at India’s rise to major power status in contemporary international relations, looking at New Delhi’s concerns and aspirations.

Chacko, Priya. Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 . London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

DOI: 10.4324/9780203147733

A rich and theoretically informed study of the ways in which India’s postcolonial identity has shaped its foreign policy since independence.

Cohen, Stephen P. India: Emerging Power . Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001.

An accessible and authoritative guide to the domestic contexts in which foreign policy is made, India’s economic and military power, and its relationships with key states.

Ganguly, Šumit, ed. Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947 . New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016.

A useful set of essays looking in turn at a series of bilateral relationships, as well as India’s nuclear, economic, and energy policies.

Hansel, Mischa, Raphaëlle Khan, and Melissa Levaillant, eds. Theorizing Indian Foreign Policy . London and New York: Routledge, 2017.

A pathbreaking collection of essays applying a range of theories drawn from foreign policy analysis to the Indian case.

Malone, David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

A comprehensive collection of fifty essays written by leading experts covering every aspect of India’s foreign policy.

Pant, Harsh V., ed. New Directions in India’s Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis . New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

An innovative edited volume that explores new theoretical approaches to India’s foreign policy as well as emerging themes in its practice.

Schaffer, Teresita C., and Howard B. Schaffer. India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy . Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.

A perceptive study of India’s aims and aspirations in its region and the world, written by former United States diplomats with extensive experience of South Asia.

back to top

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login .

Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative click here .

• About International Relations »
• Meet the Editorial Board »
• Academic Theories of International Relations Since 1945
• Africa, The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) in
• Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
• Arab-Israeli Wars
• Arab-Israeli Wars, 1967-1973, The
• Armed Conflicts/Violence against Civilians Data Sets
• Arms Control
• Asylum Policies
• Audience Costs and the Credibility of Commitments
• Authoritarian Regimes
• Balance of Power Theory
• Bargaining Theory of War
• Brazilian Foreign Policy, The Politics of
• Canadian Foreign Policy
• Case Study Methods in International Relations
• Casualties and Politics
• Causation in International Relations
• Central Europe
• Challenge of Communism, The
• China and Japan
• China's Defense Policy
• China’s Foreign Policy
• Chinese Approaches to Strategy
• Cities and International Relations
• Civil Resistance
• Civil Society in the European Union
• Cold War, The
• Colonialism
• Comparative Foreign Policy Security Interests
• Comparative Regionalism
• Complex Systems Approaches to Global Politics
• Conflict Behavior and the Prevention of War
• Conflict Management
• Conflict Management in the Middle East
• Constructivism
• Contemporary Shia–Sunni Sectarian Violence
• Counterinsurgency
• Countermeasures in International Law
• Coups and Mutinies
• Criminal Law, International
• Critical Theory of International Relations
• Cuban Missile Crisis, The
• Cultural Diplomacy
• Cyber Security
• Cyber Warfare
• Decision-Making, Poliheuristic Theory of
• Demobilization, Post World War I
• Democracies and World Order
• Democracy and Conflict
• Democracy in World Politics
• Deterrence Theory
• Development
• Digital Diplomacy
• Diplomacy, Gender and
• Diplomacy, History of
• Diplomacy in the ASEAN
• Diplomacy, Public
• Disaster Diplomacy
• Diversionary Theory of War
• Drone Warfare
• Eastern Front (World War I)
• Economic Coercion and Sanctions
• Economics, International
• Embedded Liberalism
• Emerging Powers and BRICS
• Empirical Testing of Formal Models
• Energy and International Security
• Environmental Peacebuilding
• Epidemic Diseases and their Effects on History
• Ethics and Morality in International Relations
• Ethnicity in International Relations
• European Migration Policy
• European Security and Defense Policy, The
• European Union as an International Actor
• European Union, International Relations of the
• Experiments
• Face-to-Face Diplomacy
• Fascism, The Challenge of
• Feminist Methodologies in International Relations
• Feminist Security Studies
• Food Security
• Forecasting in International Relations
• Foreign Aid and Assistance
• Foreign Direct Investment
• Foreign Policy Decision-Making
• Foreign Policy of Non-democratic Regimes
• Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia
• Foreign Policy, Theories of
• French Empire, 20th-Century
• From Club to Network Diplomacy
• Future of NATO
• Game Theory and Interstate Conflict
• Gender and Terrorism
• Genocide, Politicide, and Mass Atrocities Against Civilian...
• Genocides, 20th Century
• Geopolitics and Geostrategy
• Germany in World War II
• Global Citizenship
• Global Civil Society
• Global Constitutionalism
• Global Environmental Politics
• Global Ethic of Care
• Global Governance
• Global Justice, Western Perspectives
• Globalization
• Governance of the Arctic
• Grand Strategy
• Greater Middle East, The
• Greek Crisis
• Hague Conferences (1899, 1907)
• Hierarchies in International Relations
• History and International Relations
• Human Nature in International Relations
• Human Rights
• Human Rights and Humanitarian Diplomacy
• Human Rights, Feminism and
• Human Rights Law
• Human Security
• Hybrid Warfare
• Ideal Diplomat, The
• Identity and Foreign Policy
• Ideology, Values, and Foreign Policy
• Illicit Trade and Smuggling
• Imperialism
• Indian Perspectives on International Relations, War, and C...
• Indigenous Rights
• Industrialization
• Intelligence
• Intelligence Oversight
• Internal Displacement
• International Conflict Settlements, The Durability of
• International Criminal Court, The
• International Economic Organizations (IMF and World Bank)
• International Health Governance
• International Justice, Theories of
• International Law, Feminist Perspectives on
• International Monetary Relations, History of
• International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution
• International Nongovernmental Organizations
• International Norms for Cultural Preservation and Cooperat...
• International Organizations
• International Relations, Aesthetic Turn in
• International Relations as a Social Science
• International Relations, Practice Turn in
• International Relations, Research Ethics in
• International Relations Theory
• International Security
• International Society
• International Society, Theorizing
• International Support For Nonstate Armed Groups
• Internet Law
• Interstate Cooperation Theory and International Institutio...
• Intervention and Use of Force
• Interviews and Focus Groups
• Iran, Politics and Foreign Policy
• Iraq: Past and Present
• Japanese Foreign Policy
• Just War Theory
• Kurdistan and Kurdish Politics
• Law of the Sea
• Laws of War
• Leadership in International Affairs
• Leadership Personality Characteristics and Foreign Policy
• League of Nations
• Lean Forward and Pull Back Options for US Grand Strategy
• Mediation and Civil Wars
• Mediation in International Conflicts
• Mediation via International Organizations
• Memory and World Politics
• Mercantilism
• Middle East, The Contemporary
• Middle Powers and Regional Powers
• Military Science
• Minorities in the Middle East
• Minority Rights
• Morality in Foreign Policy
• Multilateralism (1992–), Return to
• National Liberation, International Law and Wars of
• National Security Act of 1947, The
• Nation-Building
• Nations and Nationalism
• NATO, Europe, and Russia: Security Issues and the Border R...
• Natural Resources, Energy Politics, and Environmental Cons...
• New Multilateralism in the Early 21st Century
• Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation
• Nonviolent Resistance Datasets
• Normative Aspects of International Peacekeeping
• Normative Power Beyond the Eurocentric Frame
• Nuclear Proliferation
• Peace Education in Post-Conflict Zones
• Peace of Utrecht
• Peacebuilding, Post-Conflict
• Peacekeeping
• Political Demography
• Political Economy of National Security
• Political Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa
• Political Learning and Socialization
• Political Psychology
• Politics and Islam in Turkey
• Politics and Nationalism in Cyprus
• Politics of Extraction: Theories and New Concepts for Crit...
• Politics of Resilience
• Popuism and Global Politics
• Popular Culture and International Relations
• Post-Civil War State
• Post-Conflict and Transitional Justice
• Post-Conflict Reconciliation in the Middle East and North ...
• Power Transition Theory
• Preventive War and Preemption
• Prisoners, Treatment of
• Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)
• Process Tracing Methods
• Pro-Government Militias
• Proliferation
• Prospect Theory in International Relations
• Psychoanalysis in Global Politics and International Relati...
• Psychology and Foreign Policy
• Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
• Public Opinion and the European Union
• Quantum Social Science
• Race and International Relations
• Rebel Governance
• Reconciliation
• Reflexivity and International Relations
• Religion and International Relations
• Religiously Motivated Violence
• Reputation in International Relations
• Responsibility to Protect
• Rising Powers in World Politics
• Role Theory in International Relations
• Russian Foreign Policy
• Russian Revolutions and Civil War, 1917–1921
• Sanctions in International Law
• Science Diplomacy
• Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), The
• Secrecy and Diplomacy
• Securitization
• Self-Determination
• Shining Path
• Sinophone and Japanese International Relations Theory
• Small State Diplomacy
• Social Scientific Theories of Imperialism
• Sovereignty
• Soviet Union in World War II
• Space Strategy, Policy, and Power
• Spatial Dependencies and International Mediation
• State Theory in International Relations
• Status in International Relations
• Strategic Air Power
• Strategic and Net Assessments
• Sub-Saharan Africa, Conflict Formations in
• Sustainable Development
• Systems Theory
• Teaching International Relations
• Territorial Disputes
• Terrorism and Poverty
• Terrorism, Geography of
• Terrorist Financing
• Terrorist Group Strategies
• The Changing Nature of Diplomacy
• The Politics and Diplomacy of Neutrality
• The Politics and Diplomacy of the First World War
• The Queer in/of International Relations
• the Twenty-First Century, Alliance Commitments in
• The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relation...
• Theories of International Relations, Feminist
• Theory, Chinese International Relations
• Time Series Approaches to International Affairs
• Transnational Actors
• Transnational Law
• Transnational Social Movements
• Tribunals, War Crimes and
• Trust and International Relations
• UN Security Council
• United Nations, The
• United States and Asia, The
• Uppsala Conflict Data Program
• US and Africa
• US–UK Special Relationship
• Voluntary International Migration
• War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)
• Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Western Balkans
• Western Front (World War I)
• Westphalia, Peace of (1648)
• Women and Peacemaking Peacekeeping
• World Economy 1919-1939
• World Polity School
• World War II Diplomacy and Political Relations
• World-System Theory
• Privacy Policy
• Cookie Policy
• Legal Notice
• Accessibility

Powered by:

• [185.66.14.236]
• 185.66.14.236

• Search Menu
• Sign in through your institution
• Advance articles
• Author Guidelines
• Submission Site
• Open Access
• Why Publish
• About International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
• About the Japan Association of International Relations
• Editorial Board
• Advertising and Corporate Services
• Journals Career Network
• Self-Archiving Policy
• Dispatch Dates
• Journals on Oxford Academic
• Books on Oxford Academic

Article Contents

1 introduction, 2 historical development of india’s foreign policy, 3. india’s aspiration to major power status, 4 india’s foreign policy at work: implications of its relations with russia and japan, 5. conclusion: prospects.

