antithesis definition sociology

• Anatomy & Physiology
• Astrophysics
• Earth Science
• Environmental Science
• Organic Chemistry
• Precalculus
• Trigonometry
• English Grammar
• U.S. History
• World History

... and beyond

• Socratic Meta
• Featured Answers

What are thesis, antithesis, synthesis? In what ways are they related to Marx?

• Ask LitCharts AI
• Discussion Question Generator
• Essay Prompt Generator
• Quiz Question Generator

• Literature Guides
• Poetry Guides
• Shakespeare Translations
• Literary Terms

Antithesis Definition

What is antithesis? Here’s a quick and simple definition:

Antithesis is a figure of speech that juxtaposes two contrasting or opposing ideas, usually within parallel grammatical structures. For instance, Neil Armstrong used antithesis when he stepped onto the surface of the moon in 1969 and said, "That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind." This is an example of antithesis because the two halves of the sentence mirror each other in grammatical structure, while together the two halves emphasize the incredible contrast between the individual experience of taking an ordinary step, and the extraordinary progress that Armstrong's step symbolized for the human race.

Some additional key details about antithesis:

• Antithesis works best when it is used in conjunction with parallelism (successive phrases that use the same grammatical structure), since the repetition of structure makes the contrast of the content of the phrases as clear as possible.
• The word "antithesis" has another meaning, which is to describe something as being the opposite of another thing. For example, "love is the antithesis of selfishness." This guide focuses only on antithesis as a literary device.
• The word antithesis has its origins in the Greek word antithenai , meaning "to oppose." The plural of antithesis is antitheses.

How to Pronounce Antithesis

Here's how to pronounce antithesis: an- tith -uh-sis

Antithesis and Parallelism

Often, but not always, antithesis works in tandem with parallelism . In parallelism, two components of a sentence (or pair of sentences) mirror one another by repeating grammatical elements. The following is a good example of both antithesis and parallelism:

To err is human , to forgive divine .

The two clauses of the sentence are parallel because each starts off with an infinitive verb and ends with an adjective ("human" and "divine"). The mirroring of these elements then works to emphasize the contrast in their content, particularly in the very strong opposite contrast between "human" and "divine."

Antithesis Without Parallelism

In most cases, antitheses involve parallel elements of the sentence—whether a pair of nouns, verbs, adjectives, or other grammar elements. However, it is also possible to have antithesis without such clear cut parallelism. In the Temptations Song "My Girl," the singer uses antithesis when he says:

"When it's cold outside , I've got the month of May ."

Here the sentence is clearly cut into two clauses on either side of the comma, and the contrasting elements are clear enough. However, strictly speaking there isn't true parallelism here because "cold outside" and "month of May" are different types of grammatical structures (an adjective phrase and a noun phrase, respectively).

Antithesis vs. Related Terms

Three literary terms that are often mistakenly used in the place of antithesis are juxtaposition , oxymoron , and foil . Each of these three terms does have to do with establishing a relationship of difference between two ideas or characters in a text, but beyond that there are significant differences between them.

Antithesis vs. Juxtaposition

In juxtaposition , two things or ideas are placed next to one another to draw attention to their differences or similarities. In juxtaposition, the pairing of two ideas is therefore not necessarily done to create a relationship of opposition or contradiction between them, as is the case with antithesis. So, while antithesis could be a type of juxtaposition, juxtaposition is not always antithesis.

Antithesis vs. Oxymoron

In an oxymoron , two seemingly contradictory words are placed together because their unlikely combination reveals a deeper truth. Some examples of oxymorons include:

• Sweet sorrow
• Cruel kindness
• Living dead

The focus of antithesis is opposites rather than contradictions . While the words involved in oxymorons seem like they don't belong together (until you give them deeper thought), the words or ideas of antithesis do feel like they belong together even as they contrast as opposites. Further, antitheses seldom function by placing the two words or ideas right next to one another, so antitheses are usually made up of more than two words (as in, "I'd rather be among the living than among the dead").

Antithesis vs. Foil

Some Internet sources use "antithesis" to describe an author's decision to create two characters in a story that are direct opposites of one another—for instance, the protagonist and antagonist . But the correct term for this kind of opposition is a foil : a person or thing in a work of literature that contrasts with another thing in order to call attention to its qualities. While the sentence "the hare was fast, and the tortoise was slow" is an example of antithesis, if we step back and look at the story as a whole, the better term to describe the relationship between the characters of the tortoise and the hare is "foil," as in, "The character of the hare is a foil of the tortoise."

Antithesis Examples

Antithesis in literature.

Below are examples of antithesis from some of English literature's most acclaimed writers — and a comic book!

Antithesis in Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities

In the famous opening lines of A Tale of Two Cities , Dickens sets out a flowing list of antitheses punctuated by the repetition of the word "it was" at the beginning of each clause (which is itself an example of the figure of speech anaphora ). By building up this list of contrasts, Dickens sets the scene of the French Revolution that will serve as the setting of his tale by emphasizing the division and confusion of the era. The overwhelming accumulation of antitheses is also purposefully overdone; Dickens is using hyperbole to make fun of the "noisiest authorities" of the day and their exaggerated claims. The passage contains many examples of antithesis, each consisting of one pair of contrasting ideas that we've highlighted to make the structure clearer.

It was the best of times , it was the worst of times , it was the age of wisdom , it was the age of foolishness , it was the epoch of belief , it was the epoch of incredulity , it was the season of Light , it was the season of Darkness , it was the spring of hope , it was the winter of despair , we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven , we were all going direct the other way —in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.

Antithesis in John Milton's Paradise Lost

In this verse from Paradise Lost , Milton's anti-hero , Satan, claims he's happier as the king of Hell than he could ever have been as a servant in Heaven. He justifies his rebellion against God with this pithy phrase, and the antithesis drives home the double contrast between Hell and Heaven, and between ruling and serving.

Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.

Antithesis in William Shakespeare's Othello

As the plot of Othello nears its climax , the antagonist of the play, Iago, pauses for a moment to acknowledge the significance of what is about to happen. Iago uses antithesis to contrast the two opposite potential outcomes of his villainous plot: either events will transpire in Iago's favor and he will come out on top, or his treachery will be discovered, ruining him.

This is the night That either makes me or fordoes me quite .

In this passage, the simple word "either" functions as a cue for the reader to expect some form of parallelism, because the "either" signals that a contrast between two things is coming.

Antithesis in William Shakespeare's Hamlet

Shakespeare's plays are full of antithesis, and so is Hamlet's most well-known "To be or not to be" soliloquy . This excerpt of the soliloquy is a good example of an antithesis that is not limited to a single word or short phrase. The first instance of antithesis here, where Hamlet announces the guiding question (" to be or not to be ") is followed by an elaboration of each idea ("to be" and "not to be") into metaphors that then form their own antithesis. Both instances of antithesis hinge on an " or " that divides the two contrasting options.

To be or not to be , that is the question: Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, And by opposing end them ...

Antithesis in T.S. Eliot's "Four Quartets"

In this excerpt from his poem "Four Quartets," T.S. Eliot uses antithesis to describe the cycle of life, which is continuously passing from beginning to end, from rise to fall, and from old to new.

In my beginning is my end . In succession Houses rise and fall , crumble, are extended, Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place Is an open field, or a factory, or a by-pass. Old stone to new building , old timber to new fires ...

Antithesis in Green Lantern's Oath

Comic book writers know the power of antithesis too! In this catchy oath, Green Lantern uses antithesis to emphasize that his mission to defeat evil will endure no matter the conditions.

In brightest day , in blackest night , No evil shall escape my sight. Let those who worship evil's might Beware my power—Green lantern's light!

While most instances of antithesis are built around an "or" that signals the contrast between the two parts of the sentence, the Green Lantern oath works a bit differently. It's built around an implied "and" (to be technical, that first line of the oath is an asyndeton that replaces the "and" with a comma), because members of the Green Lantern corps are expressing their willingness to fight evil in all places, even very opposite environments.

Antithesis in Speeches

Many well-known speeches contain examples of antithesis. Speakers use antithesis to drive home the stakes of what they are saying, sometimes by contrasting two distinct visions of the future.

Antithesis in Patrick Henry's Speech to the Second Virginia Convention, 1775

This speech by famous American patriot Patrick Henry includes one of the most memorable and oft-quoted phrases from the era of the American Revolution. Here, Henry uses antithesis to emphasize just how highly he prizes liberty, and how deadly serious he is about his fight to achieve it.

Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take: but as for me, give me liberty or give me death .

Antithesis in Martin Luther King Jr.'s Oberlin Commencement Address

In this speech by one of America's most well-known orators, antithesis allows Martin Luther King Jr. to highlight the contrast between two visions of the future; in the first vision, humans rise above their differences to cooperate with one another, while in the other humanity is doomed by infighting and division.

We must all learn to live together as brothers —or we will all perish together as fools .

Antithesis in Songs

In songs, contrasting two opposite ideas using antithesis can heighten the dramatic tension of a difficult decision, or express the singer's intense emotion—but whatever the context, antithesis is a useful tool for songwriters mainly because opposites are always easy to remember, so lyrics that use antithesis tend to stick in the head.

Antithesis in "Should I Stay or Should I Go" by The Clash (1981)

In this song by The Clash, the speaker is caught at a crossroads between two choices, and antithesis serves as the perfect tool to express just how confused and conflicted he is. The rhetorical question —whether to stay or to go—presents two opposing options, and the contrast between his lover's mood from one day (when everything is "fine") to the next (when it's all "black") explains the difficulty of his choice.

One day it's fine and next it's black So if you want me off your back Well, come on and let me know Should I stay or should I go ? Should I stay or should I go now? Should I stay or should I go now? If I go, there will be trouble If I stay it will be double ...

Antithesis in "My Girl" by the Temptations (1965)

In this song, the singer uses a pair of metaphors to describe the feeling of joy that his lover brings him. This joy is expressed through antithesis, since the singer uses the miserable weather of a cloudy, cold day as the setting for the sunshine-filled month of May that "his girl" makes him feel inside, emphasizing the power of his emotions by contrasting them with the bleak weather.

I've got sunshine on a cloudy day When it's cold outside I've got the month of May Well I guess you'd say, What can make me feel this way? My girl, my girl, my girl Talkin' bout my girl.

Why Do Writers Use Antithesis?

Fundamentally, writers of all types use antithesis for its ability to create a clear contrast. This contrast can serve a number of purposes, as shown in the examples above. It can:

• Present a stark choice between two alternatives.
• Convey magnitude or range (i.e. "in brightest day, in darkest night" or "from the highest mountain, to the deepest valley").
• Express strong emotions.
• Create a relationship of opposition between two separate ideas.
• Accentuate the qualities and characteristics of one thing by placing it in opposition to another.

Whatever the case, antithesis almost always has the added benefit of making language more memorable to listeners and readers. The use of parallelism and other simple grammatical constructions like "either/or" help to establish opposition between concepts—and opposites have a way of sticking in the memory.

Other Helpful Antithesis Resources

• The Wikipedia page on Antithesis : A useful summary with associated examples, along with an extensive account of antithesis in the Gospel of Matthew.
• Sound bites from history : A list of examples of antithesis in famous political speeches from United States history — with audio clips!
• A blog post on antithesis : This quick rundown of antithesis focuses on a quote you may know from Muhammad Ali's philosophy of boxing: "Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee."

• Climax (Figure of Speech)
• Figure of Speech
• Juxtaposition
• Parallelism
• Protagonist
• Rhetorical Question
• Stream of Consciousness
• Anadiplosis
• Antanaclasis
• Dramatic Irony
• Climax (Plot)
• End-Stopped Line
• Red Herring
• Verbal Irony
• Personification
• Static Character
• Anthropomorphism
• Bildungsroman
• Dynamic Character
• Alliteration

• Quizzes, saving guides, requests, plus so much more.

• More from M-W
• To save this word, you'll need to log in. Log In

Definition of antithesis

Did you know.

Writers and speechmakers use the traditional pattern known as antithesis for its resounding effect; John Kennedy's famous "ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country" is an example. But antithesis normally means simply "opposite". Thus, war is the antithesis of peace, wealth is the antithesis of poverty, and love is the antithesis of hate. Holding two antithetical ideas in one's head at the same time—for example, that you're the sole master of your fate but also the helpless victim of your terrible upbringing—is so common as to be almost normal.

Examples of antithesis in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'antithesis.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

Late Latin, from Greek, literally, opposition, from antitithenai to oppose, from anti- + tithenai to set — more at do

1529, in the meaning defined at sense 1b(1)

Dictionary Entries Near antithesis

anti-theoretical

Cite this Entry

“Antithesis.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/antithesis. Accessed 19 Aug. 2024.

Kids Definition

Kids definition of antithesis, more from merriam-webster on antithesis.

Nglish: Translation of antithesis for Spanish Speakers

Britannica English: Translation of antithesis for Arabic Speakers

Britannica.com: Encyclopedia article about antithesis

Subscribe to America's largest dictionary and get thousands more definitions and advanced search—ad free!

Can you solve 4 words at once?

Word of the day.

See Definitions and Examples »

Get Word of the Day daily email!

Popular in Grammar & Usage

Plural and possessive names: a guide, 31 useful rhetorical devices, more commonly misspelled words, absent letters that are heard anyway, how to use accents and diacritical marks, popular in wordplay, 8 words for lesser-known musical instruments, it's a scorcher words for the summer heat, 7 shakespearean insults to make life more interesting, 10 words from taylor swift songs (merriam's version), 9 superb owl words, games & quizzes.

• Scholarly Community Encyclopedia
• Log in/Sign up

Video Upload Options

• MDPI and ACS Style
• Chicago Style

In philosophy, the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese; originally: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis) is a progression of three ideas or propositions. The first idea, the thesis, is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis, that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis, resolves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. It is often used to explain the dialectical method of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but Hegel never used the terms himself; instead his triad was concrete, abstract, absolute. The thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad actually originated with Johann Fichte.

1. History of the Idea

Thomas McFarland (2002), in his Prolegomena to Coleridge's Opus Maximum , [ 1 ] identifies Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as the genesis of the thesis/antithesis dyad. Kant concretises his ideas into:

• Thesis: "The world has a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space."
• Antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space."

Inasmuch as conjectures like these can be said to be resolvable, Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations of the Science of Knowledge , 1794) resolved Kant's dyad by synthesis, posing the question thus: [ 1 ]

• No synthesis is possible without a preceding antithesis. As little as antithesis without synthesis, or synthesis without antithesis, is possible; just as little possible are both without thesis.

Fichte employed the triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" as a formula for the explanation of change. [ 2 ] Fichte was the first to use the trilogy of words together, [ 3 ] in his Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (1795, Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty ): "Die jetzt aufgezeigte Handlung ist thetisch, antithetisch und synthetisch zugleich." ["The action here described is simultaneously thetic, antithetic, and synthetic." [ 4 ] ]

Still according to McFarland, Schelling then, in his Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), arranged the terms schematically in pyramidal form.

According to Walter Kaufmann (1966), although the triad is often thought to form part of an analysis of historical and philosophical progress called the Hegelian dialectic, the assumption is erroneous: [ 5 ]

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Gustav E. Mueller (1958) concurs that Hegel was not a proponent of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and clarifies what the concept of dialectic might have meant in Hegel's thought. [ 6 ]

"Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".

According to Mueller, the attribution of this tripartite dialectic to Hegel is the result of "inept reading" and simplistic translations which do not take into account the genesis of Hegel's terms:

Hegel's greatness is as indisputable as his obscurity. The matter is due to his peculiar terminology and style; they are undoubtedly involved and complicated, and seem excessively abstract. These linguistic troubles, in turn, have given rise to legends which are like perverse and magic spectacles – once you wear them, the text simply vanishes. Theodor Haering's monumental and standard work has for the first time cleared up the linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved – though it was complete when he began to publish. Hegel's contemporaries were immediately baffled, because what was clear to him was not clear to his readers, who were not initiated into the genesis of his terms. An example of how a legend can grow on inept reading is this: Translate "Begriff" by "concept," "Vernunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science" – and they are all good dictionary translations – and you have transformed the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd pan-logistic rationalism and scientism. The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." [ 7 ]

Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) adopted and extended the triad, especially in Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). Here, in Chapter 2, Marx is obsessed by the word "thesis"; [ 8 ] it forms an important part of the basis for the Marxist theory of history. [ 9 ]

2. Writing Pedagogy

In modern times, the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been implemented across the world as a strategy for organizing expositional writing. For example, this technique is taught as a basic organizing principle in French schools: [ 10 ]

The French learn to value and practice eloquence from a young age. Almost from day one, students are taught to produce plans for their compositions, and are graded on them. The structures change with fashions. Youngsters were once taught to express a progression of ideas. Now they follow a dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. If you listen carefully to the French arguing about any topic they all follow this model closely: they present an idea, explain possible objections to it, and then sum up their conclusions. ... This analytical mode of reasoning is integrated into the entire school corpus.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis has also been used as a basic scheme to organize writing in the English language. For example, the website WikiPreMed.com advocates the use of this scheme in writing timed essays for the MCAT standardized test: [ 11 ]

For the purposes of writing MCAT essays, the dialectic describes the progression of ideas in a critical thought process that is the force driving your argument. A good dialectical progression propels your arguments in a way that is satisfying to the reader. The thesis is an intellectual proposition. The antithesis is a critical perspective on the thesis. The synthesis solves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis by reconciling their common truths, and forming a new proposition.

• Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Opus Maximum. Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 89.
• Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History. Greenwood Publishing Group (1986), p.114
• Williams, Robert R. (1992). Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. SUNY Press. p. 46, note 37. 
• Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Breazeale, Daniel (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. p. 249. 
• Walter Kaufmann (1966). "§ 37". Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-268-01068-3. OCLC 3168016. https://archive.org/details/hegelreinterpret00kauf. 
• Mueller, Gustav (1958). "The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (4): 411–414. doi:10.2307/2708045.  https://dx.doi.org/10.2307%2F2708045
• Mueller 1958, p. 411.
• marxists.org: Chapter 2 of "The Poverty of Philosophy", by Karl Marx https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm
• Shrimp, Kaleb (2009). "The Validity of Karl Marx's Theory of Historical Materialism". Major Themes in Economics 11 (1): 35–56. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol11/iss1/5/. Retrieved 13 September 2018. 
• Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French. Sourcebooks, Inc.. p. 62. https://archive.org/details/sixtymillionfren00nade_041. 
• "The MCAT writing assignment.". Wisebridge Learning Systems, LLC. http://www.wikipremed.com/mcat_essay.php. Retrieved 1 November 2015. 

• Terms and Conditions
• Privacy Policy
• Advisory Board

How to Build Argument with Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis in an Argumentative Essay

• All writings
• Formatting styles
• Theacademicpapers insights
• General guides
• How to write
• Scholarships
• Translations

Publication date:

Modification date: 31, Jul. 2024

An argumentative essay requires writers to evaluate a specific topic, gather and assess the evidence, evaluate counter-arguments, and prove the thesis. It requires thoroughly researched and accurate information as evidence. You can structure an argumentative essay using thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to maintain coherence and fulfil the purpose of the writing. 

In this article, we will explore how the B.C. Georg Hegel’s dialects can help you build a coherent argument through the essay. Remember, Hegel never mentioned these terms himself; instead, he used the triad concrete, abstract, and absolute. We will also discuss where to discuss the thesis and where the antithesis will take over the scene. How can synthesis give you a way forward between supportive and counter-argument? 

Note: The most important factor of an argumentative essay is the coherence of the opinion so the reader can easily understand the objective and whether they meet the expectations. 

What is An Argumentative Essay?

Purdue University’s online writing lab defines an argumentative essay as “ a genre of writing that requires the student to investigate a topic, collect, generate, and evaluate evidence, and establish a concise position on the subject. ” 

What Are Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis in Structuring an Argumentative Essay?

Associated with the philosophy of history, these dialects are progressions or adpositions of three arguments. The first and foremost idea is a thesis, a formal statement making a point. The thesis is followed by an antithesis or, you can say, a counter idea as it neglects and opposes the ideas presented by the thesis. Then comes the reconciler, the synthesis, which settles the disagreement between the thesis and antithesis. These concepts are similar to Toulmin's model of argumentation, which has six components overall, but the major ones are claim, counterclaim, and rebuttal. The claim acts as the thesis, the counterclaim acts as the antithesis, and the rebuttal acts as the synthesis. 

Structure Argument With Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis.

Hey, champ, you have opted for a challenging task, but don’t stress. We have compiled this guide to help you write a winning argument essay. Let’s start with the introduction first. 

Introduction

To write an introduction to your argumentative essay, the standard structure remains the same as that of other essays. You first start with a hook line to engage the reader. Then, you need to present the background information on the topic to familiarise the reader. While presenting the background information, make sure you do not go into the nitty-gritty of the background history; keep it concise and to the point. 

Now, state the main part of the introduction, the part for which you have hooked the reader, and describe the background information: your thesis statement. 

Let’s discuss the first component of Hegel’s dialects now. 

Thesis/ Thesis Statement 

Now, once you have hooked the reader to read your essay and provided them with background information, your next task is to present your thesis. Your thesis statement is actually your perspective of the topic or something you believe is true, based on evidence. You make a point within the scope of the subject and defend it.  

Basically, the argument while writing your essay starts here and continues until the end. Make sure to state your thesis clearly and avoid being overly stylish in your writing. Remember, your thesis statement will hold your entire essay, so you need to give it special consideration while formulating it. If your thesis statement fails to impress the reader, they might not read it entirely. 

Pro Tip: To make your thesis impressive and spark the reader's interest in your thesis, antithesis, and synthesis essay , try to keep the topic controversial. This will be unexpected for the reader, which might trigger his/her interest in reading the entire essay and seeing where the argument goes. 

Evidence in Support of Your Thesis

Remember, when you claim something, you need to prove it (don’t take it personally; your opinion is still respected). That’s how arguments work, and it’s the perfect time to provide supporting evidence to strengthen your argument made in the thesis statement. That’s why it is important to gather all the data, supporting and opposing arguments, and evidence. 

While presenting the evidence of your thesis, make sure you have gathered the data from reliable sources only. Reliable sources might include books, journals, and library resources (might be physical or digital). Now, provide the evidence and arguments supporting your thesis and prove how you think it’s true and legitimate. 

Once you provide the evidence, your work is not done with this section. You still need to provide sources (readers are not your friends; they need solid proof). Make sure to add citations on the references page along with writing each section; this will ensure you don’t forget to add citations at the end. 

Antithesis/ Counter-Arguments 

That’s the second stage of your essay, and it's more difficult (don’t worry, it's not that difficult if you have control over your nerves). It's just you have to be critical of your own thesis and present the antithesis with evidence. While writing the antithesis, act truly against the thesis and provide the opposing arguments with full commitment. 

Presenting the antithesis and opposing arguments to your thesis will build your reputation as a credible researcher. Who are not subtle or have a fixed mindset to stick with their opinions and not consider other perspectives. 

Antithesis will also fulfil the purpose of an argumentative essay, which requires the writer to provide different points of view and prove one perspective right. B.C. Georg Hegel, with his thesis, antithesis, and synthesis dialects, has made it easier to structure an argumentative essay. 

Evidence in Support of Antithesis

Hell yeah, you are bound to! As with the thesis, you must provide evidence of your arguments supporting the antithesis. As you have done for the thesis section, you must also ensure the reliability of the sources you are citing. The reason we emphasise the credibility of the sources is you might encounter rather you are bound to encounter to be guilty of plagiarism (intentional or unintentional).

As we mentioned before, make sure to formulate the references page and cite the sources along with the writing process. If you miss any of the sources (for any reason, such as a shortage of time), you will be charged with plagiarism, which might result in termination or can be considered a legal offence in some countries. 

Synthesis/ Your verdict 

Here comes the reconciler of the town, the synthesis; its role is to break the blockhole and suggest a way forward. Have you ever seen a political or other debate in society? It literally never ends; arguments keep coming from both sides. Then, a respected person in the society ends the debate with some wise words or a way forward. Synthesis can be considered a respected person of the society. 

The synthesis suggests avoiding extreme perspectives and suggesting a middle point of view that respects both opposing arguments. It basically takes their common perspectives/truths and forms a new preposition that attracts both supporting and opposing points of view (of course, with evidence). It’s like you are providing your verdict to solve the conflict. 

Note: Add the citations to the references page to avoid ambiguity later. If that’s not your cup of tea, you can also buy an essay online .

Conclusion 

To write a perfect conclusion to the essay, you need to summarise the argument and points made on all sides (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis). Also, reinstate the evidence you provided and explain how the synthesis resolved the conflict between the two perspectives. 

Pro Tip: If you make the above-mentioned scenario of a debate in your mind, this will help you be neutral while presenting the counter-argument or antithesis. 

To end the conclusion section, provide the reader with something to take home (not literally). Add some intriguing question or state a fact that sticks to the reader’s mind, and one can’t stop thinking about it. This will fulfil the purpose of your writing; otherwise, the examiners read plenty of essays daily, and it will be difficult for you to impress them in that crowd. To stand out, you need to be different. 

What Are Thesis and Antithesis in an Argumentative Essay?

In a nutshell, the thesis is the main idea/point of the essay, while the antithesis is the counterargument or opposing idea of the argumentative essay. Generally, the thesis remains the major theme of the essay, which sets the basis of the writing, while the antithesis is an opposition to your stand but a strong one. 

What Is the Cycle of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis?

Hegel’s insight into the cycle suggests a thesis statement is the starting point of the argument. The antithesis is the opposite/conflicting reaction to it. In contrast, the synthesis is the result of opposing arguments. He believes “ everything is made out of contradictions . ” 

Here is the visual representation of the cycle of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. 