• < Previous

Explaining India’s Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of Major Power

• Article contents
• Figures & tables
• Supplementary Data

Takenori Horimoto, Explaining India’s Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of Major Power, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific , Volume 17, Issue 3, September 2017, Pages 463–496, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx011

• Permissions Icon Permissions

A power transformation appears to be taking place in Asia, brought about by the rapid emergence of China and the relative decline of US influence. India has sought a way to cope with this new situation. India itself has been rising to prominence since the 1990s, particularly its nuclear weapon tests in 1998 onward. Since the start of the twenty-first century, India has been perceived as the next country to follow China in seeking a major power status. Although India has previously tended to conceal its power aspirations, in 2015 it declared its intention to be a leading power. This article elucidates this transformation through India's policy orientation on a local, regional, and global level and its key partnerships with Russia and Japan. India’s metamorphosis holds great implications for the transformation of power in Asia.

After the Cold War, particularly since the 2000s, the rapid rise of China has presented a challenge to United States (US) influence. Although the US can still be regarded as the sole superpower, its relative decline is stark. Asian players, such as Japan, the ASEAN countries and Australia, and India, have been encountering and adapting to the new circumstances, which might be designated as a power transformation in Asia.

Although the US and China can be regarded as the two major powers of the present and the future, among the Asian players, India is trying evidently to catch up with those two countries as a major power, albeit lagging perhaps one or two laps behind them.

Hence, the main objective of this article is to present an examination of how India is attempting to construct its overall foreign policy in the current international situation and beyond. To state the conclusion at the beginning, India is trying to respond to the emerging situation by aiming to become a major power itself in the future. India has been a reluctant player in the international theater since its independence in 1947 until the 2000s. With the start of the 2010s, however, India has metamorphosed itself into a dynamic actor and has switched from denying to affirming its status as a major power. The dearth of literature on India's transformation requires further examination. Accordingly, this article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of India's foreign policy. There is hardly any literature on this topic, and therefore this article is an attempt to elucidate a holistic view of India’s foreign policy.

In this context, it might be required to touch upon the definition of a major power. There is no established definition of a major power, but some experts offer helpful clues in relation to India. Perkovich (2003 –04), for instance, points out that ‘India cannot get other important states to comply with Indian demands … India does have the capability to resist demands placed upon it by other countries.’ Others argue that India’s foreign policy objective is to become a major power in terms of having the capability to alter the international system or to be perceived as a major power ( Kondo, 2012 , p. 7). 1

Delving into India’s strategic response to the power transformation in Asia and examining India’s objectives, this article presents four sections. The first section provides a brief historical context of India’s foreign policy responses to the situation prevailing in Asia between the end of the Second World War and the 1990s. The principal characteristic of the period would be India’s self-conception of the inadequacy of its capabilities. It is possible to say the perception has epitomized the basic factor for India’s foreign policy of non-alignment and its alliance with the Soviet Union.

The second section, which mainly addresses the 2010s, analyzes the puzzling rationale behind India’s major power intentions. Putting it another way, this period shows the metamorphosis of India's foreign policy as distinctively different from that of the preceding long period. In order to clarify such difference, the section shows India’s foreign policy matrix. The matrix offers a basic and overall framework and perception toward understanding India’s foreign policy goals.

The third section discusses India’s close relations with Russia and Japan—currently India's two key partners. The author believes that India, in order to smoothly engineer its foreign policies at regional and global levels, seeks alignments with these two prominent players. Geopolitically speaking, India is striving to cope with an assertive China through its relations with Russia in Eurasia and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. The concluding section considers how India might proceed with its foreign policy orientation.

The main thrust of this article examines how India’s quest to be a major power concretized in the middle of 2010s after the long period of caution on the international stage. Through elucidating India’s foreign policy in the past six decades after independence, it is possible to bring the recent emergence of India’s foreign policy as a major power into sharp relief.

2.1 During the Cold War

India, which was partitioned from British India and achieved independence in August 1947, had several basic attributes of a typical major power: its history, size, and location. Study of its history reveals that India has a distinctive feature: ‘Of the great world civilizations, only India and China embody a civilization in a single large nation-body politic’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 51). Although India under British colonial rule was not a sovereign state, it became an original member of the United Nations (UN) at its foundation in 1945. As such, India is in a position to claim its status as the successor state of British India. Pakistan, another partitioned entity of British India, joined the UN in September 1947 as a new state.

In addition, India is one of the largest countries in terms of population and area. Its area is nine times bigger than that of Japan. Moreover, India occupies a central location in the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, these attributes have not naturally catapulted India into major power status, particularly because of its lack of national power in terms of economic size and defense capability. The lack of national power left India with the empty daydream of becoming a major power. It was a major country, but its sphere of influence was essentially limited to the South Asian region. Given those circumstances, India’s foreign policy options have remained rather constrained.

Such limitations were readily apparent during the Cold War period. First, India established and maintained its so-called non-alignment policy as its basic tenet of foreign policy between the 1940s and the 1960s under its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The policy meant alignment to neither the US camp nor the Soviet camp. Although this was true, this definition explains one-half of the important aspects of the non-alignment. The other half was in finding common causes with other non-aligned countries such as Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Egypt with which it could act in concert.

The non-alignment policy was jettisoned in the early 1970s. However, India officially claimed it as a continuous policy during the era of rapprochement between the US and China, and when the Second India–Pakistan war (also known as the Bangladesh independence war) was imminent in December 1971. China and Pakistan developed an all-weather relationship in the 1960s and have maintained it subsequently. Since ‘for thousands years military threats to India have been perceived as coming primarily from India’s northwest’ ( Brewster, 2012 , p. 26), the emerged combination of Pakistan to the west and China to the north amplified India’s threat perception further.

In contrast, India effectively abandoned its non-aligned policy by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on 9 August 1971, which specified mutual strategic cooperation. If alliances are to be defined as ‘formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military forces, in specified circumstance, against outside their own membership’ ( Snyder, 1997 , p. 4), the treaty 2 signified the creation of bilateral relations between India and the Soviet Union and aligned these states ( Horimoto and Lalima, 2013 , pp. 5–8).

Therefore, The Times (London) noted that: ‘India today discarded her policy of non-alliance and entered into a formal coalition with the Soviet Union.’ 3 It is noteworthy, however, that India has officially maintained its foreign policy of non-alignment, even after signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty, as outlined in the Ministry of External Affairs’ Annual Reports during the period under review.

Therefore, since independence, India has transformed its foreign policy from non-alignment to alliance with the Soviet Union. Regarding this transformation, I would like to introduce an opposite view among Japanese scholars specializing in the study of India's foreign policy. Namely, ‘Even though the treaty was an alliance in nature, if the bilateral relations of India and Russia were made up of mutually dependable relations based upon independence, the relations were equal, then logically speaking, the treaty is not a so-called Cold War alliance and did not contradict the non-alignment principles’ ( Yoshida, 2001 , p. 46). But this author opines rather differently. Since in those days, India depended heavily on Russia for trade and defense acquisitions, Indo-Russia relations could not be readily regarded as equal.

Why was India compelled to alter its policy? The basic factor would be the insufficiency of its national power. The alignment of non-aligned countries was the first option, followed by alignment with the Soviet Union. India could not afford to go it alone. India has been bound to adopt various alignment policies. 4 The net result of India’s two foreign policies was an ineffectual presence on the international stage. India’s alliance with the Soviet Union was generally perceived to render it a dependent actor in the prevailing international political scene.

P.A.N. Murthy, India's East Asian specialist, has regarded India as an intermediate power in the bipolar international order, which could not be regarded ‘as a corner or a pole by itself ( Murthy, 1986 , p. 391).

2.2 In the post-Cold War period of the 1990s: various new foreign policy initiatives

Entering into the 1990s, India was faced with a difficult situation. Among others, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant India had lost the mainstay of its foreign policy. India had no alternative but to grope at initiating various new policies. This presented difficult challenges for India because ‘India has generally seen itself as a world power in making, and conducted its regional and international relations on this basis. The result has been insignificance abroad, suspicion in the region and turbulence at home’ ( Thakur, 1992 ).

Moreover, the Soviet Union was not just India's principal partner, but its major trading partner. Because of the Gulf War of 1990–91, oil price spikes, and a sharp reduction of home remittances from Indians overseas in the Middle East, India faced the prospect of defaulting on its loans. It had no alternative but to seek assistance from IMF loans. In return for that assistance, India was required to deregulate its economic system and to open up its economy from the closed approach it had maintained during the Cold War period. Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister in June 1991 and in the following month introduced economic liberalization together with Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (later prime minister).

The transformation of the Indian economy and the crash of the Soviet Union, along with the changed international structure, have compelled India to overhaul its foreign policy altogether. Many foreign policy initiatives were launched in the 1990s. In 1992, Rao visited the US. For India, the US was ‘on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, but, more often, just estranged’ ( Kux, 1993 , p. 447) during the Cold War period. That remark might not be an overstatement. After all, India’s foreign policy has mirrored its policy toward the US during the last half-century.

Rao visited China in 1993 and concluded an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility concerning the lines of actual control between India and China. The essence of the agreement can be distilled as normalization of the relationship by shelving the knotty issue of their mutual border (Horimoto, 2014b). The Look-East Policy has been followed since 1993 ( Haidar, 2012 , p. 53). This new orientation resulted in India achieving the status of a Dialog Partner of ASEAN in 1994 and becoming an ARF member the next year. This change of status was attributable to a change of perception by ASEAN, enabling it ‘to digest the implications of China’s rise, not just as an economic power but also as a military power’ ( Naidu, 2013 , p. 63).

During the latter half of the 1990s, India set up its first strategic partnership with South Africa in 1997. Creating strategic partnerships became established as one of India’s foreign policy pillars ( Horimoto, 2012 ). As of 2015, India has maintained strategic partnerships with 28 countries. At the end of the 1990s, India conducted atom bomb tests in 1998, for the second time since 1974. These tests were vehemently denounced worldwide, but helped to elevate India’s image as a major power.

All these policy initiatives impressed the world with a fresh image of India, but they were miscellaneous initiatives without any clear indication of a new objective of India’s foreign policy. Naturally, India’s foreign policy invited various critiques: ‘Even as India’s rise in the interstate global hierarchy continues steadily, its policymakers still act in the international arena as if India can continue to afford the luxury of responding to foreign policy challenges on a case-by-case basis with no requirement for a long-term strategic policy framework. The same ad hoc-ism that had characterized Indian foreign policy in the past lingers’ ( Pant, 2009 ). Similarly, Rajiv Sikri (former Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs) said ‘India must have a clear grand strategic design’ ( Sikri, 2009 , p. 300).

3.1 India’s emergence

These critical remarks could be directed toward India’s foreign policy in the two decades of the 1990s and the 2000s. They might be correct assessments for India of the 1990s, but India of the 2000s onward presents a completely changed picture. Upon entering the 2000s, India’s inclination to become a major power gradually emerged. One might say that 1998 was the latent starting point of this intention, but that India's nuclear achievements turned out to be a pipedream until the term BRICs came into popular use in 2001. The BRICs 5 were introduced to the public by the then Chair of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Jim O'Neill, in his publication Building Better Global Economic BRICs ( O’Neil, 2001 ). BRICs denoted the group of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, all sharing their bright prospects of emerging economies. India lived up to these predictions. It showed a high economic growth rate of 8–10 percent between financial years 2003 and 2010 ( Ishigami, 2017 , p. 52).