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis Are Associated with Which Theory in Sociology?

In the 19th century, German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel was well known for his system of inquiry. He inquired about many philosophies in the field of the nature of reality. This system of inquiring about the nature of reality is known as dialectic. The notions that form historical movements become a cause of conflicting opposites. 

Hegel divided his thoughts into three components: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Therefore, we can say that thesis, antithesis and synthesis are associated with the philosophy of history . It is also a fact that Hegel never used these terms himself. That’s why thesis, antithesis and synthesis are often associated with Johann Fichte.

Final Thoughts

To summarise the discussion, we have discussed what an argumentative essay is and Hegel’s dialects of argument: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Later, we gave you a step-by-step strategy for structuring your argumentative essay using these concepts. 

In this article, we have tried to help you build your argument without the technical jargon in simple conversation. We have also provided some pro tips and additional notes to streamline your writing process for an argumentative essay. If you find this article helpful, make sure to share it with your friends and fellows so they can also understand the concept of using thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in an argumentative essay. 

As you know, writing a perfect argumentative essay with these concepts can be tricky if you are trying for the first time. So, The Academic Papers UK has compiled this guide to assist you in this case.

Degree: PhD

(5.0) Rating

Ready to elevate your essay game? Let our experts do the heavy lifting!

Total Orders:

Success Rate:

Get Help with Your Essay , Spend Your Time Wisely.

Attention all students.

Welcome! Get 20% discount right away!

Do not forget your special offer! USE CODE TAPUKFIRST20

Get 20% cut off from the price

You Might Also Like

Post By : On

Publication date: Aug 13, 2024

How to Write a Tentative Thesis Statement - The Ultimate Guide for 2024-25

Publication date: Aug 9, 2024

8 Mistakes to Avoid When Using Secondary Data Collection in Your Research

Publication date: Aug 6, 2024

10 Primary Data Collection Methods Every Researcher Should Know | Examples Included

Literature Review Survival Library Guide: Thesis, antithesis and synthesis

• What is a literature review?
• Thesis, antithesis and synthesis
• 1. Choose your topic
• 2. Collect relevant material
• 3. Read/Skim articles
• 4. Group articles by themes
• 5. Use citation databases
• 6. Find agreement & disagreement
• Review Articles - A new option on Google Scholar
• How To Follow References
• Newspaper archives
• Aditi's Humanities Referencing Style Guide
• Referencing and RefWorks
• New-version RefWorks Demo
• Tracking Your Academic Footprint This link opens in a new window
• Finding Seminal Authors and Mapping the Shape of the Literature
• Types of Literature Review, including "Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: A Practical Guide"
• Research Data Management
• Tamzyn Suleiman's guide to Systematic Reviews
• Danielle Abrahamse's Search String Design and Search Template

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

The classic pattern of academic arguments is:

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

An Idea (Thesis) is proposed, an opposing Idea (Antithesis) is proposed, and a revised Idea incorporating (Synthesis) the opposing Idea is arrived at. This revised idea sometimes sparks another opposing idea, another synthesis, and so on…

If you can show this pattern at work in your literature review, and, above all, if you can suggest a new synthesis of two opposing views, or demolish one of the opposing views, then you are almost certainly on the right track.

Next topic: Step 1: Choose your topic

• << Previous: What is a literature review?
• Next: 1. Choose your topic >>
• Last Updated: Apr 2, 2024 12:22 PM
• URL: https://libguides.lib.uct.ac.za/litreviewsurvival

What is Antithesis? Definition, Examples of Antitheses in Writing

Home » The Writer’s Dictionary » What is Antithesis? Definition, Examples of Antitheses in Writing

Antithesis definition: Antithesis is a literary and rhetorical device where two seemingly contrasting ideas are expressed through parallel structure.

What is Antithesis?

What does antithesis mean? An antithesis is just that—an “anti” “thesis.” An antithesis is used in writing to express ideas that seem contradictory.

An antithesis uses parallel structure of two ideas to communicate this contradiction.

Example of Antithesis:

• “Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.” –Muhammad Ali

First, the structure is parallel. Each “side” of the phrase has the same number of words and the same structure. Each uses a verb followed by a simile.

Second, the contracting elements of a butterfly and a bee seem contradictory. That is, a butterfly is light and airy while a bee is sharp and stinging. One person (a boxer, in this case) should not be able to possess these two qualities—this is why this is an antithesis.

However, Ali is trying to express how a boxer must be light on his feet yet quick with his fist.

Modern Examples of Antithesis

• “That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.”

Through parallel structure, this quotation presents an antithesis. It seems contradictory that one action could be a “small step” and a “giant leap.”

However, this contradiction proposes that the action of landing on the moon might have just been a small physical step for the man Neil Armstrong, but it was a giant leap for the progress of mankind.

The Function of Antithesis

An antithesis stands out in writing. Because it uses parallel structure, an antithesis physically stands out when interspersed among other syntactical structures. Furthermore, an antithesis presents contrasting ideas that cause the reader or audience to pause and consider the meaning and purpose.

Oftentimes, the meaning of an antithesis is not overtly clear. That is, a reader or audience must evaluate the statement to navigate the meaning.

Writers utilize antitheses very sparingly. Since its purpose is to cause an audience to pause and consider the argument, it must be used with purpose and intent.

Antithesis Example from Literature

• “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity…”

From the beginning, Dickens presents two contradictory ideas in this antithesis.

How can it be the “best” and the “worst” of times? These two “times” should not be able to coexist.

Similarly, how can the setting of this novel also take place during an “age of wisdom” and an “age of foolishness?”

The antithesis continues.

Dickens opens his with these lines to set the tone for the rest of the novel. Clearly, there are two sides to this story, two tales of what is the truth. These two “sides” should not function peacefully. And, in fact, they do not. That, after all, is the “tale of two cities.”

Dickens sets up this disparity to set the tone for his novel, which will explore this topic.

Summary: What is an Antithesis?

Define antithesis: An antithesis consists of contrasting concepts presented in parallel structure.

Writers use antithesis to create emphasis to communicate an argument.

• Note: The plural form of antithesis is antitheses.

What Is Dialectics? What Is The Triad Thesis?

Hegel’s dialectical triad, the synthesis, dialectical materialism and marxism, limitations of dialectics.

Dialectics underscores reality’s dynamic and contradictory nature, as seen in the Hegelian triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

Dialectics is a philosophical concept that originates from ancient Greek philosophy and has been developed and refined over centuries by various thinkers. At its core, dialectics is a way of reasoning and understanding the world that emphasizes reality’s dynamic, interconnected, and contradictory nature. 

The term ‘dialectics’ comes from the Greek word ‘dialektikḗ,’ which means the art of conversation or discussion. In the classical Greek tradition, dialectics was associated with the Socratic method of questioning and refuting opposing arguments to arrive at a deeper truth. 

In modern philosophy, dialectics has taken on a more specific meaning, implying a contradictory process between opposing sides that aims to supersede the logic of reductio ad absurdum . 

This means that if the premises of an argument result in a contradiction, the premises are false, rendering one either devoid of premises or devoid of any substantive foundation.

Recommended Video for you:

Hegel’s conception of dialectics is centered around the idea of a triad, which consists of three interconnected elements: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

The thesis represents the initial, established idea or position that serves as the starting point of the dialectical process. It is the generally accepted or dominant view on a particular issue or topic, providing a foundation upon which the dialectical exploration begins. The thesis is not necessarily absolute or infallible; it is simply the initial point of departure for the dialectical inquiry. It can be a specific theory, belief, social norm, or any established understanding that is widely held or considered the norm.

The antithesis is the opposing idea or position that arises in reaction to the thesis. It challenges and contradicts the existing thesis, often by highlighting its limitations, inconsistencies, or flaws. The antithesis represents a different perspective, a counterargument, or an alternative way of understanding the same issue or topic.

It emerges as a response to the perceived inadequacies or shortcomings of the thesis, introducing a new element, a different set of assumptions, or a contrasting approach that challenges the status quo. The antithesis is not merely a negation of the thesis; it is a necessary component of the dialectical process, as it pushes the dialogue forward.

Also Read: What Is Metaphysics?

The  synthesis  is the resolution or reconciliation of the thesis and the antithesis. It represents a new, higher-level understanding that incorporates elements of both the thesis and the antithesis, while transcending their limitations. The synthesis is not a simple compromise or a midpoint between the two opposing positions; rather, it is a qualitatively different perspective that combines and transforms the previous viewpoints.

The synthesis arises from the dynamic interaction and tension between the thesis and the antithesis, as they challenge and inform each other. It represents a more comprehensive, nuanced, and integrated  understanding  of the issue or topic at hand.

The synthesis does not necessarily negate or completely discard the thesis and antithesis; instead, it incorporates their valuable aspects and elevates the discourse to a new level. This new synthesis then becomes the new thesis, leading to the emergence of a new antithesis, and the cycle continues, driving the dialectical process forward.

The thesis and antithesis are not seen as static, fixed entities, but rather as constantly evolving and interacting with one another. The synthesis, in turn, becomes a new thesis, which is then challenged by a new antithesis, leading to a further synthesis, and so on. Hegel saw this perpetual cycle  of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as the driving force behind the development of knowledge, society, and history.

The Industrial Revolution exemplifies the dialectical process. The thesis was the dominance of traditional agricultural and craft-based economic systems. The antithesis was the rise of industrialization, mechanization, and the factory system. The synthesis was the development of modern capitalist industrial societies with new social classes, technologies, and economic structures.

Hegel’s dialectical philosophy had a profound influence on the development of Marxism and the idea of dialectical materialism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the founders of Marxism, appropriated and transformed Hegel’s dialectics to fit their materialist, revolutionary worldview. In Marxist dialectical materialism, the focus shifts from the realm of ideas to the material, economic, and social conditions of human existence. The dialectical process is seen as the driving force behind the development of human societies and the class struggle.

The Marxist dialectical triad reworks the 3 components. Thesis becomes the existing mode of production, social relations, and the dominant class in a given society. Antithesis is the contradictions and conflicts within the existing social and economic system, which give rise to the oppressed class. Synthesis is the revolutionary transformation of the social and economic system, leading to a new, more just and equitable society.

For Marxists, the dialectical process is not simply an abstract philosophical concept, but a tool for understanding and transforming the material world. The goal of dialectical materialism is to identify and resolve the inherent contradictions within capitalist society, leading to a socialist revolution and the establishment of a communist society.

Also Read: Can History Be Changed By People?

Despite its widespread influence, dialectics has also faced significant criticism and limitations. The Hegelian-Marxist triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been criticized for being too simplistic and unable to capture the full complexity of real-world phenomena.

Dialectical theories have been accused of exhibiting a deterministic view of history, suggesting that the dialectical process inevitably leads to a predetermined outcome. Some critics also argue that dialectical theories lack sufficient empirical evidence and are more rooted in philosophical speculation than in rigorous scientific observation and testing.

Dialectical theories, particularly in the Marxist tradition, have been criticized for being heavily influenced by ideological and political agendas, rather than being purely objective and scientific, and for downplaying the role of individual agency and free will in shaping historical and social developments.

Despite these criticisms, dialectics remain a powerful and influential philosophical framework that continues to be debated and developed by thinkers across various disciplines. Its emphasis on the dynamic, contradictory, and interconnected nature of reality has inspired many to challenge traditional, static, and linear modes of thinking and to seek a more nuanced understanding of the complex world in which we live.

At its core, dialectics emphasizes the dynamic, interconnected, and contradictory nature of reality, and the constant process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis that drives the development of knowledge, society, and history.

While dialectics has faced significant criticism and limitations, it remains a powerful and influential framework for understanding the world around us. By embracing the dialectical perspective, we can challenge our assumptions, engage with opposing viewpoints, and strive for a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the complex and ever-changing reality we inhabit.

• What is Dialectic?.
• Dialectic Creativity, Based Upon Hegel's Triad of Thesis, ....
• Hegel's Dialectics - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Mueller, G. E. (1958, June). The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis". Journal of the History of Ideas. JSTOR.

Shreya Sethi is currently a law student at National Academy of Legal Studies & Research (NALSAR) University, Hyderabad. She likes to believe that she was born with a book in her hand and that she has subsequently only replaced it occasionally to suit her reading list. She also enjoys a good cup of tea as she watches a better sunset. She is passionate about history, arguably, the greatest story ever told

What Are Syllogisms?

Why Isn’t Nihilism Perceived Positively?

Orientalism: Definition, History, Explanation, Examples And Criticism

How Has The Atomic Model Evolved Over The Years?

Münchhausen Trilemma: Is It Possible To Prove Any Truth?

Right Wing Vs. Left Wing: What’s The Difference?

What is an Ethical Dilemma?

What Makes a Hero?

Photosynthesis: The Biochemistry Behind How Plants Make Their Food

What is Calculus in Math? Simple Explanation with Examples

Quantum Physics: Here’s Why Movies Always Get It Wrong

Is Mathematics INVENTED or DISCOVERED?

• History & Society
• Science & Tech
• Biographies
• Animals & Nature
• Geography & Travel
• Arts & Culture
• Games & Quizzes
• On This Day
• One Good Fact
• New Articles
• Lifestyles & Social Issues
• Philosophy & Religion
• Politics, Law & Government
• World History
• Health & Medicine
• Browse Biographies
• Birds, Reptiles & Other Vertebrates
• Bugs, Mollusks & Other Invertebrates
• Environment
• Fossils & Geologic Time
• Entertainment & Pop Culture
• Sports & Recreation
• Visual Arts
• Demystified
• Image Galleries
• Infographics
• Top Questions
• Britannica Kids
• Saving Earth
• Space Next 50
• Student Center

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

• Fact Monster - Entertainment - Antithesis

antithesis , (from Greek antitheton , “opposition”), a figure of speech in which irreconcilable opposites or strongly contrasting ideas are placed in sharp juxtaposition and sustained tension, as in the saying “Art is long, and Time is fleeting.”

The opposing clauses, phrases, or sentences are roughly equal in length and balanced in contiguous grammatical structures.

The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. (Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg Address” )

In poetry, the effect of antithesis is often one of tragic irony or reversal.

Saddled and bridled And booted rade he; A plume in his helmet, A sword at his knee; But toom [empty] cam’ his saddle A’ bloody to see, O hame cam’ his gude horse But never cam’ he! (“Bonnie George Campbell,” anonymous)

Karl Marx Sociologist: Contributions and Theory

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Saul McLeod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul McLeod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

On This Page:

Marxism is a social, political, and economic theory proposed by Karl Marx in the 19th century, and Marxists are those who ascribe to the ideas of Marxism.

Karl Marx was a German philosopher interested in exploring the relationship between the economy and the people working within the economic system.

Marx’s theory was strongly based on the struggles of the working class during the Industrial Revolution in Europe. He explained how there are power relationships between the capitalists and the workers, which are exploitative and would eventually cause class conflict.

According to Marx, the workers are those from a low social class, which he termed the proletariat, whereas those few in charge, the wealthy bosses, owners, and managers, are what he termed the bourgeoisie.

The proletariat are the individuals who perform labor that is then taken and sold by the bourgeoisie so that they themselves receive profit while the workers receive minimal wages.

Noteworthy writings of Marxism include Capital by Marx and The Communist Manifesto written by Marx and Friedrich Engels. These writings describe the features of Marxist ideology, including the struggle of the working class, capitalism, and how a classless society is needed to end the class conflict.

Key Takeaways

• Karl Marx was a German philosopher who, in the 19th century, began exploring the relationship between the economy and the people who work within the economic system.
• The basic idea of Marx’s theory is that society is characterized by the struggle between the workers and those in charge. The workers are those of lower social classes, which he termed the proletariat.
• The few in charge, who are the bosses, owners, and managers of an upper social class, are what he termed the bourgeoisie. The proletariat are the individuals who perform the labor, while the bourgeoisie obtains the profits from this labor. From this system, Marx argued that the workers are exploited while those in power get more powerful and wealthier.
• The workers are viewed as slaves of the bourgeoisie, given wages for their labor that is the minimum subsidence so that they can just about survive while also depending on their labor that they cannot simply quit (Marx & Engels, 2019).
• The writings ‘Capital’ by Marx and ‘The Communist Manifesto’ written by Marx and Friedrich Engels are noteworthy pieces that lay out what is now referred to as Marxism.
• These writings discuss capitalism, which is believed to eventually stagnate due to the increased struggle between the social classes.
• Marxist ideology predicts that there will be a proletariat revolution whereby capitalism will end, to be replaced by communism.

The Basic Principles Of Marx’s Theory

Class struggle.

Marx argued that there were two social classes; the working-class laborers, known as the proletariat, and the wealthy bourgeoise, who controlled the workers.

Marx argued that there is a struggle between the social classes. While the bourgeoisie is concerned with the means of producing via the laborers, those who conduct the labor, the proletariat , want to end this exploitation.

Marx explained that there is a constant conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. While the bourgeoisie aims to make as much profit as possible by exploiting the labor of others, the proletariat is dissatisfied with this exploitation and wants to end it.

Class tensions are thought to increase with the opposing desires of those who want bigger profits and the workers who defend their right to fair pay and working conditions.

Competition in the market and the desire for bigger profits compels the bourgeoisie to further exploit their workers, who defend their rights and working conditions. These opposing desires of pushing the rate of exploitation in opposite directions create class tensions.

Over time, there is a broader division of labor and increased use of machinery to complete the labor. Marx and Engels argued that with this came an increase in the burden of toil, whether by the work hours getting longer, an increase in the amount of work in a given time, or by the increased speed of the machinery.

The workers are viewed as slaves of the bourgeoisie and the machine, given wages for their labor that is the minimum subsidence so they can just about survive while also depending on their labor (Marx & Engels, 2019).

The struggle between social classes was initially confined to individual factories. However, as capitalism matured, personal struggles became generalized to coalitions across factories and eventually manifested at societal levels (Rummel, 1977).

Marxists believe that the division between classes will widen with the exploitation of the workers deteriorating so severely that the social structure collapses and transforms into a proletarian revolution . A classless society will pursue erasing any exploitation or political authority (Rummel, 1977).

Theory of Capitalism

Capitalism is an economic system in which private individuals have the means of control over their own property, with the motivation to make as much profit as possible.

Marx describes capitalists as those who exploit the hard work of the laborers and pay them as little as possible to ensure the highest profits. The capitalists believe they are entitled to the profits made from their workers’ labor, which Marx viewed as theft.

Marx described the capitalists as the bourgeoisie business owners who organized the means of production, such as any tools or machinery used, and were entitled to any profit made.

Marxists believe that most societies are capitalist. That such a system is accepted without the need for violence or coercion is said to reflect the fact that the capitalists have a strong influence over ideas in society (Rose, 2005).

Marx saw profit as theft since the capitalists are stealing the hard work of the laborers, selling goods and services for an enormous profit while paying the laborers as little as possible. Workers’ labor is bought and sold like any other commodity.

That such a system is accepted without the need for violence or coercion reflects the fact that the capitalists have a strong influence over ideas in society (Rosen, 2005).

Marx viewed capitalism as an unstable system that would eventually result in a series of crises. The means of exploitation built into a capitalist economic system will be the source of social revolt and ultimately lead to capitalism”s dismantling.

Marx and Engels proposed that there would eventually be a proletariat revolution caused by continued exploitation by capitalists. The workers will revolt due to increasingly worse working conditions and wages.

In The Communist Manifesto , Marx and Engels proposed that after the proletariat revolution, the means of production from the bourgeoisie would end and be replaced with collective ownership over economic assets. This is a move from capitalism to communism.

The result of the revolution is that capitalism will be replaced by a classless society in which private property will be replaced with collective ownership. This will mean that society will become communist. With private property abolished, the means of production will come to a common agreement, what is called the communal ownership of goods.

Communism would aim to create a classless society in which no social class would exploit the labor of the other. In a communist society, accumulated labor is but a means to widen, enrich, and promote the laborer’s existence (Marx & Engels, 2019).

According to Marxism, the key features of a communist society are that there would be no private property or inherited wealth, steeply graduated income tax, centralized control of the banking, communication, and transport industries, and free public education (Marx & Engels, 2019).

Conflict Theory

Karl Marx is known as the developer of conflict theory . This is the idea that society is in a state of perpetual conflict because of two or more groups with competing and incompatible interests. It is the theory that power struggles and dynamics drive societal change.

Marx concentrated on the conflict between the social classes: those of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat . The power the bourgeoisie hold can be found in their material resources, accumulated wealth, and social status.

As capitalism develops, there are fewer but more powerful individuals in the upper class, which creates conflict with a majority oppressed class. The two groups are in a struggle, and resources are unjustly distributed to the few.

Marx reasoned that as the social conditions worsened for the workers (e.g., through lower pay), they would develop a class consciousness that revealed that their exploitation was at the hands of the capitalist. The workers can make demands to ease the conflict, but conditions would eventually get worse again.

According to Marx, the only way to end the cycle of conflict is to bring about communism.

Theory Of Alienation

Alienation means the lack of power, control, and fulfillment experienced by workers in capitalist societies in which the means of producing goods are privately owned and controlled.

Marx described a division of labor , meaning that the production workers increasingly feel separated from their work. Workers have moved away from an artisanal approach to work when one person works on one product.

With the increase in machinery, technological advancements, and assembly lines where many people work on one product, there is a loss of meaning to individual workers (Marx, 1992).

As this division of labor increases along with the extent of production required for the market, the workers become more dependent on their labor for mere survival. As capitalist production becomes more technical, the workers’ productivity increases, but the final product of their labor is not for the worker to enjoy – it is the property of the capitalist (Prychitko, 2002).

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels suggest that under capitalism, the proletariat loses all individual character, becoming ‘an appendage of the machine’; thus, their work becomes alien (Marx & Engels, 2019).

The proletariat loses agency over their work lives, instead, this is determined by the bourgeoisie, including when and how long to work. Thus, the workers view their labor as something alien to them.

Marx describes alienated labor as forced and involuntary labor in which the worker finds no purpose, pleasure, contentment, or power. The worker feels isolated and insignificant, seeing their labor as purely for wages (Mukhopadhyay, 2020).

As the division of labor increases along with the extent of production required for the market, the workers become more dependent on their labor for mere survival. Their productivity increases as capitalist production become more technical, but as a result, the final product is not for them to enjoy, rather, it is the property of the capitalist (Prychitko, 2002).

Thus, the workers view their labor as something alien. Not only the object but the process of production is alien, for it is no longer a creative activity.

Marx describes alienated labor in his writings as forced and involuntary labor in which the worker finds no purpose, pleasure, contentment, or power. The worker feels isolated and insignificant, seeing their labor as purely for wages (Mukhopadhyay, 2020).

Historical Materialism

Marx proposed a theory of historical materialism in which he describes stages or epochs that societies pass through. These are primitive communism, slave society, feudalism, capitalism, and advanced communism.

Marx used historical materialism to attempt to explain where society has come from, why it is the way that it is, and where it is heading.

Primitive communism was a time when society was free of social class divisions, and there were simply hunters and gathers who obtained enough food for survival. Since there was not a surplus of production, there was no exploitation.

Slave society is thought of as the first stage of exploitation. This is when there was a division between the wealthy aristocrats and those who were slaves. This epoch gave way to more advanced productive forces, with the means of production being by the people who were the property of the slaveowners.

Feudalism was a dominant social system in medieval Europe, and society was divided into landowners and land occupiers. It was a system in which people were given land and protection by the nobles, who had to work and fight for them in return. Essentially, in feudalism, the landowners exploited the land occupiers.

Marx proposed that the current society is a capitalist one in which there are private property owners who exploit the labor of their workers, whom they pay as little as possible to obtain high profits. This epoch is viewed as the wealthiest in society exploiting the poorest.

Marx’s prediction for the next epoch of society is that it will be an advanced communist one. In a communist society, there would be shared resources and wealth and no exploitation.

This was Marx’s idea of a utopia in which the system benefits most people in society rather than a small minority.

Critical Theory

Marxism would come to facilitate the development of critical theories and cultural studies.

Critical theory  is a philosophical approach to culture — especially literature — that seeks to confront the social, historical, and ideological forces and structures of power that produce and constrain culture.

The first and most notable critical theorists are the members of the Frankfurt School (Bohman, 2005).

The critical method of analysis has far-reaching academic influence. Often, critical theorists are preoccupied with critiquing modernity and capitalist society, the definition of what it means to be free in society, and the detection of wrongs in society.

Critical theorists often use a specific interpretation of Marxist philosophy focusing on economic and political ideas such as commodification, reification, fetishization, and the critique of mass culture.

Stages of Societal Development in Marxism

Marxism believes that economic systems in societies go through five stages, these are:

1. Primitive Communism

Marx and Engels conceptualized society prior to antiquity as free of social class division as hunter-gatherers gathered just enough to survive. Because everyone in this system worked for subsistence, there was no surplus production, thus making exploitation impossible.

2. Antiquity

Antiquity, to Marx, represented the first stage of exploitation between two classes, as the dynamic between aristocrats and their slaves and servants characterized society.

3. Feudalism

The second stage of exploitation in Marx’s vision of society was medieval society. Divided into landowners and occupiers, the lords and landlords exploited those who cultivated their lands by taking a portion of their yield.

4. Capitalist Society

Marxism focuses most heavily on the ills of contemporary capitalist society. In this system, anyone could trade with anyone and were free to make money from their own goods and services.

However, according to Marx and Engels, this just as powerfully bred injustice through the exploitation of the poor by the rich. Marx and Engels were particularly inspired by the conditions of their era, the industrial revolution.

Karl Marx was born in what is now Western Germany, and he experienced England at the turn of the Industrial Revolution.