Such amazing economic performance has given India great self-confidence. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the then ruling party, presented its slogan of ‘Shining India’ in its 2004 General Election manifesto. C. Raja Mohan, India’s leading strategic thinker, has said: ‘After disappointing itself for decades, India is now on the verge of becoming a great power’ ( Mohan, 2006 ). India’s momentum of emergence continued into the 2010s. The China Daily remarked upon India's great power ambitions when India launched the Agni, a medium-range missile in December 2011. 6 The Economist in 2013 published a special issue carrying the title India as a Great Power . 7

Consequently, India looked to be emerging on the global stage in the 2000s and 2010s. Nevertheless, the Government of India (GOI) itself has never publicly proclaimed the country to be a major power and has instead adhered to its traditional external policy of cooperation or alliance with like-minded nations. The first document made public by GOI was the Report of GOM on National Security , which suggests that India has no reasonable alternative but to opt for closer relations with the US ( Group of Ministers, 2001 ).

The second document was The Challenge: India and the New American Global Strategy , 2006, which was submitted to Prime Minister Singh by the task force headed by K. Subrahmanyam, who was assumed to be the greatest strategic thinker in independent India. Although this document remains secret, Sanjaya Baru disclosed the gist of it as ‘the time has come for India to advance its interests through greater integration with the global economy, making the best use of economic opportunities provided by developed economies, especially the US’ ( Baru, 2014 , p. 168). It carries an almost identical tone to that of the 2001 report.

Certainly, and particularly for foreigners, these documents provide excellent materials and data elucidating India’s current foreign policy. Aside from these two, since the 2000s, various arguments have been put forth to characterize India’s foreign policy as a diversified, multilateral policy. However, they remain incomplete, failing to provide a total picture of foreign policy, particularly the main objectives of its foreign policy. Perhaps, India might have had difficulty taking suitable steps during the transitional period because India’s emergence as a major power is a recent phenomenon.

3.2 Negation of major power and Taoguang Yanghui

Although India has been generally acknowledged to be a future major power, an interesting and strange phenomenon emerged: India’s negation of such a status and role. Perhaps one can find a similar tendency in the report Nonalignment2.0 in 2012 ( Khilnani et al. , 2012 ), which has been regarded as a quasi-official document. In it, one might identify the basic principles used to guide India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. The report is filled with references to India as a major power, but is wary of this status, suggesting rather that the country should maintain its status of strategic autonomy . Subsequently, the report attracted severe criticism particularly from the strategic community in India. 8 Its main argument can be summarized as emphasizing strategic autonomy and the means to realize this ( Khilnani et al. , 2012 )

India’s wariness has been pointed out by Miller, who observed that India’s diplomatic elites tend to resist the rise of their own country ( Miller, 2013 ). In a similar vein, M.K. Narayanan, India’s ex-National Security Advisor, has characterized India as a reluctant power ( Narayanan, 2014 ). In addition, India has been characterized as using swing-state policies ( Kliman and Fontaine, 2012 ).

One can interpret such wariness from the historical tendency of India’s strategically defensive posture ( Tanham, 1992 , pp. 52–53). A similar analytical attempt has been made to explain the application of the strategic restraint concept to India’s defense policy after its independence, which shows no clear-cut approach ( Cohen and Dasgupta, 2010 ).

This makes it difficult to draw comparisons with other rising powers. The geopolitical condition that has driven Indian strategic thinking through the Cold War is sui generis in nature. For example, China adopted Deng Xiaoping’s tenets, Japan mobilized its resources, and sought to become an economic power and achieve great power status under the Yoshida Doctrine. However, there remained several inconsistencies in Indian economic policies and security interests which compelled it to seek help from both the US and the Soviet Union at different times of crisis.

3.3 India as a leading power

Now, one can discern a shift of India’s foreign policy since the BJP came to power as a result of the General Election in April to May 2014. The BJP won 282 seats out of 543 seats of the Lok Sabha (the lower house) with allied parties winning a further 54 seats. Narendra Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister in May. The BJP is a right-wing party whose parent organization is a Hindu nationalist organization: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer/Patriotic Organization). The BJP alone commands a parliamentary majority for the first time since the 1989 general election in India.

With its election slogan of Shreshtha Bharat (Great India) and high economic growth, the BJP has sought to capture the people’s imagination by presenting a plan to make India a richer and stronger nation. The election manifesto was settled in Modi’s favor after an intra-party struggle. The slogan of Great India was an effective means of stimulating the Indian people to feel happy, serving as the best means in terms of domestic political mobilization.

Modi has brought about a popular majority with the so-called Modi Wave. He is truly at the helm of the government. Moreover, his approach as Prime Minister is unprecedented in Indian diplomatic history. He is not a follower of the so-called Nehru diplomacy , unlike all his predecessors, including the BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee. 10 Modi is a perfect follower of Sardar Patel, the first Home Minister and later Deputy Prime Minister (August 1947 to December 1950). Where Nehru was an idealist, pragmatist, and realist, Patel was thoroughly realistic and pragmatic. 11

Modi’s foreign policy orientation was apparent at an early stage in his remarks at Chennai on 18 October 2013 during the election campaign: ‘India's foreign policy should be built on the foundation of our culture, tradition, strength, economy, trade, strategy and security.’ After becoming Prime Minister, Modi emphasized the gist of his foreign policy orientation at the meeting of Heads of Indian Missions in February 2015. He urged them to use the present unique opportunity to help India position itself in a leading role , rather than just a balancing force globally 12 (emphasis added). Indian people have not in general been surprised at Modi’s pronouncement which they regard as the natural corollary of the BJP’s election manifesto.

However, when Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (the second son of K. Subrahmanyam), who was appointed to the post by Modi, declared on 20 July 2015 at his IISS-Fullerton Lecture (Singapore): India’s foreign policy dimension is ‘to aspire to be a leading power , rather than just a balancing power’ 13 (emphasis added), his speech marked the first time a high-ranking Indian official had made public such an intention. A great difference exists, however, between playing a leading role and being a leading power: the former is abstract, but the latter is concrete in terms of its implications. Although his speech was talked about in several of India’s national newspapers, apparently its significance was not clearly noticed. 14 India’s unannounced Taoguang Yanghui was set aside.

Therefore, India has self-evidently crossed the threshold of circumscribing its self-imposed external stance: from negation to affirmation of its aspiration to be a major power. This change of stance might be attributable to Modi, the first non-Nehruvian Prime Minister of India.

3.4 India’s Foreign Policy Matrix

As pointed out previously, India has basic attributes of various magnitudes and a geopolitical position sufficient for status as a major power. During the Cold War period, India's national power was deficient, in terms of economy and defense. Therefore, it seemed only a pipe dream that India might someday become a major power. In the 2016 world rankings, India now ranks seventh in terms of national GDP (Japan ranks third) 15 and fifth in terms of defense expenditures (Japan ranks eighth). 16

At the moment, the US is the largest and the only major power. China chases it, as does India, although it remains one or two lengths behind China. There appears to be no other emerging country with an objective, like India’s, to become a major power. In fact, the National Intelligence Council of the US predicted as early as 2012 that: ‘In 2030 India could be the rising economic powerhouse that China is seen to be today. China’s current economic growth rate – 8–10% – will probably be a distant memory by 2030’ ( National Intelligence Council, 2012 , p. 36). 17

Nevertheless, in reality, for overseas observers and scholars, the substance of India’s foreign policy has been extremely difficult to grasp because India deploys its policies depending upon circumstances and timings. India sometimes leans on the US and Japan while at other times befriending China and Russia. Such foreign postures have continually puzzled outsiders.

India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala)

The Matrix is a provisional attempt to delve into India’s foreign policy and provide a grand outlook. India since the 2000s onward has been unfolding various foreign policies depending on regions to a greater or lesser degree. Such tendencies of foreign policy implementation have turned out to be distinctive in the mid-2010s.

The Matrix has several characteristics. First, it constitutes the three tiers of levels: the Global level, the Regional (Indo-Pacific region) level, and the Local (South Asia region) level. Each level has specific and different objectives with corresponding measures.

The inconsistencies in Indian approaches at the three levels tend to puzzle outsiders, as India has always appeared to be ‘playing off’ major powers to achieve its diverse interests. Perhaps such various differentiations make outsiders wonder at the objectives and contents of India’s foreign policy, unlike the non-alignment policy and the alliance with the Soviet Union. Japan’s newspapers tend to characterize India’s foreign policy as omnidirectional, 19 an overly superficial view. Even Indian experts have not analyzed their country’s foreign policy structurally.

Second, from the standpoint of time sequence, the present and future objectives at the Global level are basically future aspirations to be achieved, particularly so, in the case of international order building capability. After the end of World War II, the US as the victorious nation, with its incomparable national power – half of the global GDP and extraordinary military capabilities – led the founding of political and economic institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF. For India, the present and future objectives of the Regional and Local Levels are crucially important areas to achieve the Global objectives in the present and beyond.

Now, the outline of each level will be explained. The Global level is India’s overall target to achieve. The process of getting to that target would first be to establish multi-polarization of the international system and possibly at the same time to acquire its position as a pole in the international system in the coming years.

Next, India’s major and ultimate objectives – and China’s also – is to acquire the capability of international order building. At the moment, China is striving to emulate the US by equipping itself with similar capabilities through the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) along with the One Belt, One Road Initiative (BR Initiative), and other associated measures. Like China, India also dreams of having such capabilities in the future. In short, the two countries have aspirations to become rule-makers rather than rule followers as they have been in the past. Now China appears to be gradually acquiring such capability, while India is lagging behind. However, after acquiring such capabilities, what China and India's new international order desires to create is opaque.

To materialize these objectives, India cooperates with China and Russia vis-à-vis the US and other associated countries. India’s full memberships at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS summit signify its cooperation with Russia and China at the Global level. If one regards China, Russia, and India as revisionist powers, then the US and its associated countries could be termed status quo powers. For India, membership of the UN Security Council and other measures would be one of its first major gambits.

At the Regional level (Indo-Pacific region), India is striving to achieve a dominant position and to display its relative presence through joining hands with the US, Japan, and other like-minded countries while facing China. One of Japan’s South Asian security specialists pointed out, ‘it is natural that Japan designs Indo-Japan cooperation in tandem with the India-Japan-US trilateral cooperation’ ( Izuyama, 2013 , p. 195). It is said Japan–India security relations could be seen as distinctively apparent in the field of maritime cooperation ( Kiyota, 2016 , pp. 175–191). More specifically, building the interoperability of the two navies and undergirding peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region are said to be indispensable ( Nagao, 2017 , p. 71).

At the Local level (South Asia), India has become a de facto major power in consolidating its dominant position. It does not hesitate to cooperate with the US and others in matters directly or indirectly related to China, but it would fundamentally prefer to act independently, particularly in the Indian Ocean ( Jain and Horimoto, 2016 , pp. 26–42).

For India, the realization of foreign policy objectives at the Regional and Local levels would help in cementing its final Global objectives which are more long term in nature. India’s leading power aspirations would cause a ‘ripple-effect’ to the future configuration of Asia’s international relations.