Witnessing first-hand the exploitation of British factory workers, the pair conducted a series of profiles of laborers and collaboratively authored The Communist Manifesto (Prychitko, 1991).

Although the ideas of Marxism seemed to take hold by the first half of the twentieth century, as the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the spread of communism came to define much of Eastern Europe, their association — the USSR — began to reject Marxist ideology, entering a transition toward private property rights and a market exchange system.

The societies of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and the other Soviet states shifted to a capitalist and consumerist system, and the USSR collapsed in 1991 (Prychitko, 2002).

5. Advanced Communism

After the fall of the current capitalist system, Marx predicted a utopian society involving shared resources, wealth, and equality.

Strengths of Marxism

Marx’s ideas of society are a source of many useful insights and arguments, many of which remain relevant for modern analyses of society. While some ideas may have lost some relevance, the legacy of Marxism has endured (Burawoy & Wright, 2001).

Karl Marx has remained a prominent and influential figure in the world of sociology. In particular, his ideas on conflict theory gave rise to other conflict theories that developed later, including race-conflict theory, gender-conflict theory, and intersectional theory .

These theories provide sociologists with ways to understand power, control, freedom, and exploitation in society.

Due to Marx’s understanding of capitalism, we have a better understanding of how society functions and why we may have certain ideas about labor.

Marx provided the understanding that capitalism may be the cause of why society holds these views and how it teaches us to be competitive and conformist.

Many institutions are believed to use capitalist ideology to justify inequalities. For instance, educational institutions socialize children into working hard and being obedient.

With the increase of technological advancements in the workplace and the seemingly excessive number of products in the modern world – a lot of which would be considered non-essential- supports Marx’s ideas about capitalism.

Marxism can help sociologists understand how past revolutions have occurred in capitalist societies. It is considered a social theory of vital importance for understanding the issues and possibilities of social change and social reproduction in modern societies.

While not every element within Marxism is sustainable, Marxist ideas can be built upon to challenge and transform it (Burawoy & Wright, 2001).

Criticisms of Marxism

Marxism can be criticized for being overly simplistic in the idea of society being split into two social classes. There are different levels of wealth in society, so it is more likely that there are several social classes.

Likewise, Marx’s theory ignores other factors that contribute to social inequality, such as a person’s race and religion. A person’s gender is also mostly ignored by Marxism. Feminists would suggest that gender provides a greater social division in society rather than social class.

Marxism is argued to be a doctrine with little relevance for serious social change. It is said to be ideological for mobilizing political parties and social movements but lacks scientific credibility (Burawoy & Wright, 2001). It is thought to be unlikely that there would be total social class equality in a communist society.

Further, communist ideas have been introduced in some countries and have not fared well. For instance, there was a fall of communism in the former socialist state of the USSR. Therefore, a Marxist society, while promising in theory, may not be fully sustainable unless reconstructed.

In general, there are negative connotations about those who are unemployed, considering those who take too much time off as lazy and holding the belief that more belongings make people happier.

Frequently Asked Questions

What are the main goals of marxism.

The main goal of Marxism is to achieve a classless society that is not only adopted in one society but on a global scale.

Marx’s idea was to design a social system that eliminates exploitation and differences in power between groups of people.

In communism, the proletariat has political power, and private property is abolished. In a communist society, private ownership will be replaced with collective ownership over economic assets.

What Is The Importance of Marxism In Society?

Karl Marx is one of the most prominent and influential figures in sociological theory. These ideas on conflict theory have given rise to different conflict theories, such as race-conflict theory, gender-conflict theory, and intersectional theory.

Marx’s explanations of capitalism have provided a deep understanding of how society functions and enabled people to think critically about the labor they do.

Marx further offered that capitalism may be why society holds particular views about labor, including negative judgments about those who do not work and why people are competitive and conformist.

Is Marxism Still Relevant Today?

While some ideas of Marxism may be outdated and may not necessarily be a comprehensive theory for social change, they can still help understand some of the key social mechanisms in a society divided by class.

Marxism offers a way to understand history and economics, as well as an explanation of the global capitalist crisis. It can be argued that exploitation is still at the heart of a capitalist system enforced by those in the upper social classes.

Marxism also captures how capitalism develops and impacts specific world regions, specifically how some regions are developed unevenly relative to one another. Marxists would argue that unregulated commodification comes with environmental hazards, the costs of which are becoming increasingly clear (Fasenfest, 2018).

What were the criticisms of Marx on capitalism?

Karl Marx criticized capitalism for its inherent exploitation of the working class, who, he argued, were not fairly compensated for their labor. He also highlighted the alienation workers experience due to a lack of control over the production process and the products they create.

Marx further criticized capitalism’s tendency towards periodic economic crises and its creation of social inequality through the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the bourgeoisie, or the capitalist class.

Burawoy, M., & Wright, E. O. (2001). Sociological marxism. In Handbook of sociological theory (pp. 459-486). Springer, Boston, MA.

Callinicos, A. (2011). The revolutionary ideas of Karl Marx. Haymarket Books.

Fasenfest, D. (2018). Is Marx still relevant?.  Critical Sociology , 44(6), 851-855.

Marx, K. (1873).  Capital: A critical analysis of capitalist production . Humboldt.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1967). The communist manifesto . 1848. Trans. Samuel Moore. London: Penguin, 15.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (2019). The communist manifesto. In Ideals and Ideologies  (pp. 243-255). Routledge.

Mukhopadhyay, R. (2020). Karl Marx”s Theory of Alienation . Available at SSRN 3843057.

Poulantzis, N. (1975). Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism . London: New Left Books.

Prychitko, D. L. (Ed.). (2002).  Markets, Planning, and Democracy: Essays after the Collapse of Communism . Edward Elgar Publishing.

Rosen, M. (2005). Marx, Karl. Ed. Edward Craig. The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 619-631.

Rummel, R. J. (1977). Understanding conflict and war: Vol. 3: Conflict in perspective.  Beverly Hills: Sage.

Persuasive Writing In Three Steps: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

April 14, 2021 by Ryan Law in

Great writing persuades. It persuades the reader that your product is right for them, that your process achieves the outcome they desire, that your opinion supersedes all other opinions. But spend an hour clicking around the internet and you’ll quickly realise that most content is passive, presenting facts and ideas without context or structure. The reader must connect the dots and create a convincing argument from the raw material presented to them. They rarely do, and for good reason: It’s hard work. The onus of persuasion falls on the writer, not the reader. Persuasive communication is a timeless challenge with an ancient solution. Zeno of Elea cracked it in the 5th century B.C. Georg Hegel gave it a lick of paint in the 1800s. You can apply it to your writing in three simple steps: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Use Dialectic to Find Logical Bedrock

“ Dialectic ” is a complicated-sounding idea with a simple meaning: It’s a structured process for taking two seemingly contradictory viewpoints and, through reasoned discussion, reaching a satisfactory conclusion. Over centuries of use the term has been burdened with the baggage of philosophy and academia. But at its heart, dialectics reflects a process similar to every spirited conversation or debate humans have ever had:

• Person A presents an idea: “We should travel to the Eastern waterhole because it’s closest to camp.”
• Person B disagrees and shares a counterargument: “I saw wolf prints on the Eastern trail, so we should go to the Western waterhole instead.”
• Person A responds to the counterargument , either disproving it or modifying their own stance to accommodate the criticism: “I saw those same wolf prints, but our party is large enough that the wolves won’t risk an attack.”
• Person B responds in a similar vein: “Ordinarily that would be true, but half of our party had dysentery last week so we’re not at full strength.”
• Person A responds: “They got dysentery from drinking at the Western waterhole.”

This process continues until conversational bedrock is reached: an idea that both parties understand and agree to, helped by the fact they’ve both been a part of the process that shaped it.

Dialectic is intended to help draw closer to the “truth” of an argument, tempering any viewpoint by working through and resolving its flaws. This same process can also be used to persuade.

Create Inevitability with Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

The philosopher Georg Hegel is most famous for popularizing a type of dialectics that is particularly well-suited to writing: thesis, antithesis, synthesis (also known, unsurprisingly, as Hegelian Dialectic ).

• Thesis: Present the status quo, the viewpoint that is currently accepted and widely held.
• Antithesis: Articulate the problems with the thesis. (Hegel also called this phase “the negative.”)
• Synthesis: Share a new viewpoint (a modified thesis) that resolves the problems.

Hegel’s method focused less on the search for absolute truth and more on replacing old ideas with newer, more sophisticated versions . That, in a nutshell, is the same objective as much of content marketing (and particularly thought leadership content ): We’re persuading the reader that our product, processes, and ideas are better and more useful than the “old” way of doing things. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis (or TAS) is a persuasive writing structure because it:

• Reduces complex arguments into a simple three-act structure. Complicated, nuanced arguments are simplified into a clear, concise format that anyone can follow. This simplification reflects well on the author: It takes mastery of a topic to explain it in it the simplest terms.
• Presents a balanced argument by “steelmanning” the best objection. Strong, one-sided arguments can trigger reactance in the reader: They don’t want to feel duped. TAS gives voice to their doubts, addressing their best objection and “giv[ing] readers the chance to entertain the other side, making them feel as though they have come to an objective conclusion.”
• Creates a sense of inevitability. Like a story building to a satisfying conclusion, articles written with TAS take the reader on a structured, logical journey that culminates in precisely the viewpoint we wish to advocate for. Doubts are voiced, ideas challenged, and the conclusion reached feels more valid and concrete as a result.

There are two main ways to apply TAS to your writing: Use it beef up your introductions, or apply it to your article’s entire structure.

Writing Article Introductions with TAS

Take a moment to scroll back to the top of this article. If I’ve done my job correctly, you’ll notice a now familiar formula staring back at you: The first three paragraphs are built around Hegel’s thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure. Here’s what the introduction looked like during the outlining process . The first paragraph shares the thesis, the accepted idea that great writing should be persuasive:

Next up, the antithesis introduces a complicating idea, explaining why most content marketing isn’t all that persuasive:

Finally, the synthesis shares a new idea that serves to reconcile the two previous paragraphs: Content can be made persuasive by using the thesis, antithesis, synthesis framework. The meat of the article is then focused on the nitty-gritty of the synthesis.

Introductions are hard, but thesis, antithesis, synthesis offers a simple way to write consistently persuasive opening copy. In the space of three short paragraphs, the article’s key ideas are shared , the entire argument is summarised, and—hopefully—the reader is hooked.

Best of all, most articles—whether how-to’s, thought leadership content, or even list content—can benefit from Hegelian Dialectic , for the simple reason that every article introduction should be persuasive enough to encourage the reader to stick around.

Structuring Entire Articles with TAS

Harder, but most persuasive, is to use thesis, antithesis, synthesis to structure your entire article. This works best for thought leadership content. Here, your primary objective is to advocate for a new idea and disprove the old, tired way of thinking—exactly the use case Hegel intended for his dialectic. It’s less useful for content that explores and illustrates a process, because the primary objective is to show the reader how to do something (like this article—otherwise, I would have written the whole darn thing using the framework). Arjun Sethi’s article The Hive is the New Network is a great example.

The article’s primary purpose is to explain why the “old” model of social networks is outmoded and offer a newer, better framework. (It would be equally valid—but less punchy—to publish this with the title “ Why the Hive is the New Network.”) The thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure shapes the entire article:

• Thesis: Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram grew by creating networks “that brought existing real-world relationships online.”
• Antithesis: As these networks grow, the less useful they become, skewing towards bots, “celebrity, meme and business accounts.”
• Synthesis: To survive continued growth, these networks need to embrace a new structure and become hives.

With the argument established, the vast majority of the article is focused on synthesis. After all, it requires little elaboration to share the status quo in a particular situation, and it’s relatively easy to point out the problems with a given idea. The synthesis—the solution that needs to reconcile both thesis and antithesis—is the hardest part to tackle and requires the greatest word count. Throughout the article, Arjun is systematically addressing the “best objections” to his theory and demonstrating why the “Hive” is the best solution:

• Antithesis: Why now? Why didn’t Hives emerge in the first place?
• Thesis: We were limited by technology, but today, we have the necessary infrastructure: “We’re no longer limited to a broadcast radio model, where one signal is received by many nodes. ...We sync with each other instantaneously, and all the time.”
• Antithesis: If the Hive is so smart, why aren’t our brightest and best companies already embracing it?
• Thesis: They are, and autonomous cars are a perfect example: “Why are all these vastly different companies converging on the autonomous car? That’s because for these companies, it’s about platform and hive, not just about roads without drivers.”

It takes bravery to tackle objections head-on and an innate understanding of the subject matter to even identify objections in the first place, but the effort is worthwhile. The end result is a structured journey through the arguments for and against the “Hive,” with the reader eventually reaching the same conclusion as the author: that “Hives” are superior to traditional networks.

Destination: Persuasion

Persuasion isn’t about cajoling or coercing the reader. Statistics and anecdotes alone aren’t all that persuasive. Simply sharing a new idea and hoping that it will trigger an about-turn in the reader’s beliefs is wishful thinking. Instead, you should take the reader on a journey—the same journey you travelled to arrive at your newfound beliefs, whether it’s about the superiority of your product or the zeitgeist-changing trend that’s about to break. Hegelian Dialectic—thesis, antithesis, synthesis— is a structured process for doing precisely that. It contextualises your ideas and explains why they matter. It challenges the idea and strengthens it in the process. Using centuries-old processes, it nudges the 21st-century reader onto a well-worn path that takes them exactly where they need to go.

Ryan is the Content Director at Ahrefs and former CMO of Animalz.

Why ‘Vertical Volatility’ Is the Missing Link in Your Keyword Strategy

Get insight and analysis on the world's top SaaS brands, each and every Monday morning.

Success! Now check your email to confirm your subscription.

There was an error submitting your subscription. Please try again.

• Organizations
• Planning & Activities
• Product & Services
• Structure & Systems
• Career & Education
• Entertainment
• Fashion & Beauty
• Political Institutions
• SmartPhones
• Protocols & Formats
• Communication
• Web Applications
• Household Equipments
• Career and Certifications
• Diet & Fitness
• Mathematics & Statistics
• Processed Foods
• Vegetables & Fruits

Difference Between Thesis and Antithesis

• Categorized under Miscellaneous | Difference Between Thesis and Antithesis

Thesis and antithesis are literary techniques used to make a point during a debate or a lecture or discourse about a topic.  The thesis is the theory or the definition of the point under discussion.  Antithesis is the exact opposite of the point made in the thesis.  Anti is a prefix meaning against.  The antithesis therefore goes against the thesis to create an opposition effect.  The antithesis creates a clash of ideas or opinions and is a rhetorical device used to sway the opinions of the reader.  The two opposite statements highlight a point in literature, politics and other forums of debate.  Hearing the two sides of an argument has to have more impact on the reader or listener.  The two opposing ideas make the writer’s point more definite and obvious.

Definition of  Thesis

The thesis is the beginning of the study or debate.  It is the introduction to the topic.  The thesis is the normal way of looking at the subject matter.  The thesis is the accepted way of thinking or viewing an issue to be discussed or written about.  It is often the theory that is presented by philosophers and usually believed by the majority.  A thesis can be used in a written document or as a speech.  The thesis study looks at the positive side of the topic to be presented or discussed.  The subject matter is usually what readers consider normal.  In a political context it may be what is seen as the status quo.  Not necessarily the right situation for the times politically, but what has been the norm, and what has been established before change must take place.

Definition of  Antithesis

The antithesis is the opposite or opposition to the thesis.  Anti being the prefix, and when it is added to thesis, spells antithesis.  Anti changes the meaning of the word thesis.  Opposition or an opposing statement or word, is the role that the antithesis plays.  The antithesis helps to bring out the reason behind a debate or an emotive statement.  Looking at the opposing theme and comparing the thesis and the antithesis highlights the mental picture through the anti aspect of the word antithesis.  For example, when Neil Armstrong told the world he had made one small step for man and a giant leap for mankind he used the normal step he took as the thesis, and used the antithesis as a giant leap to create the picture of how great this step was for mankind.  This created a memorable image, and shows the enormity of the first man walking on the moon.  Antithesis is a form of rhetoric and a useful way of persuading people and igniting emotional reactions.  Antithesis has been used by writers and politicians to stir emotions and bring home an important point.

What is the connection between Thesis, Antithesis and synthesis?

Thesis, together with antithesis results in a synthesis, according to philosopher Hegel.  Hegel’s dialectics is a philosophical method involving a contradictory series of events between opposing sides.  He describes the thesis as being the starting point, the antithesis is the reaction and the synthesis is the outcome from the reaction.  Karl Marx used this philosophy to explain how communism came about.  According to Marx’s theory:

The thesis was capitalism, the way Russia was run at the time.

The antithesis was the Proletariat, the industrial workers and labor force, at that time.  The Proletariat decided to revolt against the capitalists, because they were being exploited.  This reaction is the antithesis, or the opposition.

The synthesis results from these two groups opposing one another and there is an outcome, a synthesis.  The outcome is a new order of things and new relationships.  The new order was Communism.  I t was a direct result of the antithesis or political opposition.  The connection is therefore between the perceived ‘normal’ or starting point against the opposition, the antithesis, to create a new order of doing things.

How is Thesis and Antithesis used in literary circles?

Dramatic effect and contrasts of character are created through an antithesis.  The writer uses the normal character matched with the completely opposite character to create an understanding or the different personalities or the different environment.  Snow White and the wicked queen, who is the stepmother, are a shining example of antithesis.  Hamlet’’s soliloquy, to be or not to be, sums up his dilemma at the time and creates a confusion of thought.  Charles Dickens uses this rhetorical technique in a Tale of Two Cities as he describes ‘It was the best of times and the worst of times,’ when chapter one begins.  The reader is immediately drawn into the story and the upsetting times of the French Revolution that is the scene for the book. 

How are Thesis and Antithesis used in the political arena?

Well known politicians have used thesis and antithesis in their propaganda and speeches to rouse their followers.  The well known Gettysburg address, given by Abraham Lincoln, used the antithesis of little and long at Gettysburg at the dedication to national heroism.  Lincoln said:

“The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here.”  This speech has gone down in history as one of the most important speeches and it has definitely been remembered.  

Antithesis in a speech helps to advertise sentiments and rally crowds together due to its emotional power.  Martin Luther King used antithesis to sway a crowd by saying unless people chose to live together as brothers they would surely perish as fools.  

How does Thesis and Antithesis form part of a debate?

Formal debates make good use of the opposition concept brought about by the use of antithesis.  The debate will start with the presentation of the thesis, followed by the antithesis and summed up in the synthesis.  For example, a debate about eating meat could open with the points for eating meat.  The next section of the debate argues for not eating meat and finally the points for and against could sum up eating meat, but as small portions of a persons dietary needs.  The conflict of the argument comes between the thesis and the antithesis.  The summary for the listeners to take away is the synthesis of the points made in the debate.

What makes Antithesis a rhetorical device?

The antithesis conjures up a more emotive response because of the opposition factor.  Adding in the opposite or exaggerated form of a word in a statement makes more impact for the listener.  In the event of a man walking on the moon, for example, this was not just a small event happening when a rocket went to the moon.  No, this was a gigantic expedition to another planet.  Whether it was intentional or not this statement has stood the test of time. It has become one of the most well known quotes highlighting a particular event.  The clever use of the antithesis of a giant leap as part of the statement has made these words stand out in asthey marked this occasion.  They bring the impact of these steps to the world as a great vision and achievement for mankind.  

Chart to compare Thesis and Antithesis 

Summary of Thesis and Antithesis:

• Thesis and antithesis are literary devices that highlight themes or emotional rhetorical situations.
• Well known events, using thesis and antithesis, show how this form of rhetoric creates an emotional response from readers or audiences.  Neil Armstrong’s comment upon landing and walking on the moon for the first time in history is a shining example.
• The use of thesis and antithesis in literature enable the author to give more emphasis to an event or a theme in a story or play.
• Karl Marx used the thesis, antithesis and conclusion of a synthesis, to explain the evolution of communism.
• Using this format in debate helps to understand how two opposing ideals, around one debatable topic, can help the speakers provide their arguments.  The debate is then wrapped up in a synthesis of ideas and the conclusion of the debate leading to a consensus of opinion.
• When well known politicians make a statement using thesis and antithesis, the statement is more powerful.  These rhetorical statements become part of our history and become famous for the impact they made using just a few words to express a life changing situation.
• Recent Posts
• Difference Between Lagoon and Bay - October 20, 2021
• Difference Between Futurism and Preterism - August 12, 2021
• Difference Between Dichotomy and Paradox - August 7, 2021

Sharing is caring!

• Pinterest 3

Search DifferenceBetween.net :

• Difference Between Antithesis and Oxymoron
• Difference Between Thesis and Dissertation
• Difference Between Analysis and Synthesis
• Difference Between Full Moon and New Moon
• Difference Between Lunar Eclipse And New Moon

Cite APA 7 Wither, C. (2020, November 23). Difference Between Thesis and Antithesis. Difference Between Similar Terms and Objects. http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-thesis-and-antithesis/. MLA 8 Wither, Christina. "Difference Between Thesis and Antithesis." Difference Between Similar Terms and Objects, 23 November, 2020, http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-thesis-and-antithesis/.

Leave a Response

Name ( required )

Email ( required )

Please note: comment moderation is enabled and may delay your comment. There is no need to resubmit your comment.

Notify me of followup comments via e-mail

References :

Advertisments, more in 'miscellaneous'.

• Difference Between Caucus and Primary
• Difference Between an Arbitrator and a Mediator
• Difference Between Cellulite and Stretch Marks
• Difference Between Taliban and Al Qaeda
• Difference Between Kung Fu and Karate

Top Difference Betweens

Get new comparisons in your inbox:, most emailed comparisons, editor's picks.

• Difference Between MAC and IP Address
• Difference Between Platinum and White Gold
• Difference Between Civil and Criminal Law
• Difference Between GRE and GMAT
• Difference Between Immigrants and Refugees
• Difference Between DNS and DHCP
• Difference Between Computer Engineering and Computer Science
• Difference Between Men and Women
• Difference Between Book value and Market value
• Difference Between Red and White wine
• Difference Between Depreciation and Amortization
• Difference Between Bank and Credit Union
• Difference Between White Eggs and Brown Eggs

• Subject List
• Take a Tour
• For Authors
• Subscriber Services
• Publications
• African American Studies
• African Studies
• American Literature
• Anthropology
• Architecture Planning and Preservation
• Art History
• Atlantic History
• Biblical Studies
• British and Irish Literature
• Childhood Studies
• Chinese Studies
• Cinema and Media Studies
• Communication
• Criminology
• Environmental Science
• Evolutionary Biology
• International Law
• International Relations
• Islamic Studies
• Jewish Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Latino Studies
• Linguistics
• Literary and Critical Theory
• Medieval Studies
• Military History
• Political Science
• Public Health
• Renaissance and Reformation
• Social Work
• Urban Studies
• Victorian Literature
• Browse All Subjects

How to Subscribe

• Free Trials

In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Civil Rights

Introduction, citizenship and rights claims.

• Foundational Works
• External Environments
• Internal Dynamics
• Responses and Countermovements
• Macro Political Impacts
• Micro/Biographical Impacts
• Other Social Movements, Issues, and Constituencies
• Reference to a Particular Historical Era
• Foundational Texts
• Legislative and Institutional
• Impacts of Specific Civil Rights Legislation

Related Articles Expand or collapse the "related articles" section about

About related articles close popup.

Lorem Ipsum Sit Dolor Amet

Vestibulum ante ipsum primis in faucibus orci luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae; Aliquam ligula odio, euismod ut aliquam et, vestibulum nec risus. Nulla viverra, arcu et iaculis consequat, justo diam ornare tellus, semper ultrices tellus nunc eu tellus.

• Law and Society
• Political Sociology

Other Subject Areas

Forthcoming articles expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" section.

• Global Racial Formations
• Transition to Parenthood in the Life Course
• Find more forthcoming articles...
• Export Citations
• Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Civil Rights by David Cunningham , Nicole Fox LAST REVIEWED: 30 September 2013 LAST MODIFIED: 30 September 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756384-0147

Unlike many standard sociological concepts, “civil rights” is rarely interrogated as a phenomenon sui generis or in relation to other categories of rights, and instead is typically invoked in reference to a range of political claims, statuses, entitlements, and outcomes. Though foundational accounts of citizenship situate the sources and boundaries of civil rights, by far the most frequent usage of the term is in relation to the US civil rights movement, which has served as the central case informing prevailing theories of social movements. The movement’s canonical status and sweeping impacts on political, economic, and social life has given rise to a loosely bounded conception of an associated era, with much scholarship focusing on the contours of racial discrimination and mobility in the “post-civil rights” decades that have followed. Another area of movement influence relates to the encoding of civil rights protections in legislation and court decisions. A particularly robust literature has engaged with the implementation and enforcement of various provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as its impact on subsequent related legislation, such as the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act. The legacy of the movement is also evident in its influence on subsequent civil rights movements, both tactically and through their ability to advance “civil rights” claims in familiar and resonant ways. The unique and familiar character of the civil rights movement, then, has ensured that conceptions of civil rights remain prevalent within a variety of sociological literatures––from social movements, to organizations, gender, race and ethnicity, and the sociology of law––while perhaps paradoxically discouraging focused research on the definitional and political contours of the term itself.

This section brings together work on the relationship between civil rights and conceptions of citizenship, engaging with how communities or movements make claims to civil rights, often alongside or implicitly in contrast to other kinds of rights. Marshall 1950 offers a foundational conceptualization of core relationships between civil rights and citizenship, their historical evolution, and their implications for capitalist class systems. Turner 1993 elaborates on Marshall’s seminal essay to introduce a range of theoretical issues associated with citizenship. That volume’s emphasis on the intersection of civil and human rights clearly anticipates a now-burgeoning body of work focused on human rights claims in the age of globalization ( Blau and Moncada 2009 ; Smith 2008 , cited under Other Social Movements, Issues, and Constituencies ). Within sociology, a related stream of scholarship has concentrated on how groups articulate and mobilize around rights claims. Such work most clearly emerges within the social movements literature, particularly related to analytic notions of “framing” developed by Snow and his colleagues and elaborated in Snow and Benford 1992 . Conceptions of framing that speak most directly to “civil rights” tend to focus on how a movement articulates rights-based claims to resonate with intended audiences or constituencies, mobilize followings, solidify collective identities, and expand resources and political access. Particular works examine how movement framings can alter the meaning of rights over time ( Engel and Munger 1996 ), and how claims to identities and rights structure the ways in which stories are told, received, and ultimately remembered ( Polletta 2006 ). How such processes operate within the context of actual ( Cole 2012 ) or imagined ( Stanfield 2012 ) national and international governing bodies provides a means for assessing how norms and discourses around human rights can provide on-the-ground protection against civil rights abuses. Taken together, these sources speak to both the bases for, and the dynamics of, rights-based claims, as well as how those claims structure meanings, mobilizations, and orientations to political resources.

Blau, Judith, and Alberto Moncada. 2009. Human rights: A primer . Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Introduces an integrative critical approach that orients conceptions of human rights in civil, social, economic, and environmental practices. The volume’s breadth and grounding in processes associated with globalization make it an ideal starting place for undergraduates and those seeking a broad overview of cutting-edge thinking in the rights field.

Cole, Wade M. 2012. Institutionalizing shame: The effect of Human Rights Committee rulings on abuse, 1981–2007. Social Science Research 41.3: 539–554.

DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.12.003

This article assesses the impacts of appeals to an international human rights body over claimed violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cole finds that, while such international judgments did not reduce subsequent state-imposed physical retribution, civil rights freedoms subsequently expanded in states found guilty of covenant violations.

Engel, D. M., and F. W. Munger. 1996. Rights, remembrance, and the reconciliation of difference. Law & Society Review 30.1: 7–53.

DOI: 10.2307/3054033

Focusing on the Americans with Disabilities Act, Engel and Munger explore the meaning of rights in America by focusing on the intersection between the changing nature of civil rights and personal histories of individuals who benefit from many of these changes.

Marshall, T. H. 1950. Citizenship and social class, and other essays . New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

The classic eponymous essay situates civil rights as one of three elements of citizenship. Marshall argues that civil rights––encompassing personal liberty and rights to property and justice––have become increasingly differentiated from citizenship’s political and social elements, with the development of civil strands predating the others and enabling the maintenance of capitalist institutions.

Polletta, Francesca. 2006. “It was like a fever”: Storytelling in protest and politics . Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226673776.001.0001

This well-received book asks important questions about why and how stories matter. Paying close attention to American civil rights activism, Polletta examines why people protest and what is at stake in the remembrance and articulation of rights claims.

Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1992. Master frames and cycles of protest. In Frontiers in social movement theory . Edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, 133–155. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.

Alongside an influential body of scholarship by Snow, Benford, and their colleagues, this chapter summarizes and extends research on how social movements frame issues to align their goals with audience values by examining connections among movements within a particular protest cycle. A key illustration centers on civil rights activists’ adoption of a rights-based “master frame.”

Stanfield, John H. 2012. “Taking care of unfinished business and the business of the 21st century: What an Institute for Advanced Study in Civil Rights, preferably in the academic deep South, should examine.” American Behavioral Scientist 56.10: 1434–1454.

DOI: 10.1177/0002764212454426

This unique article is based on a fictitious institute that would inquire about what was learned in retrospect from the American civil rights movement. Stanfield engages with the ways in which knowledge about the lessons of the movement has been produced, and how such ideas have shifted over time.

Turner, Bryan S., ed. 1993. Citizenship and social theory . New York: SAGE.

An edited volume that engages broadly with key theoretical developments around citizenship. Turner’s concluding essay orients thinking about citizenship around conceptions of civil society and human rights.

back to top

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login .

Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative click here .

• About Sociology »
• Meet the Editorial Board »
• Actor-Network Theory
• Adolescence
• African Americans
• African Societies
• Agent-Based Modeling
• Analysis, Spatial
• Analysis, World-Systems
• Anomie and Strain Theory
• Arab Spring, Mobilization, and Contentious Politics in the...
• Asian Americans
• Assimilation
• Authority and Work
• Bell, Daniel
• Biosociology
• Bourdieu, Pierre
• Catholicism
• Causal Inference
• Chicago School of Sociology
• Chinese Cultural Revolution
• Chinese Society
• Citizenship
• Civil Rights
• Civil Society
• Cognitive Sociology
• Cohort Analysis
• Collective Efficacy
• Collective Memory
• Comparative Historical Sociology
• Comte, Auguste
• Conflict Theory
• Conservatism
• Consumer Credit and Debt
• Consumer Culture
• Consumption
• Contemporary Family Issues
• Contingent Work
• Conversation Analysis
• Corrections
• Cosmopolitanism
• Crime, Cities and
• Cultural Capital
• Cultural Classification and Codes
• Cultural Economy
• Cultural Omnivorousness
• Cultural Production and Circulation
• Culture and Networks
• Culture, Sociology of
• Development
• Discrimination
• Doing Gender
• Du Bois, W.E.B.
• Durkheim, Émile
• Economic Globalization
• Economic Institutions and Institutional Change
• Economic Sociology
• Education and Health
• Education Policy in the United States
• Educational Policy and Race
• Empires and Colonialism
• Entrepreneurship
• Environmental Sociology
• Epistemology
• Ethnic Enclaves
• Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis
• Exchange Theory
• Families, Postmodern
• Family Policies
• Feminist Theory
• Field, Bourdieu's Concept of
• Forced Migration
• Foucault, Michel
• Frankfurt School
• Gender and Bodies
• Gender and Crime
• Gender and Education
• Gender and Health
• Gender and Incarceration
• Gender and Professions
• Gender and Social Movements
• Gender and Work
• Gender Pay Gap
• Gender, Sexuality, and Migration
• Gender Stratification
• Gender, Welfare Policy and
• Gendered Sexuality
• Gentrification
• Gerontology
• Global Inequalities
• Globalization and Labor
• Goffman, Erving
• Historic Preservation
• Human Trafficking
• Immigration
• Indian Society, Contemporary
• Institutions
• Intellectuals
• Intersectionalities
• Interview Methodology
• Job Quality
• Knowledge, Critical Sociology of
• Labor Markets
• Latino/Latina Studies
• Law, Sociology of
• LGBT Parenting and Family Formation
• LGBT Social Movements
• Life Course
• Lipset, S.M.
• Markets, Conventions and Categories in
• Marriage and Divorce
• Marxist Sociology
• Masculinity
• Mass Incarceration in the United States and its Collateral...
• Material Culture
• Mathematical Sociology
• Medical Sociology
• Mental Illness
• Methodological Individualism
• Middle Classes
• Military Sociology
• Money and Credit
• Multiculturalism
• Multilevel Models
• Multiracial, Mixed-Race, and Biracial Identities
• Nationalism
• Non-normative Sexuality Studies
• Occupations and Professions
• Organizations
• Panel Studies
• Parsons, Talcott
• Political Culture
• Political Economy
• Popular Culture
• Proletariat (Working Class)
• Protestantism
• Public Opinion
• Public Space
• Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
• Race and Sexuality
• Race and Violence
• Race and Youth
• Race in Global Perspective
• Race, Organizations, and Movements
• Rational Choice
• Relationships
• Religion and the Public Sphere
• Residential Segregation
• Revolutions
• Role Theory
• Rural Sociology
• Scientific Networks
• Secularization
• Sequence Analysis
• Sex versus Gender
• Sexual Identity
• Sexualities
• Sexuality Across the Life Course
• Simmel, Georg
• Single Parents in Context
• Small Cities
• Social Capital
• Social Change
• Social Closure
• Social Construction of Crime
• Social Control
• Social Darwinism
• Social Disorganization Theory
• Social Epidemiology
• Social History
• Social Indicators
• Social Mobility
• Social Movements
• Social Network Analysis
• Social Networks
• Social Policy
• Social Problems
• Social Psychology
• Social Stratification
• Social Theory
• Socialization, Sociological Perspectives on
• Sociolinguistics
• Sociological Approaches to Character
• Sociological Research on the Chinese Society
• Sociological Research, Qualitative Methods in
• Sociological Research, Quantitative Methods in
• Sociology, History of
• Sociology of Manners
• Sociology of Music
• Sociology of War, The
• Suburbanism
• Survey Methods
• Symbolic Boundaries
• Symbolic Interactionism
• The Division of Labor after Durkheim
• Tilly, Charles
• Time Use and Childcare
• Time Use and Time Diary Research
• Tourism, Sociology of
• Transnational Adoption
• Unions and Inequality
• Urban Ethnography
• Urban Growth Machine
• Urban Inequality in the United States
• Veblen, Thorstein
• Visual Arts, Music, and Aesthetic Experience
• Wallerstein, Immanuel
• Welfare, Race, and the American Imagination
• Welfare States
• Women’s Employment and Economic Inequality Between Househo...
• Work and Employment, Sociology of
• Work/Life Balance
• Workplace Flexibility
• Privacy Policy
• Cookie Policy
• Legal Notice
• Accessibility

Powered by:

• [81.177.182.136]
• 81.177.182.136

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• Open access
• Published: 08 August 2024

When sociology must comprehend the incomprehensible: interpretation of Weber and Durkheim in the sociology of Theodor W. Adorno

• Joan Gallego Monzó 1  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  11 , Article number:  1017 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

206 Accesses

Metrics details

In this article, we will delve into Theodor W. Adorno’s sociology. The general aim is to study Adorno’s theory of society and its relation to sociological interpretation. What primarily distinguishes Adorno from other sociologists (of his time and today) is that he considers society to be the fundamental concept of the discipline. Theorising on the post-liberal capitalism of his time, Adorno proposes the concept of the exchange society, which is understood as an antagonistic totality that reproduces itself through the suffering it inflicts on socialised individuals. Within texts dating back to the 1960s, such as ‘Society’, Adorno engages in an exploration of comprehensive sociology and the sociology of social facts, reciprocally examining them. He confronts one with the other in a proposal of an interpretative model of the comprehensibility or incomprehensibility of society. This intellectual confrontation, while avoiding synthesis, leads Adorno to two main outcomes. First, it yields a diagnostic perspective on social theory, portraying capitalist society as simultaneously rational and irrational, comprehensible and incomprehensible. Second, it hints at a sociological interpretation of specific phenomena. In addition to exploring this central theme in Adorno’s sociology, we will also shed light on his distinctive approach to classic texts and concepts. Specifically, Adorno links to the received terminologies but incorporates them into constellations that imbue them with eloquence by revealing the underlying objective moments they encapsulate. The theoretical significance of this article lies in the aim to demonstrate that Adorno’s contributions to sociology are not merely borrowed from philosophical contemplations. Instead, they arise from an immanent critique of the sociological tradition.

Similar content being viewed by others

Models of science and society: transcending the antagonism

Social pathologies and ideologies in light of Jürgen Habermas: a new interpretation of the thesis of colonisation

The epistemic foundations of injustice: lessons from the young marx, introduction.

In this article, we are interested in the sociologist Adorno. The general aim is to study Adorno’s theory of society and its relation to sociological interpretation. For Adorno, the object of study of sociology can be none other than society. Thus, we want to enter into this concept of society, which must be developed theoretically so that researchers can carry out sociological interpretations of concrete social phenomena. This raises the problem of conceptual construction. Adorno does not define concepts but deploys them. This exercise is carried out in the text ‘Society’, where he takes on the task of constructing this concept in dialogue with the classics of sociology, Marx, Weber and Durkheim.

In the text ‘Society’, Adorno constructs a model or constellation that juxtaposes and brings into dialogue Émile Durkheim’s sociology of social facts and Max Weber’s comprehensive sociology. The terrain on which Adorno proposes the confrontation is the problem of whether the social is comprehensible or not. His critical dialogue with Durkheimian chosisme and Weberian comprehensive sociology does not intend to devise a new sociological method that would update their epistemological and methodological proposals. Adorno does not want to make an overcoming synthesis of Weber and Durkheim but to make one illuminate the shortcomings of the other. The opposition between the two brings a different perspective to the field of social science methodology. The epistemological discussion, even as the construction of the sociological science’s object depends on carving out its own space, is intrinsically linked to practical concerns. Methodology always goes beyond what it presupposes. Adorno criticises the methodology of the social sciences from inside, which is oblivious to the danger that scientific knowledge fulfils an ideological function; that is, it shields society –a historically determined society– from critique. The constellation explicitly pits Durkheim against Weber, but Adorno’s diagnosis is that both are insufficient to offer a model of critical interpretation. This reading is influenced by Marx’s critique of economic categories.

This article is a commentary on the text ‘Society’. More specifically, we will focus on the presentation and interpretation of the aforementioned constellation. Since ‘Society’ is a very short and sometimes schematic text, we will draw on Adorno’s other writings –particularly those focusing on social theory and sociological interpretation– in our reading. Our interpretation also draws on some reception literature: first, we link to the extensive literature on Adorno’s social theory that has drawn attention to the dimension of critique of capitalism in his concept of the exchange society as an antagonistic totality (Bonefeld, 2016 ; Heitmann 2018 ; Maiso 2022 ; Reichelt 2011 ). On the other hand, we take up the baton of studies that point to the importance of the idea of interpretation in Adorno and the understanding of the theoretical process as something constructive, tentative, of the composition of figures and models (Buck-Morss 1977 ; Romero 2010 ; Sevilla 2005 ; Vidal 2021 ). The article deals with the construction of sociological concepts as a result of interpretative modelling exercises. We are convinced that Adorno’s sociology is best understood by keeping in mind the idea of interpretation proposed as early as the 1930s and implemented in the models of Negative Dialectics .

With regard to this Weber-Durkheim constellation on the possibility of understanding the social, we will defend three theses:

From this constellation emerges a certain social diagnosis: Adorno highlights capitalist society as a fractured totality, embodying simultaneously elements of humanity and inhumanity, rationality and irrationality, and comprehensibility and incomprehensibility.

This constellation gives rise to indications as to how the sociologist should make interpretations: Adorno suggests a way of interpreting specific phenomena that, while acknowledging their social determinants, remains cognisant of the fact that the social sphere is entrenched in reified praxis. He emphasises that adopting a genetic perspective is crucial to retaining a view of the active subject.

This constellation evidences a particular way of reading the classics of sociology and their concepts: Adorno seeks to link with received terminology, incorporating it into constellations that render it eloquent by revealing the objective moments encapsulated within it.

We intend to contribute to the underdeveloped literature on Adorno’s sociology. In this sense, the article has the theoretical significance of demonstrating that Adorno’s contributions to sociology are not merely borrowed from philosophical contemplations. Instead, they exhibit a sense of continuity with the concepts of the sociological tradition, which are criticised from within. Thus, the article offers keys to understanding what Adorno thinks of the classics of sociology: Weber, Durkheim, and Marx.

This article focuses on the interpretative aspect of Adorno’s sociology in terms of both the sociologist’s work in interpreting social phenomena and Adorno’s own theoretical construction of the fundamental concepts of sociology. Although there are important works that point to the interest of Adorno’s sociology (Benzer 2011 ; Muller-Doohm 1996 ), the interpretation of Adorno within the discipline does not sufficiently take into account that his sociological categories are dialectically developed in a model building process. ‘Society’, ‘individual’ or ‘totality’ are not standard concepts, they function as figures that make their time (post-liberal capitalist society) legible and at the same time want to liberate the living subjects who suffer reproducing it. These categories are multiple within themselves: they are composed of elements of description and critique. But it is not a matter of describing in order to criticise; the very mode of exposition is critical. This is what is at stake in the concept of constellation, which will be central to this paper. The constellation on the comprehensibility of society is one of the key models by which Adorno constructs the concept of antagonistic totality and makes it yieldable for a critical interpretation of concrete phenomena.

We shall begin with two chapters (‘A sociology of capitalist society’ and ‘Socialisation and damaged lives’) that attempt to give an idea of the concept of the exchange society as an antagonistic totality and of the problem of how it reproduces itself through the action of socialised individuals. These two chapters provide an insight into the role of Marxism and psychoanalysis in Adorno’s social thought. They also help to situate the Weber-Durkheim constellation within the interests of Adorno’s sociology. The third and longest chapter (‘Is the social comprehensible?’) will elaborate on the Weber-Durkheim constellation on the comprehensibility of the social. Finally, the fourth chapter (‘Dialectical reading: Terminology and constellations’) will make explicit Adorno’s way of reading the classics of sociology and their concepts.

A sociology of capitalist society

For Adorno, the central object of sociology is society. This already has a substantial significance and is far from being a mere triviality. In the decades following the Second World War, although the concept of society was in good health in the social imaginary, leading German sociologists of note, such as René König and Helmut Schelsky, saw it as problematic. They viewed it as a speculative vestige in sociology, one that should be removed in favour of a more empirically oriented approach, thereby eliminating philosophical perspectives (Adorno 2022c , p. 314; Lepsius 1979 ). The crisis surrounding the concept of society has deepened, as evidenced by the current pre-eminence of postmodern and asocial (if not anti-social) discourses (Alonso and Fernández Rodríguez, 2013 , p. 245). Within sociology, this crisis is evidenced in the contemporary relevance of post-social sociology and various versions of individual-focused sociologies, particularly those that have arisen in France (see, for example, Dubet 2007 ; García Selgas 2010 ; Lahire 2011 ; Latour 2007 ; Martucelli and Santiago 2017 ). Footnote 1

The text ‘Society’ represents a specific proposition aimed at defining the concept of society. Adorno penned this text in 1965, just four years prior to his passing, and delivered it as a lecture on October 14, 1966, in Rome. As a prelude to his exposition, Adorno made it clear that it’s impossible to divorce ‘his formulations’ in the text from the motivation behind it, which was that it was written as a commissioned piece for the Evangelische Staatslexikon (Adorno 2022c , p. 569). It’s worth noting that Adorno is not inclined to arbitrarily fix terminological concepts but rather to develop them (Adorno 2021b ). In other words, when confronted with the challenge of capturing something objective subjectively, which is the challenge of definition, he believes that problems and contradictions should not be simply resolved through conceptual clarification – though he acknowledges its necessity – but rather, they must be fully unfolded (Adorno 2021b , p. 741). Footnote 2

Faced with the task of defining society, Adorno was initially daunted by the impossibility of doing justice to such a concept within the confines of a dictionary entry. During his lecture, he emphasised that he could undertake this endeavour only as a tour de force, a balancing act (Adorno 2022c , p. 569). The term tour de force is of French origin and, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, refers to ‘an achievement or performance that shows great skill and attracts admiration’. However, Adorno imbues it with a different nuance that transcends the mere accomplishment of something highly complex. He employs this expression in Aesthetic Theory in the context of interpreting artworks: works of art designed as a tour de force are conceived as a balancing act capable of achieving the unattainable. Adorno asserts that ‘works of art that are deliberately conceived as a tour de force are semblance because they must purport in essence to be what they in essence cannot be; they correct themselves by emphasising their own impossibility’ (Adorno 2021a , p. 163). This notion is a fundamental element of Adorno’s understanding of interpretation and constitutes part of the challenge he believes all theory must undertake: to address the non-conceptual without renouncing the concept. That the theory proceeds as a tour de force means that its possibility starts by emphasising its impossibility, constructing a figure that renders the subject matter elusive. Thus, Adorno agrees to define the term ‘society’ only as an attempt or essay to explain why an emphatic concept of society, one that refers to dynamic realities, defies a straightforward definition. This is how the text commences:

Of the few concepts which, according to Nietzsche’s thesis, allow a verbal definition ‘in which a whole process is semiotically synthesised’, the concept of society is an exemplary model. Society is essentially a process; more is said about it by its kinetic laws than by the invariants which one could try to elaborate. (Adorno 2022c , p. 9)

Adorno commences his examination by critiquing certain common attempts at defining society. First, in contrast to how it may appear in common understanding, society is not simply the aggregate of all individuals inhabiting a particular place at a given time. This formal, nominalistic definition would prematurely assume that society is inherently human and immediately associated with individual subjects. It fails to recognise that the distinctive essence of society lies in the predominance of relationships over individual human beings, who are ultimately nothing more than its private products of power (Adorno 2022c , p. 9). In essence, society is not merely a collection of individuals; rather, it implies a complex network of relationships that exert control over them, akin to an alien nexus.

Society is not only a dynamic concept but also a functional one. Adorno characterises society as a totality that represents a functional nexus. This signifies that we are referring to a framework of functions that encompasses every individual and interweaves all its members: every individual must fulfil a function as a means of ‘earning a living’ (Adorno 2022c , p. 10). Totality, in this context, is not an external construct; rather, it is realised only through the unity of functions.

This reevaluation of the starting point of social science does not stem from a mere methodological preference for holism over methodological individualism. Totality is not a methodological postulate; it represents the concept of a tangible reality that acquires autonomy (Reichelt 2007 , p. 5). It is a distinct historical process –the establishment of capitalist society as a system– that necessitates a structural approach within sociology. Furthermore, the inception of sociology is intricately intertwined with the historical emergence of capitalist society, a society that manifests as a totality where each process is a function of other processes and, in turn, of the totality (Adorno 2011 , pp. 123–124).

To elucidate the underlying logic of the advanced capitalist society of his era, Adorno draws upon Marx’s terminology. Particularly in Adorno’s later works, where social theory takes on a foundational role, he provides key components for a theory of the exchange society (Adorno 2020 , pp. 327–351; 2021c, pp. 58-63; 2022c, pp. 13–14, 38, 47, 209, 293–296). This functional interconnection binding individuals together is determined by the exchange relationship. In the universal realisation of exchange, ‘the qualitative constitution of producers and consumers, the mode of production, even the need that the social mechanism satisfies in passing, is disregarded as secondary. What comes first is profit’ (Adorno 2022c , p. 13). Here, Adorno references Marx’s theory of value: this common element among commodities, allowing for their comparison once singular elements are set aside, is value. Value emerges as a result of the objective social process in which all privately produced goods, transformed into commodities, are interrelated within the generalised exchange relation (Marx 2012 , pp. 85–98). The objectivity of value is inherently social: a conceptual component, value, lies at the core of the object. Adorno advances the notion of an ‘objective conceptuality’ or ‘objective abstraction’ (Reichelt 2007 ). ‘Exchange-value, which is something merely thought as opposed to use-value, dominates over human need, and in its place, appearance dominates over reality’ (Adorno 2022c , p. 209). Value, akin to the concept, performs generalisation operations wherein different entities are linked to others based on a shared element. Thus, when Hans Albert, within the context of the disputation of positivism in German sociology, criticises Adorno for having an abstract, metaphysical concept of society and totality, Adorno responds by asserting that abstraction is not a discretionary choice within his critical model of sociology –it does not originate from him– but rather is inherent to the object itself (Adorno 2022c , pp. 293–294). It constitutes a real abstraction produced by subjects in the realm of exchange. Footnote 3

In capitalist society, the system’s essence lies in the expansion of the principle of exchange. As Adorno articulates in his work ‘Society’, “abstractness of exchange value, before any concrete social stratification, goes together with the domination of the general over the particular, of society over those who are forcibly its members” (2022c, pp. 13–14). Adorno’s critique of identity fundamentally revolves around this critique of value.

The concept of society is not merely a classificatory one, that is, the most abstract concept in sociology, which should be abstracted from individual facts (Adorno 2022c , p. 9). The categorisation of society cannot be achieved by simply progressing from the specific to the general, for when we recognise that the essence of society involves a complex and differentiated network juxtaposed with individual beings and phenomena, we cannot presume a seamless continuity. The objectification of social relations renders it arduous to elucidate the intricate interconnections implied by society concerning living individuals –or, in Marx’s terminology, it impedes a straightforward explanation of value with respect to living people and their labour. Adorno underscores the notion that the core of capitalist society has become something alien, profoundly inscrutable to individuals, suggesting that we have become reliant on something not entirely human. Hence, regarding the concept of society as merely a classification is, to borrow from Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , to confuse the fact of logic with the logic of fact (Marx 1981 , p. 216). In Adorno’s words, it is ‘to confuse the usual ideal of the scientific, hierarchical ordering of categories with the object of knowledge’ (2022c, p. 9). Furthermore, the attempt to derive society from the generalisation of the specific fundamentally excludes the possibility of recognising that the general, the social totality, inherently shapes individual actions.

This assertion hinges on the idea that, in Hegelian terminology, society constitutes a concrete totality –a concept upon which the existence of every individual depends, yet one that hasn’t been abstracted from individuality but encompasses within itself, as a prerequisite, all individual aspects (Adorno 2021c , p. 103). However, Adorno’s interpretation of Hegel carries a critical dimension. Totality, in his view, isn’t a category of the spirit but rather a feature of social objectivity, even though it possesses a conceptual core. Furthermore, as a force compelling the living individual who fails to recognise themselves within it, exchange society bears an element of falsity. This is why it represents an antagonistic totality . According to Adorno, liberated humanity would not be synonymous with totality in any way (Adorno 2022c , p. 292). The fundamental problem of Adorno’s social theory is to understand the process by which relations between people eventually take the form of a rigid structure that is opposed to individuals. He shares Marx’s interest in the process of fetishisation or reification. Reified structures must be able to refer to the action or praxis objectified in them.