Thus, India’s foreign policy is neither omnidirectional nor double-dealing. It is possible to point out in the coming one or two decades that the Matrix might transform its present three levels to two levels, concomitant with changes of objectives and measures.

Ultimately the characteristics of a future international order are expected to be based on the relationships between the major powers of Asia and their political ambitions.

At the moment, India's two closest partners are Russia and Japan. For India, from the viewpoint of the Matrix, the main raison d'être of its relations with Russia exists at the Global level whereas Japan operates at the Regional level. Maybe, for Russia and Japan, India’s aspiration is seen to be transformation into a major power. Its concretization would be welcome in terms of coping with the emerging and assertive China against the backdrop of obfuscating and elusive perceptions and implementation of US policy toward China, particularly so under the Trump administration.

4.1 Partnership with Russia

Regarding Russian relations with India, several factors underlie their close relationship. India maintained its close relations with the Soviet Union during the 1970s and the 1980s. Even after the Union devolved into Russia and several independent republics, India established its a strategic partnership in 2000 with Russia preceded only by South Africa (1997) and France (1998). India and Russia have held bilateral annual summits since 2000. At that time, Russia was the only country with which India held a regular summit. They continue to the present day. It is noteworthy that Russian affairs tend to be off the table when India’s foreign policy is discussed in Japan.

At the Global level since the 1990s, India has never been a member of mini-lateral 20 international organizations. India ended such practices in 2003 when the IBSA Dialogue Forum was established, consisting of India, Brazil, and South Africa. In fact, during its first meeting, they agreed on the urgent necessity for reform of the UN, particularly the Security Council. These three countries have common traits: democratic countries and leading candidates to be future permanent members of the UN Security Council.

India joined another mini-lateral meeting of the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs) Summit, which was established in 2009. The summit was re-named the BRICS summit when South Africa joined in 2011. The summit mainly addresses means of improving the global economic system and reforming international financial institutions. It is noteworthy that the three IBSA countries can be characterized as a group within the larger group (the BRICS Summit) to check the predominance of China (also that of the China–Russia combination).

If the summit represented the first chance for India to play its cards well, then another case was membership in the SCO, which is characterized as a Eurasian political, economic, and military organization. India has maintained observer status since 2005, mirroring US attendance of the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). India, along with Pakistan, signed the memorandum of obligations on 2016, thereby starting the formal process of joining the SCO. They were designated as full members in 2017.

Moscow has consistently championed the admission of India to the SCO to balance China's dominance and strengthen the group's clout (Vladimir, 2011). However, China has objected to India’s membership under the pretext of a lack of standards and procedures. Subsequently, China has favored reviewing its unofficial moratorium on admitting new members in the wake of the planned drawdown of the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). China has prepared its own quid pro quo of India’s membership by admitting Pakistan as a full member, whereas other countries aspiring to be full members have been shelved.

India has its own calculations. India during the Manmohan Singh Government (May 2004 to May 2014) remained wary by not sending the Prime Minister to attend the SCO Summit except on one occasion, perhaps principally not to damage its relations with the US. When the BJP government came to power, India initiated its move to full membership after its relations with the US consolidated. Indian confidence held that the full membership of the SCO would not necessarily infuriate the US.

The two mini-lateral organizations of the BRICS Summit and the SCO have a common trait: Russia and China are members. Probably, India expects Russia to play a role of checking and balancing vis-à-vis China. Russia expects India to play a role of balancer vis-à-vis China. For India, the SCO also carries a significant implication in terms of its Central Asian diplomacy, which is yet to be fully explored politically and economically.

For India, its relations with Russia are indispensable in terms of acquisition of defense equipment and energy resources and also diplomatic cards vis-à-vis China and the US, although the bilateral trade between India and Russia has waned in importance 21 compared to the Indo-Soviet era.

4.2 Japan as the second close country

Russia is followed by Japan as the country with the second-closest relations to India. 22 It might be possible to say Japan would be more important than Russia because of the recent international situations where Russia tends to be rather cooperative with China and the Indo-Pacific is of increasing importance for India.

To conclude this section in advance, economy and security are the two major engines bringing forth the contemporary close bilateral relations. In other words, the close relations are the result of growing convergence between the two countries’ world views, interests, and goals. In one way or another, these two factors are related to the emergence of China. As early as in 2006, it was pointed out that ‘In the emerging Asia, the two major non-Western democracies, India and Japan, look like natural allies as China drives them closer together’ ( Chellaney, 2006 , p. 221).

Viewed from India’s diplomatic history, India’s close relations with Russia have far antedated those with Japan. In fact, Japan’s relations with India are a recent phenomenon that has unfolded during the past quarter century since the 1990s. 23

The transformation of Japan–India relations has transpired against the backdrop of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the shift of US policy to Asia with the US’ relative diminution of power, and particularly the rapid emergence of China.

Realistically speaking, as illustrated by various aspects of India’s Foreign Policy Matrix, India’s main foreign policy theater at the moment is confined primarily to the Regional Level (Indo-Pacific) and the Local level (South Asia). With the passage of time and following the consolidation of its interests at these two levels, India might then become more active at the Global level. India might still need time before becoming more active at the Global level. Russia’s presence is insufficient on a regional level whereas Japan’s presence (along with the US) constitutes an effective partnership vis-à-vis China. For Japan also, India could be a reliable cooperative partner in the Indo-Pacific. In short, at the moment, Japan and India have become, for all practical purposes, mutually indispensable partners: for Japan, to cope with the rise of China, to say the least of utilizing economic opportunities; and for India to buy time as it becomes a major power.

The development of the closer relationship of Japan and India might be described as a triple jump of hop, step, and jump: the 1990s, the 2000s, and then the 2010s onward. The favorable improvement in Japan–India relations, which began as a mere rivulet in the 1990s, grew into a stream in the early 2000s onward. By around 2005, it had gained all the momentum of a major river.

Such a metamorphosis of bilateral relations is readily apparent from the number of mutual VIP visits by prime ministers, cabinet ministers, and other high government officials of both countries. There were only 16 mutual visits of VIPs in the 1980s, but 27 in the 1990s, 84 in the 2000s, and 47 already in the first half of the 2010s. The gradual but sharp increases of mutual VIP visits clearly mark the rapprochement between the two countries. The Japan–India Nuclear Agreement of 2016 signified a major culmination of bilateral relations ( Tamari, 2017 , pp. 232–237).

These close contacts paved the way for the bilateral annual summit between of the prime ministers of Japan and India which started in 2005. For Japan, India is the first and only country, whereas for India, Japan is the second country after Russia. The Strategic Partnership between the two countries was established in 2006. Consequently, India maintains close relations with Japan in addition to Russia.

Another major factor cementing these bilateral relations is economic relations. First, there is the so-called China risk. In 2004, Japan’s trade with China (including Hong Kong) reached 22 trillion yen, replacing the 20 trillion yen trade between Japan and the US. Thereby, China became Japan’s largest trading partner. In that year, markedly anti-Japanese behavior was displayed by Chinese spectators against Japanese players at the AFC Asian Cup football match in Chongqing, China in July 2004. Furthermore, between March and April in 2005, large-scale anti-Japanese riots targeting Japanese stores broke out in Chengdu, Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities.

This turn of events raised grave concern. As a consequence, ‘spurred by the anti-Japanese demonstrations occurring in China in spring that year, companies began increasing their direct investment in Vietnam and India to take advantage of the high growth and significant market scale expected in these countries, as well as to defuse the risk of investment concentration in China’ ( Tsutsumi, 2005 ). India’s China expert, Kondapalli, pointed out that: ‘It is only since 2005 that China started considering relations with India “strategic” in nature’ ( Kondapalli, 2013 ). It would not be sheer coincidence.

Secondly, Japan’s ODA to India plays a crucial role ( Jain 2017 ). Japan has been devoting attention to India as the destination of its ODA viewed from the angle of India’s bright prospect as an emerging market. Japan’s ODA has been serving as a forerunner of Japan’s exploration of new business opportunities ( Ghosh, 2017 , pp. 71–80). India, with high economic potential and gigantic size, was evaluated as a worthwhile country to be a recipient of Japan’s major share of ODA. In fact, Japan has been the largest ODA provider to India from 1986 to the present day, except during 1998–2001 when Japan used economic measures 24 to protest India’s atomic testing in 1998. Since fiscal year 2003, the largest share of Japan’s ODA has been given to India, replacing China, the perennial leading recipient. Japan has been supporting various mega-infrastructure developments such as the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and the Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC) ( Choudhury, 2014 ; Kojima, 2017 ).

In 2011, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Japan and India was promulgated. The Modi Government carries ‘Make in India’ in its economic policy and ‘Act East Policy’ 25 in its foreign policy, which combine well with Japan’s active and forward-looking posture toward India. The prime ministers of the two countries emphasized the importance of the Act East Policy and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in their joint statement of 2016.

4.3 China factor

Economic circumstances were certainly an important factor in the Japan–India rapprochement. An even more important factor is security policy, designed to cope with the rise of China as a common priority. Rather than initiation based on a clear policy direction, the mutual rapprochement policies adopted by both Japan and India were the result of fortuitous timing for gradual convergence since 2000 in the two countries’ foreign policy objectives on both economic and security fronts. One of India’s Japan specialists has suggested that the China factor has risen to the fore, and that it has assumed major importance in India–Japan relations ( Jain, 2007 ; Varma, 2013 , p. 52).

Viewed from the perspective of their China policies, both countries’ policy needs might also be regarded as having drawn the two countries closer together, with engagement in economic areas and hedging in terms of security, although hedging and engagement are used infrequently these days in the US, where the phrase originated. This same double-sided policy of engagement and hedging underpinned the approaches to China pursued by the US and other of China’s neighbors, albeit with different degrees of intensity. India’s dual policy of engagement and hedging is a new policy orientation after the Cold War period. During the Cold War, India could not afford such a risky strategy because of its insufficient power. And thus it could only pursue an engagement policy.

The engagement and hedging policy might be regarded as India's response to China’s assertive external orientation in the 2000s and the 2010s, particularly since Xi Jinping reached power in China in 2012 as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. He underscored the importance of the Dream of China . His Chinese Dream is described as ‘achieving the “Two 100s”: The material goal of China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by about 2020, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the modernization goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic’ ( Kuhn, 2013 ). In other words, the Dream of China is a national construction project producing a wealthy superpower with a powerful military ( Mifune, 2016 , p. 31). China’s assertive policies are likely to continue to achieve its two dreams.

Perhaps, when China realizes its dream, it might acquire international order building capability. However, it is not clear what concrete institutions and systems China would create based on its capability. India's ambitions in this respect are even more opaque than those of China. China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and concretizing various plans such as the AIIB and the BR Initiative, implying a new world order, whereas India is not a permanent UN Security Council member and does not have plans like those of China.

Viewed in this way, the China factor seems unlikely to disappear in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years. In the region, Japan and India, the most affected countries, will continue their close relations and join together along with the ASEAN countries, Australia, and the US, even beyond the personally close relationship between the leaders Abe and Modi ( Horimoto, 2014a ). Albeit, personal relationships between top leaders exert influence more or less on bilateral diplomatic relations. Abe, who promotes a pro-active foreign policy , appears to be keener to have close relations than Modi ( Basu 2016 ).