An exchange society constitutes a functional interconnection, remains elusive, and defies immediate comprehension or empirical verification. In other words, it eludes the commonly referred to criterion of verifiability, refusing to be confined to empirical facts . (Adorno wryly employs English terms to satirise positivist and scientistic American sociology.) Consequently, positivism seeks to discard a concept like society, dismissing it as a metaphysical vestige of a historically less critical era in social science. But ‘what an unrealistic realism’, Adorno replies, for ‘there is no social factor that is not determined by society’ (2022c, p.10).

Socialisation and damaged live

However, the social sphere doesn’t merely assert itself ‘over the heads of individuals’. In his Introduction to Sociology , Adorno emphasises that the examination of the individual cannot simply consist of identifying what directly results from society’s influence. On the contrary, one must interpret the category of individuation itself and the specific forms of individuality as manifestations of the internalisation of social coercion or societal demands (Adorno 2021c , pp. 188–190). If we want to express it in jargon more familiar to sociology, we would say that Adorno considers a theoretical explanation of the problem of the internalisation of the external to be necessary (Berger and Luckmann 1967 ).

Despite its overwhelming influence, society isn’t detached from specific moments; it thrives within the thoughts, actions, and emotions of unique individuals within particular situations and institutions (Heitmann 2017 , p. 56). Adorno understood that post-liberal capitalism, characterised by an immense concentration of economic and political power that disempowers individuals, transcends being simply a mode of production; it becomes a mode of constituting life in its entirety (Maiso 2022 , pp. 155–156). Consequently, even though his diagnosis adopts Marxian categories of the critique of political economy, the transformations of the object compel him to go beyond them (Maiso 2022 ). The critique of capitalism must encompass the processes of socialisation – that is, how living subjects internalise and perpetuate an increasingly irrational society. Living individuals are indeed victims of society, but they are also essential for its existence. It’s not merely a systemic logic dominating a different logic, that of action; instead, it reproduces itself precisely through the actions of individuals. All actions are socially determined, but the social persists and reproduces itself because living individuals, with a certain degree of agency, adapt to these constraints in various ways. This core issue, which challenges a concept like Lebenswelt , is encapsulated in Adorno’s statement that individuals are objects, not subjects, of the social process they perpetuate as subjects (2022c, p. 358).

Society reproduces itself through antagonism and violence: there is conflict between groups and individuals who never cease to compete for the social cake, and there is intrapsychic conflict resulting from the need to adapt to social demands. Adorno saw this paradox of capitalist socialisation: the mechanism that brings people together is the same that tears them apart; the unity of the system derives from its irreconcilable violence (Adorno 2022a , p. 273).

The process of socialisation does not take place beyond or in spite of conflicts and antagonisms. Its medium is the very antagonisms themselves, which simultaneously tear society apart. The antagonism that could wipe out organised society any day with total catastrophe is set and reproduced in the relationship of exchange as such. Only through the interest in profit and the immanent breakdown of the social whole that the mechanism survives, creaking, groaning, with unspeakable sacrifices, until today. (Adorno 2022c , pp. 14–15)

Therefore, the fact that the individual makes the determinants livable and has, particularly in consumption, a certain capacity for choice, does not mean that it is a successful subject (Maiso 2022 ). For Adorno, the life that has incorporated social needs can only be a damaged life . We make the determinants livable but with great sacrifices. The attempt to make the demands of the exchange society compatible with our personality is painful and involves the splitting of the subject itself. Thus, when Adorno speaks of the damaged life, he is referring to a social suffering that does not depend on particular situations but on the social constitution itself. The ‘new human type’ borne out of post-liberal capitalism can no longer be considered a fully realised individual, as its character loses the qualities of uniqueness, continuity, and substantiality (Maiso 2022 , p. 253). This is the sense of non-identity between subject and object, between society and individuals.

Post-liberal capitalist society, a ‘radically societalised society’, becomes a seamless system but irreconcilable (Adorno 2022a , p. 273). This directs attention to the psychology of the socialised subjects. Adorno will be clear that the critique of psychologism must not lead to a renunciation of psychology. The diagnosis of the damaged life, which identifies the point where the logic of the social system intersects with the biography of the individual (Maiso 2022 , p. 15), draws essential support from psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, in tandem with sociological theory, could examine the connection between society as a whole and the structures of human drives. Following the failure of the revolution, the rise of fascism, and the solidification of capitalist society as an oppressive second nature, psychoanalysis could emerge as an ally in deciphering the ‘enigma of docility’ (Zamora 2007 ). Adorno frequently remarks on his era, emphasising that the chasm between the power and powerlessness of living individuals has never been more pronounced. This common characteristic binds capitalism and fascism as societies of ‘total socialisation’ despite their obvious differences (Maiso 2022 , p. 117 ff.). It became imperative to scrutinise the subjective conditions of objective irrationality, and in this endeavour, psychoanalysis became relevant (Adorno 2022c , p. 42; Maiso 2022 , p. 275).

Is the social comprehensible?

After addressing the key aspects of social theory and the issue of socialisation, we need to explore how we grasp society and make intelligible the phenomena it influences. Two classical perspectives have played a central role in sociology: Weber’s comprehensive sociology and Durkheim’s sociology of social facts.

For Weber, sociology’s goal is to comprehend ( verstehen ) social action through interpretation. Social action refers to human conduct in which one or multiple individuals attribute subjective meanings. To truly understand an action, one must focus on the meaning ascribed by the relevant subject (Weber 2021 , p. 149). In this regard, sociology aligns with the tradition of Dilthey and methodological hermeneutics. However, the emphasis on rationality demarcates this understanding from psychology.

Additionally, Weber addresses and rectifies his historicism and idiographic orientation by introducing the concept of ideal types – abstract models that enable him to move beyond the examination of individual cases. Ideal types, though not existing in reality, serve as mental constructs that unilaterally accentuate particular viewpoints, synthesising numerous individual and diffuse phenomena. They function as heuristic tools, akin to ‘yardsticks’, helping to identify divergences or similarities between cases and the type (Weber 2021 , pp. 157–158). They do not represent knowledge of reality itself but facilitate the formulation of hypotheses (Bourdieu et al. 2005 , p. 246).

For Durkheim, sociology primarily concerns itself with social facts rather than individual actions. These social facts emerge from processes that occur outside of us, making them akin to natural facts. Social facts cannot be apprehended through introspection or hermeneutic methods because they possess an inherent foreignness that necessitates a departure from spontaneous sociology. Instead, Durkheim advocates for observation and experimentation, asserting that ‘the mind cannot understand without going outside itself’ (Durkheim 1982 , p. 36).

Durkheim challenges what Bourdieu labels the illusion of transparency to establish the focus of the emerging sociological science. To understand and explain an institution, it is insufficient to rediscover the intentions that may have contributed to its formation. Institutions are entwined within a complex web of historical determinants and interactions with other institutions (Bourdieu et al. 2005 , p. 146). Social facts are imposed on individuals as external, coercive entities, exerting daily pressure without being readily comprehensible. In response, sociologists are compelled to approach social facts as if they were inanimate objects. Durkheim contends that sociological study must begin with ‘the principle that one is entirely ignorant of what they are’ (1982, p. 36). This implies that, unlike ideas, which are known through introspection, social facts must be explained externally within their relational contexts.

In a passage from his work ‘Society’, Adorno brings Weber and Durkheim face to face, seeking to examine their respective moments of truth and falsity. While this passage is lengthy, I believe it merits quotation before we delve into our analysis.

Society, however, is both recognisable and unrecognisable from within. [Dialectical thesis to be developed]. In it, in the human product, the living subjects are still capable of finding themselves despite everything and as if from afar, contrary to what happens in chemistry and physics. In fact, action within bourgeois society, as rationality, is from a largely objective perspective both ‘comprehensible’ and ‘motivated’. The generation of Max Weber and Dilthey rightly reminded us of this. The ideal of understanding was partial in excluding from society that which is contrary to the identification by the person understanding. Durkheim’s rule that one should treat social facts as things, refraining in principle from understanding them, referred to this. He did not allow himself to be talked out of the fact that society encounters each individual primarily as a non-identical thing, as a ‘constraint’. In this respect, reflection on society begins where comprehensibility ends. In Durkheim, the method of natural science he advocates registers Hegel’s ‘second nature’, which society eventually became as opposed to living beings. The antithesis to Weber, however, remains as particular as Weber’s thesis, since it is satisfied with non-comprehensibility in the same way as Weber was with the postulate of comprehensibility. Instead, non-comprehensibility would have to be understood as deriving relations from relations between people, relations that have become independent and opaque. Today, sociology would finally have to understand the incomprehensible, the incursion of humanity into inhumanity. (Adorno 2022c , pp. 11-12) Footnote 4

Adorno juxtaposes Durkheim against Weber and Weber against Durkheim, even though both are seen as having their limitations. On the one hand, while sociology’s primary focus should be on objectified forms as social totality rather than meaningful actions or values, there is a moment of truth in comprehensive sociology. In society, living individuals can still discover themselves and catch a glimpse of the practical essence within the objectified, reified structures. In this sense, Adorno acknowledges that in Dilthey’s methodological hermeneutics and Weber’s comprehensive sociology, there exists this moment of truth. Despite the pervasive reification, not everything is alien or unfamiliar. Even if this understanding is achieved from a distance and often requires intricate interpretation, we can still discern our actions and rationality embedded within structures that aren’t entirely rational. This is why the social sciences can maintain the possibility of comprehension [Verstehen].

This recognition of the moment of truth within sociological subjectivism is, however, contingent upon the “dialectisation” of the Verstehen, which connects it to the issue of reification. This ‘ideal of Verstehen’ neglects what exists in society that contradicts comprehension, what cannot be equated with it: reality and experience cannot be simply reduced to mere meaning (‘the ideal of understanding [Verstehensideal] was partial in excluding from society what is contrary to identification by the one who understands’ (2022c, p. 12)). In contrast, Adorno juxtaposes Durkheim’s concept of chosisme , which highlights that which cannot be reduced to understanding (‘reflection on society arises where comprehensibility ends’ (2022c, p. 12)). Here, comprehensibility refers to the Weberian Verstehen . Adorno, along with Durkheim, does not advocate for abandoning the conceptual or empirical grasp of social facts but rather for comprehending them as meaningful. Durkheim illustrates that society primarily confronts individuals as something non-identical and coercive. For instance, in the context of education, he argued that:

it is vain to believe that we can educate our children as we wish. There are customs which we are obliged to accept; if we depart from them too severely, they come upon our children. […] There is, then, at every moment, a regulating type of education from which we cannot depart without encountering lively resistance which serves to restrain the vagaries of dissidence. (Durkheim 1922 , p. 41)

This is why the Durkheimian method, which mirrors that of the natural sciences and their inherent detachment from the object, captures the reified social (‘registers Hegel’s “second nature”, which society eventually became as opposed to living beings’ (2022c, p. 12)). The notion of second nature already contains a critique of hermeneutics: it suggests that society is presented as something distinct, something separated from the individual, akin to the first nature, and drained of meaning (Lukács 1920 , pp. 52–57). Traditional hermeneutics posit a meaning that, from this perspective, justifies the existing state of the world. On the other hand, any application of the natural sciences’ method to sociology can effectively capture social dynamics ‘a contrario’ –Adorno also highlights this in Comte (2011)– not solely due to a methodological choice, but owing to the historical process by which humanity becomes estranged.

The concept of a social fact, an inherently incomprehensible foreign entity, serves to ‘register’ second nature. However, Durkheim’s objectivism is only partial because it is not only a matter of registering social totality (‘the antithesis to Weber, however, remains as particular as Weber’s thesis, since it is satisfied with non-comprehensibility in the same way as Weber was with the postulate of comprehensibility’ (2022c, p. 12)). Durkheim’s sociology focuses exclusively on society in its alienated state as a worthy object, but it lacks reflection on the mechanisms of reification (Adorno 2011 , p. 86). The external and coercive nature of social facts records the reification within capitalist society but transforms this issue of the object into a methodological presupposition, dehistoricising and absolutising it. Criticising Verstehen should not lead to an affirmative stance on existing institutions.

Every science must correspond to its object in the sense of being commensurate with its complexity. Nevertheless, it is clear that a particular knowledge, a specific science, does not share the same nature as that object. A science is distinct from its object. For example, the science that studies diseases is not itself a diseased science (Plato 2018 , 438e). In Durkheim’s case, we can say that sociology seems to become too closely aligned with its object, the reified society (or how it presents itself): he transfers the negativity, opacity, and disconcerting unfamiliarity of the social from the individual to the methodological maxim –‘you must not understand’. He essentially reinforces the existing myth of society as destiny but with a scientific positivist stance (Adorno 2022c , p. 240).

Weber and Durkheim both exhibit partial perspectives. In both cases, social objectivity remains shielded from critique. In one instance, this is achieved by not delving into the study of the mediation of the social totality and by justifying the world through the lens of endowed meaning. In the other, it’s achieved by conforming too closely to it and presenting it as a fact when, in reality, it has undergone transformation. Adorno concludes this passage by emphasising the task of sociology: ‘non-comprehensibility would have to be understood as deriving relations from relations between people, relations that have become independent and opaque. Today, sociology would finally have to comprehend the incomprehensible [ das Unverstehbare zu verstehen ], the incursion of humanity into inhumanity’ (2022c, p. 12).

It is important to note that ‘comprehending incomprehensibility’ does not imply the overcoming or synthesis of the sociology of action and the sociology of social facts. The concept of totality does not emerge from the fusion of both paradigms, action theory and system theory. Adorno constructs a figure or constellation of positivism (Reichelt 2011 , p. 39). In the construction of constellations or models, the goal is to arrange and rearrange elements, juxtapose them, and create a tentative figure (Adorno 2022b , pp. 335–337). Adorno develops an interpretative constellation between comprehensibility and incomprehensibility. ‘Comprehending incomprehensibility’ constitutes an oxymoron, combining two contradictory terms within the same syntactic structure. However, this composition does not seek to generate a new sense; such expectations are preemptively frustrated (2022b, p. 334). In the constellation, one moment throws light on the other. This figure successfully highlights the tension between subject and object that has been perpetuated or externalised throughout the history of the sociological discipline. No compromise or middle ground is possible because social objectivity itself is the subject of contention (Jameson 1990 , pp. 38–39).

This epistemological dispute unveils the antagonistic nature of society, establishing a perspective “that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted” (Adorno 2021d , p. 283). The confrontation between comprehensive sociology and the sociology of social facts generates a field of tensions in which society unfolds as a rational and irrational, comprehensible and incomprehensible, human and inhuman totality. A related mode of interpretation emerges, which, while not naive about the true moment of imposition ( de facto , people are products of their social relations, of this totality), is also aware of its false moment (the social is reified praxis, and second nature is the alienation of the historical).

Adorno employs the figure ‘comprehending incomprehensibility’ as a means of playing with hermeneutics, conducting an immanent critique of it. This understanding of incomprehensibility, namely, the interpretation of the social as second nature, differs significantly from Weber’s Verstehen, although they both share an interest in the practical perspective. The foundation for this approach can be traced back to Marx and his critique of economic categories (Bonefeld 2016 ; Reichelt 2011 ). As Lars Heitmann points out: ‘Marx shows how the “economic categories” (value, price, money, capital, wages, profit, interest, etc.) establish a practice of economic activity that belongs to an inverted, seemingly self-moving “whole”’ (2018, p. 591). Adorno’s ironic demand for ‘good comprehension’ refers to the capacity to discern the laws governing society, essentially the theoretical intellection of the totality’s constitution. This has little to do with understanding from the perspective of individual intentions.

As Helmut Reichelt notes, Durkheim and Weber articulate a ‘phenomenal knowledge’ of how social objectivity is experienced by individuals. They (perhaps unknowingly) express an awareness of society’s autonomisation but fail to conceptually grasp it, resulting in a lack of development of incomprehensibility, of objective abstraction within its inherent dynamics. Positivism does not grasp the genesis of objectification; in this sense, it remains limited to a mere phenomenal understanding. In contrast, Adorno champions materialism as an anamnesis of genesis (Reichelt 2011 , pp. 35–39). The objective is to recognise the processes of ‘having come to be’ or the ‘immobilised dynamics’ of phenomena (Adorno 2021c , p. 244). A sociology that neglects the historical dimension of ‘having come to be’ is, in essence, a sociology devoid of genuine experiential insight (2021c, p. 250). The link with Marx is explicitly pointed out by Adorno in his lectures on ‘History and Freedom’:

Interpretation, I said, is criticism of phenomena that have been brought to a standstill; it consists in revealing the dynamism stored up in them, so that what appears as second nature can be seen to be history. On the other hand, criticism ensures that what has evolved loses its appearance as mere existence and stands revealed as the product of history. This is essentially the procedure of Marxist critique (if I may briefly make mention of this here). Marxist critique consists in showing that every conceivable social and economic factor that appears to be part of nature is in fact something that has evolved historically (Adorno 2006 , pp. 135–136).

While Weber exhibits an inclination to treat the social as practical, the distinguishing trait of critical sociology lies in not unquestioningly accepting praxis as a given but maintaining it as a possibility, persistently denouncing the objectified aspects of the social. Only through this approach can sociology potentially contribute to broadening human experience.

From this point, the interpretative task of sociology, primarily conceived as social physiognomy (Romero 2010 , pp. 151 ff.), can be delineated: it must render the historical totality evident within concrete phenomena (sometimes even within apocryphal or divergent phenomena, which can be particularly revealing). However, it should not reveal this totality as its meaning but as a web of guilt-nexus that stifles experience, as a structural context, historical but naturalised, that binds human action. In this manner, social phenomena, individual actions, and modes of thought and emotion are interconnected with the process that led them to become what they are. Only through this historical perspective can the possibility arise that they could become something else. The interest of interpretation is the unique and the individual: ‘dialectical critique seeks to safeguard or help establish that which does not obey the totality, that which opposes it, or that which first forms itself as the potential of an as yet non-existent individuation’ (2022c, p. 292).

Dialectical reading: terminology and constellations

Adorno’s interpretation of Weber and Durkheim is to be understood within a theory and practice of dialectical reading of inherited texts and concepts. Adorno’s approach has the potential to transform non-dialectical thinkers into dialectical ones by nurturing the thematic or objective element that “creeps in”, even against their own intentions. Adorno states in his course Philosophy and Sociology :

the origins of dialectical thinking do not lie in the speculative tendency of an individual thinker, in purely intellectual functions, but even thinkers as unsuspected of such intentions as the old Comte, only by the force of what they dealt with, were forced into dialectical conceptions. (2011, p. 36)

Beyond the author’s intentionality, the language objectified in the texts fixes their time and its conflicts. This language, alienated from the author’s subjectivity, becomes a sign to be interpreted, an indication of the historical moment (Vidal,+ 2019 , pp. 134 ff.). In terms of psychoanalysis, a concept dear to Adorno, one could liken this process to uncovering the latent social unconscious within the text’s literalness.

Adorno’s interpretation reveals how Weber and Durkheim inadvertently incorporate their contemporary societal context into their writings. Within the epistemology and methodology of classical sociology, capitalist society and its reification subtly infiltrates. In fact, Adorno asserts in his Introduction to Sociology lectures that the support for this objectivity in the structure and organisation of the subject matter becomes even more compelling when it unintentionally emerges from sociologists whose methodological stance contradicts his own (2021c, p. 208).

This is linked to a particular way of conceptualising terminology and adopting a specific stance towards longstanding philosophical issues. Only a dialectical philosophy, guided by an ahistorical truth, is willing to set aside traditional problems and embark on a fresh beginning (Adorno, 2022b , p. 339). Adorno dismisses attempts to eradicate inherited terminology, whether through artificial language or neologisms (2012, p. 44). Acknowledging the connection of thought to historical continuity is essential. The originality of a thought, its capacity to engage with that core of experience that remains distant from rigid terminology, necessitates a ‘strict dialectical communication with the most recent attempts at solution that have been made in philosophy and its terminology’ (2022b, p. 340). In his lessons on Philosophical Terminology , Adorno intertwines the exploration of established terminology with the concept of a constellation:

The most fruitful means of communicating an original thought from the point of view of language consists in splicing with the terminology received by tradition, but incorporating constellations into it by which the related terms are expressed differently. (Adorno, 2012 , p. 44)

In this notion of aligning with tradition, of working with inherited concepts without attempting to unearth their original meanings but also without discarding them in favour of entirely new ones, Adorno encourages us to engage with significant texts and transcend the all-too-common scholastic barriers. However, this stance does not constitute a defence of the authority of tradition but rather seeks to connect with potent concepts and theorems. These concepts derive their power precisely because, whether the author intended it or not, they have the capacity to encapsulate the essence of their own era. It is about compelling these concepts to convey different meanings to us. Adorno manages to make the fractured capitalist society appear within the framework of classical sociology (Weber and Durkheim). And through the interpretative construction, he is able to detect a critical potential in Weberian subjectivism and Durkheimian structuralism. The bourgeois concepts are not discarded; instead, an immanent critique is applied, revealing their critical potential and aiming to transcend capitalist society itself.

After affirming in The Rules of Sociological Method that it is imperative to examine social facts in their own right as external entities detached from individuals, Durkheim notes, ‘if this exteriority is only apparent, the illusion will dissipate as science advances and, so to speak, the exterior will become interior ’ (1982, p. 70, emphasis mine). Interpreting this passage allows us to glimpse a Durkheim who seeks to break free from the constraints imposed by his own methodology. In the words of critical theory, Durkheim is alluding to the possibility that the social, in its reified form, is akin to a fetish. The phrase ‘if this exteriority is only apparent’ can be read without too many interpretative pirouettes as ‘if the fact that the social presents itself as second nature is only an appearance’ (this conditional sentence is an affirmation in Adorno). And then Durkheim goes on: ‘the illusion will dissipate as science will advance and the exterior will become interior’. This eloquent phrase, ‘the exterior will become interior’, essentially relates, as we have attempted to elucidate, to the potential for a genuinely humane society where individuals recognise themselves within their social relationships. Formulating this process in terms of the dissipation of an illusion fits with the Adornian topos of breaking the spell .

Primarily, Durkheim offers a methodological assessment that places trust in scientific progress. However, we can now discern that within it, the issue of social emancipation becomes objectified. Durkheim and Adorno would concur that it is not yet possible to be interpretative in sociology and that an inner knowledge of social phenomena is not yet possible. Yet, whereas Durkheim believes this potential hinges on scientific advancement, Adorno is convinced that it first and foremost relies on a transformation of society. Critical theory would not entertain the idea that the exterior becoming interior or the realisation of an emancipated society could be achieved through social science or thought, regardless of how critical or successful their interpretations might be. Instead, it demands a fundamental restructuring of the social framework itself by subjects who re-appropriate the world.

Conclusions

Adorno’s dialectical reading, which aims to connect with classical terminology while incorporating it into constellations, takes the form in sociological texts of the ‘constellation of positivism’. Weber’s and Durkheim’s frameworks are incorporated into the comprehensibility-incomprehensibility model. Adorno’s critical interpretation makes their dispute a sign of a fractured society, both rational and irrational, system and rupture. In this regard, he puts forth a non-systematic social theory that embraces the element of non-identity. This non-identity is crucial as it enables us to maintain the perspective of an ‘individuation that is not yet’ in the social physiognomy (Adorno 2022c , p. 292).

Adorno’s work allows us to continue exploring the realm of critical sociology, one that resides beyond the boundaries of both positivism and hermeneutics. It acknowledges the moment of truth and falsehood within praxis, within social action. To grasp Adorno’s interpretation of Weber and Durkheim and to articulate the comprehensibility-incomprehensibility constellation effectively, it is imperative to comprehend what Adorno’s sociology derives from Marx. Approaching society as an object is only critical if it ensures that the perspective of society as a subject is not forfeited. Without the viewpoint of society as a subject, we cannot develop a theory of the constitution of totality as a process of reification, nor can we envision social relations where we genuinely recognise ourselves –thus envisaging a truly humane society.

Stating that the subject matter of sociology is society is a proposition that many sociological currents might not readily embrace. The concept of society was already in crisis in the 1960s, at the time of the Disputation of Positivism , but the crisis has worsened today. In contemporary sociology and social sciences, it is increasingly common to encounter the argument that the individual serves as the starting point for comprehending modern societies. This shift is attributed to various factors, such as the growing singularity of socialisations, the phenomenon of deinstitutionalisation, or the preference for discarding surplus individuals rather than exploiting their labour force. Adorno provides valuable tools for addressing this issue, which calls for innovative approaches to understanding the complex relationship between society and individuals who are apprehensive about being marginalised within the machinery, all while maintaining a sociological perspective centred on a theory of late capitalist society.

So-called micro and interactionist-oriented sociologies have always preferred notions such as interaction or situation as more explanatory than social structure; they have also preferred to prioritise uncertainty over structural adjustment. Today, it is quite common in sociology, and in social sciences in general, to find the thesis that the individual, and not society, should be the analytical starting point for understanding contemporary societies (Martucelli and de Singly 2012, Martucelli and Santiago 2017 , pp. 31–44). A change in the sociologist’s gaze is advocated, however, induced by a diagnosis of social theory: ‘various processes of social change brought about by advanced modernity, such as deinstitutionalisation, the decline of the “institutional programme”, the multiplication of inequalities and of the spheres of socialisation or the increasing singularisation of individual trajectories, make this idea of society, as well as the model of the social figure, implausible –and above all not very useful analytically’ (Martucelli and Santiago 2017 , p. 32). This diagnosis has paved the way for interesting proposals such as the various sociologies of the individual, the sociology of experience, the sociology of social challenges, or even the sociology of the network actor. We do not intend to establish a discussion with these recent currents but simply to show the topicality of the discussions on whether we should continue to use the concept of society or not. In any case, affirming that society does not offer a unity of social life and that sociology must therefore start from the individual, attending to how he or she metabolises the social (Dubet, 2013, p. 189, cited in Martucelli and Santiago 2017 , p. 34), does not imply renouncing Adorno’s position that it is precisely a split society that makes identity between the system and individuals impossible, nor the associated idea that much of the uncertainty that determines different situations is structurally produced. But then, the demand to attend to the individual –also in Adorno, that of the ego is a privileged space for attending to the conflicts between the demands of adaptation and the potential for possible emancipation (Maiso 2022 , p. 275)– is always accompanied by a certain diagnosis of social theory.

To offer a model for what it means to unfold the problems and not solve them by mere terminological clarification, we can turn to the notion of the subject. In the first of the Dialectical Epilegomena , entitled On Subject and Object , Adorno points out that the concept of subject refers both to the moment of individuality, as presented in what Schelling called ‘egoity’, and to general determinations that refer to something more than the ‘it-there’ of a particular person, in various senses. Well, this ambiguity should not be resolved by betting on one of these senses, but both elements must be present, and it must be shown how they need each other (Adorno 2021b , pp. 741–742).

This decisive element in Marx’s critique of value completely escapes vulgar materialism, which makes statements such as: ‘ideas are derived from the material, from the basis of society’. The question is more complex because ‘where it is a question of the decisive, of the reproduction of life, i.e. of exchange, a conceptual moment is already contained’ (Adorno 2011 , p. 145).

Gesellschaft jedoch ist beides, von innen zu erkennen und nicht zu erkennen. In ihr, dem menschlichen Produkt, vermögen stets noch die lebendigen Subjekte trotz allem und wie aus weiter Ferne sich wiederzufinden, anders als in Chemie und Physik. Tatsächlich ist Handeln innerhalb der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, als Rationalität, weitgehend objektiv ebenso „verstehbar” wie motiviert. Daran hat die Generation von Max Weber und Dilthey zu Recht erinnert. Einseitig war das Verstehensideal, indem es ausschied, was an der Gesellschaft der Identifikation durch den Verstehenden konträr ist. Darauf bezog sich Durkheims Regel, man solle die sozialen Tatsachen wie Dinge behandeln, prinzipiell darauf verzichten, sie zu verstehen. Er hat es sich nicht ausreden lassen, daß Gesellschaft auf jeden Einzelnen primär als Nichtidentisches, als „Zwang” stößt. Insofern hebt die Reflexion auf Gesellschaft dort an, wo Verstehbarkeit endet. Bei Durkheim registriert die naturwissenschaftliche Methode, die er verficht, die Hegelsche „zweite Natur”, zu der Gesellschaft den Lebendigen gegenüber gerann. Die Antithesis zu Weber indessen bleibt so partikular wie dessen Thesis, weil sie bei der Nichtverstehbarkeit sich beruhigt wie jener beim Postulat der Verstehbarkeit. Statt dessen wäre die Nichtverstehbarkeit zu verstehen, die Menschen gegenüber zur Undurchsichtigkeit verselbständigten Verhältnisse aus Verhältnissen zwischen Menschen abzuleiten. Heute vollends hätte Soziologie das Unverstehbare zu verstehen, den Einmarsch der Menschheit in die Unmenschlichkeit (2022c, pp. 11–12).

Adorno TW (2006) History and Freedom. Lectures 1964-1965. Polity Press, Cambridge

Google Scholar  

Adorno TW (2011) Philosophie und Soziologie, Abteilung IV: Vorlesungen 6. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2012) Philosophische Terminologie I. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2020) Negative Dialectics. In: Negative Dialectics. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, GS 6. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2021a) Ästhetische Theorie, GS 7. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno, TW (2021b). Dialektische Epilegomena. In: GS 10.2, Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft II, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main, p 739–782

Adorno TW (2021c) Einleitung in die Soziologie, Abteilung IV: Vorlesungen 15. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2021d) Minima Moralia, GS 4. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2022a) Drei Studien zu Hegel. In: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel, GS 5. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2022b) Philosophofische Frühschriften, GS 1. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Adorno TW (2022c) Soziologische Schriften I, GS 8. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt Main

Alonso L-E, Fernández Rodríguez CJ (2013) Los discursos del presente. Un análisis de los imaginarios sociales contemporáneos. Siglo XXI, Madrid

Benzer M (2011) The sociology of Theodor Adorno. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Book   Google Scholar  

Berger, P and Luckmann, T (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Anchor

Bonefeld W (2016) Negative dialectics and the critique of economic objectivity. Hist. Hum. Sci. 29(2):60–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952695116637294 . SAGE Pub

Article   Google Scholar  

Bourdieu P, Chamboredon J-P, Passeron J-C (2005) Le métier de sociologue. Préalables épistémologiques. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin

Buck-Morss S (1977) Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno. The Harverter Press, Hassocks

Dubet F (2007) L’expérience sociologique. La Découverte, Paris

Durkheim E (1922) Education and sociology. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris

Durkheim E (1982) The Rules of Sociological Method. The Free Press, New York

García Selgas FJ (2010) Argumentos para una sociología posthumanista y postsocial. Athenea digital 19:7–27. https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/athenead/v0n19.745

Heitmann L (2017) Acción comunicativa – Sistema – Crítica. Observaciones sobre la crítica sociológica del sistema en la teoría de la acción comunicativa de Jürgen Habermas, Constelaciones. Rev. de. Teor.ía Crítica 8/9:46–81. https://constelaciones-rtc.net/article/view/1912

Heitmann L (2018) Society as ‘Totality’: On the Negative-Dialectical Presentation of Capitalist Socialization. In: Best, B, Bonefeld, W and O’Kane, C (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, vol. 2, 589-606

Lahire B (2011) L’homme pluriel: les ressorts de l’action. Fayard/Pluriel, Paris

Latour B (2007) Changer de société, refaire de la sociologie. La Découverte, Paris

Jameson F (1990) Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the persistence of the dialectic. Verso, London

Lepsius MR (1979) Die Entwicklung der Soziologie Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1967. In: Lüschen, G. (eds), Deutsche Soziologie Seit 1945. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol 21. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83690-8_2

Lukács G (1920) Die Theorie des Romans. Ein geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch über die Formen der großen Epik. P. Cassirer, Berlin

Maiso J (2022) Desde la vida dañada. La teoría crítica de Theodor W. Adorno. Siglo XXI, Madrid

Martucelli D, Santiago J (2017) El desafío sociológico hoy. Individuo y retos sociales. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid

Martucelli D, de Singly F (2012) Les sociologies de l’individu: domaines et approches. Armand Colin Editeur, Paris

Marx K (2012) Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, I. In: Marx-Engels Werke (MEW), vol. 23, Dietz, Berlin

Marx K (1981) Karl Marx Friedrich Engels Werke, Band I. Dietz, Berlin

Muller-Doohm S (1996) Die Soziologie Theodor W. Adornos Eine Einführung. Campus, Frankfurt am Main

Plato (2018) The Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Reichelt (2007) Marx’s Critique of Economic Categories: Reflections on the Problem of Validity in the Dialectical Method of Presentation in Capital. In: Historical Materialism. Research in Critical Marxist Theory, vol. 15, 4, pp. 3–52

Reichelt H (2011) Neue Marx-Lëkture. Zur Kritik sozialwissenschaftlicher Logik. Ça-ira-Verlag, Freiburg

Romero JM (2010) Hacia una hermenéutica dialéctica. Editorial síntesis, Madrid

Sevilla S (2005) La hermenéutica materialista,. Quad. de. filosofia i ciència 35:79–91

Vidal V (2019) Crítica antes de la Teoría Crítica: el proyecto filosófico de Th. W. Adorno, in ONCINA COVES, Faustino (Ed.), Crítica de la Modernidad. Modernidad de la crítica (Una aproximación histórico-conceptual) (pp. 85–101). Valencia: Pre-textos

Vidal V (2021). Esto no tiene sentido. La interpretación materialista del arte. PUV Universitat de València

Weber M (2021) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen und Mächte, Gesamtausgabe, Abt.1, Bd.22, Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen

Zamora JA (2007) El enigma de la docilidad: Teoría de la sociedad y psicoanálisis en Th. W. Adorno. In: Cabot, M (Ed.). El pensamiento de Th. W. Adorno: balance y perspectivas. Edicions UIB

Download references

Acknowledgements

This work has been possible thanks to the CIACIF/2021/146 contract and has arisen within the framework of the Group (GIUV2013-037) and the research project “Historia conceptual y crítica de la modernidad” (FFI2017-82195-P) of the AEI/FEDER, EU.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

Joan Gallego Monzó

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Contributions

The sole author is responsible for all aspects of the article.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joan Gallego Monzó .

Ethics declarations

Competing interests.

The author declares no competing interests.

Ethical approval

The article does not require any ethical approval.

Informed consent

The article does not require any informed consent.

Additional information

Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License, which permits any non-commercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if you modified the licensed material. You do not have permission under this licence to share adapted material derived from this article or parts of it. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ .

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Gallego Monzó, J. When sociology must comprehend the incomprehensible: interpretation of Weber and Durkheim in the sociology of Theodor W. Adorno. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 11 , 1017 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03426-2

Download citation

Received : 01 November 2023

Accepted : 01 July 2024

Published : 08 August 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-024-03426-2

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Hegel’s Dialectics

“Dialectics” is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of “dialectics”, the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato (see entry on Plato ), for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other. In the course of the dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes. The back-and-forth debate between opposing sides produces a kind of linear progression or evolution in philosophical views or positions: as the dialogues go along, Socrates’ interlocutors change or refine their views in response to Socrates’ challenges and come to adopt more sophisticated views. The back-and-forth dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors thus becomes Plato’s way of arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated views or positions and for the more sophisticated ones later.

“Hegel’s dialectics” refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel (see entry on Hegel ), which, like other “dialectical” methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Whereas Plato’s “opposing sides” were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the “opposing sides” are in Hegel’s work depends on the subject matter he discusses. In his work on logic, for instance, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of logical concepts that are opposed to one another. In the Phenomenology of Spirit , which presents Hegel’s epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato’s dialogues, a contradictory process between “opposing sides” in Hegel’s dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel’s method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel regarded this dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” (PR §10) as the hallmark of his philosophy and used the same method in the Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG], as well as in all of the mature works he published later—the entire Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (including, as its first part, the “Lesser Logic” or the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]), the Science of Logic [SL], and the Philosophy of Right [PR].

Note that, although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato’s version of dialectics. He argued that Plato’s dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31). According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then,

the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. (PhG-M §79)

Hegel argues that, because Plato’s dialectics cannot get beyond arbitrariness and skepticism, it generates only approximate truths, and falls short of being a genuine science (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31; cf. EL Remark to §81). The following sections examine Hegel’s dialectics as well as these issues in more detail.

1. Hegel’s description of his dialectical method

2. applying hegel’s dialectical method to his arguments, 3. why does hegel use dialectics, 4. is hegel’s dialectical method logical, 5. syntactic patterns and special terminology in hegel’s dialectics, english translations of key texts by hegel, english translations of other primary sources, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences , which is often called the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments (EL §79). These sides are not parts of logic, but, rather, moments of “every concept”, as well as “of everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79; we will see why Hegel thought dialectics is in everything in section 3 ). The first moment—the moment of the understanding—is the moment of fixity, in which concepts or forms have a seemingly stable definition or determination (EL §80).

The second moment—the “ dialectical ” (EL §§79, 81) or “ negatively rational ” (EL §79) moment—is the moment of instability. In this moment, a one-sidedness or restrictedness (EL Remark to §81) in the determination from the moment of understanding comes to the fore, and the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into its opposite (EL §81). Hegel describes this process as a process of “self-sublation” (EL §81). The English verb “to sublate” translates Hegel’s technical use of the German verb aufheben , which is a crucial concept in his dialectical method. Hegel says that aufheben has a doubled meaning: it means both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time (PhG §113; SL-M 107; SL-dG 81–2; cf. EL the Addition to §95). The moment of understanding sublates itself because its own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self -sublation, or a process in which the determination from the moment of understanding sublates itself , or both cancels and preserves itself , as it pushes on to or passes into its opposite.

The third moment—the “ speculative ” or “ positively rational ” (EL §§79, 82) moment—grasps the unity of the opposition between the first two determinations, or is the positive result of the dissolution or transition of those determinations (EL §82 and Remark to §82). Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, reductio ad absurdum argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing. As Hegel suggests in the Phenomenology , such an argument

is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results . (PhG-M §79)

Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a specific process. There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment has a definition, determination or content because it grows out of and unifies the particular character of those earlier determinations, or is “a unity of distinct determinations ” (EL Remark to §82). The speculative moment is thus “truly not empty, abstract nothing , but the negation of certain determinations ” (EL-GSH §82). When the result “is taken as the result of that from which it emerges”, Hegel says, then it is “in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content” (PhG-M §79). As he also puts it, “the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]; a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). Or, as he says, “[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation ], it has a content ” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54). Hegel’s claim in both the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic that his philosophy relies on a process of “ determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]” has sometimes led scholars to describe his dialectics as a method or doctrine of “determinate negation” (see entry on Hegel, section on Science of Logic ; cf. Rosen 1982: 30; Stewart 1996, 2000: 41–3; Winfield 1990: 56).

There are several features of this account that Hegel thinks raise his dialectical method above the arbitrariness of Plato’s dialectics to the level of a genuine science. First, because the determinations in the moment of understanding sublate themselves , Hegel’s dialectics does not require some new idea to show up arbitrarily. Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations and so “comes about on its own accord” (PhG-P §79). Indeed, for Hegel, the movement is driven by necessity (see, e.g., EL Remarks to §§12, 42, 81, 87, 88; PhG §79). The natures of the determinations themselves drive or force them to pass into their opposites. This sense of necessity —the idea that the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later ones—leads Hegel to regard his dialectics as a kind of logic . As he says in the Phenomenology , the method’s “proper exposition belongs to logic” (PhG-M §48). Necessity—the sense of being driven or forced to conclusions—is the hallmark of “logic” in Western philosophy.

Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside. Instead, the transition to the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the process itself. Unlike in Plato’s arbitrary dialectics, then—which must wait around until some other idea comes in from the outside—in Hegel’s dialectics “nothing extraneous is introduced”, as he says (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33). His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or “inwardness” of its own content (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33; cf. PR §31). As he puts it, dialectics is “the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).

Third, because later determinations “sublate” earlier determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely cancelled or negated. On the contrary, the earlier determinations are preserved in the sense that they remain in effect within the later determinations. When Being-for-itself, for instance, is introduced in the logic as the first concept of ideality or universality and is defined by embracing a set of “something-others”, Being-for-itself replaces the something-others as the new concept, but those something-others remain active within the definition of the concept of Being-for-itself. The something-others must continue to do the work of picking out individual somethings before the concept of Being-for-itself can have its own definition as the concept that gathers them up. Being-for-itself replaces the something-others, but it also preserves them, because its definition still requires them to do their work of picking out individual somethings (EL §§95–6).

The concept of “apple”, for example, as a Being-for-itself, would be defined by gathering up individual “somethings” that are the same as one another (as apples). Each individual apple can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to an “other” that is the same “something” that it is (i.e., an apple). That is the one-sidedness or restrictedness that leads each “something” to pass into its “other” or opposite. The “somethings” are thus both “something-others”. Moreover, their defining processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into one another: one “something” can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to another “something” that is the same as it is, which, in turn, can be what it is (an apple) only in relation to the other “something” that is the same as it is, and so on, back and forth, endlessly (cf. EL §95). The concept of “apple”, as a Being-for-itself, stops that endless, passing-over process by embracing or including the individual something-others (the apples) in its content. It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples . But the “something-others” must do their work of picking out and separating those individual items (the apples) before the concept of “apple”—as the Being-for-itself—can gather them up for its own definition. We can picture the concept of Being-for-itself like this:

Later concepts thus replace, but also preserve, earlier concepts.

Fourth, later concepts both determine and also surpass the limits or finitude of earlier concepts. Earlier determinations sublate themselves —they pass into their others because of some weakness, one-sidedness or restrictedness in their own definitions. There are thus limitations in each of the determinations that lead them to pass into their opposites. As Hegel says, “that is what everything finite is: its own sublation” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). Later determinations define the finiteness of the earlier determinations. From the point of view of the concept of Being-for-itself, for instance, the concept of a “something-other” is limited or finite: although the something-others are supposed to be the same as one another, the character of their sameness (e.g., as apples) is captured only from above, by the higher-level, more universal concept of Being-for-itself. Being-for-itself reveals the limitations of the concept of a “something-other”. It also rises above those limitations, since it can do something that the concept of a something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the finite to the universal. As Hegel puts it, “all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle [of dialectics]” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).

Fifth, because the determination in the speculative moment grasps the unity of the first two moments, Hegel’s dialectical method leads to concepts or forms that are increasingly comprehensive and universal. As Hegel puts it, the result of the dialectical process

is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite. (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54)

Like Being-for-itself, later concepts are more universal because they unify or are built out of earlier determinations, and include those earlier determinations as part of their definitions. Indeed, many other concepts or determinations can also be depicted as literally surrounding earlier ones (cf. Maybee 2009: 73, 100, 112, 156, 193, 214, 221, 235, 458).

Finally, because the dialectical process leads to increasing comprehensiveness and universality, it ultimately produces a complete series, or drives “to completion” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54; PhG §79). Dialectics drives to the “Absolute”, to use Hegel’s term, which is the last, final, and completely all-encompassing or unconditioned concept or form in the relevant subject matter under discussion (logic, phenomenology, ethics/politics and so on). The “Absolute” concept or form is unconditioned because its definition or determination contains all the other concepts or forms that were developed earlier in the dialectical process for that subject matter. Moreover, because the process develops necessarily and comprehensively through each concept, form or determination, there are no determinations that are left out of the process. There are therefore no left-over concepts or forms—concepts or forms outside of the “Absolute”—that might “condition” or define it. The “Absolute” is thus unconditioned because it contains all of the conditions in its content, and is not conditioned by anything else outside of it. This Absolute is the highest concept or form of universality for that subject matter. It is the thought or concept of the whole conceptual system for the relevant subject matter. We can picture the Absolute Idea (EL §236), for instance—which is the “Absolute” for logic—as an oval that is filled up with and surrounds numerous, embedded rings of smaller ovals and circles, which represent all of the earlier and less universal determinations from the logical development (cf. Maybee 2009: 30, 600):

Since the “Absolute” concepts for each subject matter lead into one another, when they are taken together, they constitute Hegel’s entire philosophical system, which, as Hegel says, “presents itself therefore as a circle of circles” (EL-GSH §15). We can picture the entire system like this (cf. Maybee 2009: 29):

Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical method genuinely scientific. As he says, “the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). He acknowledges that a description of the method can be more or less complete and detailed, but because the method or progression is driven only by the subject matter itself, this dialectical method is the “only true method” (SL-M 54; SL-dG 33).

So far, we have seen how Hegel describes his dialectical method, but we have yet to see how we might read this method into the arguments he offers in his works. Scholars often use the first three stages of the logic as the “textbook example” (Forster 1993: 133) to illustrate how Hegel’s dialectical method should be applied to his arguments. The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the understanding. We can think of Being here as a concept of pure presence. It is not mediated by any other concept—or is not defined in relation to any other concept—and so is undetermined or has no further determination (EL §86; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). It asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further determination. Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative (EL §87). It is therefore equally a Nothing (SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). Being’s lack of determination thus leads it to sublate itself and pass into the concept of Nothing (EL §87; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59), which illustrates the dialectical moment.

But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content. The only difference between them is “something merely meant ” (EL-GSH Remark to §87), namely, that Being is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be absence. The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence (Being) and then taken as absence (Nothing), or taken as absence (Nothing) and then taken as presence (Being). To Become is to go from Being to Nothing or from Nothing to Being, or is, as Hegel puts it, “the immediate vanishing of the one in the other” (SL-M 83; cf. SL-dG 60). The contradiction between Being and Nothing thus is not a reductio ad absurdum , or does not lead to the rejection of both concepts and hence to nothingness—as Hegel had said Plato’s dialectics does (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5)—but leads to a positive result, namely, to the introduction of a new concept—the synthesis—which unifies the two, earlier, opposed concepts.

We can also use the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example to illustrate Hegel’s concept of aufheben (to sublate), which, as we saw, means to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time. Hegel says that the concept of Becoming sublates the concepts of Being and Nothing (SL-M 105; SL-dG 80). Becoming cancels or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition. Indeed, it is the first concrete concept in the logic. Unlike Being and Nothing, which had no definition or determination as concepts themselves and so were merely abstract (SL-M 82–3; SL-dG 59–60; cf. EL Addition to §88), Becoming is a “ determinate unity in which there is both Being and Nothing” (SL-M 105; cf. SL-dG 80). Becoming succeeds in having a definition or determination because it is defined by, or piggy-backs on, the concepts of Being and Nothing.

This “textbook” Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely connected to the traditional idea that Hegel’s dialectics follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a “thesis” or positive concept, which then develops into a second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its “antithesis”, which in turn leads to a third concept, the “synthesis”, that unifies the first two (see, e.g., McTaggert 1964 [1910]: 3–4; Mure 1950: 302; Stace, 1955 [1924]: 90–3, 125–6; Kosek 1972: 243; E. Harris 1983: 93–7; Singer 1983: 77–79). Versions of this interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics continue to have currency (e.g., Forster 1993: 131; Stewart 2000: 39, 55; Fritzman 2014: 3–5). On this reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment of aufheben or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.

We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too dogmatically to the rest of Hegel’s logic or to his dialectical method more generally (for a classic criticism of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel’s dialectics, see Mueller 1958). There are other places where this general pattern might describe some of the transitions from stage to stage, but there are many more places where the development does not seem to fit this pattern very well. One place where the pattern seems to hold, for instance, is where the Measure (EL §107)—as the combination of Quality and Quantity—transitions into the Measureless (EL §107), which is opposed to it, which then in turn transitions into Essence, which is the unity or combination of the two earlier sides (EL §111). This series of transitions could be said to follow the general pattern captured by the “textbook example”: Measure would be the moment of the understanding or thesis, the Measureless would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Essence would be the speculative moment or synthesis that unifies the two earlier moments. However, before the transition to Essence takes place, the Measureless itself is redefined as a Measure (EL §109)—undercutting a precise parallel with the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example, since the transition from Measure to Essence would not follow a Measure-Measureless-Essence pattern, but rather a Measure-(Measureless?)-Measure-Essence pattern.

Other sections of Hegel’s philosophy do not fit the triadic, textbook example of Being-Nothing-Becoming at all, as even interpreters who have supported the traditional reading of Hegel’s dialectics have noted. After using the Being-Nothing-Becoming example to argue that Hegel’s dialectical method consists of “triads” whose members “are called the thesis, antithesis, synthesis” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 93), W.T. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system. It is hard to see, Stace says, how the middle term of some of Hegel’s triads are the opposites or antitheses of the first term, “and there are even ‘triads’ which contain four terms!” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 97). As a matter of fact, one section of Hegel’s logic—the section on Cognition—violates the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern because it has only two sub-divisions, rather than three. “The triad is incomplete”, Stace complains. “There is no third. Hegel here abandons the triadic method. Nor is any explanation of his having done so forthcoming” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 286; cf. McTaggart 1964 [1910]: 292).

Interpreters have offered various solutions to the complaint that Hegel’s dialectics sometimes seems to violate the triadic form. Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several stages (e.g. Burbidge 1981: 43–5; Taylor 1975: 229–30). Others have applied Hegel’s triadic method to whole sections of his philosophy, rather than to individual stages. For G.R.G. Mure, for instance, the section on Cognition fits neatly into a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis account of dialectics because the whole section is itself the antithesis of the previous section of Hegel’s logic, the section on Life (Mure 1950: 270). Mure argues that Hegel’s triadic form is easier to discern the more broadly we apply it. “The triadic form appears on many scales”, he says, “and the larger the scale we consider the more obvious it is” (Mure 1950: 302).

Scholars who interpret Hegel’s description of dialectics on a smaller scale—as an account of how to get from stage to stage—have also tried to explain why some sections seem to violate the triadic form. J.N. Findlay, for instance—who, like Stace, associates dialectics “with the triad , or with triplicity ”—argues that stages can fit into that form in “more than one sense” (Findlay 1962: 66). The first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming example. In a second sense, however, Findlay says, the dialectical moment or “contradictory breakdown” is not itself a separate stage, or “does not count as one of the stages”, but is a transition between opposed, “but complementary”, abstract stages that “are developed more or less concurrently” (Findlay 1962: 66). This second sort of triplicity could involve any number of stages: it “could readily have been expanded into a quadruplicity, a quintuplicity and so forth” (Findlay 1962: 66). Still, like Stace, he goes on to complain that many of the transitions in Hegel’s philosophy do not seem to fit the triadic pattern very well. In some triads, the second term is “the direct and obvious contrary of the first”—as in the case of Being and Nothing. In other cases, however, the opposition is, as Findlay puts it, “of a much less extreme character” (Findlay 1962: 69). In some triads, the third term obviously mediates between the first two terms. In other cases, however, he says, the third term is just one possible mediator or unity among other possible ones; and, in yet other cases, “the reconciling functions of the third member are not at all obvious” (Findlay 1962: 70).