Additionally, we should not rule out another possibility that continued tension between India and Pakistan nudges India to opt for maintaining close relations with Japan in considerations of the power relations among the US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Japan. Probably, the power gap separating India and China can be expected to dwindle gradually. Thereafter, China, instead of direct confrontation with India, might choose to enhance its all-weather diplomatic relations 26 with Pakistan to limit India’s influence to South Asia or to obstruct India’s expansion of national influence in Asia. It is possible that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is an integral part of the BR initiative, would enhance China–Pakistan relations. Conversely India–Pakistan relations would aggravate further.

Putting it in another way, ‘the enduring Sino-Pak partnership has long been seen in New Delhi as aimed at boxing India within the subcontinent and preventing it from ever emerging as a rival to China in Asia and beyond’ ( Mohan, 2012 , p. 21). China’s support of Pakistan can be expected to keep India–Pakistan tensions intensified or at least persistent: a situation of tension by proxy. 27

Consequently, India might augment its relations with Japan as an important countermeasure. For Japan, which relies closely on the US only, India is an indispensable country. Beyond dovetailing mutual strategic interest, Japan and India should take the lead to create a stable multipolar Asia ( Rajagopalan, 2012 , p. 252). 28

4.4 India’s wary foreign posture and Modi’s foreign policy

Against such a backdrop how would Japan–India and other elements of India’s foreign policy proceed? Plainly speaking, the present bilateral relations can be characterized as a relationship of convenience based on mutual necessity and benefit. The two countries would make the best use of their present close relations to maximize their respective national interests.

However, one might notice that subtle differences of perceptions exist between the two countries toward China, although fundamentally the two countries are commonly adopting engagement and hedging policies. Japan looks to try to prevent China from occupying the dominant position in Asia, particularly in the Western Pacific region in cooperation with the US and other like-minded countries, whereas India’s basic orientation is to maintain stable relations with China.

When the Modi government rose to power, Sandy Gordon of the Australia National University noted the government’s attempt to ‘play both ends against the middle’, especially since this approach has been a classic feature of Indian foreign policy. Under this scenario, India would seek the best deal it can from China, both economically and in terms of a possible border settlement, while attempting to maintain its hedge against a possible difficult rise of China with powers such as the US and Japan ( Gordon, 2014 ).

In a similar vein, Kanwal Sibal, the former Foreign Secretary of India, remarked: ‘Japan’s economic stakes in China are huge; our own political and economic stakes in China are high, given China’s contiguity with us and our direct exposure to its power. Neither Japan nor India seek a confrontation with China, but both have a responsibility to build lines of defence against any disruptive exercise of power by a rising China’ ( Sibal, 2014 ).

Prime Minister Modi, since coming to power in May 2014, looks to have been practicing his foreign policy, as predicted by two experts. President Mukherjee’s Parliamentary Address on 9 June 2014 might be particularly revealing of Modi’s policy framework: ‘We will pursue our international engagement based on enlightened national interest, combining the strength of our values with pragmatism.’ 29

The Matrix presented herein shows that Modi has been practicing his policy of expediting economic growth and expanding defense capabilities to create a rich and powerful nation. For Modi, a strong economy means not only the economy per se , but also the infrastructure of his diplomacy: ‘A strong economy is a base of effective foreign policy.’ 30 He appears to be implementing his foreign policy from the perspective of geo-economics rather than geopolitics.

Nevertheless, he is compelled to confront the dilemma of domestic politics versus foreign policy. For example, the issue has arisen of a Trade Facilitation Agreement with economic benefits said to be worth 1 trillion US dollars. India agreed to join it in December 2013 in Bali with a grace period of four years with regard to its agricultural procurements. However, in July 2014, India backpedalled due to considerations of farmers’ concerns. Such a tendency is discernible in the case of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiated in 2013, which was to have been concluded by 2015 (extended to 2017).

His slogan of Make in India must be seen in the context of the interests of consumers and other relevant parties in India. He must cope with the difficult political dichotomy of localism versus globalism.

Japan is struck by typhoons in summer and autumn every year. When the Japan Meteorological Agency forecasts that a typhoon is heading towards Japan, the agency cannot say exactly when and where it might strike. In the same vein, India appears to be heading toward a global power status now and is metamorphosing into a major power, but it remains unpredictable ‘when’ that might occur.

5.1 Variables: the US, China, and their mutual relations

Various influences are likely to affect India’s journey to take the mantle of a major power in the future. Among them, the US and China might be the most influential factors at the Regional level (Indo-Pacific region).

Many Indian newspapers predicted that US President Trump would be likely to boost the Indian–US strategic relationship with special emphasis on defense ties and counter-terrorism cooperation. Prime Minister Modi was the fifth world leader to speak with Trump both soon after the US Presidential election and also after the inauguration. 31 Trump and Modi certainly have a common perception related to Israel and Islamic fundamentalism. Setting aside their personal predilections, no one knows for sure what will happen to Indian–US relations because of Trump’s renowned unpredictability.

At the moment, perhaps, the Trump administration’s main concerns are how to address Asian issues such as China, the Western Pacific, North Korea, and the Middle East quagmires. South Asia and the Indian Ocean would be positioned as circumferential issues. Therefore, India might be able to afford to wait and see how the US–China relations develop. Simultaneously with their development, India can deploy its foreign policy.

5.2 India’s theoretical formulation as a major power

If we assume that India is on the verge of becoming a major power, then it might be necessary to provide a theoretical explanation of its emergence. Such aspects have been completely lacking in India by the 2000s. Upon entering the 2010s, when India showed its upswing, there appeared some moves, particularly among the strategic community of India.

Reflecting atmosphere, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (under the Ministry of Defence) started various seminars on The Arthasyastra and Kautilya since 2012. The Arthashastra 32 is an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic policy, and military strategy, written in Sanskrit. Kautilya is traditionally credited as the author of the treatise. In India, the treatise is often likened proudly to China’s The Art of War by Sun Tsu. It can be said that the Arthashastra is the fountainhead of India’s international politics ( Ito, 2015 ).

Shivshankar Menon, the former National Security Advisor and presumed to be one of prominent members of India’s strategic community, has insisted during one of the seminars in October 2014 that India’s strategic thoughts have been imported from overseas. He has asserted that they instead must have maximum strategic autonomy, and that one should read the Arthashastra . 33

When the first convention of the Indian Association of International Studies was held in 2012, Amitabh Mattoo congratulated its establishment in his opening remarks but simultaneously warned: ‘If Asia merely mimics the West in its quest for economic growth and conspicuous consumption, and the attendant conflict over economic resources and military prowess, the “revenge of the East” in the Asian century and “all its victories” will remain “truly Pyrrhic”’ ( Mattoo, 2012 ).

Be that as it may, India’s pursuit of its own theoretical international relations remains at an inchoate stage. For that reason, India cannot help but start with its political classics to formulate a theoretical foundation as its gambit.

Entering the 2010s, India has just started to explore measures and plans to achieve major power status alongside a new international framework to be formulated to legitimize its rise to power. This is perhaps the way in which India tries to respond to the power transformation in Asia and in the world. India is recognized generally as a major power in the future. However, for legitimization, India needs to devise universally acceptable narratives, though this might be an uphill task and challenge. Probably, one of the keywords would be inclusivity as India has propounded over the past seven decades. In order to realize such narratives, Japan–India relations should be molded in a way which is neither exclusive nor antagonistic toward China ( Ito, 2013 , pp. 113–131; Singh, 2013 , pp. 133–152). Kesavan, the senior most East Asian specialist, pointed out that: ‘India believes in constructing a transparent, inclusive and democratic regional order free from the hegemony of any single country’ ( Kesavan, 2015 ).

5.3 Implication of India’s metamorphosis into a major power

Modi’s ascent to power constitutes a historic confluence of interests and opportunities. After the end of the Cold War, various models such as the Washington consensus, the Beijing consensus, and the Arab spring have been attempted without much success. Now India’s attempt to develop as a major power under a liberal democratic setup might carry great historic significance.

In that sense, the country watching India’s future with the greatest curiosity is likely to be China. India’s success in achieving its ultimate aims would deal the strongest blow to China, which increasingly serves domestic demands for economic equality more than it meets mounting clamour for democratic rights.

How can Modi and his successors successfully coordinate and accommodate domestic policies and foreign policies? Upon overcoming these challenges, India might be making a great step forward to becoming a major power in the future. No one would object to the perception that a power transformation or shift is taking place in Asia. The most important issue might be whether the shift turns out to be a paradigm shift, bringing about the emergence of a new international order. In tandem, India would be required to put forward its vision of how it will function as a global major power. K. Subrahmanyam stressed the importance of India’s grand strategy 34 in an article made public immediately after his death as he requested ( Subrahmanyam, 2012 ) (May 2017).

India’s membership of major powers would be conditioned on whether the US as a superpower recognizes India as a major power ( Nayar and Paul, 2004 , pp. 113).

Article IX of that treaty stipulated ‘In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.’ The article is available at http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty+of+ (20 March 2017, date last accessed).

The Guardian (1971, August 10) described it as ‘departure from the Indian policy of non-alignment’.

In contrast, China has consistently implemented its independent foreign policy without alignment. China ceased to align with other countries in the early 1960s, when its close relations with the Soviet Union faltered.

BRICs changed its acronym to BRICS when South Africa joined the BRICs summit in 2010.

Times of India (2011, December 18, paper edition).

The Economist (30 March 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poised-become-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end (3 March 2017, date last accessed).

No clear-cut definition of the term exists in India. Generally, those who are engaging in foreign and national security issues comprise such experts as university professors, think-tank analysts, ex-officials of the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence, and journalists. They are opinion makers-cum-leaders influencing India’s external policies.

Vijay Goel, Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office, has known Vajpayee for about 30 years. When Goel asked who his favorite leader was, he named Nehru, available at http://muraleedharan.tripod.com/legends_vajpayee.html (2 March 2017, date last accessed).

Modi has initiated its foreign policy of placating, utilizing and restraining vis-à-vis China ( Takenaka, 2014) .

PM to Heads of Indian Missions on 7 February 2015, available at http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-to-heads-of-indian-missions/?comment=disable (21 March 2017, date last accessed).

His speech was ‘India, the United States and China,’ available at https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-jaishankar-f64e (20 March 2017, date last accessed).

In India and the US, noted specialists on India’s foreign policy were rather late in commenting on Jaishankar’s speech. See Tellis (2016) , Mohan (2016) and Huntsman and Gopalaswamy (2015) .

World Development Indicators database, Gross Domestic product 2016 , available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (20 May 2017, date last accessed).

SIPRI Fact Sheet, Trends in world military expenditure, 2016 , available at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf (20 May 2017, date last accessed).

Its report also predicted ‘As the world’s largest economic power, China is expected to remain ahead of India, but the gap could begin to close by 2030. India’s rate of economic growth is likely to rise while China’s slows (Ibid.).’