Let us look more closely at one place where the “textbook example” of Being-Nothing-Becoming does not seem to describe the dialectical development of Hegel’s logic very well. In a later stage of the logic, the concept of Purpose goes through several iterations, from Abstract Purpose (EL §204), to Finite or Immediate Purpose (EL §205), and then through several stages of a syllogism (EL §206) to Realized Purpose (EL §210). Abstract Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, where the purpose has not been further determined or defined. It includes not just the kinds of purposes that occur in consciousness, such as needs or drives, but also the “internal purposiveness” or teleological view proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (see entry on Aristotle ; EL Remark to §204), according to which things in the world have essences and aim to achieve (or have the purpose of living up to) their essences. Finite Purpose is the moment in which an Abstract Purpose begins to have a determination by fixing on some particular material or content through which it will be realized (EL §205). The Finite Purpose then goes through a process in which it, as the Universality, comes to realize itself as the Purpose over the particular material or content (and hence becomes Realized Purpose) by pushing out into Particularity, then into Singularity (the syllogism U-P-S), and ultimately into ‘out-thereness,’ or into individual objects out there in the world (EL §210; cf. Maybee 2009: 466–493).

Hegel’s description of the development of Purpose does not seem to fit the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example or the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. According to the example and model, Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis, Finite Purpose would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis. Although Finite Purpose has a different determination from Abstract Purpose (it refines the definition of Abstract Purpose), it is hard to see how it would qualify as strictly “opposed” to or as the “antithesis” of Abstract Purpose in the way that Nothing is opposed to or is the antithesis of Being.

There is an answer, however, to the criticism that many of the determinations are not “opposites” in a strict sense. The German term that is translated as “opposite” in Hegel’s description of the moments of dialectics (EL §§81, 82)— entgegensetzen —has three root words: setzen (“to posit or set”), gegen , (“against”), and the prefix ent -, which indicates that something has entered into a new state. The verb entgegensetzen can therefore literally be translated as “to set over against”. The “ engegengesetzte ” into which determinations pass, then, do not need to be the strict “opposites” of the first, but can be determinations that are merely “set against” or are different from the first ones. And the prefix ent -, which suggests that the first determinations are put into a new state, can be explained by Hegel’s claim that the finite determinations from the moment of understanding sublate (cancel but also preserve) themselves (EL §81): later determinations put earlier determinations into a new state by preserving them.

At the same time, there is a technical sense in which a later determination would still be the “opposite” of the earlier determination. Since the second determination is different from the first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, or is not -the-first-determination. If the first determination is “e”, for instance, because the new determination is different from that one, the new one is “not-e” (Kosek 1972: 240). Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or determination that is different from the definition that Abstract Purpose has, it is not -Abstract-Purpose, or is the negation or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense. There is therefore a technical, logical sense in which the second concept or form is the “opposite” or negation of—or is “not”—the first one—though, again, it need not be the “opposite” of the first one in a strict sense.

Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the product of several stages of development (at least four, by my count, if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determination), which would seem to violate a triadic model. Moreover, the concept of Realized Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose. Realized Purpose is the result of (and so unifies) the syllogistic process of Finite Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on and is realized in a particular material or content. Realized Purpose thus seems to be a development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing.

These sorts of considerations have led some scholars to interpret Hegel’s dialectics in a way that is implied by a more literal reading of his claim, in the Encyclopaedia Logic , that the three “sides” of the form of logic—namely, the moment of understanding, the dialectical moment, and the speculative moment—“are moments of each [or every; jedes ] logically-real , that is each [or every; jedes ] concept” (EL Remark to §79; this is an alternative translation). The quotation suggests that each concept goes through all three moments of the dialectical process—a suggestion reinforced by Hegel’s claim, in the Phenomenology , that the result of the process of determinate negation is that “a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). According to this interpretation, the three “sides” are not three different concepts or forms that are related to one another in a triad—as the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example suggests—but rather different momentary sides or “determinations” in the life, so to speak, of each concept or form as it transitions to the next one. The three moments thus involve only two concepts or forms: the one that comes first, and the one that comes next (examples of philosophers who interpret Hegel’s dialectics in this second way include Maybee 2009; Priest 1989: 402; Rosen 2014: 122, 132; and Winfield 1990: 56).

For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure presence. This determination is one-sided or restricted however, because, as we saw, it ignores another aspect of Being’s definition, namely, that Being has no content or determination, which is how Being is defined in its dialectical moment. Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines that determination and leads to the definition it has in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being (as pure presence) implies nothing. It is also the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [ Entgegensetzung ]” (EL §82; alternative translation): since it captures a process from one to the other, it includes Being’s moment of understanding (as pure presence) and dialectical moment (as nothing or undetermined), but also compares those two determinations, or sets (- setzen ) them up against (- gegen ) each other. It even puts Being into a new state (as the prefix ent - suggests) because the next concept, Nothing, will sublate (cancel and preserve) Being.

The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted to be the speculative result of the concept of Being, it has its moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure absence, as the absence of determination. But Nothing’s moment of understanding is also one-sided or restricted: like Being, Nothing is also an undefined content, which is its determination in its dialectical moment. Nothing thus sublates itself : since it is an undefined content , it is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being did. It is present as an undefined content . Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces (cancels) Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition (as an undefined content) and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this (the circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are each undefined; cf. Maybee 2009: 51):

In its speculative moment, then, Nothing implies presence or Being, which is the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [ Entgegensetzung ]” (EL §82; alternative translation), since it both includes but—as a process from one to the other—also compares the two earlier determinations of Nothing, first, as pure absence and, second, as just as much presence.

The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or form—Becoming—not by a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothing—which leads Nothing to sublate itself—and by the implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and Nothing at the same time. Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence (i.e., Being) implies Nothing (or absence), and that an undefined content taken to be absence (i.e., Nothing) implies presence (i.e., Being). The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implications—namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing becomes Being. We can picture Becoming this way (cf. Maybee 2009: 53):

In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. In its moment of understanding, Finite Purpose particularizes into (or presents) its content as “ something-presupposed ” or as a pre-given object (EL §205). I go to a restaurant for the purpose of having dinner, for instance, and order a salad. My purpose of having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object—the salad. But this object or particularity—e.g. the salad—is “inwardly reflected” (EL §205): it has its own content—developed in earlier stages—which the definition of Finite Purpose ignores. We can picture Finite Purpose this way:

In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the previously ignored content, or by that other content. The one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose in relation to the ignored content. The first syllogism links the Finite Purpose to the first layer of content in the object: the Purpose or universality (e.g., dinner) goes through the particularity (e.g., the salad) to its content, the singularity (e.g., lettuce as a type of thing)—the syllogism U-P-S (EL §206). But the particularity (e.g., the salad) is itself a universality or purpose, “which at the same time is a syllogism within itself [ in sich ]” (EL Remark to §208; alternative translation), in relation to its own content. The salad is a universality/purpose that particularizes as lettuce (as a type of thing) and has its singularity in this lettuce here—a second syllogism, U-P-S. Thus, the first singularity (e.g., “lettuce” as a type of thing)—which, in this second syllogism, is the particularity or P —“ judges ” (EL §207) or asserts that “ U is S ”: it says that “lettuce” as a universality ( U ) or type of thing is a singularity ( S ), or is “this lettuce here”, for instance. This new singularity (e.g. “this lettuce here”) is itself a combination of subjectivity and objectivity (EL §207): it is an Inner or identifying concept (“lettuce”) that is in a mutually-defining relationship (the circular arrow) with an Outer or out-thereness (“this here”) as its content. In the speculative moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the whole process of development from the moment of understanding—when it is defined by particularizing into a pre-given object with a content that it ignores—to its dialectical moment—when it is also defined by the previously ignored content. We can picture the speculative moment of Finite Purpose this way:

Finite Purpose’s speculative moment leads to Realized Purpose. As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a return process (a series of return arrows) that establishes each layer and redefines Finite Purpose as Realized Purpose. The presence of “this lettuce here” establishes the actuality of “lettuce” as a type of thing (an Actuality is a concept that captures a mutually-defining relationship between an Inner and an Outer [EL §142]), which establishes the “salad”, which establishes “dinner” as the Realized Purpose over the whole process. We can picture Realized Purpose this way:

If Hegel’s account of dialectics is a general description of the life of each concept or form, then any section can include as many or as few stages as the development requires. Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)—a technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG §50; cf. section 3 )—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.

We can begin to see why Hegel was motivated to use a dialectical method by examining the project he set for himself, particularly in relation to the work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant (see entries on Hume and Kant ). Hume had argued against what we can think of as the naïve view of how we come to have scientific knowledge. According to the naïve view, we gain knowledge of the world by using our senses to pull the world into our heads, so to speak. Although we may have to use careful observations and do experiments, our knowledge of the world is basically a mirror or copy of what the world is like. Hume argued, however, that naïve science’s claim that our knowledge corresponds to or copies what the world is like does not work. Take the scientific concept of cause, for instance. According to that concept of cause, to say that one event causes another is to say that there is a necessary connection between the first event (the cause) and the second event (the effect), such that, when the first event happens, the second event must also happen. According to naïve science, when we claim (or know) that some event causes some other event, our claim mirrors or copies what the world is like. It follows that the necessary, causal connection between the two events must itself be out there in the world. However, Hume argued, we never observe any such necessary causal connection in our experience of the world, nor can we infer that one exists based on our reasoning (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature , Book I, Part III, Section II; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Section VII, Part I). There is nothing in the world itself that our idea of cause mirrors or copies.

Kant thought Hume’s argument led to an unacceptable, skeptical conclusion, and he rejected Hume’s own solution to the skepticism (see Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , B5, B19–20). Hume suggested that our idea of causal necessity is grounded merely in custom or habit, since it is generated by our own imaginations after repeated observations of one sort of event following another sort of event (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature , Book I, Section VI; Hegel also rejected Hume’s solution, see EL §39). For Kant, science and knowledge should be grounded in reason, and he proposed a solution that aimed to reestablish the connection between reason and knowledge that was broken by Hume’s skeptical argument. Kant’s solution involved proposing a Copernican revolution in philosophy ( Critique of Pure Reason , Bxvi). Nicholas Copernicus was the Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than the other way around. Kant proposed a similar solution to Hume’s skepticism. Naïve science assumes that our knowledge revolves around what the world is like, but, Hume’s criticism argued, this view entails that we cannot then have knowledge of scientific causes through reason. We can reestablish a connection between reason and knowledge, however, Kant suggested, if we say—not that knowledge revolves around what the world is like—but that knowledge revolves around what we are like . For the purposes of our knowledge, Kant said, we do not revolve around the world—the world revolves around us. Because we are rational creatures, we share a cognitive structure with one another that regularizes our experiences of the world. This intersubjectively shared structure of rationality—and not the world itself—grounds our knowledge.

However, Kant’s solution to Hume’s skepticism led to a skeptical conclusion of its own that Hegel rejected. While the intersubjectively shared structure of our reason might allow us to have knowledge of the world from our perspective, so to speak, we cannot get outside of our mental, rational structures to see what the world might be like in itself. As Kant had to admit, according to his theory, there is still a world in itself or “Thing-in-itself” ( Ding an sich ) about which we can know nothing (see, e.g., Critique of Pure Reason , Bxxv–xxvi). Hegel rejected Kant’s skeptical conclusion that we can know nothing about the world- or Thing-in-itself, and he intended his own philosophy to be a response to this view (see, e.g., EL §44 and the Remark to §44).

How did Hegel respond to Kant’s skepticism—especially since Hegel accepted Kant’s Copernican revolution, or Kant’s claim that we have knowledge of the world because of what we are like, because of our reason? How, for Hegel, can we get out of our heads to see the world as it is in itself? Hegel’s answer is very close to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle’s response to Plato. Plato argued that we have knowledge of the world only through the Forms. The Forms are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because the world is imperfect, however, Plato exiled the Forms to their own realm. Although things in the world get their definitions by participating in the Forms, those things are, at best, imperfect copies of the universal Forms (see, e.g., Parmenides 131–135a). The Forms are therefore not in this world, but in a separate realm of their own. Aristotle argued, however, that the world is knowable not because things in the world are imperfect copies of the Forms, but because the Forms are in things themselves as the defining essences of those things (see, e.g., De Anima [ On the Soul ], Book I, Chapter 1 [403a26–403b18]; Metaphysics , Book VII, Chapter 6 [1031b6–1032a5] and Chapter 8 [1033b20–1034a8]).

In a similar way, Hegel’s answer to Kant is that we can get out of our heads to see what the world is like in itself—and hence can have knowledge of the world in itself—because the very same rationality or reason that is in our heads is in the world itself . As Hegel apparently put it in a lecture, the opposition or antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears by saying, as the Ancients did,

that nous governs the world, or by our own saying that there is reason in the world, by which we mean that reason is the soul of the world, inhabits it, and is immanent in it, as it own, innermost nature, its universal. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to §24)

Hegel used an example familiar from Aristotle’s work to illustrate this view:

“to be an animal”, the kind considered as the universal, pertains to the determinate animal and constitutes its determinate essentiality. If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what it is. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to §24; cf. SL-dG 16–17, SL-M 36-37)

Kant’s mistake, then, was that he regarded reason or rationality as only in our heads, Hegel suggests (EL §§43–44), rather than in both us and the world itself (see also below in this section and section 4 ). We can use our reason to have knowledge of the world because the very same reason that is in us, is in the world itself as it own defining principle. The rationality or reason in the world makes reality understandable, and that is why we can have knowledge of, or can understand, reality with our rationality. Dialectics—which is Hegel’s account of reason—characterizes not only logic, but also “everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79).

But why does Hegel come to define reason in terms of dialectics, and hence adopt a dialectical method? We can begin to see what drove Hegel to adopt a dialectical method by returning once again to Plato’s philosophy. Plato argued that we can have knowledge of the world only by grasping the Forms, which are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because things in the world are so imperfect, however, Plato concluded that the Forms are not in this world, but in a realm of their own. After all, if a human being were perfectly beautiful, for instance, then he or she would never become not-beautiful. But human beings change, get old, and die, and so can be, at best, imperfect copies of the Form of beauty—though they get whatever beauty they have by participating in that Form. Moreover, for Plato, things in the world are such imperfect copies that we cannot gain knowledge of the Forms by studying things in the world, but only through reason, that is, only by using our rationality to access the separate realm of the Forms (as Plato argued in the well-known parable of the cave; Republic , Book 7, 514–516b).

Notice, however, that Plato’s conclusion that the Forms cannot be in this world and so must be exiled to a separate realm rests on two claims. First, it rests on the claim that the world is an imperfect and messy place—a claim that is hard to deny. But it also rests on the assumption that the Forms—the universal, rational concepts or ideas of reason itself—are static and fixed, and so cannot grasp the messiness within the imperfect world. Hegel is able to link reason back to our messy world by changing the definition of reason. Instead of saying that reason consists of static universals, concepts or ideas, Hegel says that the universal concepts or forms are themselves messy . Against Plato, Hegel’s dialectical method allows him to argue that universal concepts can “overgrasp” (from the German verb übergreifen ) the messy, dialectical nature of the world because they, themselves, are dialectical . Moreover, because later concepts build on or sublate (cancel, but also preserve) earlier concepts, the later, more universal concepts grasp the dialectical processes of earlier concepts. As a result, higher-level concepts can grasp not only the dialectical nature of earlier concepts or forms, but also the dialectical processes that make the world itself a messy place. The highest definition of the concept of beauty, for instance, would not take beauty to be fixed and static, but would include within it the dialectical nature or finiteness of beauty, the idea that beauty becomes, on its own account, not-beauty. This dialectical understanding of the concept of beauty can then overgrasp the dialectical and finite nature of beauty in the world, and hence the truth that, in the world, beautiful things themselves become not-beautiful, or might be beautiful in one respect and not another. Similarly, the highest determination of the concept of “tree” will include within its definition the dialectical process of development and change from seed to sapling to tree. As Hegel says, dialectics is “the principle of all natural and spiritual life” (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35), or “the moving soul of scientific progression” (EL §81). Dialectics is what drives the development of both reason as well as of things in the world. A dialectical reason can overgrasp a dialectical world.

Two further journeys into the history of philosophy will help to show why Hegel chose dialectics as his method of argument. As we saw, Hegel argues against Kant’s skepticism by suggesting that reason is not only in our heads, but in the world itself. To show that reason is in the world itself, however, Hegel has to show that reason can be what it is without us human beings to help it. He has to show that reason can develop on its own, and does not need us to do the developing for it (at least for those things in the world that are not human-created). As we saw (cf. section 1 ), central to Hegel’s dialectics is the idea that concepts or forms develop on their own because they “self-sublate”, or sublate (cancel and preserve) themselves , and so pass into subsequent concepts or forms on their own accounts, because of their own, dialectical natures. Thus reason, as it were, drives itself, and hence does not need our heads to develop it. Hegel needs an account of self-driving reason to get beyond Kant’s skepticism.

Ironically, Hegel derives the basic outlines of his account of self-driving reason from Kant. Kant divided human rationality into two faculties: the faculty of the understanding and the faculty of reason. The understanding uses concepts to organize and regularize our experiences of the world. Reason’s job is to coordinate the concepts and categories of the understanding by developing a completely unified, conceptual system, and it does this work, Kant thought, on its own, independently of how those concepts might apply to the world. Reason coordinates the concepts of the understanding by following out necessary chains of syllogisms to produce concepts that achieve higher and higher levels of conceptual unity. Indeed, this process will lead reason to produce its own transcendental ideas, or concepts that go beyond the world of experience. Kant calls this necessary, concept-creating reason “speculative” reason (cf. Critique of Pure Reason , Bxx–xxi, A327/B384). Reason creates its own concepts or ideas—it “speculates”—by generating new and increasingly comprehensive concepts of its own, independently of the understanding. In the end, Kant thought, reason will follow out such chains of syllogisms until it develops completely comprehensive or unconditioned universals—universals that contain all of the conditions or all of the less-comprehensive concepts that help to define them. As we saw (cf. section 1 ), Hegel’s dialectics adopts Kant’s notion of a self-driving and concept-creating “speculative” reason, as well as Kant’s idea that reason aims toward unconditioned universality or absolute concepts.

Ultimately, Kant thought, reasons’ necessary, self-driving activity will lead it to produce contradictions—what he called the “antinomies”, which consist of a thesis and antithesis. Once reason has generated the unconditioned concept of the whole world, for instance, Kant argued, it can look at the world in two, contradictory ways. In the first antinomy, reason can see the world (1) as the whole totality or as the unconditioned, or (2) as the series of syllogisms that led up to that totality. If reason sees the world as the unconditioned or as a complete whole that is not conditioned by anything else, then it will see the world as having a beginning and end in terms of space and time, and so will conclude (the thesis) that the world has a beginning and end or limit. But if reason sees the world as the series, in which each member of the series is conditioned by the previous member, then the world will appear to be without a beginning and infinite, and reason will conclude (the antithesis) that the world does not have a limit in terms of space and time (cf. Critique of Pure Reason , A417–18/B445–6). Reason thus leads to a contradiction: it holds both that the world has a limit and that it does not have a limit at the same time. Because reason’s own process of self-development will lead it to develop contradictions or to be dialectical in this way, Kant thought that reason must be kept in check by the understanding. Any conclusions that reason draws that do not fall within the purview of the understanding cannot be applied to the world of experience, Kant said, and so cannot be considered genuine knowledge ( Critique of Pure Reason , A506/B534).

Hegel adopts Kant’s dialectical conception of reason, but he liberates reason for knowledge from the tyranny of the understanding. Kant was right that reason speculatively generates concepts on its own, and that this speculative process is driven by necessity and leads to concepts of increasing universality or comprehensiveness. Kant was even right to suggest—as he had shown in the discussion of the antinomies—that reason is dialectical, or necessarily produces contradictions on its own. Again, Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “ things in themselves ” (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35; see also section 4 ). Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it , shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself. Kant, however, failed to draw this conclusion, and continued to regard reason’s conclusions as illusions. Still, Kant’s philosophy vindicated the general idea that the contradictions he took to be illusions are both objective—or out there in the world—and necessary. As Hegel puts it, Kant vindicates the general idea of “the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations” (SL-M 56; cf. SL-dG 35), or to the nature of concepts themselves.

The work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (see entry on Fichte ) showed Hegel how dialectics can get beyond Kant—beyond the contradictions that, as Kant had shown, reason (necessarily) develops on its own, beyond the reductio ad absurdum argument (which, as we saw above, holds that a contradiction leads to nothingness), and beyond Kant’s skepticism, or Kant’s claim that reason’s contradictions must be reined in by the understanding and cannot count as knowledge. Fichte argued that the task of discovering the foundation of all human knowledge leads to a contradiction or opposition between the self and the not-self (it is not important, for our purposes, why Fichte held this view). The kind of reasoning that leads to this contradiction, Fichte said, is the analytical or antithetical method of reasoning, which involves drawing out an opposition between elements (in this case, the self and not-self) that are being compared to, or equated with, one another. While the traditional reductio ad absurdum argument would lead us to reject both sides of the contradiction and start from scratch, Fichte argued that the contradiction or opposition between the self and not-self can be resolved. In particular, the contradiction is resolved by positing a third concept—the concept of divisibility—which unites the two sides ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 110–11; Fichte 1982: 108–110). The concept of divisibility is produced by a synthetic procedure of reasoning, which involves “discovering in opposites the respect in which they are alike ” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 112–13; Fichte 1982: 111). Indeed, Fichte argued, not only is the move to resolve contradictions with synthetic concepts or judgments possible, it is necessary . As he says of the move from the contradiction between self and not-self to the synthetic concept of divisibility,

there can be no further question as to the possibility of this [synthesis], nor can any ground for it be given; it is absolutely possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any kind. ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 114; Fichte 1982: 112)

Since the analytical method leads to oppositions or contradictions, he argued, if we use only analytic judgments, “we not only do not get very far, as Kant says; we do not get anywhere at all” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 113; Fichte 1982: 112). Without the synthetic concepts or judgments, we are left, as the classic reductio ad absurdum argument suggests, with nothing at all. The synthetic concepts or judgments are thus necessary to get beyond contradiction without leaving us with nothing.

Fichte’s account of the synthetic method provides Hegel with the key to moving beyond Kant. Fichte suggested that a synthetic concept that unifies the results of a dialectically-generated contradiction does not completely cancel the contradictory sides, but only limits them. As he said, in general, “[t]o limit something is to abolish its reality, not wholly , but in part only” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 108; Fichte 1982: 108). Instead of concluding, as a reductio ad absurdum requires, that the two sides of a contradiction must be dismissed altogether, the synthetic concept or judgment retroactively justifies the opposing sides by demonstrating their limit, by showing which part of reality they attach to and which they do not ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 108–10; Fichte 1982: 108–9), or by determining in what respect and to what degree they are each true. For Hegel, as we saw (cf. section 1 ), later concepts and forms sublate—both cancel and preserve —earlier concepts and forms in the sense that they include earlier concepts and forms in their own definitions. From the point of view of the later concepts or forms, the earlier ones still have some validity, that is, they have a limited validity or truth defined by the higher-level concept or form.

Dialectically generated contradictions are therefore not a defect to be reigned in by the understanding, as Kant had said, but invitations for reason to “speculate”, that is, for reason to generate precisely the sort of increasingly comprehensive and universal concepts and forms that Kant had said reason aims to develop. Ultimately, Hegel thought, as we saw (cf. section 1 ), the dialectical process leads to a completely unconditioned concept or form for each subject matter—the Absolute Idea (logic), Absolute Spirit (phenomenology), Absolute Idea of right and law ( Philosophy of Right ), and so on—which, taken together, form the “circle of circles” (EL §15) that constitutes the whole philosophical system or “Idea” (EL §15) that both overgrasps the world and makes it understandable (for us).

Note that, while Hegel was clearly influenced by Fichte’s work, he never adopted Fichte’s triadic “thesis—antithesis—synthesis” language in his descriptions of his own philosophy (Mueller 1958: 411–2; Solomon 1983: 23), though he did apparently use it in his lectures to describe Kant’s philosophy (LHP III: 477). Indeed, Hegel criticized formalistic uses of the method of “ triplicity [Triplizität]” (PhG-P §50) inspired by Kant—a criticism that could well have been aimed at Fichte. Hegel argued that Kantian-inspired uses of triadic form had been reduced to “a lifeless schema” and “an actual semblance [ eigentlichen Scheinen ]” (PhG §50; alternative translation) that, like a formula in mathematics, was simply imposed on top of subject matters. Instead, a properly scientific use of Kant’s “triplicity” should flow—as he said his own dialectical method did (see section 1 )—out of “the inner life and self-movement” (PhG §51) of the content.

Scholars have often questioned whether Hegel’s dialectical method is logical. Some of their skepticism grows out of the role that contradiction plays in his thought and argument. While many of the oppositions embedded in the dialectical development and the definitions of concepts or forms are not contradictions in the strict sense, as we saw ( section 2 , above), scholars such as Graham Priest have suggested that some of them arguably are (Priest 1989: 391). Hegel even holds, against Kant (cf. section 3 above), that there are contradictions, not only in thought, but also in the world. Motion, for instance, Hegel says, is an “ existent contradiction”. As he describes it:

Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now, but because in one and the same now it is here and not here, because in this here, it is and is not at the same time. (SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M 440)

Kant’s sorts of antinomies (cf. section 3 above) or contradictions more generally are therefore, as Hegel puts it in one place, “in all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts and ideas” (EL-GSH Remark to §48). Hegel thus seems to reject, as he himself explicitly claims (SL-M 439–40; SL-dG 381–82), the law of non-contradiction, which is a fundamental principle of formal logic—the classical, Aristotelian logic (see entries on Aristotle’s Logic and Contradiction ) that dominated during Hegel’s lifetime as well as the dominant systems of symbolic logic today (cf. Priest 1989: 391; Düsing 2010: 97–103). According to the law of non-contradiction, something cannot be both true and false at the same time or, put another way, “x” and “not-x” cannot both be true at the same time.

Hegel’s apparent rejection of the law of non-contradiction has led some interpreters to regard his dialectics as illogical, even “absurd” (Popper 1940: 420; 1962: 330; 2002: 443). Karl R. Popper, for instance, argued that accepting Hegel’s and other dialecticians’ rejection of the law of non-contradiction as part of both a logical theory and a general theory of the world “would mean a complete breakdown of science” (Popper 1940: 408; 1962: 317; 2002: 426). Since, according to today’s systems of symbolic logic, he suggested, the truth of a contradiction leads logically to any claim (any claim can logically be inferred from two contradictory claims), if we allow contradictory claims to be valid or true together, then we would have no reason to rule out any claim whatsoever (Popper 1940: 408–410; 1962: 317–319; 2002: 426–429).

Popper was notoriously hostile toward Hegel’s work (cf. Popper 2013: 242–289; for a scathing criticism of Popper’s analysis see Kaufmann 1976 [1972]), but, as Priest has noted (Priest 1989: 389–91), even some sympathetic interpreters have been inspired by today’s dominant systems of symbolic logic to hold that the kind of contradiction that is embedded in Hegel’s dialectics cannot be genuine contradiction in the strict sense. While Dieter Wandschneider, for instance, grants that his sympathetic theory of dialectic “is not presented as a faithful interpretation of the Hegelian text” (Wandschneider 2010: 32), he uses the same logical argument that Popper offered in defense of the claim that “dialectical contradiction is not a ‘normal’ contradiction, but one that is actually only an apparent contradiction” (Wandschneider 2010: 37). The suggestion (by the traditional, triadic account of Hegel’s dialectics, cf. section 2 , above) that Being and Nothing (or non-being) is a contradiction, for instance, he says, rests on an ambiguity. Being is an undefined content, taken to mean being or presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken to mean nothing or absence ( section 2 , above; cf. Wandschneider 2010: 34–35). Being is Nothing (or non-being) with respect to the property they have as concepts, namely, that they both have an undefined content. But Being is not Nothing (or non-being) with respect to their meaning (Wandschneider 2010: 34–38). The supposed contradiction between them, then, Wandschneider suggests, takes place “in different respects ”. It is therefore only an apparent contradiction. “Rightly understood”, he concludes, “there can be no talk of contradiction ” (Wandschneider 2010: 38).

Inoue Kazumi also argues that dialectical contradiction in the Hegelian sense does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 121–123), and he rejects Popper’s claim that Hegel’s dialectical method is incompatible with good science. A dialectical contradiction, Inoue says, is a contradiction that arises when the same topic is considered from different vantage points, but each vantage point by itself does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 120). The understanding leads to contradictions, as Hegel said (cf. section 3 above), because it examines a topic from a fixed point of view; reason embraces contradictions because it examines a topic from multiple points of view (Inoue 2014: 121). The geocentric theory that the sun revolves around the Earth and the heliocentric theory that the Earth revolves around the sun, for instance, Inoue suggests, are both correct from certain points of view. We live our everyday lives from a vantage point in which the sun makes a periodic rotation around the Earth roughly every 24 hours. Astronomers make their observations from a geocentric point of view and then translate those observations into a heliocentric one. From these points of view, the geocentric account is not incorrect. But physics, particularly in its concepts of mass and force, requires the heliocentric account. For science—which takes all these points of view into consideration—both theories are valid: they are dialectically contradictory, though neither theory, by itself, violates the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 126–127). To insist that the Earth really revolves around the sun is merely an irrational, reductive prejudice, theoretically and practically (Inoue 2014: 126). Dialectical contradictions, Inoue says, are, as Hegel said, constructive: they lead to concepts or points of view that grasp the world from ever wider and more encompassing perspectives, culminating ultimately in the “Absolute” (Inoue 2014: 121; cf. section 1 , above). Hegel’s claim that motion violates the law of non-contradiction, Inoue suggests, is an expression of the idea that contradictory claims can be true when motion is described from more than one point of view (Inoue 2014: 123). (For a similar reading of Hegel’s conception of dialectical contradiction, which influenced Inoue’s account [Inoue 2014: 121], see Düsing 2010: 102–103.)

Other interpreters, however, have been inspired by Hegel’s dialectics to develop alternative systems of logic that do not subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Priest, for instance, has defended Hegel’s rejection of the law of non-contradiction (cf. Priest 1989; 1997 [2006: 4]). The acceptance of some contradictions, he has suggested, does not require the acceptance of all contradictions (Priest 1989: 392). Popper’s logical argument is also unconvincing. Contradictions lead logically to any claim whatsoever, as Popper said, only if we presuppose that nothing can be both true and false at the same time (i.e. only if we presuppose that the law of non-contradiction is correct), which is just what Hegel denies. Popper’s logical argument thus assumes what it is supposed to prove or begs the question (Priest 1989: 392; 1997 [2006: 5–6]), and so is not convincing. Moreover, consistency (not allowing contradictions), Priest suggests, is actually “a very weak constraint” (Priest 1997 [2006: 104]) on what counts as a rational inference. Other principles or criteria—such as being strongly disproved (or supported) by the data—are more important for determining whether a claim or inference is rational (Priest 1997 [2006: 105]). And, as Hegel pointed out, Priest says, the data—namely, “the world as it appears ” (as Hegel puts it in EL) or “ordinary experience itself” (as Hegel puts it in SL)—suggest that there are indeed contradictions (EL Remark to §48; SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M 440; Priest 1989: 389, 399–400). Hegel is right, for instance, Priest argues, that change, and motion in particular, are examples of real or existing contradictions (Priest 1985; 1989: 396–97; 1997 [2006: 172–181, 213–15]). What distinguishes motion, as a process, from a situation in which something is simply here at one time and then some other place at some other time is the embodiment of contradiction: that, in a process of motion, there is one (span of) time in which something is both here and not here at the same time (in that span of time) (Priest 1985: 340–341; 1997 [2006: 172–175, 213–214]). A system of logic, Priest suggests, is always just a theory about what good reasoning should be like (Priest 1989: 392). A dialectical logic that admits that there are “dialetheia” or true contradictions (Priest 1989: 388), he says, is a broader theory or version of logic than traditional, formal logics that subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Those traditional logics apply only to topics or domains that are consistent, primarily domains that are “static and changeless” (Priest 1989: 391; cf. 395); dialectical/dialetheic logic handles consistent domains, but also applies to domains in which there are dialetheia. Thus Priest, extending Hegel’s own concept of aufheben (“to sublate”; cf. section 1 , above), suggests that traditional “formal logic is perfectly valid in its domain, but dialectical (dialetheic) logic is more general” (Priest 1989: 395). (For an earlier example of a logical system that allows contradiction and was inspired in part by Hegel [and Marx], see Jaśkowski 1999: 36 [1969: 143] [cf. Inoue 2014: 128–129]. For more on dialetheic logic generally, see the entry on Dialetheism .)

Worries that Hegel’s arguments fail to fit his account of dialectics (see section 2 , above) have led some interpreters to conclude that his method is arbitrary or that his works have no single dialectical method at all (Findlay 1962: 93; Solomon 1983: 21). These interpreters reject the idea that there is any logical necessity to the moves from stage to stage. “[T]he important point to make here, and again and again”, Robert C. Solomon writes, for instance,

is that the transition from the first form to the second, or the transition from the first form of the Phenomenology all the way to the last, is not in any way a deductive necessity. The connections are anything but entailments, and the Phenomenology could always take another route and other starting points. (Solomon 1983: 230)

In a footnote to this passage, Solomon adds “that a formalization of Hegel’s logic, however ingenious, is impossible” (Solomon 1983: 230).

Some scholars have argued that Hegel’s necessity is not intended to be logical necessity. Walter Kaufmann suggested, for instance, that the necessity at work in Hegel’s dialectic is a kind of organic necessity. The moves in the Phenomenology , he said, follow one another “in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image from the preface, bud, blossom and fruit succeed each other” (Kaufmann 1965: 148; 1966: 132). Findlay argued that later stages provide what he called a “ higher-order comment ” on earlier stages, even if later stages do not follow from earlier ones in a trivial way (Findlay 1966: 367). Solomon suggested that the necessity that Hegel wants is not “‘necessity’ in the modern sense of ‘logical necessity,’” (Solomon 1983: 209), but a kind of progression (Solomon 1983: 207), or a “necessity within a context for some purpose ” (Solomon 1983: 209). John Burbidge defines Hegel’s necessity in terms of three senses of the relationship between actuality and possibility, only the last of which is logical necessity (Burbidge 1981: 195–6).

Other scholars have defined the necessity of Hegel’s dialectics in terms of a transcendental argument. A transcendental argument begins with uncontroversial facts of experience and tries to show that other conditions must be present—or are necessary—for those facts to be possible. Jon Stewart argues, for instance, that “Hegel’s dialectic in the Phenomenology is a transcendental account” in this sense, and thus has the necessity of that form of argument (Stewart 2000: 23; cf. Taylor 1975: 97, 226–7; for a critique of this view, see Pinkard 1988: 7, 15).

Some scholars have avoided these debates by interpreting Hegel’s dialectics in a literary way. In his examination of the epistemological theory of the Phenomenology , for instance, Kenneth R. Westphal offers “a literary model” of Hegel’s dialectics based on the story of Sophocles’ play Antigone (Westphal 2003: 14, 16). Ermanno Bencivenga offers an interpretation that combines a narrative approach with a concept of necessity. For him, the necessity of Hegel’s dialectical logic can be captured by the notion of telling a good story—where “good” implies that the story is both creative and correct at the same time (Bencivenga 2000: 43–65).

Debate over whether Hegel’s dialectical logic is logical may also be fueled in part by discomfort with his particular brand of logic. Unlike today’s symbolic logics, Hegel’s logic is not only syntactic, but also semantic (cf. Berto 2007; Maybee 2009: xx–xxv; Margolis 2010: 193–94). Hegel’s interest in semantics appears, for instance, in the very first stages of his logic, where the difference between Being and Nothing is “something merely meant ” (EL-GSH Remark to §87; cf. section 2 above). While some of the moves from stage to stage are driven by syntactic necessity, other moves are driven by the meanings of the concepts in play. Indeed, Hegel rejected what he regarded as the overly formalistic logics that dominated the field during his day (EL Remark to §162; SL-M 43–44; SL-dG 24). A logic that deals only with the forms of logical arguments and not the meanings of the concepts used in those argument forms will do no better in terms of preserving truth than the old joke about computer programs suggests: garbage in, garbage out. In those logics, if we (using today’s versions of formal, symbolic logic) plug in something for the P or Q (in the proposition “if P then Q ” or “ P → Q ”, for instance) or for the “ F ”, “ G ”, or “ x ” (in the proposition “if F is x , then G is x ” or “ F x → G x ”, for instance) that means something true, then the syntax of formal logics will preserve that truth. But if we plug in something for those terms that is untrue or meaningless (garbage in), then the syntax of formal logic will lead to an untrue or meaningless conclusion (garbage out). Today’s versions of prepositional logic also assume that we know what the meaning of “is” is. Against these sorts of logics, Hegel wanted to develop a logic that not only preserved truth, but also determined how to construct truthful claims in the first place. A logic that defines concepts (semantics) as well as their relationships with one another (syntax) will show, Hegel thought, how concepts can be combined into meaningful forms. Because interpreters are familiar with modern logics focused on syntax, however, they may regard Hegel’s syntactic and semantic logic as not really logical (cf. Maybee 2009: xvii–xxv).

In Hegel’s other works, the moves from stage to stage are often driven, not only by syntax and semantics—that is, by logic (given his account of logic)—but also by considerations that grow out of the relevant subject matter. In the Phenomenology , for instance, the moves are driven by syntax, semantics, and by phenomenological factors. Sometimes a move from one stage to the next is driven by a syntactic need—the need to stop an endless, back-and-forth process, for instance, or to take a new path after all the current options have been exhausted (cf. section 5 ). Sometimes, a move is driven by the meaning of a concept, such as the concept of a “This” or “Thing”. And sometimes a move is driven by a phenomenological need or necessity—by requirements of consciousness , or by the fact that the Phenomenology is about a consciousness that claims to be aware of (or to know) something. The logic of the Phenomenology is thus a phenomeno -logic, or a logic driven by logic—syntax and semantics—and by phenomenological considerations. Still, interpreters such as Quentin Lauer have suggested that, for Hegel,

phenomeno-logy is a logic of appearing, a logic of implication, like any other logic, even though not of the formal entailment with which logicians and mathematicians are familiar. (Lauer 1976: 3)

Lauer warns us against dismissing the idea that there is any implication or necessity in Hegel’s method at all (Lauer 1976: 3). (Other scholars who also believe there is a logical necessity to the dialectics of the Phenomenology include Hyppolite 1974: 78–9 and H.S. Harris 1997: xii.)

We should also be careful not to exaggerate the “necessity” of formal, symbolic logics. Even in these logics, there can often be more than one path from some premises to the same conclusion, logical operators can be dealt with in different orders, and different sets of operations can be used to reach the same conclusions. There is therefore often no strict, necessary “entailment” from one step to the next, even though the conclusion might be entailed by the whole series of steps, taken together. As in today’s logics, then, whether Hegel’s dialectics counts as logical depends on the degree to which he shows that we are forced—necessarily—from earlier stages or series of stages to later stages (see also section 5 ).

Although Hegel’s dialectics is driven by syntax, semantics and considerations specific to the different subject matters ( section 4 above), several important syntactic patterns appear repeatedly throughout his works. In many places, the dialectical process is driven by a syntactic necessity that is really a kind of exhaustion: when the current strategy has been exhausted, the process is forced, necessarily, to employ a new strategy. As we saw ( section 2 ), once the strategy of treating Being and Nothing as separate concepts is exhausted, the dialectical process must, necessarily, adopt a different strategy, namely, one that takes the two concepts together. The concept of Becoming captures the first way in which Being and Nothing are taken together. In the stages of Quantum through Number, the concepts of One and Many take turns defining the whole quantity as well as the quantitative bits inside that make it up: first, the One is the whole, while the Many are the bits; then the whole and the bits are all Ones; then the Many is the whole, while the bits are each a One; and finally the whole and the bits are all a Many. We can picture the development like this (cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix):

Since One and Many have been exhausted, the next stage, Ratio, must, necessarily, employ a different strategy to grasp the elements in play. Just as Being-for-itself is a concept of universality for Quality and captures the character of a set of something-others in its content (see section 1 ), so Ratio (the whole rectangle with rounded corners) is a concept of universality for Quantity and captures the character of a set of quantities in its content (EL §105–6; cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix, 95–7). In another version of syntactic necessity driven by exhaustion, the dialectical development will take account of every aspect or layer, so to speak, of a concept or form—as we saw in the stages of Purpose outlined above, for instance ( section 2 ). Once all the aspects or layers of a concept or form have been taken account of and so exhausted, the dialectical development must also, necessarily, employ a different strategy in the next stage to grasp the elements in play.

In a second, common syntactic pattern, the dialectical development leads to an endless, back-and-forth process—a “bad” (EL-BD §94) or “spurious” (EL-GSH §94) infinity—between two concepts or forms. Hegel’s dialectics cannot rest with spurious infinities. So long as the dialectical process is passing endlessly back and forth between two elements, it is never finished, and the concept or form in play cannot be determined. Spurious infinities must therefore be resolved or stopped, and they are always resolved by a higher-level, more universal concept. In some cases, a new, higher-level concept is introduced that stops the spurious infinity by grasping the whole, back-and-forth process. Being-for-itself (cf. section 1 ), for instance, is introduced as a new, more universal concept that embraces—and hence stops—the whole, back-and-forth process between “something-others”. However, if the back-and-forth process takes place between a concept and its own content—in which case the concept already embraces the content—then that embracing concept is redefined in a new way that grasps the whole, back-and-forth process. The new definition raises the embracing concept to a higher level of universality—as a totality (an “all”) or as a complete and completed concept. Examples from logic include the redefinition of Appearance as the whole World of Appearance (EL §132; cf. SL-M 505–7, SL-dG 443–4), the move in which the endless, back-and-forth process of Real Possibility redefines the Condition as a totality (EL §147; cf. SL-M 547, SL-dG 483), and the move in which a back-and-forth process created by finite Cognition and finite Willing redefines the Subjective Idea as Absolute Idea (EL §§234–5; cf. SL-M 822–3, SL-dG 733–4).

Some of the most famous terms in Hegel’s works—“in itself [ an sich ]”, “for itself [ für sich ]” and “in and for itself [ an und für sich ]”—capture other, common, syntactic patterns. A concept or form is “in itself” when it has a determination that it gets by being defined against its “other” (cf. Being-in-itself, EL §91). A concept or form is “for itself” when it is defined only in relation to its own content, so that, while it is technically defined in relation to an “other”, the “other” is not really an “other” for it. As a result, it is really defined only in relation to itself. Unlike an “in itself” concept or form, then, a “for itself” concept or form seems to have its definition on its own, or does not need a genuine “other” to be defined (like other concepts or forms, however, “for itself” concepts or forms turn out to be dialectical too, and hence push on to new concepts or forms). In the logic, Being-for-itself (cf. section 1 ), which is defined by embracing the “something others” in its content, is the first, “for itself” concept or form.

A concept or form is “in and for itself” when it is doubly “for itself”, or “for itself” not only in terms of content —insofar as it embraces its content—but also in terms of form or presentation, insofar as it also has the activity of presenting its content. It is “for itself” (embraces its content) for itself (through its own activity), or not only embraces its content (the “for itself” of content) but also presents its content through its own activity (the “for itself” of form). The second “for itself” of form provides the concept with a logical activity (i.e., presenting its content) and hence a definition that goes beyond—and so is separate from—the definition that its content has. Since it has a definition of its own that is separate from the definition of its content, it comes to be defined—in the “in itself” sense— against its content, which has become its “other”. Because this “other” is still its own content, however, the concept or form is both “in itself” but also still “for itself” at the same time, or is “in and for itself” (EL §§148–9; cf. Maybee 2009: 244–6). The “in and for itself” relationship is the hallmark of a genuine Concept (EL §160), and captures the idea that a genuine concept is defined not only from the bottom up by its content, but also from the top down through its own activity of presenting its content. The genuine concept of animal, for instance, is not only defined by embracing its content (namely, all animals) from the bottom up, but also has a definition of its own, separate from that content, that leads it to determine (and so present), from the top down, what counts as an animal.

Other technical, syntactic terms include aufheben (“to sublate”), which we already saw ( section 1 ), and “abstract”. To say that a concept or form is “abstract” is to say that it is only a partial definition. Hegel describes the moment of understanding, for instance, as abstract (EL §§79, 80) because it is a one-sided or restricted definition or determination ( section 1 ). Conversely, a concept or form is “concrete” in the most basic sense when it has a content or definition that it gets from being built out of other concepts or forms. As we saw ( section 2 ), Hegel regarded Becoming as the first concrete concept in the logic.

Although Hegel’s writing and his use of technical terms can make his philosophy notoriously difficult, his work can also be very rewarding. In spite of—or perhaps because of—the difficulty, there are a surprising number of fresh ideas in his work that have not yet been fully explored in philosophy.

• [EL], The Encyclopedia Logic [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] . Because the translations of EL listed below use the same section numbers as well as sub-paragraphs (“Remarks”) and sub-sub-paragraphs (“Additions”), citations simply to “EL” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific translation, the translators’ initials are added.
• [EL-BD], Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] , translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• [EL-GSH], The Encyclopedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] , translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
• [LHP], Lectures on the History of Philosophy [Geschichte der Philosophie] , in three volumes, translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974.
• [PhG], Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] . Because the translations of PhG listed below use the same section numbers, citations simply to “PhG” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific translation, the translator’s initial is added.
• [PhG-M], Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• [PhG-P], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] , translated and edited by Terry Pinkard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
• [PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right [Philosophie des Rechts] , edited by Allen W. Wood and translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
• [SL-dG], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik] , translated by George di Giovanni, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• [SL-M], Hegel’s Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik] , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Aristotle, 1954, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (in two volumes), edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to Aristotle’s text use the Bekker numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Aristotle’s works.)
• Fichte, J.G., 1982 [1794/95], The Science of Knowledge , translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Fichte’s work include references to the volume and page number in the German edition of Fichte’s collected works edited by I.H Fichte, which are used in the margins of many translations of Fichte’s works.)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1999 [1781], Critique of Pure Reason , translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Kant’s text use the “Ak.” numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Kant’s works.)
• Plato, 1961, The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters , edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to Plato’s text use the Stephanus numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Plato’s works.)
• Bencivenga, Ermanno, 2000, Hegel’s Dialectical Logic , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Berto, Francesco, 2007, “Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory: An Analytic Reading”, European Journal of Philosophy , 15(1): 19–39.
• Burbidge, John, 1981, On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary , Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
• Düsing, Klaus, 2010, “Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel’s Thought”, translated by Andrés Colapinto, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 97–122.
• Findlay, J.N., 1962, Hegel: A Re-Examination , New York: Collier Books.
• –––, 1966, Review of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary , by Walter Kaufmann. The Philosophical Quarterly , 16(65): 366–68.
• Forster, Michael, 1993, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel , Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130–170.
• Fritzman, J.M., 2014, Hegel , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Harris, Errol E., 1983, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel , Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
• Harris, H.S. (Henry Silton), 1997, Hegel’s Ladder (in two volumes: vol. I, The Pilgrimage of Reason , and vol. II, The Odyssey of Spirit ), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett).
• Hyppolite, Jean, 1974, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit ”, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Inoue, Kazumi, 2014, “Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 28(2), 113–132.
• Jaśkowski, Stanislaw, 1999 [1969], “A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems”, translated by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz and A. Pietruszczak, Logic and Logical Philosophy (7)7: 35–56. (This article is a republication, with some changes, of a 1969 translation by Wojtasiewicz entitled “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems (Communicated at the Meeting of March 19, 1948)”, published in Studia Logica , 24, 143–160.)
• Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, 1965, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary , Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company Inc.
• –––, 1966, A Reinterpretation , Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (This is a republication of the first part of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary .)
• –––, 1976 [1972], “The Hegel Myth and its Method”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 21–60. (This is a republication of the 1972 Anchor Books/Doubleday edition.)
• Kosok, Michael, 1972, “The Formalization of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , Alisdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 237–87.
• Lauer, Quentin, 1976, A Reading of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” , New York: Fordham University Press.
• Margolis, Joseph, 2010, “The Greening of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic”, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 193–215.
• Maybee, Julie E., 2009, Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel’s “Encyclopaedia Logic” , Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
• McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 1964 [1910], A Commentary of Hegel’s Logic , New York: Russell and Russell Inc. (This edition is a reissue of McTaggart’s book, which was first published in 1910.)
• Mueller, Gustav, 1958, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Synthesis-Antithesis-Thesis’”, Journal of the History of Ideas , 19(3): 411–14.
• Mure, G.R.G., 1950, A Study of Hegel’s Logic , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pinkard, Terry, 1988, Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of a Possibility , Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
• Priest, Graham, 1985, “Inconsistencies in Motion”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 22(4): 339–346.
• –––, 1989, “Dialectic and Dialetheic”, Science and Society , 53(4): 388–415.
• –––, 1997 [2006], In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent , expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press; first edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997.
• Popper, Karl R., 1940, “What is Dialectic?”, Mind , 49(196): 403–426. (This article was reprinted, with some changes, in two different editions of Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , listed below.)
• –––, 1962, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , New York: Basic Books.
• –––, 2002, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , second edition, London: Routledge Classics.
• –––, 2013, The Open Society and its Enemies , Princeton: Princeton University Press. (This is a one-volume republication of the original, two-volume edition first published by Princeton University Press in 1945.)
• Rosen, Michael, 1982, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Rosen, Stanley, 2014, The Idea of Hegel’s “Science of Logic” , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Singer, Peter, 1983, Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Solomon, Robert C., 1983, In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Stace, W.T., 1955 [1924], The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition , New York: Dover Publications. (This edition is a reprint of the first edition, published in 1924.)
• Stewart, Jon, 1996, “Hegel’s Doctrine of Determinate Negation: An Example from ‘Sense-certainty’ and ‘Perception’”, Idealistic Studies , 26(1): 57–78.
• –––, 2000, The Unity of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”: A Systematic Interpretation , Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Taylor, Charles, 1975, Hegel , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Wandschneider, Dieter, 2010, “Dialectic as the ‘Self-Fulfillment’ of Logic”, translated by Anthony Jensen, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 31–54.
• Westphal, Kenneth R., 2003, Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the “Phenomenology of Spirit” , Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
• Winfield, Richard Dien, 1990, “The Method of Hegel’s Science of Logic ”, in Essays on Hegel’s Logic , George di Giovanni (ed.), Albany, NY: State University of New York, pp. 45–57.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Hegel on Dialectic , Philosophy Bites podcast interview with Robert Stern
• Hegel , Philosophy Talks preview video, interview notes and recorded radio interview with Allen Wood, which includes a discussion of Hegel’s dialectics

Aristotle | Aristotle, General Topics: logic | Fichte, Johann Gottlieb | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Hume, David | Kant, Immanuel | Plato

Copyright © 2020 by Julie E. Maybee < julie . maybee @ lehman . cuny . edu >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054