One of the most interesting resources and one overlapping with my objective is Karnad (2015) . As the title of the book Why India is not a Great Power (yet) suggests, it is the first of its kind discussing India’s emergence as a major power. Karnad laments this is attributable to the lack of combination between economic and hard power policy orientations and stress the importance of military and economic trajectories have complemented each other. Ganguly (2010) , Khilnani et al. (2012), Bajpai and Pant (2013) show us excellent examinations of India’s foreign policy, but they do not cover the period under the Modi government. Malone et al. (2015) could be termed as an encyclopedia of India’s foreign policy with more than 700 pages but it is noteworthy that it does not include addressing issues such as major power status or Japan.

For example, Japan’s newspaper, Sankei Shimbun (2014, October 7, paper edition), termed Modi’s approach and stance to the US and Japan as unrestrained by its traditionally continued omnidirectional foreign policy.

The term ‘mini-lateral’ might be used to designate a small group of countries situated just between bilateral and multilateral.

India’s trade with Russia in 2016–17 is not ranked within the India’s top 25 countries (Department of Commerce, Government of India, Export Import Data Bank, 16 April 2017, available at http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopn.asp (20 April 2017, date last accessed).

Reflecting the recent development of closer bilateral relations, there emerge various publications: Khan (2017) , Borah (2017); Mukherjee and Yazaki (2016) .

The two countries enjoyed a brief honeymoon period after mutual relations were established in 1952. They did not last, however, because efforts to foster the relationship were thwarted by the unfolding Cold War. The two countries pursued incompatible policy orientations in terms of foreign policy and economic policy. Therefore, the present phase might possibly be regarded as the second honeymoon period. For detailed discussions, see Horimoto (2016) .

An official terminology used by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead of economic sanction. For details, see ( Tamari, 2017 , pp. 226–227).

‘Change ′Look East Policy′ to ′Act East Policy′: Sushma Swaraj,’ NDTV (2014, August 25), available at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/time-to-change-look-east-policy-to-act-east-policy-sushma-swaraj-653063 (2 March 2017, date last accessed).

On 20 April 2015, China and Pakistan elevated their relations by their ‘Joint Statement on Establishing an All-Weather Strategic Co-operative Partnership during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan’ (The Express Tribune , 2015, April 21), available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/873290/strategic-partnership-pakistan-china-ties-hit-a-new-high/ (18 April 2017, date last accessed). All weather relations have been repeatedly stated in their bilateral documents but it was the first time their relations were officially characterized as All- Weather Strategic Co-operative Partnership.

Ed Royce, Chairman House Foreign Affairs Committee (the US) said in his opening statement in 16 December 2015 ‘But while the U.S. was quick to embrace Pakistan, Pakistan has hardly reciprocated. Pakistani Governments have come and gone, but its northwestern frontier has remained a terrorist haven. With its security services supporting what it considers to be good Islamist terrorist groups, these good groups—under Pakistan’s calculus— destabilize Afghanistan and threaten neighboring India while the government simultaneously opposes what it considers the bad Islamist groups’ ( Royce, 2015) .

The book admirably delves into the military strategies of four powers (China, the US, Ruassia and Japan).

The President of India is vested with all the executive authority but, in practice exercised by the Prime Minister with the help of the Council of Ministers (Article 53 of the Constitution of India).

Business Standard (19 October 2014), available at http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/StudyofArthashastraImportantShivShankarMenon (3 March 2017, date last accessed).

The Hindu (25 January 2017), available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-a-%E2%80%98true-friend%E2%80%99-Trump-tells-Modi/article17092065.ece (3 March 2017, date last accessed).

Business Standard (2014, October 19). He has also stressed the importance of study of Arthashastra in the previous occasion, available at http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/StudyofArthashastraImportantShivShankarMenon (3 March 2017, date last accessed).

Business Standard (2014, October 19). He has also stressed the importance of study of Arthashastra in the previous occasion, available at http://www.idsa.in/pressrelease/StudyofArthashastraImportantShivShankarMenon .

Recently also, Jacob (2017) pointed out ‘It’s time New Delhi focused on the big picture and avoided puritanical positions while addressing the emerging fault lines on the global geopolitical landscape.’

Bajpai P.K. , Pant H.V. (eds) ( 2013 ) India's Foreign Policy: A Reader . New Delhi : Oxford University Press .

Google Scholar

Google Preview

Baru S. ( 2014 ) The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh . New Delhi : Viking .

Basu T. ( 2016 ) ‘Decoding Japan's Security Discourse: Diverse Perspectives ,’ India Quarterly , Vol. 72 , No. 1, pp. 30 – 49 .

Bohrah R. ( 2017 ) The Elephant and The Sumurai: Why Japan Can Trust India . New Delhi : Kaveri Books .

Brewster D. ( 2012 ) India as an Asian Pacific Power. London : Routledge .

Chellaney B. ( 2006 ) Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan . New Delhi : HarperCollins Publishers India .

Choudhury S.R. (ed.) ( 2014 ) Japan-SAARC Partnership: A Way Ahead. New Delhi : Pentagon Press .

Cohen S.P. ( 2001 ) India: Emerging Power . Washington : Brookings .

Cohen S.P. , Dasgupta S. ( 2010 ) Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization . Washington : Brookings .

Frankel F. ( 2000 ) ‘Contextual Democracy: Intersections of Society, Culture and Politics in India’, in Frankel F. et al.  (eds), Transforming India . New Delhi : Oxford University Press .

Ganguly S. (ed.) ( 2010 ) India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect . New Delhi : Oxford University Press .

Ghosh M. ( 2017 ) ‘Indo no Keizai Dainamizumu to Nichiin Kankei’ [India’s Economic Dynamism and India–Japan Relations], in Horimoto, T. (ed.), Gendai Nichiin Kankei Nyumon [Introduction to Contemporary Japan–India Relations], pp. 61–80. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Gordon S. ( 2014 ) ‘Will China “Wedge” India and the US?’ (2014, June 5). South Asia Masala http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2014/06/05/will-china-wedge-india-and-the-us/#more-5530 . (1 July 2014, date last accessed).

Group of Ministers (Government of India) ( 2001 ) Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security , New Delhi.

Haidar S. ( 2012 ) ‘Look East’, in Ram A. (ed.), Two Decades of India’s Look East Policy . New Delhi : Manohar .

Horimoto T. ( 2012 ) ‘Gendai Indo Gaiko Rosen: Renkei Gaiko Niyoru Taikoku Shiko’ [Contemporary India’s Foreign Policy: Partnership Diplomacy toward Major Power], N. Kondo (ed.), Gendai I no Kokusaikankei: Meja Pawaa heno Modaku [India’s Contemporary International Relations: The Way to Major Power]. Makuhari: Institute of Developing Economies, pp. 37–68.

Horimoto T. ( 2014a ) ‘Between Friends ’, (2014, June 3–9). India Today , Vol. XXXIX No. 23, pp. 54 – 56 .

Horimoto T. ( 2014b ) ‘ Ambivalent Relations of India and China: Cooperation and Caution’ , Journal of Contemporary China Studies , 3 ( 2 ), 61 – 92 .

Horimoto T. ( 2015 ) ‘Why Abe’s Security Package Has the Japanese up in Arms’, (2015, July 12). The Wire (India’s digital daily) http://thewire.in/2015/07/12/why-abes-security-package-has-the-japanese-up-in-arms-5367/ (1 August 2015, date last accessed).

Horimoto T. ( 2016 ) ‘Japan–India Rapprochement and Its Future Issues’, Japan’s Diplomacy Series, Japan Digital Library of Japan Institute of International Affairs, April, http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy/160411_Takenori_Horimoto.pdf (2 May 2016, date last accessed).

Horimoto T. (ed.) ( 2017 ) Gendai Nichiin Kankei Nyumon [Introduction to Contemporary Japan–India Relations]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Horimoto T. , Lalima V. (eds) ( 2013 ) India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia . New Delhi : Manohar .

Huntsman J. Jr. , Bharath G . ( 2015 ), ‘Transforming India from a Balancing to a Leading Power’, The National Interest , April 14. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/transforming-india-balancing-leading-power-1262 4 .

Ishigami E. ( 2017 ) ‘Nichin Keizai Kankei no Kiseki’ [Trajectory of Japan-India Economic Relations], in T. Horimoto (ed.), pp. 35 – 57 .

Ito T. ( 2013 ) ‘“China Threat” Theory in Indo-Japan Relations’, in T. Horimoto and L. Varma (eds), India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia . New Delhi : Manohar .

Ito T. ( 2015 ) ‘Arthashastra’s Riarizumu’ [Realism of Arthashastra], Bulletin of National Defense Academy (Social Science) (110), 103 – 119 .

Izuyama M. ( 2013 ) ‘India, Japan and Maritime Security Cooperation’, in T. Horimoto and L. Varma (eds), India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia , pp. 175–200. New Delhi : Manohar , pp. 113 – 131 .

Jacob H. ( 2017 ) ‘Lonely and Disinterested’ (2017, April 18). The Hindu . http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lonely-and-disinterested/article18113786.ece?homepage=true (19 April 2017, date last accessed).

Jain P. ( 2007 ) ‘The China Factor in Japan's Rising Interest in India', Background Brief, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore No. 326, March 29. http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB326.pdf (1 January 2017, date last accessed).

Jain P. ( 2017 ) Twin Peaks: Japan’s Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s , JICA Research Institute, No. 139, February. https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/ja/publication/workingpaper/l75nbg0000054l3s-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.139.pdf (1 April 2017, date last accessed).

Jain P. , Horimoto T. ( 2016 ) ‘Japan and the Indo-Pacific’, in Chacko Priya (ed.), New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific , pp. 26–42. London and New York : Routledge .

Karnad B. ( 2015 ) Why India is Not a Great Power (yet). New Delhi : Oxford University Press .

Kesavan K.V. ( 2015 ) ‘India’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific Region’, Seminar , 670. http://www.india-seminar.com/2015/670/670_k_v_kesavan.htm (2 March 2017, date last accessed).

Khan S.A. ( 2017 ) Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relation Buddhism to Special Strategic Partnersip . New Delhi : Pentagon Press .

Khilnani S. , Kumar R. , Mehta P.B. et al.  ( 2012 ) NONALIGNMENT 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century . http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/working_papers/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf (February 10, 2017, date last accessed).

Kiyota T. ( 2016 ) ‘Looming over the Horizon Japan’s Naval Engagement with India’, in A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan (eds), India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security , pp. 175–191. Routledge.

Kliman D.M. , Richard F. ( 2012 ) Global Swing States Brazil, India Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order . Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States & Center for a New American Security. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/global-swing-states-brazil-india-indonesia-turkey-and-future-international-order (28 February 2017, date last accessed).

Kojima M. ( 2017 ) ‘Indo Keizai no Taito to Nichiin Kankei no Shinkyokumen’ [Emergence of Indian Economy and New Phase of Japan–India Relations], in T. Horimoto (ed.), Gendai Nichiin Kankei Nyumon [Introduction to Contemporary Japan–India Relations], pp. 197 – 220 . Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Kondapalli S. ( 2013 ) ‘China’s Foreign Policy and Indo-Japan Relations’, in T. Horimoto and L. Varma (eds), India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia , pp. 63–91. New Delhi : Manohar .

Kondo N. ( 2012 ) ‘Gendai Indo no Kokusaikankei’ [India’s Contemporary International Relations], in Kondo N. (ed.), Gendai I no Kokusaikankei: Meja Pawaa heno Modaku [ India’s Contemporary International Relations: The Way to Major Power]. Makuhari: Institute of Developing Economies , pp. 3 – 36 .

Kuhn R.L. ( 2013 ) ‘Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream’ (2013, June 4). The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (March 1, 2017, date last accessed).

Kux D. ( 1993 ) Estranged Democracies India and the United States 1941–1991 . New Delhi : Sage Publications .

Malone D. , Raja Mohan C. , Raghavan S. (eds) ( 2015 ) The Oxford Handbook of India's Foreign Policy . New Delhi : Oxford University Press .

Mattoo ( 2012 ) ‘An Indian Grammar for International Studies’ (2012, December 11). The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/An-Indian-grammar-for-International-Studies/article12442433 . ece (4 March 2017, date last accessed).

Mifune E. ( 2016 ) Chugokoku Gaiko Senryaku―Sono Kontei ni Arumono [ China’s Diplomatic Strategy – Its Underlying Foundation] . Tokyo: Kodansha .

Miller M.C. ( 2013 ) ‘India’s Feeble Foreign Policy A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise’, Foreign Affairs , May/June. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2013-04-03/indias-feeble-foreign-policy (1 March 2017, date last accessed).

Mohan C.R. ( 2006 ) ‘India and the Balance of Power,’ Foreign Affairs , July/August. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-and-balance-power (1 March 2017, date last accessed).

Mohan C.R. ( 2012 ) Samudra Manthan Sino-India Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific . Washington : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .

Mohan C.R. ( 2016 ) ‘PM Modi’s Foreign Policy: Making India a Leading Power’ (2016, April 5). The Hindustan Times . http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/pm-modi-s-foreign-policy-making-india-a-leading-power/story-SMXx2543j1uPgcHCb0QmJJ.html (1 April 2017, date last accessed).

Mukherjee R. , Yazaki A. ( 2016 ) Poised for Partnership Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century . New Delhi : Oxford University Press .

Murthy P.A.N. ( 1986 ) India and Japan, Dimensions of their Relations: Historical and Political . New Delhi : ABC Publishing House .

Nagao S. ( 2017 ) ‘A Japan-India Partnership in Maritime-Asia’, Line in the Water , January, http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/GP-ORF-Line-in-the-Waters.pdf (1 February 2017, date last accessed).

Naidu G.V.C. ( 2013 ) ‘India and East Asia: The Look East Policy’, Perceptions , Spring, XVIIIm(1), pp. 53 – 74 .

Narayanan M.K. ( 2014 ) Keynote Address at the 16th Asian Security Conference on February 19, 2014. http://www.idsa.in/asc/keySPeeches.html (16 March 2017, date last accessed).

National Intelligence Council ( 2012 ) Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. https://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november2012.pdf#search=%27Global+Trends+2030%3A%27 Trends (1 March 2017, date last accessed).

Nayar B.R. , Paul T.V. ( 2004 ) India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status , New Delhi , Cambridge University Press .

O’Neil J. ( 2001 ) Building Better Global Economic BRICs . http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf . (20 March 2017, date last accessed).

Pant H.V. ( 2009 ) ‘The Trials of a Rising Power’, Livemint . http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/rixr6JJXrpGS3lgYj4YxVP/Harsh-V-Pant–The-trials-of-a-rising-power.html . (20 March 2017, date last accessed).

Perkovich G. ( 2003 ) ‘ Is India a Major Power?’, Washington Quarterly , 27(1) , 129 – 144 .

Radyuhin V. ( 2011 ) ‘SCO: 10 years of Evolution and Impact’ (2011, June 14). The Hindu .

Rajagopalan R.P. ( 2012 ) Clashing Titans Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers . New Delhi : KW Publishers .

Royce , Ed ( 2015 ) Opening Statement of the Honorable Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing: The Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations , December 16. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20151216/104290/HHRG-114-FA00-20151216-SD002.pdf) . (21 March 2017, date last accessed).

Sibal K. ( 2014 ) ‘It is Cherry Blossom Time in India–Japan Relations’ (2014, January 23). The Hindustan Times. http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/it-is-cherry-blossom-time-in-india-japan-relations/story-MR5pirQd1YNp265cen4ORJ.html (4 March 2017, date last accessed).

Sikri R. ( 2009 ) Challenge and Strategy Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy . New Delhi : Sage Publications .

Singh S. ( 2013 ) ‘US-Japan-India Trilogue: The China Factor’, in T. Horimoto and L. Varma (eds), India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia , pp. 133–152. New Delhi : Manohar .

Snyder G.H. ( 1997 ) Alliance Politics . Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press .

Subrahmanyam K. ( 2012 ) ‘India’s Grand Design’ (2012, February 3 and 4, paper edition). Indian Express.

Tamari K. ( 2017 ) ‘Kakumondai wo Meguru Tairitsu kara Kyouryoku heno Tenkai’ [Turning to Cooperation on Nuclear Issues], in T. Horimoto (ed.), Gendai Nichiin Kankei Nyumon [Introduction to Contemporary Japan–India Relations], pp. 221 – 239 . Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Takenaka C. ( 2014 ) ‘Modi Sinseiken to Sekai Nichiin Kankei no Yukue’ [Will Modi’s Diplomacy Change the Global Scenery? Situating Japan-India Global Partnership], Contemporary India Forum , Autumn No. 23. http://www.japan-india.com/pdf/forum/59-1.pdf (1 February 2017, date last accessed).

Tanham G.K. ( 1992 ) Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay . Santa Monica : Rand .

Tellis J.A. ( 2016 ) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper ‘India as a Leading Power’ (April 4). http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/04/india-as-leading-power-pub-63185 ( 1 April 2017, date last accessed).

Thakur R. ( 1992 ) ‘ India after Nonalignment’, Foreign Affairs , 71(2) . https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1992-03-01/india-after-nonalignment (2 March 2017, date last accessed).

Tsutsumi H. ( 2005 ) ‘Genryu Rukku Uesto’ [Current: Look West]. (October, paper edition). Kinnyu Shijou . http://www.nochuri.co.jp/report/pdf/f0510sea.pdf (1 April 2017, date last accessed).

Varma L. ( 2013 ) ‘Enhancing Strategic Times between Japan and India: Japan–China Relations as a Factor,’ in T. Horimoto and L. Varma (eds), India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia , pp. 41–62. New Delhi : Manohar .

Yoshida O. ( 2001 ) ‘Indira Gandhi Seiken no Jiritsuka Rosen to Inso Kinmitsuka no Haikei’ [The Background of Indira Gandhi Government’s Independent Foreign Policy and Strengthening India-Soviet Ties], Kokusai Seiji [International Politics], no. 127. http://jair.or.jp/old_documents/kokusaiseiji/127.pdf (1 April 2017, date last accessed).

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

• Recommend to your Library

Affiliations

• Online ISSN 1470-4838
• Print ISSN 1470-482X
• Copyright © 2024 Japan Association of International Relations and Oxford University Press
• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Quantifying India and its foreign relations through media monitoring

Subscribe to the center for technology innovation newsletter, shamika ravi and shamika ravi former brookings expert, economic advisory council member to the prime minister and secretary - government of india mudit kapoor mudit kapoor associate professor - indian statistical institute @muditkapoor.

December 13, 2022

In September 2022, India became the fifth largest economy in the world by overtaking the United Kingdom, according to a recent report from the International Monetary Fund. India’s economic and political rise has both domestic and global implications and might alter the nature of the country’s foreign relations with powerful countries like the United States, China, and Russia, and vice versa. Furthermore, global events, such as the protectionist tech policies imposed by former President Trump on Chinese trade policies, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the deepening of authoritarianism in China, are forcing global realignment. Consequently, countries like India are reassessing their foreign relations with existing major powers and signaling interests and preferences vis-à-vis new emerging powers.

In this essay, we quantify India’s foreign relations based on news that involves the country and the top economies in the world: Australia, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and Russia. We exploit the Global Database of Society , which is a part of the Global Data on Events, Location, and Tone (GDELT) Project that monitors news (broadcast, print, and digital) across the globe in more than 65 languages. Within 15 minutes of a news event breaking worldwide, the GDELT Project translates the event if it is in a language other than English and processes the news to identify the event, location, people, and organizations involved and the nature and theme of the event based on more than 24 emotional measurement packages (the largest deployment of sentiment analysis) to assess more than 2,300 emotions and themes to “contextualize, interpret, respond to, and understand global events” in near real-time.

The GDELT database lends itself to fascinating quantitative analysis of the changing nature of international relations as reflected in the news and media coverage. In our analysis, we find significant changes in India’s bilateral relations with major economies like France, China, Russia, and the United States in recent years. We also find structural breaks and major realignment in the relations of global powers vis-à-vis China since 2018.

Research methods

We limit our analysis to the GDELT event database that records events (such as appeals for rights, ease of restrictions on political freedoms, protest, etc.), the date of the event, and the actors involved (which could be geographic, ethnic, religious, etc.), the country of the actors, the number of mentions of the event (the higher the mentions, the more important the event), and the average media tone associated with the event, which is a numeric value that can range from -100 (extremely negative tone) to +100 (extremely positive tone), with typical values between -10 and +10 and with zero indicating a neutral event. Our analyses focus on events from June 15, 2015, to September 24, 2022. Overall, we analyze more than 99 million events, where the major actors were from three large countries: India, China, and the United States. We also estimate an average daily tone for each of the three countries by constructing a weighted mean of the average tone of all the events recorded on that date, with the number of mentions as a weight for each event. Our primary objective is to identify the pattern of the daily weighted average tone of the events related to India, China, and the United States from 2015 to 2022. To achieve this, we fit a Bayesian regression with a cubic spline and seven knots and plot the posterior mean with 95% intervals of the weighted average daily tone.

Media Tone: China vs. USA vs. India

Overall, we find that events related to China, an authoritarian country with severe restrictions on free media, have a relatively more positive tone than the tone of events in democracies such as India and the United States. However, since 2018, the tone of events related to China has begun a sharp downward trend. This change toward China was also observed in a 2021 Pew survey on Americans’ views toward China . It is also interesting to note a more positive trend in tone for India-related events since 2020, which remains steady and does not exhibit any sharp pattern.

(i) India’s relations with the United States, China, and Russia

In our analysis of events related to India, China, the United States, and Russia, we focus on events where the prominent actor is India. Until late 2021, events related to India and Russia had a relatively more positive tone than those associated with India and the United States. and India and China. However, since late 2021, there has been a sharp reversal in the tone of events related to India and Russia. This is most likely a direct outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

We also find that the tone of events related to India and China had a sharp reversal during the Doklam crisis in 2017 when there was a military border standoff between the Indian Armed Forces and the People’s Liberation Army of China. This was in response to the Chinese constructing a road at the trijunction area of India-Bhutan-China. The border standoff lasted more than two months and ended only when the Chinese halted the road construction and troops from both sides withdrew from Doklam. There was a short recovery in late 2018, however, from early 2019 onwards, there has been a sharp reversal in tone which worsened at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. Thereafter, India-China relations have continued to remain steady but at a historic low.

Concerning events related to India and the United States, we observe that their tone was steady and continuous until the middle of 2018, after which it started to fall. This downward trend continued until 2020 (the year of U.S. elections and the start of the pandemic), after which we observe a steady rise in the tone of events related to India and the United States.

(ii) Global realignment: China v. India

In our analysis, we also reviewed events that relate India and China to the world’s top economies: Australia, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the United States, and Russia. We include Pakistan (PAK) and Israel (ISR) for this analysis, as both countries are important actors in India’s foreign policy.

Over the entire period, the average tone of events that relate India to the major economies has remained somewhat similar, except for France and Israel, where there is a significant upward swing in the average tone after 2021. Not surprisingly, this reflects the dramatic improvements in India’s ties with Israel and France in recent years.

In contrast, since 2018, the average tone of events that relate China to the major economies has experienced a downward trend. In particular, the India-China gap in the average tone with Australia, Germany (DEU), France, and the United States widened after 2018. However, since 2020, the downward trend in the average tone of events has either reversed or remained constant. The most striking result of this analysis concerns Russia’s relations with India and China. We observe a sharp downward trend in the tone of events concerning Russia’s relations with both China and India between 2021 and 2022, which is most likely the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Broadly, the average tone of events that relate India to the major economies is higher compared to events that relate China to the major economies (in particular, Australia, Germany, France, and the United States); this gap has widened since 2018-2019. Results for Pakistan are along expected lines, as the tone of events covering its relations with China and India remain steady and unaffected by global events over time. Pakistan’s relations with China are significantly better than its relations with India, which have a systematic and significant negative tone.

The findings of our research suggest that events related to China (which has heavy-handed, authoritarian restrictions on all forms of media) have a relatively more positive tone than large federal democracies when it comes to media, such as India and the United States, which have a relatively free press. However, since 2018-2019, there has been a sharp downward trend in tone of events related to China, perhaps reflecting the changing view of China in the western world, particularly within the United States, and the former president’s political attack on China concerning its trade policy. However, in the last two years, we have observed a reversal in this trend, which could reflect an easing of the tension post-pandemic and change in the U.S. government.

When analyzing events that relate India and China to the top economies and Russia, we find a widening gap in the average tone of events. However, when it comes to Russia post-2021, there has been a sharp decline in the average tone of events for both China and India, perhaps an outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Based on the average tone of events, the findings suggest a consistent realignment of the world’s top economies in their foreign relations concerning India and China, especially after 2018.

Related Content

Gautam Bambawale, Tanvi Madan

November 1, 2023

Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, Emilie Kimball

July 20, 2020

C. Raja Mohan, Garima Mohan, Tanvi Madan

December 27, 2023

Media & Journalism

Governance Studies

Center for Technology Innovation

Mireya Solís, Mathieu Duchâtel

June 3, 2024

Joshua P. Meltzer

May 21, 2024

Caitlin Welsh, Jude Blanchette, Lily McElwee, Jude Blanchette, Ryan Hass, Ryan McElveen

May 7, 2024

• Macroeconomic Policy, Trade & Competetiveness
• Sub-national Economy
• Health and Human Development
• Financial Sector and Development
• Governance & Institutions
• Fiscal Governance and Architecture
• Climate Change
• Minerals & Mining
• Coal, Oil & Gas
• Electricity
• Renewable Energy & CleanTech
• Future of Energy
• Access & Social Contract
• Regulations, Reforms & Pricing
• Carbon Tracker
• Regional Connectivity (Sambandh)
• Foreign Policy & Strategy
• Security & Defence
• European Union
• Democracy & Multilateralism
• Working Papers
• Impact Papers
• Executive Policy Briefs
• Discussion Papers
• Technical Papers
• Opinion & Commentary
• Books & Chapters
• Journals and Other Publications
• All Publications
• Researchers
• Communication & Development
• Administration & Finance
• Staff Directory
• Upcoming Events
• Past Events
• Conferences
• External Engagements
• In Dialogue Video
• Mining Matters
• Union Budget Reflections
• Founder Circle & Friends
• Funding & Support
• Board of Directors
• Annual Report & Financials
• Current Openings
• Internships
• Press Releases
• CSEP Annual Report 2021
• Digital Version

Studying international relations in India

Editor's note.

This is a transcript of the Keynote Address delivered by Amp. Shivshankar Menon, Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings India at the All-India International and Area Studies Convention 2019 at Jawaharlal Nehru University on January 30, 2019.

Thank you for asking me to the All India International and Area Studies Convention 2019. You have chosen an ambitious topic: “Ascending India: Reflections on Global and Regional Dimensions” and have a packed agenda in the next three days.

I must confess to being a bit surprised at being asked to speak to this convention, and to be given the honour of a keynote address. The last time I was asked to the convention in 2013, I spoke in some detail about what I thought was wrong with IR studies in India. I spoke about the disconnect between theory and practice, about the apparent irrelevance and over-reliance on methodology and theory to the exclusion of fine work that could be done in the archives, and about what I saw as the absence of quality in Indian IR studies. I will not repeat what I said then as it lives forever on the web and you can google it if you are interested. But you can see why I am surprised to be asked back.

When I spoke then in 2013 it was as a practitioner, as someone who was involved in actual diplomacy and international relations and could therefore be expected to be impatient with theory and would look for practical utility. Today I am on the other side, as I try to teach a course on geopolitics in a university and write and lecture, older but not necessarily wiser, closer and closer to my anecdotage.

So what do I think today about IR studies? What have I learnt? Have I changed my opinion? Not fundamentally.  My views have evolved, as I have, in three important respects: I think I have a better understanding of the constraints on IR studies in India; I now think the problem is with how we teach IR; and, I am much more hopeful of IR studies on India than ever before. Let me explain.

I now have a better appreciation of the constraints under which IR studies operate in India. One of the most obvious is the lack of proper archiving of contemporary Indian primary sources which, by the nature of our subject, are primarily with and from government. And the more interesting, or controversial the issue, the less likely government is to transfer its papers to the archives. But that situation changed in fits and starts in this century and there are treasures to be discovered in the National Archives today, and not just in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Besides, as recent scholars have shown, there are treasures to be mined in state archives, in private papers, and in Russian and other archives abroad, all relevant to the study of India’s international relations. One recent example was the use of the Assam state government archives by a French scholar to write on development on both sides of the Arunachal Pradesh border in the fifties and early sixties.

Secondly, I still believe that there is a lack of rigour and discipline in our IR studies that results in a situation where, with a few exceptions, the best work on India and the subcontinent is done by scholars, many of them Indians, outside our institutions. Let me give you a practical example of why I say so. In the last few years, I have received questionnaires from PhD scholars researching one or other aspect of recent Indian foreign policy. It is obvious from the questions that they have been drafted without reading through the available literature, and that they are not part of a thought out or academically rigorous scheme or plan. Instead, they are more in the nature of fishing expeditions, based on a reading of the newspapers, seeking opinions rather than data or facts, and claiming theoretical or methodological merit by using the latest fashionable jargon in IR studies elsewhere. I find this sad because, frankly, it reflects primarily on the quality of the guidance that they are getting, not on the students themselves, who are bright, motivated and first rate.

There are honourable exceptions, as I said. But they are few and far between, and that is why conventions such as this are so necessary and important. This is a chance for us to introspect and to see how we can improve the quality of our understanding and teaching of our subject.

Thirdly, that situation may be changing. For some years before and after independence, there was a body of Indian scholarship, much of it centred in the School for International Studies that has now become a part of JNU which contributed to global IR scholarship and that could hold its head up in the academic world. Today again, the work of younger Indian IR scholars is what we turn to if we wish to understand Indian foreign policy and the international relations of India and the subcontinent. We now have a new generation of younger scholars whose PhDs on India and the subcontinent are both methodologically sound and pioneering. Most of them are products of today’s globalised world, and not many trained in Indian institutions, but they have brought their scholarship home and they could represent the beginning of a new wave of Indian IR.

Our goal should be to build Indian IR studies to a level where it measures up to international standards in the discipline. This is the minimum, the first step. If we are to study international relations we must be able to stand the quality test and be world class. This is essential if we are to achieve our real purpose, to devise the concepts and scholarship necessary for an understanding of India’s unique place and role in the world. In other words, ultimately to devise an Indian school of IR studies.

Our goal should be to build Indian IR studies to a level where it measures up to international standards in the discipline.

I find, now that I am teaching and traveling around universities, that my Indian students know a great deal about abstract IR theory, but do not see how it is connected to the life and the headlines around them. It is the reverse when I go to universities abroad. I think we forget when we teach that IR theory, like all theory in the liberal arts, is the product of a very specific, European or American, time and place, and an intellectual expression of a certain economic and political dominance. In the real world that we study, that situation of European or North American hegemony is rapidly changing. If IR theory is to be relevant to us in India, it will need to adapt and change too.

Today we can see that the world which created IR theory as we know it now is rapidly fading. The center of gravity of the world economy and politics is returning to Asia. And that why it is time for us to think afresh and for ourselves again about India and its place in the world. Relevance is critical. What scholars produce in IR studies must be relevant to reality and practice. We are not a fundamental science like theoretical physics. We are not studying the fundamental laws of the universe but how people and their creations behave in international society, which itself is a man-made construct. IR is a social science and its best practitioners, from EH Carr to Robert Jervis to Mearsheimer and Walt all speak to the policy dilemmas and practice of states, leaders and nations of their day.

One other point. Language is not just a tool but the tool. It not only affects your ability to communicate your ideas, and your clarity, but affects the way you think. Many of us seem to think that to be regarded as intelligent we should also be unintelligible. The use of abstract nouns leaves us wondering what is meant.

Language is not just a tool but the tool. It not only affects your ability to communicate your ideas, and your clarity, but affects the way you think. Many of us seem to think that to be regarded as intelligent we should also be unintelligible. The use of abstract nouns leaves us wondering what is meant.

If we are going to use terms like “Ascending India” then we should first have the means to think about them. Understand that implicit in terms like “Ascending India” are ideas of hierarchy and perception, both of which are hardly defined or measurable by agreed metrics or standard. This, in the popular mind, reduces IR to some macho contest between states, nations or leaders of who can throw a shot or missile furthest or can do the most damage to our planet and people.

India is and has been an important player on the world stage with its own interests and will continue to be so. And yet, the purpose of our participation in the international community is not to see how many people we can outdo or do down. It is to uplift our own people, to improve their condition from the abject state that we were left in after two centuries of colonialism. That is not achieved at someone else expense. Instead, it requires us to work with others in international society to achieve and enabling environment for India’s transformation. To my mind Indian IR studies have a significant contribution to make to that goal.

I have taken a great deal of your time telling you what you probably already know. Thank you for your patience.

With these few words, let me wish the convention and all those participating in it success in taking Indian IR studies another step forward.

Shivshankar Menon

A Chain that Links us All

US Campus Crises: Are America and a Fragile World Order at Risk of Coming Apart?

All Powers Great and Small: Why Bigger Isn’t Always Better in Geopolitics

Comments are closed.

Find on this page

The Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) is an independent, public policy think tank with a mandate to conduct research and analysis on critical issues facing India and the world and help shape policies that advance sustainable growth and development.

Sign up for the CSEP newsletter